ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

AND

THE EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN

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BY

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

This book is originally the doctoral research work of the present writer and is based on a minute study of the American and British attitude towards the freedom movement in India during World War II, particularly the Pakistan movement between 1940-47. During this period, especially after the Lahore Resolution in 1940, the Pakistan movement came into full swing as colonialism receded at a fast pace.

The most important development on the world scene after both World Wars has been the achievement of national independence by numerous former colonial territories. The striving for nationhood has never been smooth, and often is attained after great political efforts and even military struggle. At the beginning of World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that if the European powers, particularly Great Britain, clung to their colonies, it would only breed revolution. The peaceful transfer of power to independent governments was consistent with the principles of democracy upon which Roosevelt hoped to establish peace. Therefore, it was difficult to envision a lasting peace among the major powers as long as there was turmoil and unrest in their colonies. The President felt decolonization would help bring peace to the underdeveloped world. He believed that if his diplomacy could help achieve independence for South Asia, the largest and most important part of the British empire, a precedent would be established whereby the United Nations could persuade other European countries to transfer power to their colonies after the war. Roosevelt's efforts appear to have played a significant role in bringing independence to the nations of the subcontinent, that is, the Muslims and Hindus.

The scholars of Anglo-American diplomatic history have long felt the need of a comprehensive study of Anglo-American relations, in particular about the Muslim struggle for Pakistan in India. This study is in many ways an attempt to meet this need. I shall consider myself amply rewarded if this work is considered useful by the students of this

period. It is a modest attempt to examine the evaluation of Anglo-American diplomacy concerning the Hindu-Muslim freedom movement in India. It does not purport to be a detailed history of all facts of Anglo-American foreign policies for this period; its scope is essentially limited to developments during the crucial years 1940-47. In similar fashion, the role of major British and American personalities in the freedom struggle has been determined and analyzed, though it must be admitted that my attention has been constantly focussed on problems and events rather than on personalities. An attempt has been made to evaluate, as dispassionately as possible, the past to interpret salient factors of Anglo-American diplomacy-events which influenced the course of the Indo-Pakistan history during 1940-47.

I have not introduced Hidu-Muslim social, economic, religious and political emotions of the time and have concentrated on problems, crises and complexities. This study is in fact a story of struggle-struggle for the recoginition of Muslims by the Anglo-American decision markers. The struggle for achieving and maintaining Muslim nationahood has been almost unparalleled in the annals of Indian history. The one factor which distinguishes the emergence of Pakistan from almost all other newly-born nations is its commitment to the religious ideology of Islam, a commitment which was the foundation-stone of the heroic struggle of the Muslim nation of India for the achievement of its goal. An atempt has been made to bring this struggle into bold relief.

I feel deply obliged to many friends who have helped me during my reserach. I wish to thank the faculty and staff of the History Department of the University of Kansas for their generous support to me in the form of research expenses both within the United States and in England.

It would have been impossible to write this book without the help and guidance of my teacher and supervisor, Professor Rose L. Greaves, at the University of Kansas. I can never repay the debt of gratitude that I owe her; she has been more than a teacher to me, and has taken a maternal interest in my welfare at the University of Kansas. I also owe her my sincerest thanks for her wise guidance and inspiration on issues of greater importance in life than research itself.

My greatest debt of gratitude is also due to another teacher of mine, the revered Professor James E. Seaver, University of Kansas, who spared for me hours of friendly criticism and advice. In fact I can never adequately express my gratitude to Professor Seaver, who notwithstanding his heavy duties as Director of the Western Civilization Program and Professor of History was always ready to provide his guidance and advice with a smiling face. I learnt history at his feet. I owe to him whatever skill in research I may possess.

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It was always a pleasure to turn to Professor. A. Shakoor Ahsan, Director, Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, Lahore, for scholarly expositions of historical and lexicographical facts. I am greatful for his kindness.

Finally, I owe very special thanks to my wife, Professor Nayyar Sultana, who read drafts of the manuscript offering useful comments. She always made life very pleasant for me, particularly while the work was in progress.

Lahore. SADIQ A. GILL
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September 1990

ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.C.C.	All-India Congress Committee
A.I.M.L	All-India Muslim League
CAB	Cabinet Office, London.
Cmd.	Command Papers.
DS Files	Unpublished files of the Department of State, maintained in the National Archives in Washington, D. C. Files numbers are in the Departments series.
FO	Foreign Office.
FRUS	The Foreign Relations of the United States series of Official Department of State documents, published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. References are to years, volumes within the years, and pages.
H.C.Deb.	Official records of the Parliamentary Debates of the House of Commons, published by H. M. Stationary Office, London. References are to numbered volumes and columnar pages.
H.L.Deb.	Official records of the Parliamentary Debates of the House of Lords.
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government.
I.O.L.	India Office Library.
I.O.R.	India Office Records.
N.W.F.P.	North-West Frontier Province.
OSS R&A	Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis.
PREM	Prime Minister's Office files.
PRO	Public Record Office, London.
WP.	War Cabinet Papers, Public Record Office, London.

1

INTRODUCTION

The Second World War was a catalyst in the progression of India towards self-determination. 14 August 1947 is a date of deep historic significance to the people of the Indian subcontinent. On that day the British transferred power in India to two successor nations. The transfer of power and the creation of two sovereign states of India and Pakistan were the fateful political decisions of the period. The political ideal of nationalism, in contrast to the sense of community of Islam, was not widespread among Muslims until the last few years before the transfer of power, in the campaign for Pakistan. In the rise of both nations, as is characteristic of most national movements, there were three principal ingredients: a community possessing distinctive characteristics, a particular set of circumstances under which that community would respond to the call of nationalism, and the leadership to coordinate the first two to produce a nation. But, in the making of Pakistan, religion *appears* to have been the determinant of nationality, and the Raj came to its end amidst convulsions in which the both communities, the Hindus and the Muslims fell upon each other, a holocaust unprecedented even in the blood stained annals of India's past. The British thought that if they divided India before their departure they would have abandoned their commitment to the Indian unity, the proudest achievement of more than a hundred and fifty years of their rule.

The actions of the emergence of these two dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations had received particular attention in America. The extent of this attention during the period 1940-1947 indicates grave American public concern, plainly shared by the State Department, over the Anglo-American side of this relationship. The present study seeks to reveal the extent of American concern by

retracing the development of Anglo-American policy pertaining to Indo-Pakistani independence during the three decades preceding its achievement, in the hope that such a study of origins may lead to a clearer understanding of more recent views on these matters and provide a possible basis for their evaluation. This book is a study of decision-making and of Anglo-American policy in regard to the Muslim struggle for an independent sovereign state of their own in India during World War II. This book does not pretend to be a study of the Hindu or Muslim perspective but it covers the Anglo-American policies focusing on the emergence of Muslim nationalism in British India. Every approach to this subject has been grounded upon information, some better documented than other information, about the nature of Indian politics. But on the other hand, very little research has been done with regard to the development of American policy concerning the emergence of Pakistan. In order to assess the information available to the decision makers at that time, I have examined the United States diplomatic documents in the National Archives, the Congressional Record, the Foreign Relations of the United States, the Indian Annual Register and numerous periodicals and newspapers. For a close and accurate study of the decision-making process either within or between the Government of Britain and India, I have examined the British Government policy and its diplomatic documents in the Public Record Office, India Office Library, International Affairs Library at Chatham House in London and Churchill College Archives at Cambridge. Likewise, for a balanced survey of the policy and the attitudes of the Hindu-Muslim advocates for Indo-Pakistani states, I have traced the Muslim League and Congress papers and records. I also consulted the contemporary periodicals, newspapers, books and their reviews, and the recorded actions and speeches of leaders, legislators and statesmen for those are the mirrors which reflect trends in the world of thought.

In both India and Pakistan the circumstances that lent the final impetus to the emergent nationalism fostered by World War I was the outbreak of World War II. However, effective leadership was a *sine qua non*. Successful national leadership customarily has had two component parts: first, one or more outstanding personalities to inspire loyalty and second, permanent well organized machinery, political or otherwise, through which to develop a mass following. Nationhood for

both India and Pakistan was in large measure the achievement of such a party and such a leader. In the case of India it was the Indian National Congress Party and the internationally acclaimed Hindu Mahatma, Mohandas K. Gandhi. For Pakistan, it was the All-Indian Muslim League and its Quaid-i-Azam (great leader) Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and then the United States diplomatic strategy during World War II brought the United States into direct contact with India. Until this time, the United States conducted its trade relations with India through a Consular office in important cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, and Madras. The Consular officials had to report to the Department of State on general conditions and to protect the interest of the American citizens in India. Then United States diplomatic relations with India were handled through the British Foreign Office in London or the British Embassy in Washington.

Among the many responsibilities facing the United States as a result of the world leadership thrust upon it by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the problem of formulating a response to nationalism in Asia and Africa. Just as in World War I, nationalism and the accompanying issue of self-determination presented especially difficult dilemmas for the United States when the independence movements challenged the empires of allied nations. The problem was most difficult concerning Great Britain and its Indian empire. The American people naturally sympathized with nationalist Indians, as with all subject people, because of their memories of the American revolution. Thus, for example, *The World Tomorrow* wrote in 1930 that Indian nationalist leaders were "motivated by the same love of liberty which drove George Washington and Thomas Jefferson to historic action in 1776."[1] In the same year, the Rev. John Haynes Holmes, an American evangelistic and ardent supporter of Indian independence, said:

> Instinctively we see in these vast events across the wide Pacific the reproduction of our own history --- the renaissance of our own revolution a century and a half ago. The same uprising against the same Empire, of a people determined to be free.[2]

Never comfortable with its own empire, and proud of its reputation as an enlightened ruler of the Philippines, the United States naturally sympathized with nationalist movements that received inspiration from the American example.[3]

The American readiness to adopt a critical attitude towards the British relation with India derives not from India herself, but from the very pattern of American nationalism with the sense of rivalry with the British Empire. This sense of rivalry derives from the revoltionary separation from Britain. The American public largely held the conviction that a united India should seek independence, that India deserved it, and that Britain, for her own commercial and other purposes, was withholding independence from India.[4]

Moreover, failure to champion nationalism would have risked the loss of confidence among the emerging nations. Thus the United States was eager to win the confidence of the emerging nations by championing their cause. Yet Winston S. Churchill, Britain's wartime leader, was quick to make clear the limits within which American interference with India would be accepted. President Roosevelt might dislike Britain's imperial position, but in the face of diplomatic and military crises he soon learned when and where American pressure might be applied.[5] At this point, Indian nationalism challenged America's idealism, political wisdom, and diplomatic skill.

Prior to World War II, American public and official interest in British India had been minimal. Americans knew little of Indian history, philosophy, religion or politics, and commercial contacts between the two peoples had been slight. Yet the Indian National Congress was clearly the most advanced and certainly the most widely known nationalist movement of the colonial era, and Gandhi had become the symbol of the nationalist strivings of the Asian people.[6] On the other hand, both Jinnah and the Muslim League were virtually unknown in the United States until World War II despite Jinnah's recognition in Britain and India as one of the foremost leaders of the Indian independence movement. Actually, most Americans had little understanding of the complexities of the existing political situation in British India. They generally believed that the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, represented the political aspirations of all the

elements of the Indian population. This may be partly due to the fact that since their independence the term "Congress" had been associated in the American mind with the national legislature that represented all shades of political opinion. The propaganda of the Congress Party of India helped to strengthen this misconception. American interest in the Congress's position aroused the concern of both Jinnah and the Muslim League, but the League had no effective spokesman in the United States, and this resulted in general American ignorance of Jinnah's position and Muslim League policies.[7] In any case, the Muslim League, founded in 1906, had been, in its formative years, a national political organization without either a nation or a national cause. It was not until the 1930s that it gradually acquired the leadership and the administrative machinery that would ultimately catapult it to victory.

It was Jinnah, virtually alone, who led the Muslim League to a position from which it could force the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. To the people who followed him, Jinnah was more than the supreme head of the state and the personal architect of the Islamic nation of Pakistan. He commanded not only their confidence but also their imagination. "He organized the campaign for Pakistan as though he were a Commander-in-Chief issuing orders of the day to encourage the troops and tactical directions to control the provincial commanders."[8] In the face of difficulties that might easily have overwhelmed him he fulfilled the hope foreshadowed in the vision of the great and revered poet-philosopher, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, by creating for the Muslims of India a homeland for which they could envision the old glory of Islam growing afresh in a modern state worthy of its place in the comity of nations. Few statesmen have shaped the events by their policy more surely than Jinnah. Even his critics accepted Jinnah as a great man because his actions and influence in the last years of his life changed the course of history.[9] Certainly among his people he was regarded as a modern Moses who led them to the promised land. What the ultimate verdict of history on Jinnah will be, time will decide. In the Valhalla of the Muslim world his niche is secure.

But what was the American image of Pakistan? How was this issue regarded by the American public, the press, American officialdom, and those Americans who came to know it very closely? The American

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But what was the American image of Pakistan? How was this issue regarded by the American public, the press, American officialdom, and those Americans who came to know it very closely? The American

historian is hard pressed to find an answer to this question, for little research has centered on U.S. -Pakistan relations. Even Anglo-American diplomatic historians have paid only slight attention to the Muslim cause and its role in the struggle for the independence of subcontinent. My research into recently declassified materials reveals that the dilemma of Pakistan was well known to the numerous American officials in India as well as officialdom at Washington. Then, I examined these documents, combined with an analysis of the Anglo-American periodicals, press releases, and newspapers to reveal the Anglo-American view about the emergence of Pakistan. During World War II India, the heart of the British Empire and the very symbol of the imperial order, was demanding independence from Great Britain, America's most prized ally. The United States was sympathetic to the Indian struggle for freedom, but it could not interfere in the situation by openly supporting the Indian cause since the British Government considered the Indian problem as a domestic affair. Very often Hindu leaders like Lala Lajpat Rai, and Sardar Vallabhai Patel visited the United States and lectured about their viewpoint to the American people. On the other hand, the Muslim leaders seldom came to the United States to explain to the American people their concern that Hindu majority rule would be unacceptable for the Indian subcontinent. The Muslim leaders thought that the Muslims were a nation by any definition of the term, and majority government coupled with parliamentarianism would lead to their permanent servitude. No nation would be willing to accept a democratic constitution that endangered its own integrity. They believed that the Muslims, as a national group living in a definite territory, were entitled to separate statehood. But it must be admitted that the average American and Indian citizens had little interest in these issues during World War II.

At the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt hoped to reverse the isolationist sentiment in the United States, and through his diplomacy, build the framework for post-war American policies which would contribute to strengthen the economic, diplomatic and military ties between the United States and Europe. The President also believed that the era of colonialism was on the wane and that for the European powers to cling to their colonies would only breed revolutions. The peaceful transfer of power to independent governments was consistent

with the principles of democracy for which America was fighting the war and upon which Roosevelt hoped to establish the peace. Moreover, it was difficult to envision a lasting peace among the major powers as long as there was revolution in their colonies, so the President felt that decolonization would help to bring peace to the underdeveloped world.

Roosevelt's assumption that the affairs of colonial peoples were directly related to the possibilities of world peace was in conflict with the principle that colonial affairs were within the domestic domain of the ruling country, and thus separate from international relationships. Roosevelt's policy towards the Philippines did not challenge this principle of decolonization and was not accepted as a model by Britain and other countries with colonies. The President felt that if his diplomacy could help to achieve independence for India, Britain's largest and most important colony, a precedent would be established whereby the United Nations could persuade other European countries to transfer power to their colonies after the war.

During the early period of the war, this policy was supported within the State Department because of the fear of a Japanese invasion of India, a recognition of India's strategic location, and the hope of developing India's economic potential for the allies. These factors soon became less relevant. The Battle of Midway decreased the concern about the invasion of India, and economic planners realized that India would be more a drain than a supplement to allied supply problems. Most important, perhaps, was the decision of the Government of Britain to send the Cripps Mission of reconcilation to India in 1942, depriving American officials of much flexibility in their actions. The Cripps-Johnson efforts coincided with a growing closeness of British-American relations, expressed in the correspondence of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

The Cripps Mission had been sent to India for two reasons: in the first place, Churchill was much concerned about Japanese advance in the Far East; and second, he hoped to win over public opinion both in Great Britain and in the United States by showing that his Government was willing to make an honest attempt to solve the political deadlock in India. The failure of the Mission could be attributed to disagreement among Hindu-Muslim leaders. As a matter of fact,

"Indian leaders had reason to believe that the Churchill government was not interested in either the success or failure of the Cripps Mission, because the Prime Minister was confident of continued American assistance in the prosecution of the war."[10]

Thus the vision of Roosevelt remained, while many of the original means of achieving it changed or disappeared. The result was a gap between the expressed idealism of the president and the reality of American actions. The search for resolution was postponed for the duration of the war.

The focus of this book is on the pattern of decisions and factors which determined them. When the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill was examined within this context, it may be concluded that Roosevelt's style of decision making was to allow his course of action to evolve from full and extended debate and discussion. He reached decisions slowly, held them with flexibility, and supported them with compromise. In contrast, Churchill seemingly reached decision quickly, argued for them eloquently, and clung to them tenaciously. Roosevelt's style worked well within the democratic framework of domestic politics, but was easily thwarted by churchill's policy of foreclosing negotiations or discussions about India.

After 1944 the State Department officials and advisers, who were hampered by the lack of high-level American representation in India following William Phillips' departure, decreased their efforts to seek new alternatives and means for supporting the president's idealism which they generally shared. As a result Roosevelt did not establish a means for achieving his stated goals. In April of 1945 the President's death left America with the unresolved dilemma of her hopes for colonial peoples and the realities of her alliance with the European powers.

The alliance with America had been the heart of Britain's war strategy. Early in the war, Churchill had believed that without American participation, victory would be doubtful at best. At this time when Britain's strength was on the wane, Churchill tried to form a new power of Anglo-American might, of which Britain would be a major partner. After the Unted States declared war, Churchill followed Roosevelt's lead

might have thrived in such conditions, but not in 1947. After the independence of India and Pakistan, they were no longer the key diplomats in the world affairs. Britain was quite suddenly less powerful and less confident than it had been almost in 150 years. Now instead of guiding events, Britain was guided by them. As a member of the Attlee Government put it several years later, "In relation to the task before us [after the war], our resources were surely smaller than those of almost any country."[12] Britain's empire was shrinking, a role which brought grave crisis in India (during 1946-7), and in many ways, the years immediately after the war were the worst. The old imperial robe no longer fitted and no other had appeared to replace it. At this point "we might look at the fall of the British empire in a briskly functionalist way, and conclude that it was simply the damage of the Second World War which brought the British Empire down."[13] With this sort of argument we may say that at the end of war the British felt that the war had shown them that the colonial game was up.

India was Britain's most momentous post-war dilemma, and probably the most complicated, too. Since 1942, when the War Cabinet had authorized Sir Stafford Cripps to devise a plan for Indian independence, it had been obvious that Britian would soon have to relinquish the jewel of the empire. Attlee made self-rule for India a firm policy of his government soon after he took office. But many serious difficulties separated Attlee's declaration of intent from the reality of a self-governing India. The most serious, as Attlee had known since his service on the Simon Commission in the late 1920s, was the bitter division between Hindus and Muslims.

The historical debate on the question of Hindu and Muslim as two nation has always been characterised by the Hindu and the Muslim historians more by polemic and recrimination than by analysis. But the question which I have tried to analyze here is that Muslims have always been a separate and identifiable community, distinguishable since the time of the Muslim invasion and separable at the time of the British retreat. It may easily be argued that India contained the seeds of two nations ever since the Muslim invasion of India. The Muslims of India had resolutely maintained their indentity since the advent of Islam in India and had refused to be merged into the mosaic of Indian culture

and religion. They were never wholly assimilated into their Indian environment, and indeed were not assimilable. Islam never is. Religion for Indian Muslim was the obstacle which prevented them from uniting with the Hindus. Apart from religion the political backwardness of the Muslims, their cultural cleavages and the economic gulf between them and Hindus also played important roles in keeping them as separate entities. Apparently, the concept for Pakistan emerged from these diversities. It can clearly be argued that before the changes wrought by British rule there was no solid harmony between these communities or nations. It remains only to consider the role that the imperial factor may have played in creating or heightening communal consciousness, whether among the politicians at the top or among the peoples at the local base. What cannot be denied is that the British came to view community as an organizing principle of the greatest importance in Indian society. Their inquest into the "Mutiny" suggested to them that they had paid little heed to specifically Muslim grievances. After the "Mutiny" their tentative steps towards treating the communities as separate political interests, deserving a share of the Raj's patronage and representation in its councils, were in time to have large consquences. These steps were in line with British concepts of western history and from the British view of the Indian past.

Moreover, when the British in the late nineteenth century exported to India their social enumeration and came to record the details of their Indian empire with a new precision, they employed categories and guiding concepts which had been worked out in the metropolies. By deeming India to be neatly divided into communities and castes, the government had given its stamp of authority to broad categories; and these categories came to be important when the British adjudicated between rival claimants for its patronage. Anyhow, every link in this official chain of thinking which had imposed lines of communal division on the map of India was questionable, and its conclusion amounted to a distortion of social fact.[14]

Historically, from the Minto-Morley reforms of 1909 until the Cabinet Mission plan of 1946, the British took the momentous step of giving separate representation to the Muslims in the provincial legislative councils as had been persistently demanded by them. The

principle of allocating separate seats for Muslims had to be conceded, and this gave a distinctly separate colour to their political interests in the remaining years of the British rule. This sense of separatism enabled Muslim politicians to organize the Muslims and to create a separate soverign state of their own. I may conclude that the British did not create Pakistan as a matter of their policy. But it came into being because the Muslims were a nation, distinct and separate from other communities in India, and Muslims conflict with the Hindus had existed long before the British came to India. The Hindu-Muslim dilemma was embedded in the historical logic of India. The British only witnessed it and, adjusted to it, but did not create it. It was thus natural for Muslims to demand a separate homeland when the British were about to depart from India. In this respect the Muslim League did not create this demand but merely expressed the convictions of the mass of the Muslim population which turned to it for leadership and organization. "Then the creation of Pakistan was made possible out of what appeared to be an impossibility in the twentieth century."[15]

On 15 August 1947 the British Raj in India ended. The British who had come to India as unifiers had finally to divide and quit. Here we might argue that imperialism devours its own children and nationalism destroys its own parents.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. *The World Tomorrow,* March 1930, p. 104.

2. *The Indian Social Reformer,* 23 August 1930.

3. For detail see letter Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, 10 March 1942: Prem 49/9; W. P. (42) 318 Cab 66/26.

4. W.P. (42) 318 Cab 66/26; L/PO/6/105: 59, annex 339; Nicholas Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby, eds., *The Transfer of Power 1942-47,* Vol. 11 p. 472.

5. Christopher Throne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945,* pp. 339-62; Gary Hess, *America Encounters India,* 1941-1947, pp. 1-2.

6. Hess, *op. cit.,* pp. 2-20.

7. Paul H. Alling, American ambassador to Pakistan, to George C. marshall, Secretary of State, 22 March 1948: 845F. 00/3-2248, Decimal Files, Department of State, National Archives (hereafter cited as DSNA); Military Intelligence Division, report no. 4265, RG 226, Modern Military Records, National Archives (hereafter cited as MID Report, NA); Hess, op. cit., p. 21

8. Keith Callard, Pakistan: *A Political Study,* pp. 19-20. Thus when, in 1941, the Viceroy appointed the Muslim provincial Chief Ministers as members of the National Defence Council, Jinnah required them to resign because the invitation had not come through him. See Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan,* p. 64

9. *Statesman,* 13 Sept. 1948; *Amrita Bazar Patrika,* 13 Sept. 1948; *Hindustan Standard,* 13 Sept; Edgar Snow, "The World's Queerest Stae," *Saturday Evening Post,* 221 (17 June 1948): 24-5; Sir Alfred Watson, "The Man who Made a Nation", *Daily Telegraph,* 13 Sept. 1948.

10. "Britain Ready for Indian Self-rule," *The Christian Century* (Dec. 22 1942), 584.

11. Telegram Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 March 1942: L/PO/6/106b: ff 105-6, India Office Library, London; Nicholas Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby, eds., *The Transfer of Power* 1942-7, Vol. 1, pp. 409-10.

12. The comment was made by Christtopher Mayhew, Parliamentary Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, 1946-1950, in an address, "British Foreign Policy Since 1945," delivered at Chatham House on 27 June 1950. It was published in *International Affairs* Vol. XXVI, No. 4, pp. 477-85.

13. Gallagher John, *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire*, p. 145.

14. For detail see, "Imperialism and Nationalism," in John Gallagher and Anil Seal, eds., *Locality, Provinces and Nation, Essays on Indian Politics*, 1870-1940, pp. 1-21.

15. Not until 1947, in Mountbatten's time, had London thought about the unthinkable, namely a splitting up of India which would leave no vestige at all of a unitary structure. See John Gallagher, *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire*, p. 145.

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2

THE EARLY ANGLO-AMERICAN CONTACTS WITH THE INDO-PAKISTAN SUBCONTINENT

Historical Antecedents

The British empire was born towards the end of the sixteenth century, and that of America in the nineteenth. The first grew with the expansion of mercantile capitalism, carrying with it a feudal heritage, the second was born in revolution and grew to plentitude and power with the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century. Where other imperial states have sought and succeeded in absorbing nations and underdeveloped territories through conquest, purchase, or creation, as examplified by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic; the British Empire has been a breeder of new nations and a stimulator of nationalism in the nations it conquered.[1] The differences between Britain and the United States can be appreciated and understood only in the light of their own history and make-up.

The British Empire was one of the oldest of the modern empires and America an English colony. However, it is one of the greatest ironies of history (and yet very natural) that Britain, having given birth to America, had those formal ties severed by the American War of Independence. This was the first effect of the American Revolution and represents the first slackening of the centralized control of the British Parliament over its colonies.[2]

Before delineating the Indian Muslim Nationalist view, it seems necessary to provide an adequate background against which to place the Indian Muslims' political and social conditions and Anglo-American views which confront one at the commencement of the study.

The first historical link between Indo-America and Anglo-India was the discovery of America, an accident due to the desire to tap more readily the fabulous wealth of India. As a result, the famous and from the point of view of its purpose, unsuccessful voyage of 1492 inaugurated the well known expansion of Western Europe with the Spanish developing an empire in Central and South America, and the Portugese another on the shores of the Indian Ocean. A century later the English founded the East India Company in 1600, Jamestown in 1607, and a factory at Surat, India in 1612, although not until 1623 did they concentrate upon the development of trade with India. Thus English victories in India and North America parallel each other, and an Indian writer remarked with reference to the founding of the East India Company and Jamestown:

> From these two humble beginnings, there grew on the one hand the British Indian Empire with an area of 1,800,000 square miles, and on the other hand the United States of America with an area of 3,600,000 square miles. Needless to say, neither group of traders had the remotest idea that any such results would follow.[3]

In 1664 the French founded their East India Company and since they had also founded colonies along the bank of Saint Lawrence in Canada, a war with England would now involve both North America and India. This occurred during the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) which brought King George's war (1744-1748) in America, and the beginning of Clive's military career in India (1747), so that it is possible to write of "George Washington in Pennsylvania and Clive in India" as "Colleagues and fellow officers fighting together in the British army,"[4] a somewhat novel way of linking the father of the American Republic with the "great robber"[5] who founded the British Indian Empire.

It can thus be seen that widely separated India and the United States have had connection with and influence upon each other since American colonial ties. But, unfortunately, the American image of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent before the Second World War was distorted conceiving that India was a poverty stricken, superstitious country full of yogis, fakirs, snake-charmers and rope-trick preformers, and at the

same time it was a country of mystical wisdom and spiritual values (Asiatic non-white) striving for independence. It was a far-away country in the imagination of the people.

Most of the American authors who wrote about India prior to 1919 were either missionaries or tourists. None of them correctly depicted India to the western eye, and very few made any reference, except a passing one, to the government and politics of the country. The reason for their neglect of this important aspect of study is obvious. The missionaries saw India from their own limited point of view. The casual travellers were more pedantic in their interests. They strove hard to give an impression of deep insight into the life of the country and of being fully conversant with the wisdom of the "mysterious East."[6] As it gave them a sense of importance in the eyes of their fellow Americans. It requires a prolonged stay in India to understand her and to write about her because of her multitudinous variety and vast mystery of their strange social customs.

When Americans thought of foreign affairs, they thought of Europe and later of China and Japan and not of the Indian subcontinent.[7] To them Indian meant Hindu; the existence of other communities, the Muslims, and Sikhs, seldom appeared in the American consciousness. Neither was the image of the American in India a happy one. Americans were considered to be vulgar materialists, devoid of spiritual values and to be an extremely race-conscious people.[8] The social, economic, and political standing was difficult.

By 1940, the United States was the most prosperous nation in the world, British India one of the least. The United States was highly industrialized, while British India was extremely underdeveloped. The United States had obtained independence by breaking away from the British empire about the same time that the Indian subcontinent became a part of it.

One of the first division of interest between the American colonies and their mother country occurred at the termination of King George's war. "In 1748, at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the diplomats weighed the English conquest of Louisbourg against the French capture of Madras in India," and the English chose Madras[9] in the southeast.

They also retained territory in the northeast near Calcutta and at Surat in the west of India. Thus the stage was set for the growth of the empire,[10] changing the history of India and possibly of America. The New Englanders did not appreciate the choice, and felt a grievance against the home government for handing back to the French a naval base which they had gone to some expanse and trouble to help capture. Louisbourg, as a threat to New England's shipping, was much nearer home than Madras.

Thus, destiny seemed to have linked these two countries in their respective developments. This was partly to relieve the distress of the East India Company whose financial problems were aggrievated by the expense of wars on the subcontinent. The British government permitted the company to ship tea directly to the thirteen colonies.[11] The Americans thought it a diabolical scheme of the British government to induce them to purchase the boycotted tea. Another grievance over Louisbourg was soon augumented including the classic difference over taxation, and the dumping overboard of an East Indiaman's tea in Boston harbor in 1773. The Boston tea party riot set off a chain reaction which eventually culminated in the breaking of the political ties with the mother country and led to the independence of America. When the news of the battle of Saratoga reached India, Warren Hastings, the Governor General of Bengal, observed that if Britain was losing in America, the loss should be redressed in India.[12] Lord Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown effectively ended British rule in the Thirteen Colonies. As a result of the American Revolution, Cornwallis was destined to build up a mighty empire for Britain in the Indian subcontinent.[13] This shifted the British balance of power from one hemisphere to another. As the former colonies did not wish to break commercial ties, the independent United States was soon seeking trade with the East. A direct route to British India was established via the Cape Horn, and in the first tariff act of 4 July 1789, by the new nation, substantial preference was given to goods imported from India in American ships as compared with other foreign vessels. American commerce with India continued to grow and in 1794 was legalized in Article XIII of the Jay Treaty which allowed American ships and commerce direct trade between the United States and British East Indian ports.[14] An interesting argument ensued when Sir Francis Baring

contended that this trade made America prosperous, that her prosperity in turn aided England and that her silver was necessary to India. Charles Grant, who wrote the Official dispatches, argued that it was not.[15]

Therefore, how profitable the American trade with India was is shown by Samuel Eliot Morrison in his article, "India Ventures of Fisher Arms, 1794-1804."[16] There were five such ventures, and Professor Morrison commented: "As a result of all five adventures, Ames figured out that on a total cash outlay of $13,457. 95, he had realized a net profit of $4, 714. 23, by March 1799. Not so bad."[17] Such profitable and growing commercial relations continued for another sixty years, until the American Civil War had the effect of terminating them for a time at least. In fact, the contacts had been comparatively few when the countries are considered in their entirety. They were being made on behalf of a few traders, who expected and made good profits, by their sea captains and sailors. The United States, as a whole, continued to grow within her own great territories and had more than enough to do to keep her attention at home, while England expanded her political control in India. It is alleged that by her conquest not only did England destroy the Indian social and economic system, but as well she provided a catalyst which augmented the English industrial revolution, namely the wealth taken from India. Here is a passage from Brooks Adams as quoted by Ram Chandra:[18]

> Very soon after the battle of Plassey, the Bengal plunder began to arrive in London and effect appears to have been almost instantaneous. Probably since the world began, no investment has yielded the profit from the Indian plunder. The amount of treasure wrung from the conquered people and transferred from India to English banks between Plassey and Waterloo (fiftyseven years) has been variously estimated at from $2,500,000,000 to $ 5,000,000,000. The methods of plunder and embezzlement by which every Briton in India enriched himself during the earlier history of the East India Company gradually passed away, but the drain did not pass away. The difference between the earlier day and the present is that India's tribute to England is obtained by "indirect methods" under forms of law.[19]

More recent shcolarship takes a more moderate line. According to P. J. Marshall, fortunes were indeed made in India, though few Englishmen returned home to enjoy them. The amount of revenue from India relative to Britain's national income was very small.[20]

For the subcontinent the so-called Mutiny of 1857 was the first war of independence, and its stories played an important part in the later process of nation building. In 1946 Nehru wrote: "It was much more than a military mutiny, and it appeared rapidly and assumed the character of a popular rebellion and a war of independence."[21] Other historians, including American, have concluded differently. Dr. Wallbank, for example, states that, "Historical objectivity, however, would seem to indicate that the Indian Mutiny cannot be correctly interpreted as a organized movement."[22] Brooks Adams, had this comment: "nothing can be plainer than that the Mutiny of 1857 was an outbreak of a martial Mohammedan population crushed under an intolerable pressure."[23] As proof of this assertion he pointed out that the location of the Mutiny centred around Lucknow and Delhi, and thus ignored Jhansi and Allahabad.

American reaction to the "Mutiny" was interesting. It showed a friendly feeling for Britain and, with the coming of her own Civil War, this was referred to as an argument in favour of Britain's aiding the United States. The *Newark* (N. J.) *Daily Mercury* wrote in 1861:

> Sympathy ... we did not speak or write of a broken or disrupted empire; we rejoiced over the activity of the British dockyards and the assembling of its armies, trusing they might soon save from disaster and peril these who were holding out against overwhelming members in their Eastern Empire. We felt a common glory in the gallant efforts of Havelock and others who won fame and honour in the suppression of the rebellion.[24]

This revealed a different American attitude towards the British and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent of an age that had passed away.

The net result of the Civil War was to worsen United States relations with Britain, while at the same time greatly reducing her direct

trade contact with India. Moreover, it may perhaps be called a war of independence in the sense that it represented the only form it could take at that stage of India's development, but except for the fact that the it left its inspiration — a most important factor — it seems to have been the last act of an age that had passed, rather than the first act of a developing Muslim nationalism. That begins rather in the 1880's with the establishment of the Indian National Congress by A. O. Hume, a retired member of the Indian Civil Service.

The traditional American hatred of colonialism gave way to a much more sophisticated attitude toward colonial problems. Aside from the grievance arising out of the Civil War what worsened Anglo-American relations, also, there were the many Irish who "imported into Anglo-American relations a note of discord,[25] and the Irish question came to affect not only relations with Britain but also internal politics. In 1899 U.S. Secretary of State John Hay wrote, "Whatever we do, Bryan will attack us as slaves of England. All over state conventions put the anti-English plank in their platform to carry favour with the Irish ..."[26] And coupled with the Irish question was the Indian question. William Bryan himself made what has been styled an anti-British speech in India during his world tour in 1905-6. The speech was perhaps not so much anti-British as anti-imperialist.[27]

At the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the rise of Germany and Japan created a problem of a new balance of power, and soon there was a growing friendship between the United States and Great Britain. Britain, in particular, was enthusiastic about close cooperation with the continental republic. This was demonstrated by London's attitude during the Venezuela crisis, the Spanish American War in 1898, and the Alaska boundary arbitration. In this atmosphere America was naturally unwilling to disrupt her understanding with England on the issue of India's independence. The British, for their part were assiduous in explaining to Americans the vital importance of India to their well being. To them India was the keystone of imperial structure and the pivot of foreign policy. They believed that their work in India constituted an unsurpassed record of constructive beneficence and that it was the ultimate touchstone of Britain's imperial greatness. Sadly this was true. It was, however, the virtual end of Britain's greatness, which

goes a long way in explaining their stance in foreign policy. The Americans, in turn, were obliged to feel a bit intimidated especially because they were essentially isolated. As Sydney Brooks, a British writer, observed:

> Since Americans within the past ten years have been brought, for the first time, into personal touch with the problem and difficulties of oriental rulership and have learned the alaphabets at any rate, of its infinite, England feels entitled to ask her experiment in India should be judged in the United States with something of a professional appreciation and understanding.[28]

When after the Spanish-American war of 1898-99, America emerged as a world power for the first time, her interest spread beyond her own borders to other lands and notably to Great Britain. The newly-awakened interest of America in the affairs of Britain and indirectly of India, was not an attempt on the part of Americans to patronize their British cousins; it was the direct result of the emergence of Uncle Sam as a world power at the beginning of the twentieth century. The colossal wealth and the new territorial responsibilities of America led to necessary and immediate interest in the policies, affairs, failures and successes of the British Empire. America could not avoid her concern in the affairs of the Empire. It was no mere idle curiosity or impertinent criticism, but an honest effort to study and understand the internal and external conditions of the British Empire from an American point of view, if for no other reason, at least for her own benefit. What if Great Britain should lose India, lose the Suez Canal, lose her supremacy of the sea? Would it not have world-wide repercussions in the field of power politics, and would it not necessitate a realignment of world forces? These thoughts came to the American mind, for America could not remain oblivious to the demands of the modern world where each other nation was dependent upon the others. Within these changed circumstances, it is not difficult to visualize the growing interest of America not only in the affairs of the British Empire but in those of other parts of the world as well.

When the United States emerged from the Spanish-American War as a world power, she had the problem of the Philippines upon her consciousness. To them the British administration of India was an

example to be shunned rather than one to be followed by the United States in her possessions.

The only "official" American statement on Indian aspirations in the last part of the nineteenth century was enunciated by Theodore Roosevelt on 18 July 1909, in an address which cheered the British rulers but it discouraged the advocates of home rule.[29] Theodore Roosevelt did, in fact, pay a glowing tribute to the British rule in India when he said:

> In India, we encounter the most colossal example history affords of the successful administration by men of European blood of a thickly populated region in another continent ... indeed, it is a greater feat than was performed under the Roman empire ... The British rule has been for the immeasurable benefit of the native of India themselves ... If the British control were withdrawn from India, the whole peninsula would become a chaos of bloodshed and violance; all the worker people and the most industrious and law-abiding would be plundered and forced to submit to indescribable oppression and the only beneficiaries among the natives would be the lawless, the violated and the bloodthirsty.[30]

President Roosevelt also observed that American missionaries working in India were full of praise for British rule. However, this was the first official statement on British India by an American President.[31] Significantly, Roosevelt at that time was at the height of his popularity. He led a section of the progressives who had been influenced by the writings of such intellectual as Herbert Baxter Adams and John W. Burgess, who wanted to spread the blessing of western civilization in distant lands. The speech was extremely gratifying to England, but in America led to protest in certain sections and to the circulation of a manifesto denonucing the British rule in India in sweeping terms. Protest was led by a few progressives, liberal clergymen, for instance, such as Rev. John T. Sunderland and Rev. John H. Holmes. The manifesto, however, suffered from misinterpretation and inaccuracies and therefore had little effect on American attitudes. For example, it cited the Indian deficit in Indo-British trade as an example of British exploitation. Its charge, that India was excessively taxed, was also an

exaggeration, for the sum derived from every kind of taxation in 1906-7 amounted to less than one dollar per capita per head and much of this represented the proceeds of land revenue.[32]

Through the years 1899-1905, Lord Curzon was viceroy of India, the last of the great British proconsuls.[33] He, alone of all the viceroys, had trained himself for the position[34] and ruled autocratically. In 1903-4, during his Bengal tour, he felt that Bengal was too unwieldy to be administered by one Lieutenant-Governor. He felt it best for Bengal to be partitioned into two East-West administrative zones or provinces. There were two main reasons for dividing the over-populated province of Bengal: first, it was hoped that two provinces, with two governors, could be administered more efficiently; and secondly, that the depressed Muslims living mostly in East Bengal, would no longer suffer under the inquisitions of the wealthy Hindu landlords and moneylenders of Calcutta and West Bengal. For the Muslims, partition brought the promise of social and economic emanicipation. For the Hindus, it meant a threat to both their prosperity and independence. The division of the province led to riots, and antagonism which were never subdued, even when the Act of partition was annulled.[35]

In October 1905 with the sanction of the Secretary of State for India, Lord Curzon, the masterful viceroy, announced and implemented a partition of Bengal with the dividing line between the Hindu west and the Muslim east. This harmless looking administrative act and its consquences made the decision for the Muslim of India,[36] a first step toward the formation of Pakistan.[37] The Muslim rejoiced at the partition, while the Hindus mourned severely at the partition and called it the stupendous blunder of Lord Curzon.[38] For the Hindus, this seemed merely an effort on the part of British to divide and rule.[39] The movement took a clear anti-Muslim turn and was organized on Hindu lines. Hindu goddesses and gods were appealed to and oaths were taken in the temple of Kali. It was well-known that this partition would benifit the Muslims of East Bengal. Sir Bampfylde Fuller, who became Governor, referred in his book to the tremendous Muslim enthusiasm in favour of partition. Muslims attended thanksgiving prayers to celebrate the establishment of the new province.[40] A highly sensitive Hindu writer, recording his impressions of those days, has pointed out that

Hindus always carried bitter memories of Muslim rule for its "intolerance" and "oppression". But under the British administration some friendly contacts between upper class Hindus and Muslims had emerged, though the contempt for Muslim peasants continued unabated. After partition, all friendly contacts were torn asunder through the bitterness generated by the new political movement:

> A cold dislike for the Muslim settled down in our hearts, putting an end to all real intimacy of relationship. Curiously enough, with us, the boys of Kishorganj, it found visible expression in the division of our class into two sections, one composed purely of Hindus and the other of Muslims. We never came to know all the circumstances of this division. Whether or not the Muslim boys had also expressed unwillingness to sit with us, for some time past we, the Hindus, had been clamouring that we did not want to sit with the Muslim boys because they smelt of onions ... Compartmentalization by communities came into our education before it was introduced into our politics.[41]

The years from 1906 to 1911 constitute a period in which the Hindu-Muslim rift continued to widen and deepen almost beyond repair. On the Hindu side, these years were big with the anti-British and anti-Muslims agitation in Bengal and other parts of India. The irrevocable communal rift brought to an abrupt end the repeal of the partition of Bengal.[42] On 12 December 1911, under the Viceroyalty of Lord Harding, and on the occasion of the visit of the new King-Emperor, George V,[43] the partition of Bengal was revoked by royal proclamation. This revocation gave a tremendous shock to the Muslims.[44] On this occasion, Hindus rejoiced and Muslims mourned all over the India. "Muslim reaction to this change was dumbfounded astonishment and bitter soreness."[45] As Lovat Fraser, a former editor of the *Times of India*, significantly remarked as early as 1911 before the First World War so greatly accelerated the Indian ferment:

> ... unrest and its accompaniment of violence would have appeared in India at this juncture, and would have spread with almost as much incendiary rapidity, if the universities had been left alone, if Bengal had remained one and indivisible, if, indeed, Lord Curzon had never been born. The times were ripe

> for it; all Asia was astir; and it was only a chronological coincidence which led short-sighted observers to attribute its appearance to an educational reform and a rearrangement of administrative boundaries, however important the effect of these measures may have been.[46]

This revolution may be expressed in this way; from 1858 to 1905 the Muslims stood outside the political arena; from 1906 to 1911 they were schooling themselves in constitutional politics; from 1911 onwards they, or at least most of them, were agitators preaching the gospel of disorder and sedition. There is another way of describing this development. From 1858 to 1905 the Muslims were in a state of neutrality *vis- a-vis* the Hindus; from 1906 to 1911 the Hindu-Muslim rift was first marked and later became ominous; from 1911 to 1922 the two communities cooperated against what they considered a common enemy-Britain.[47]

It was fortunate that the differences between the two great communities---Hindu and Muslim---had been adjusted by the Lucknow Pact of 1916. This augured well for the coming struggle, and political agitation was set in motion with a clear mind and heart. The year 1917 witnessed a quickening of the Hindu-Muslim national consciousness throughout India, and in spite of an ever-increasing severity of police repression, the cry of "Home Rule," spread to the remotest corners of the land.

Now in the light of the revocation of the partition of Bengal, the Muslims could no longer hope that the British would protect them against the superior forces of the Hindus; and the Muslim League could no longer be justified in a policy described by Mrs. Naidu as "too narrow and too nebulous."[48]

Early Diplomatic Efforts

Friendliness and forbearance by the British in the Indian subcontinent, continued to be exhibited to the American commanders for which Furber concluded there were two reasons. One was the desire to accomodate Americans at British ports lest they go to foreign ones, as they had in the case of Mahratta ports on the west coast of India.

The other which has significance for Indo-American relations he describes as follows:

> ... the small British European communities exiled in the East naturally welcomed American sea-captains and super-cargoes in a friendly manner. They were glad the Jay Treaty had put Americans on a par with British subjects. The records, especially those of St. Helena, give one the feeling that Americans were never thought of as foreigners ... throughout the period, a most fortunate series of circumstances fostered American intercourse with India, the country from which, above all others, the late rebels against his Britannic Majesty's authority might have expected to be promptly and vigorously excluded.[49]
>
> In their relations with the Eastern world the English speaking world, despite the "Revolution," tended from the first to draw together.

There is another event of 1794 that should be noted. In September of that year the Company's China ships brought to Calcutta two United States ships, the *America* and the *Enterprise*, seized in the Dutch East Indies. The advocate general of Bengal ruled that as there was no proof of French property, the ships could not be held as prizes. The importance of the incident lies in the fact that, "this was one of the first cases in which American rights were defended by Benjamin Jay of Newburyport, whom Washington had commissioned as the first consul at Calcutta,"[50] and whom Bemis described as "an underpaid consul or agent for seamen, in 1784."[51] His commission had been signed by Washington at Philadelphia, on 21 November 1792, but was not honoured by the Governor-General, who permitted Jay to reside in Bengal solely as a commercial agent.[52] On the other hand, until the first decade of the twentieth century, these commercial agents or consuls took care of the personal inconvenience of the American in British India and helped them to foster trade and commerce between the two countries. Thus, the United States had few direct contacts with India before World War II. The United States diplomatic affairs were conducted through the British Foreign Office and were never direct or personal. The United States had the Consular Office in Calcutta, Bombay and Karachi, which took care of the American citizens in

India.[53] In the 1930s the United States tried to set up a consular office at New Delhi, the capital of British India, but the British Indian government did not like the idea of having a foreign consular office at the capital and the idea was dropped.[54] Then the American representation in British India was confined to a small consulate.

The British have always been very sensitive and even defensive about American contacts with India. The example of the United States seceding from the British empire and subsquently achieving great power and prosperity would not be conducive to the continuance of the British rule in India. While the American Revolution profoundly influenced the political thought of Latin America and of Western Empire, its influence in the Indian subcontinent was to be felt only in the twentieth century. At the beginning of this century, there was a profound change in America's attitudes towards and relations with the outside world. She emerged as the most industrialized and prosperous country in the world. Somewhat half-heartedly she acquired some former Spanish colonies but still concerned herself primarily with the defence of the continental republic and its dependencies. But, the British were not willing to take the risk of American expansion and political and economic influence in their Indian Empire. Even after the First World War, they were not ready to let the American consul have the opportunity to gather information from the personal contacts with Hindu-Muslim leaders of the Indian subcontinent.

Constitutional Development

Lord Curzon's departure from India towards the end of 1905 marked the close of a great administrative activity and reforms. Lord Minto came to India as a successor to Lord Curzon.[55] Then, the pith of Muslim policy during these troubled years was well delineated. British rule was stoutly defended and bravely supported. The continuance of the partition of Bengal and the demand of separate electorates were made the central issues on which the Muslims tested the British recognition of their loyalty. Muslim leadership of the time was of a high order and succeeded in influencing the British Government in Muslim favour. In Britain, Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali did yeoman service to the Muslim cause, and it was mostly due to their efforts that the partition of Bengal was allowed tp stand and Muslim prayer for separate

representation was answered by the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909.[56] The Minto-Morley system divided the voters into a number of separate electorates. For example, Muslims and Hindus, although they might reside in the same town, voted separately. Each minority was allowed a set number of seats, known as reserve seats, in the provincial legislatures. Thus, each community voted in separate elections for the seats set aside for its representative,[57] in the hope that "separate representation would eliminate the causes of irritation between various classes."[58]

The Hindus claimed the reform Act of 1909 as a British duplicity; paradoxically, the "divide and rule" formula applied by Minto at Simla,[59] was then aimed at putting Muslims against Hindus.[60] Even the official dispatch of the government of India admitted that the proposals for special Muslim representation were generally regarded by Hindus "as an attempt to set one religion against the other, and thus to create a counterpoise to the influence of the educated middle class."[61] The basic purpose of the reform Act of 1909 was to carry out a British policy of development of local self-government reform through which the village would become the "starting point" of public life. Precisely half a century later, independent Hindu India officially adopted its policy of a village-based national system of Panchayatiraj.[62]

As the First World War engulfed Europe, troops and supplies from the Indian colony were committed to the war effort by the British rulers who constituted the Government of India. In India, in the early stages there was general support for the war. As in 1914 nationalist stirrings and attitude were just at the beginning. In 1916, the Home Rule movement was initiated by Mrs. Annie Besant[63] and Bal Gangadhar Tilk. The movement, which resulted in the jailing of Mrs. Besant, created an atmosphere and an issue for political action which was in marked contrast to the passive, intellectual outlook of the Indian National Congress.[64] In March 1913, the Muslim League adopted as its ideal the attainment of self-government of a kind suitable to India. It was pressed by some members, though without success, to adopt the Congress formula of a "system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire and a participation by

them in the rights and responsibilities of the empire on equal terms with those members."[65]

In London, the young and imaginative Edwin S. Montagu who had succeeded Sir Austin Chamberlin, was appointed Secretary of State for India, produced a draft resembling his predecessor's views,[66] and this was redrafted by Lord Curzon in its final form. On 20 August 1917, he announced a new British policy toward India as follows:

> The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive relation of responsible government in India as an internal part of the British Empire ...[67]

Montagu's address to Parliament also included the statement:

> India's political future is not to be won merely by fine phrases... it depends on the capacity of the people themselves to face the difficulties and dispose of them. And that capacity can only be fostered and enlarged by freedom.[68]

He reminded the members of the House of Commons that Gladstone had said about Ireland, "It is liberty alone which fits men for liberty."[69] Shortly after this announcement, Montagu visited India. He wrote in his *Diary*, "My visit to India means that we are going to do something big, it must be epoch-making or it is a failure."[70] After returning to London he wrote to the Viceroy saying:

> ...nor do I think it is possible to leave the question to be settled by Government of India. No bureaucracy in the world will ever transform itself into self-government. The motive of power must come from outside. Their very virtues are inimical to the parliamentary system, and it is inevitable that they should magnify the difficulty and danger of any change.[71]

The communal electoral system introduced in 1909, became a permanent feature of British policy in India's constitutional development. In 1918 while preparing the Government of India Bill, the British Government committed itself to a policy which would lead India toward the goal of parliamentary government. The communal electorate for Muslims was denounced as "a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principle."[72] But, for all the respect for principle displayed by such statements, no attempt was made in the Act of 1919 to abolish the separate electorate system. On the contrary, it was expanded to include Sikhs in the Punjab, and Eurasians elsewhere. The reasons in 1919 were the "settled facts" of Minto's promise of 1906 and the Act of 1909. But in addition, above and beyond these, just as in Morley's era, it was clear that the "Muhammadan regarded separate representation and communal electorates as their only safeguards."[73] The 1919 Act disappointed the liberal members of the Congress Party. Its value was gravely tarnished by the announcement of the Defence of India Act dealing with revolutionary crime, called the Rowlatt Act, which was followed by the unfortunate incident at Jallianwala Bagh.[74] In 1920, the Congress Party leaders in their meeting at Nagpur declared Swaraj (independence) as their goal. In the following years, the Congress leaders, under the leadership of Gandhi sought through meetings, proposals and non-violent campaigns to bring changes in the 1919 Act and to hasten the achievement of self-government for India.[75]

The Government of India Act of 1919 established a quasi-federal system for India. In the provinces, the Act inaugurated the cumbersome system of dyarchy. Accordingly, in each province the government was of a dual nature, with the various legislative subjects classified as "reserved" or "transferred". Reserved subjects were handled by the governor, assisted by an executive council, but without the participation of the provincial legislature. Transferred subjects, such as education, agriculature and health were entrusted to Indian ministers who were responsible to provincial legislatures.[76]

At the centre (a term used to designate the national level government), the 1919 Act established a bicameral legislature with both elected and appointed members. The Viceroy's executive council, which

roughly paralleled a cabinet, was appointed by the viceroy and consisted of four British and three Indian members, with the Indian members holding less significant portfolios. The executive council was non-representative and responsible to the viceroy, not the Assembly. The viceroy, in turn, represented the British Crown and was responsible to the British parliament in London.[77]

The Indian politicians called for cabinet government responsible to popularly elected assemblies in the provinces and at the centre. The Congress leaders were concerned about the position of the several hundred princely states scattered throughout India. The position of the princes over their states had been defined in treaties which dated back to the days of the British East India Trading Company. In general, these treaties deprived the princes of control over foreign affairs but allowed them to retain control over domestic affairs within their principalities. Some of these princely states enjoyed progressive leadership, but these were exceptions. The states were generally characterized as enclaves of medievalism. Then, the one-fourth of India's population living within these states shared none of the rights and privileges and experienced none of the steps towards democracy which affected their countrymen in neighbouring British provinces.

The provinces affected by the 1919 Act were divided geographically into electorates. They were further subdivided by a unique system, first adopted by the Minto-Morley agreement of 1909, which divided the voters into a number of separate electorates. Morley was unable to resolve the paradox and it could not be solved by Montagu either, though it is true that the precedent of 1909 added weight to the problem of 1919. But it must also be remembered that Minto's "fait accompli" in 1906 had doomed Morely's attempt to formulate a territorial alternative scheme to the religious register virtually from the outset. By 1919 British brains had come no closer to finding a solution to India's foremost political problem, for, as the Statutory Commission concluded, although communal representation was "an undoubted obstacle in the way of the growth of a sense of common citizenship," the Muslims were not prepared to give it up: and, "whatever view may be of the Muhammadan objection, the fact itself cannot be disputed, and it is one of the greatest possible gravity for all

who are engaged in considering the constitutional future of British India."[78] Partition of the subcontinent into Pakistan and India alone removed this anomaly from the constitution, but then British India's communal conflict was transformed from an internal to an international one.

As a system for protecting minority rights, this scheme was found wanting in many respects. While the system insured the minorities a voice through reserved seats, there were permanent minorities capable of being consistently outvoted. Secondly, the responsibility for representing and protecting minority rights and interests rested soley with the minority leaders. In contrast, the majority leaders were relieved of any direct responsibility for protecting or advocating minority rights. In this way, the legislatures and governments were structured to reflect, emphasize and perpetuate the divisions within society. The system discouraged joint responsibility and concern which might have united the communities and engendered a feeling among Indian people that their interests and basic individual rights would be protected only by their own leaders. The result was to foster the development of governments within a government. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, recognizing this problem, included the following comments:

> Division by creeds and classes means the creation of political camps organized against each other, and teaches men to think as partisans and not as citizens; and it is difficult to see how the change from this system to national representation is ever to occur. The British government is often accused of dividing men in order to govern them. But if it unnecessarily divides them at the very moment when it proposes to start them on the road to governing themselves, it will find it difficult to meet the charge of being hypocritical and shortsighted.[79]

The problem of minorities, as the *New York Times* pointed out, was that there had been too many irreconcilable promises to Arabs, Jews and Indian Muslims, and it felt that the British Government had done the only possible thing in asking Montagu to resign. It commented:

> If the British Government should change its whole Near Eastern policy at the behest of the Indian Muslims, it would give an object lesson of the power of organized minorities such as even the American Anti-Saloon League has never accomplished.[80]

Accordingly the American press ignored the violence between Hindus and Muslims and that the Muslim minority was suffering extensively. *The New York Times* saw this violence as a confirmation of an argument by Lord Sydenham of Coomb in *Current History* predicting that the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were the beginning of the end of British rule and would give India up to her ancient religious and racial feuds. While conceding that this was overdrawn, the paper could not approve the Indian nationalist's insistence upon immediate full self-government.[81] Sir Frederick saw signs that the Government of India would develop in the direction of a federation with a constitution along the lines of the United States. The chief unifying force in India was unfortunately racial and it represented an artificial alignment of some Indian parties who favoured the development of a federal system.[82]

Because of the arrangement between the Hindus and Muslims leaders in the Lucknow Pact of 1916, so far as the Muslims were concerned, they were anxious about their position under a system of popular government.[84] Under the pact the Congress had conceded the principle of separate electorates to which it had been opposed and accepted the principle of their extension to the Punjab and Central Provinces. The Muslims surrendered their right to vote in the general constituenoies in return. They were to get a third of the elected seats in the central legislature, 40% in Bengal, 50% in the Punjab, and were to receive the proportion of their numerical strength in the provinces where they were in a minority. Under the Minto-Morley Reforms they had only 10.4% in Bengal and 25% in the Punjab in spite of their majorities in these provinces. Actually in the Punjab the Muslim had neither separate electorates nor reservation of seats.[85] This was an improvement upon their previous position, but the Muslims were soon to discover that it was a mistake to permit themselves to be converted into minorities where they formed the majority of the population. For the next few years the League held its sessions alongwith the Congress, and in accordance with the general sentiments of Muslims, there was

great cooperation between the two political bodies.[86] In 1928 an All Parties Conference was assembled in Delhi to reach an inter-communal agreement in order to meet Lord Birkenhead's challenge to frame a constitution for India.[87] On 7 January 1925, in his speech in the House of Lords, Lord Birkenhead said:

> ...let them produce a constitution which carries behind it a fair measure of general agreement among the great peoples of India.[88]

He expressed the idea that if the Indian leaders were to draft such a constitution, the Government would give it due consideration. Therefore, an All Parties Conference was convened at Delhi from 12th to 22nd of Feburary 1928.[89] It appointed a Committee of leading politicians including: Motilal Nehru (Chairman), M. R. Jayakar (Mahasabha), G. R. Pradhan (non-Brah-mins), Sardar Mangal Singh (the Sikh League), Sir Taj Bahadur Sapru (Liberals), N. M. Joshi (Labour), and Sir Ali Imam and Shuaib Qureshi (Muslim).[90] This committee proposed a constitution for India modelled on self-governing dominions. The report of the committee represented a bold attempt to reserve the system of separate elecrotates in hope of establishing a solid basis for communal cooperation in an independent India.[91] The committee strongly advocated joint electorates with the rights of each and every individual within India spelled out in the constitution and with the responsibility for protecting those rights vested with the government. They stated:

> We cannot have one community domineering over another. We may not be able to prevent this entirely, but the object we should aim at is not to give domination to one over another but to prevent the harassment and exploitation of any individual or group by another. If the fullest religious liberty is given and cultural autonomy provided for, the communal problem is an effect solved.[92]

They carefully pointed out that under their system of joint electorates, the Muslims community which constituted 25 percent of the population, would maintain 27 percent representation in the national government. The only way they could fall short of this

percentage would be if Muslims did not vote for members of their faith. This would imply that some issue besides religion determined their vote and this was precisely what the committee hoped would evolve in the future. They wrote:

> How many questions that are likely to be considered by our future legislatures can be of a communal nature? ... parties will be formed in the country and in the legislatures on entirely other grounds, chiefly econor ic, we presume. We shall then find Hindus and Muslims and Sikhs in one party acting together and opposing another party which also consists of Hindus and Muslims and Sikhs. This is bound to happen if once we get going.[93]

The response from the Muslims was diverse. Some Muslims were members of the Congress Party and the Muslim congress show boy Maulana Azad was generally in favour of the Nehru Report. Another group of Muslims, whose leader was Muhammad Shafi, also agreed with the Nehru Report. The other half of the Muslim League, whose leader was Muhammad Ali Jinnah, rejected the Nehru Report,[94] and to secure the safeguard of the rights and interest of Muslims in any future constitution, presented his "Fourteen Points."[95] On the whole the Muslims became desperate over the Nehru Report. At once Hindu-Muslim differences came to the forefront because the committee produced no positive principles which might allow a constitution based on the model of a British self-governing dominion. About the situation, Lord Irwin (then the Earl of Halifax) as Secretary of State for India wrote that "he believed the Hindus and Muslims were irreconcilable, and all the conferences in the world cannot bridge the unbridgeable."[96]

On 31 December 1928, under the presidency of Aga Khan an All Parties Muslim Conference was held at Delhi. At this conference Jinnah succeeded in bringing together the two wings of the Muslim League on the basis of his "Fourteen Points." In his opinion these "Fourteen Points" safeguarded the rights and interests of the Muslims of India and offered a solution to the communal situation of India. As Dr. Rajendra Prasad (the first President of India) in his book *India Divided* explained, "Jinnah's Fourteen Points were the thesis of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's Communal Award. These Fourteen Points have

an importance of their own as they were adopted practically in their entirety by Mr. MacDonald's Communal decision or award."[97]

The recommendations (of the Fourteen Points) on the question of the position of Muslims in a self-governing India were that the constitution should inculde a declaration of rights that the North-Western Frontier Province should acquire the same status as other provinces, that Sind should be separated, and that the Muslims should have a reservation of seats only in the central government and in the provinces where they were in a majority no weightage should be allowed and the principle of separate electorates should be given up.[98] Regarding the form of government it did not lay sufficient emphasis upon federation.

In August, at Lucknow, the report was reconsidered by the All Parties Conference, where some amendments were proposed, and the committee was convened at Delhi to deliberate upon the proposals, and it issued a manifesto after unanimous adoption on 1 January 1929.[100] The two main reasons for rejecting the Nehru Report were that Muslims had determined that the provinces in which they were in a majority must have the fullest autonomy and that they must maintain separate electorates.[101] The Congress Party leadership was most concerned and disappointed by the Muslim actions and made recriminative intrigues in an attempt to avoid the inevitable communal problem. The Congress Party issued the following comment:

> The attempt by one group to get some communal favour from the British government at the expense of another group results in an increase in communal tension and the exploitation of both groups by the government. Such a struggle is hardly in keeping with the dignity of Indian nationalism ... the Congress, therefore, holds that the right way to deal with the situation created by the communal division is to intensify our struggle for independence and at the same time to seek a common basis for an agreed solution which will strengthen the unity of India.[102]

The main Indian problem in 1928 was the continuation of the Simon Commission of 1927 to examine the question of further political

reforms in connection with the constitutional development. The appointment of the Simon Commission had been in accordance with the Statutory Provision, originally provided for by Section 41 of the government India Act of 1919, to enquire into the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and to present a report and recommendation to parliament. All political circles resented the appointment of the Commission because it contained no Indian member, though there were two Indian members in the British Parliament, one in the House of Lords and the other in the House of Commons. Practically all parties including the Muslim League decided to boycott the Commission. Americans were soon aware that there was an Indian All Parties boycott of this Commission. Ramsay MacDonald, former Labour Prime Minister and champion of Indian self-government, defended this omission in *The Nation*, arguing that it made it possible for the parliamentary commission to meet with Indian commissions and this reduced the legal inequality between the two countries arising out of parliament's responsibility, and was far better than an antiquated Royal Commission including an unrepresentative Indian appointed by the bureaucracy.[103] But all the members of the left in England were not in agreement with MacDonald's defence, and held that the appointment of the Simon Commission without Indian members was a clever move on the part of Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, and those in Britain who feared the advent of the Socialists to power more than they did a revolution in India.[104] In their opinion, India was now on her own as the British Labour Party had "taken its stand for imperialism."[105] Thus the disturbance in India was an illustration of the gulf between self-determination and imperialism.

In response to pressure from the Congress, the 1935 Act expanded the participation and responsibility of Indians on the provincial level. The Act of 1935 retained separate electorates, reserved seats and weighted voting and shelved the report of the All Parties Conference. The system of dyarchy was dropped. Indians were to elect legislatures and form governments in the provinces under British governors, who would retain the veto power over the new legislatures and cabinets.

The other suggestions of the Congress leaders were passed over. The princely states retained their special position outside the influence of the 1935 Act. On the national level, the 1935 Act retained the provisions of the 1919 Act, maintaining the viceroy's position, which included the right to promulgate for a period of one year such ordinances (which would have the force of law), without a vote in the federal legislature.[106] It was further stated in the 1935 Act that:

> ... any measure which in the judgment of the Governor-General effects the safety and tranquility of British India ... on his own authority and responsibility he may adopt, suspend or reject the measure in whole or in part ... if he finds himself without the support of the majority of his council.[107]

The British declared this Act a further step towards dominion status. It subordinated India to British rule during a transition period of undetermined length. The British established responsible governments in the provinces, investing the governor with a few special responsibilities. One of these was the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the minorities. The provisions regarding the centre need not be discussed because they were never enforced.[109] Despite this there were many objections and a difference of opinion in the Congress about the desirability of accepting office under the 1935 Act; it was, however, decided to fight the election. As Jawaharlal Nehru expressed it:

> To accept office and ministry under the condition of the Act is to negative our rejection of it ... it is always dangerous to assume responsibility without power; it will be far worse with this constitution, hedged in with safeguards and reserved powers and mortgaged funds ... Imperialism ... talks of cooperation, but the kind of cooperation it wants is usually known as surrender.[110]

The Muslim League also was critical of the Act, but it decided to take advantage of its provisions. In the Hindu provinces the Congress won sweeping victories. It was then decided that the Congress should accept office.[111] Then a new hitch occurred. The Congress demanded that the governors should not exercise the special powers which they possessed. The government resisted this demand in the beginning and

even appointed ministries which did not command majorities.[112] Ultimately the government yielded and the issue was finally resolved by a statement from Lord Linlithgow, the Governor-General, which assured Gandhi that the governors would act only in serious matters.[113] On 22 June 1937, the Viceroy said:

> ... the special responsibilities of the Governor do not entitle him to intervene at random in the administration of the province. They have been restricted in scope to the narrowest limits possible.[114]

The Muslims felt that the safeguards had been undermined. But the Congress considered this statement satisfied its demand.

During 1935 in the United States, there was a consequent increase of attention to India and in that year some seventeen articles were published in the different journals. H. J. Laski stated in *The Nation* that the Joint Select Committee's report demonstrated "in a decisive way ... that capitalist imperialism neither can nor will solve the problem of subject people," and that the Indian masses had been "handed over and gagged to the forces of capitalism, British and Indian."[115] *Time* described the powers of the Viceroy in the new constitution as having "the power to be either Messiah or a tyrant." Lord Linlithgow could fulfill his duties "either by creating a genuinely self-ruling British India or by perpetuating British rule by force."[116] H. McD. Clokie of Stanford University pointed out in the *American Political Science Review* that it was the longest constitution in the world, longer even than Oklahoma's or California's. More significant was the fact that unlike the Canadian, Australian, South African and Irish constitutions, this was not made in the country for which it was intended, but in the British Parliament, and was as much an act of the British Cabinet as had been the acts of 1909 and 1919. Despite this the author felt that it marked "a definite advance in the relations of Great Britain to the Eastern races," and made it possible for "the richest, most populous, and most glamorous part of the Empire to be taken into partnership." At the same time he admitted that Indian people did not regard the act as a partnership and that it was "heavily weighted against radicalism and democracy." He felt, however, that there was every prospect that as a result of the act the

Indian government might become "whatever Indians themselves care to make of it."[117]

In July 1937, Congress ministries were formed in eight of the eleven provinces covered by the 1935 Act, where they governed for the next two years. In three provinces, there were no members of the Muslim League represented in the Legislature and there were no Muslim League ministries formed as a result of the 1937 elections.[118] When the Congress Party won the election on a wider scale, it changed its policy and demanded that the League should join the Congress and dissolve their parliamentary organization.[119] It was obvious that this was directed against the very existence of the Muslim League. The offer was, of course, rejected. This was only the first indication of the attitude of the Congress towards the Hindu-Muslim problem. The Congress rule in the provinces did more to strengthen Muslim separatism than the work of the disorganized Muslim League could have achieved.[120] The Congress rule from 1937-39 became more of a Hindu Raj and antagonistic to Islam. Since 1857, Muslims had not found such a squeezing of Indian soil on them. The Congress Government had ignored Muslim religion and culture. In schools Muslim children were expected to stand with folded hands and render *puja* (Hindu worship) before Gandhi's portrait.[121] The majority rule showed that Hindustan was only for Hindus. Muslim sentiment towards the Congress can be judged when in October 1939, the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned from their offices, under Section 93 of the 1939 Act and then the governors assumed responsibilities for governing the provinces; thereupon Jinnah declared 22 December 1939 as a "Day of Deliverance and Thanksgiving: as a token of relief from the tyranny, oppression and injustice" of the Congress regime, and instructed Muslims acclaim the day.[122]

To the surprise of the Congress, Friday December 22 became not merely a Muslim celebration; as Parsees, Christians, Hindus opposed to the Congress, and hundreds of thousands of the Untouchables, enthusiastically joined in the demonstration,[123] with a spirit of humility, relief and gratitude in their hearts, rather than joy and triumph.[124] Given the depth of communal feelings, even those who termed it an "unwise action"[125] which postponed the hopes of India's

attainment of full nationhood conceded that it was a retort invited by the action of the Congress itself.

Therefore, the moderate Muslim opinion began to veer round to the idea of some division being disappointed by the Congress attitude. With this Jinnah emerged as the deliverer and supreme leader of the Muslims, hailed by the masses the "Quaid-i-Azam."[126] Now Jinnah began to lay more and more emphasis upon the autonomy for the Muslim Majority provinces within a federal structure with Hindu units. Jinnah, as the leader of the Muslim League, took the position that the Muslims in India were not a community but a nation and that India was a "two nation" area. This caused Nehru to write to Jinnah that "our sense of values and objectives in life and politics differ very greatly."[127] Now the gulf appeared to be wider than ever. Losing all hope of a place in the Indian sun, the Muslim masses began to think of having a sun of their own. A feeling of revulsion for Hindu rule awakened in their hearts the desire for Muslim rule. Muslim separation was the logical result of Hindu intolerance. The idea of Pakistan captured the popular imagination.

American Involvement

Despite the many American links with India, little attention was paid toward the Muslim nationalist movement in American diplomacy prior to World War I, when the problem of Indian independence suddenly thrust itself upon the attention of the American order. During 1914 there was an increase of some twenty references to the British Indian problem in the *New York Times* over the preceding year. One of the most important is an interview granted to the paper's London correspondence at Claridges hotel, by Rear Admiral Richardson Clover of the United States Navy.[128] He had just returned from a visit of six months to India, Burma and Ceylon. He stated that conditions were very unsettled, that the people did not know just what they wanted, showed a decided lack of respect for whites, were sulky, and would rebel if they could see their way clear to do so. The admiral's comments revealed the influence of America in this changing Eastern world. He stated:

> When I was in India, twenty-five years ago, the natives hardly knew there was such a country as America, and they knew nothing of American politics. Now they are well posted on current events, and their respect for whites has not grown as a result.[129]

In the admiral's opinion only the fact that there were no arms for an uprising prevented there being one, which was a good thing, as he felt they were "better off under English control than they would be with political liberty."[130]

The coming of the First World War greatly increased references to India. During 1915 there were almost twice as many in the *New York Times* as in 1914. There were reports of mass meetings in India voicing the people's loyalty;[131] of men and money offered to England;[132] of Maharajas eager to serve;[133] and, from German sources, of a revolution.[134]

Such a revolution against the British imperialism was no surprise to many in the United States. It is true that the news of the expression of loyalty came through English agencies. Surely providing aid and comfort to the allies rather than the enemy is evidence that there was considerable enthusiasm on the part of many vocal Indians for the war without "parallel in the history of the dependency."[135]

There were those who did not believe this representation of India loyally supporting Britain's war effort was correct, nor in the real interests of India herself. The American press began to use this news as a vehicle for the Indian nationalist point of view. The first such article appeared in the *New York Times* which presented, "An Indian View of the Great European War," by none other than Lajpat Rai, a "distinguished lawyer and politician from Lahore,"[136] whose deportation from the Punjab had led to a sojourn in the United States. He revealed to American readers the Indian feelings of resentment and the intellectual climate in which the Hindu-Muslim leaders of India had grown up. Rai wrote that India was aiding in the war in the hope that this would haste the readjustment of her political position with Britain. In her best days, he argued, India had been mighty and powerful, yet her only conquests had been moral and religious. She had given of her

best to a third of humanity outside of her borders who owed their religion to her, and her present message for the world was that all religions should be united. He maintained that India had been misrepresented to the world which saw her only through the eyes of imperialism. It was incorrect to say that she had always been under foreign rule. Her Muhammadan rulers had made India their home and were, in fact, her own sons. Even while they were ruling, there had always been Hindu Kings. Now her soliders, which hitherto the British had refrained from using against whites, had done better than they, thus complementing the intellectual achievements of Indian students at British Universities. He listed specific grievances such as India's lack of control over her finance and industry. He differentiated between Indian moderates and extremists by stating that the former hoped to achieve self-government with the goodwill of Britain, and concluded:

> The goal in either case is self-government. It will add to the glory of Great Britain if she [India] gets it without bloodshed. She had deserved it by her conduct in the past. She is earning it now on the battle-fields of Europe. She can be a never-ending source of strength to the British Empire if dealt with justly and liberally.[137]

By April and May America was receiving reports of trouble in India, particularly in the army. One of most interesting came from the *New York Times* correspondent, telling of the Singapore Mutiny of 15 February 1915.[138] Evidence soon pointed to German plots, and aid to Indian revolutionaries abroad. The centre of these plots was on the West Coast of the United States. By July the *Literary Digest* was writing of "American-Made Hindu Revolts" as "an undesirable export."[139]

In the United States, the leader of this "Hindu conspiracy," as it later came to be called, was at this time Ram Chandra,[140] editor of the *Hindustan Ghadr*,[141] a paper published in San Francisco by the Hindu residents of the United States and, in his words, "an uncompromising advocate of complete political independence and liberty for India."[142] He wrote to the editor of the *New York Times* protesting against British reports that plots in India were hatched by the *Hindustan Ghadr*, and stated that such reports were spread to bring the *Ghadr* into trouble with the authorities and persuade the civilized world that the political

unrest in India was manufactured by enemies of Britain and a few Hindus. "British rule in India is in grave peril," he wrote, "Nobody can deny that. But the British have entirely to thank themselves for it."[143]

Thus, "there was an iron censorship on any news out of India; Americans were not welcomed as travelers, and those who told stories of fighting on the border were denounced as pro-German liars, until a few weeks ago a member of the British Government, speaking in Parliament, admitted that since the war began there had been distinct raids, some of them very serious."[144] This was the evidence of censorship in British India which caused lack of news abroad about the political unrest in various Indian cities. British propaganda was not the only means employed to keep the people of America in the dark about Indian affairs. Any ugly aspect of the British administration was carefully kept out of the purview of the American public, as was the increasing struggle of nationalist Indians for the implementation of those very principles for which they and their brothers had fought on foreign battlefields. "Because of distance, the inevitable rigors of censorship and the pressure of great issues elsewhere in the world, the restiveness of ambitious India has not, until lately, gained due attention outside the British Government."[145]

The year 1916 was marked by the attempts of British and Indian nationalist propaganda to gain the support of the American reader, and the Indian side appeared to have an edge over the British in its reception. On 9 January 1917 the *New York Times* carried on its fron page a report from London, "Death Sentence For Plots In India." In the Lahore conspiracy case six had been sentenced to death and one to transportation for life for conspiracy to overthrow the British government in India. The court had stated:

> We are fully satisfied that the United States has become the chief centre of the movement ... the overthrow of the British Empire in India was planned and discussed when the European war broke out, and many Indians sailed from the United States. The enemy's plan was to bring about a war of murder and rapine.[146]

The *Literary Digest* shortly had a page on "India's Anarchists" with a picture of Ram Chandra, the editor of the *Hindustan Ghadr*.[147] On March 6 one of those engaged in the plots, Chakravarty, was arrested in New York and other arrests soon followed, and the *New York Times* wrote in an editorial:

> The hospitality of the country has been and is being abused to its damage and danger ... if the United States has been slow to take offense, henceforth it will be swift to punish offenses and to protect its rights on land as on the sea.[148]

Professor Brown stated: "Between 1914 and 1917, neutral United States served as a spying board for an ambitious plan to overthrow British Rule in India."[149] Moreover at this stage liberal champions of India's cause in America were thinking only in terms of Indian self-government with the empire, and of course the Indian National Congress itself had not yet suggested otherwise. Whether or not this liberal method would, in fact, have saved the empire and have provided an adequate answer to the *Ghadr* conspiracy and terrorism is not known. In 1918, the *Ghadr* party received some American sympathy for championing Indian nationalist aspirations.

On 2 April 1917 President Woodrow Wilson had made his famous announcement of "the United States coordinated force and diplomacy,"[150] a statement of as historic importance to India as any ever made by a British Prime Minister of Secretary of State. He said:

> Only free people can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own. America is prepared to fight for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples; for the rights of nations great and small and for the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience; for the rights of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Government; for the rights and liberties of small nations; for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.[151]

President Wilson's lofty ideas of self-determination and justice to all people made a deep impression on the subcontinent. The President of Indian National Congress described Wilson "as the grand American who has evidently been appointed by God to be the master mason in building a new temple of international justice."[152] At the same time the Congress Party appealed to President Wilson and the United States Senate to exert their influence on the British Government so that the Indian delegates to the Peace Conference of the First World War might be representative of India rather than mere nominees of the British Government. The appeal was surprisingly embarrassing to the President who preferred a prudent silence. Senator Dudley F. Malone of New York raised this question in the Senate Committee on foreign Relations in August 1919, but nothing came out of it.[153] The positive response to Wilson's idealism can also be observed in 1929 when Jinnah made a great effort for a conciliation of Hindu-Muslim interests. He termed his proposals the "Fourteen Points."

In 1922 a former member of the Indian Civil Service, who frequently wrote in American journals as an opponent of Gandhi, claiming to do so as an American, said of this Wilsonian statement:

> There is not a Nationalist in my country today who has not read these words over and over again, hugged them to his breast and quoted them as an authority and his justification for his struggle for "swaraj." In the Nationalist headquarters throughout India copies of his address are framed and hung prominently for all to read and assimilate. Thus Mr. Wilson fashioned a formidable weapon for extremist India against British suzerainty.[154]

The Indo-American relations during the interwar period were marked by disillusionment and irritation on both sides. The Indians, particularly Muslims were disappointed about Wilson's consciousness about Indian minority, and found that his lofty idealism did not in any way help them to achieve their independence. President Wilson's concept of self-determination was momentous for India. As Phillip Woodruff has observed:

> Somewhere, then, between July and November 1918, the change of heart had taken place and the majority of Indians who had political views had made up their minds against cooperation in the reforms.[155]

Regarding the principles of self-determination, India had, in fact, made the greatest decision, one which was to culminate in partition into the two separate independent states of Pakistan and India on 15 August 1947.

However, after the First World War there was a slight increase of American interest in India. The American Farmer-Labor Party and liberal clergymen such as Rev. John T. Sunderland and Rev. John H. Holmes criticized British policy in India and the American stand on the issue of self-determination for India.[156] The Friends of Freedom for India was set up in New York in 1920. Isolationists, led chiefly by the *Chicago Tribune* and *New York Daily News*, denounced British imperialism in India in order to help defeat the Versailles Treaty in the Senate. Ratification of the treaty, they contended, meant association with the vices of the Old World as represented by British imperialism in India and Ireland.[157] The Indians in turn paid more attention to America, chiefly to some of the features of American democracy. The United States was the only country in the world where one might move from a log cabin to the White House. In the United States democracy was not confined to textbooks.

The first decade of the twentieth century saw the growth of a terrorist movement in India; and many of the terrorists, persuaded by the British government, took refuge in America. This attitude led to further American interest in Indian political problems. They set up two distinct anti-British organizations in the United States, both having their headquarters in California with branches in Chicago, New York and other important cities.[158] One was called the "Indo-American Association," which ran a periodical of its own, Free Hindustan. The other organization was called the "Young Indian Association." Its platform was more extreme, and its objectives were to study the methods of preparing explosives and smuggling arms to India. As already has been mentioned, during World War I the terrorists intensified their activities in the United States. San Francisco became

the headquarters of the famous *Ghadr Party*, which planned an armed uprising in India against British rule.[159]Though at this time, the Americans were generally sympathetic to the poltical aspirations of the Indians, these extremists enjoyed little support outside the Irish-French circle. The British Government, for their part, undertook extensive publicity in the United States about the benefits of British rule in India. Many of the terrorists or nationalists and their sympathizers were imprisoned. The British helped to bring this about.[160] They could no longer make speeches and hamper the war efforts by their activities. The trials of several these nationalists or terrorists in exile such as S. M. Ghose, Har Dayal and Tarak Nath Das called forth some adverse comments.[161] As Robert M. Lovatt observed:

> No one will defend the subserviency and sycophancy of American officials in these cases ... that the agents of a foreign power, even under the cloak of an alliance ... should play upon the stupidity, prejudice and corruption of our courts, should stimulate the ferocity of our police and soldiers-behind-the lines, is intolerable among free nations.[162]

It is to be noted that the activities of the terrorists did not represent the wishes of the people of the subcontinent. Both the Congress Party and the Muslim League pledged support to the British war efforts even during the Second World War. About this conspiracy, Professor Brown has commented:

> It proved to be merely a temporary phase in the conflict between India and her master. The failure of the plot lay not only in the shortcomings of the participants but in alliance of Japan with Great Britain, which caused national rivalries in Asia to remain dormant while other aims were uppermost. Not until 1941 was there an opportunity for India to take advantage of an allied Germany and Japan. By Then, changed conditions precluded a successful rebellion. Paradoxically, India was to receive through peaceful means from Great Britain, the country so long considered her oppressor, the very thing that the conspirators of 1917, had striven to attain by violance. In 1947, the violence was to be furnished by the Indian factions which

> had nearly sacrificed the Hindu conspiracy on the altar of Sectarian[163] strife thirty years before.[164]

At this time the reports in the American press indicate a general dissatisfaction in India with British imperial policy. Indian protests were heard in America. At the McAlpin Hotel in New York the Friends of Freedom, to quote the *New York Times*, "indulged in elocution and resolution." It was reported that:

> An Indian Friend recommended a holy alliance of all oppressed people against Great British in cooperation with Soviet Russia to destroy British imperialism.[165]

Senator Norris was there and was reported to have said that Wilson should have been impeached for sending troops to India. The paper commented that they did not seek freedom, but the irreparable loss of it by the destruction of the British Empire and that the United States "whose hospitality they abuse" knew its friends and that "Soviet Russia was the absolute negation of freedom."[166] Americans sought to make up their minds on the hastening crisis between India and Britain, the Hearst press gave favourable treatment to the Indian nationalist cause. In reporting the Prince of Wales' visit to India, W. R. Hearst, pointed out in his signed editorial:

> On what basis of justice or general good, or public benefit or individual advantage or liberty or democracy or self-determination, or anything that is recognized as right, is India left in bondage by England? ... "Must we scrap our Declaration of Independence With the Navy to Tighten British Grip on India."[167]

There was considerable American sympathy, if not active support, for the Indian nationalist movement. When Americans thought about the Muslim nationalist movement in India, they identified it with the Hindu nationalist movement. Gandhi however, intentionally sought to identify the Muslim cause with the Hindu, which was a serious menace for the Indian peace. The Muslims rejected Gandhism, the development of India on the basis of Hindu culture and ideology.[168] When the "Gandhian tactics" could not get American support for its

political ambitions, the Congress leaders became antagonistic to America. Gandhi was quite distrustful of the materialistic outlook of the Americans. After the Round Table Conference of 1931-2 on Indian constitutional problems, many Americans insisted on his visiting the United States, but he decided against it, as he explained later, because:

> I had no faith that I would be able to do any good for India. Americans would not listen to others. They would lionize people but they would go their own way. It is difficult to wean the golden calf from the worshippers of Mammon.[169]

Then, Jawaharlal Nehru, the rising leader of Congress Party, began to warn the Indian leaders about American imperialism:

> The great problem of the near future will be the American imperialism, even more than British imperialism, which appears to have had its day and is crumbling fast.[170]

Meanwhile, another Congress Party leader M. N. Roy, emphasized that, "every little act of a real communist is a blow to Imperialism, and the imperialist knows it."[171] In 1925 Nehru visited Moscow and after his return he delivered a series of lectures in which he hailed the Bolshevik Revolution as a noble experiment:

> The Bolshevik ideal has behind it the purest sacrifice of countless men and women ... the noble example of her renunciation will be emblazoned for ever and quicken and purify the ideal as the time passes.[172]

No doubt this was overdone by the Congress leaders. In fact the American press concentrated its attention upon Gandhi rather than on the Indian Congress, the force behind him.[173] It is evident that the Congress leaders distrusted American support for gaining immediate independence from the British Empire. The stringent immigration laws of 1924 and 1929, which discriminated against orientals, greatly offended the sentiment of all sections of the Indian population. It is therefore significant that the Hearst press which, as has been noted, so markedly advocated independence for India, also strongly supported the

exclusion of oriental people from the United States. An editorial published in the Hearst papers on 15 April 1924, stated:

> We do not want in this country the demoralizing competition of low oriental labor conditions, poor standards of living, and contaminating Oriental morals. This is not race prejudice. It is race preservation.[174]

Thus advocacy of Indian independence by no means presaged smooth relations with India. By and large, Americans came to consider India as a special preserve of the British. Up to the First World War, many progressives were full of admiration for the British rule in India. Later they would have been happy to see India independent, but would not risk a breach with England on this issue. It is little wonder that during the inter-war period the Congress Party developed a distinct hostility toward the United States.

Another important feature of this inter-war period, particularly after the Nehru Report of 1928, "was religion playing an important role in Indian politics."[175] The Hindu-Muslim problem was critical, as the *New York Times* commented:

> The old explanation that the feud between Hindu and Muslim has been nurtured by the British Government on the principle of divide and rule will not do, as Mr. J. Coatman points out in his highly informative article in *The Atlantic*. Setting 250,000,000 Hindus and nearly 70,000,000 Moslems by the ears is apt to create a situation not at all welcome to a suzerain power.[176]

In the paper's opinion the trouble was due to two factors: the first, the Muslims were a poor peasantry at the impending advent of Home rule. The second, Muslims were questioning how well off they would be under Hindu rule. The resultant strife caused the ability of the Indians to rule themselves to be brought into question. Politically, the minds of Indian Muslims were awakened by the Hindu's anti-Muslim hostility, not by any British policy. When the evil of Hindu's Brahminism and untouchability overtook the Muslims of the subcontinent, it served better for them to have their own separate homeland. They also knew

that England would not easily abdicate the position which it had assumed. Meanwhile a prominent Muslim leader Aga Khan had spoken of the Muslims as a "Nation" at a meeting of the Muslim League.[177] This appears to be the first reference in the American press to that seed from which Pakistan grew. Thus closed this period with which marked the first American interest in the Indian Muslims nationalist movement. The Indo-American relations were now assured by widespread American sympathy for Indian nationalist aspirations.

Marked Revival

From the beginning of the nationalist movement in India late in the nineteenth century, Indians persistently attempted to develop contacts with foreign countries with the object of obtaining sympathy and support for political reform in India. Thus, international activity in the form of unofficial overseas diplomacy was an important adjunct of the Hindu-Muslim nationalist movement from its inception, long before Indians began to take a regular and independent interest in foreign affairs generally.[178] Efforts were also made to organize nationalist Indian propaganda centres in Germany, France, Japan, and the United States.[179] In the United States, personal diplomacy was the main source of the propaganda effort after the Calcutta Congress with Sarojini Naidu, Robindranath Tagore, and C. F. Andrews, all undertaking extensive trips to America in 1929-30, during which they attempted to arouse interest in the nationalist Indian political movement and to create a favourable image of India by emphasizing the spiritual aspects of Indian life.[180] Thus, what sympathy there was in the United States for nationalist India was more a manifestation of American emotional antipathy to British imperialism than evidence of the success of overseas propaganda. It must be recognized that there was in the United States because of the memories of its own independence struggle, regardless of Indian propaganda efforts, a national reservior of sympathy for nationalist Indians as for all subject people.

While in general the year 1929 continued to present the American reader a conservative view of the Indian problem, upon its close it was reported from India that her leaders were ready for a crisis in the new year, with an ultimatum to the Labour Government for full independence on 31 December. At the close of the year the Congress

met in Lahore and passed its resolution of independence, to be effective from 26 January 1930. The *New York Times* doubted the seriousness of the intent, pointing out that despite the fiery nature of Jawaharlal Nehru's opening presidential address there was a hint of compromise when he said that India must first have freedom, but then would "... fore go part of her independence for the sake of the larger group of which she is an equal member. The British Empire is not that group ....".[181] The paper commented:

> The meaning here is apparent that the British Empire as at present constituted is not that group; but a British Commonwealth reorganized and liberalized might count on India as a member.[182]

The year 1930 was seen as a milestone in the history of the East.[183] It was the year of the first Indian independence celebration, of the famous salt-making Gandhian march to the sea and renewal of the non-cooperation campaign, and of the Simon Commission report. It was also a year of supreme American interest in the Indian problem.[184] *The Nation* at the very beginning of the year stated that it felt deeply concerned over India and therefore was devoting several articles to it. It stated:

> To our minds no compromise is possible. It is the Indian people who must have the final say and no one else. From the day of its foundation this journal has been firmly committed to the doctrine that no amount of good government inflicted upon people by officials from another country can take the place of self-government, however bad. This may be, as some say, carrying theory to indefensible ends. We can, however, no more yield our position than could the American abolitionists who were told if they persisted in their demands for freedom for the negros the United States would become nothing but a shambles.[185]

It stood for India achieving freedom through peaceful means, which in its judgment was the only way, since violence would provide an excuse for imperialism to reassert itself.

C. F. Andrews pointed out, India wanted Swaraj (full self-government), and contrary to what was thought in England, the villagers were just as anxious for this as any. For its part Britain would give India responsibility that year, with a statuary declaration of rights for minorities. As far as defence was concerned, Britain felt her officers would be willing to carry on as long as they were needed.[186] In contrast to this view *The Nation* reprinted an article from the *New Stateman* (London) representative of liberal opinion in England, which regarded Viceroy Lord Irwin's statement as a blunder for the very reason that it meant one thing in India and another in England. In its opinion India could not become a dominion in a hundred years.[187]

This issue reproduced a manifesto by the Indian independence League of America which a month earlier had appeared in the *New York Times*, indicative of the thinking of many liberal-minded Americans who held that India had a strong case before the world:

> ... no believer in democracy, no opponent of imperialism, no advocate of a fellowship of free people can accept the right of any British government to put down by force of arms the revolt of India's millions ...[188]

It was significant that American correspondents, sent to India in increasing numbers and in general not renowned as sentimental idealists, frequently came under Gandhi's spell.

The Hearst press at this time manifested far more interest in the London Naval Conference than in events in India. Arthur Brisbane commented in his column that there was "no universal feeling in India," that Hindus and Muslims hated each other, while Indian troops (who were mainly Muslims) fought "loyally" against their brothers, (in the Middle East, during World War I), so that "three hundred million Asiatics in India are kept in hand by only 200,000 Britishers."[189] Yet Americans were not entirely unconcerned with the Muslims' nationalist struggle.

M. E. Tracy pointed out in his Scripps-Howard column that America had the problem of the Philippines and, that, while denying the charge of imperialism, it had contributed more than its share to the work of proselyting western culture. He commented:

> By no stretch of the imagination can the Philippines problem be linked to that of India, yet both are rooted in the same sycophantic attitude.
>
> Though trade plays a part, England would be vastly more willing to give up India, while we would be vastly more favourable toward Philippines independence, but for the general feeling that white Christians were ordained of God to Lord it over everyone.[190]

American criticism of MacDonald's Indian policy continued, that India should be kept in tutelage no longer, emphasizing, "Let independence be granted." American sympathy was greatly stirred upon the Simon Commission's report. *The New York Times* was quoted as saying:

> Perhaps the solution it offers comes too late; Britain would be in a happier position if she had started this machinery ten years earlier. But it is a sincere approach to a colossal problem.[191]

The *Philadelphia Record* in an editorial, " A Let-Down for India," commented:

> It offers no real freedom.
>
> To get that freedom, India will continue to fight. No oil will be thrown on troubled waters by the Simon report.
>
> It comes at a bad, bitter time. It would have been excellent twenty years ago.
>
> It is a little late today; and turmoil in India seems likely to continue to a show-down.[192]

The *Boston Globe* stated:

> The important, if intangible, element of human desire for liberty is not ignored, but its explosive power, is, and that element is

> quite as vital to the situation in India as it was in 1775 in this country, in 1789 in France, and in 1917 in Russia.[193]

American reaction towards British Indian policy was in fact so strong as to call forth a defence by G. T. Garratt in *Asia* magazine.[194]

At about this time there occurred an interesting effort in Washington. Senator Blaine of Wisconsin introduced a resolution calling on the Government of the United States to use its good office for a peaceful settlement in India.[195] Senator Blaine's resolution which : (1) "deplored such acts of violence, infamy and inhumanity," on the part of the British government, and (2) instructed the Senate to use its best office to insure a peaceful settlement of the Indian struggle, with no abridgement of the just rights of people of India who are seeking to emulate our own national endependence.

The *New York Times* in its editorial added this parting shaft, no doubt comforting to British readers:

> If the Wisconsin Senator thinks this quite right, he would doubtless be ready to approve a resolution of the House of Commons directing the British Foreign Office to protest against the oppressive military rule of the United States in Santo Domingo, Haiti and Nicaragua.[197]

The British had become disturbed by American support for Indian nationalism, and felt this American attitude toward India was the most serious threat to the Anglo-American relationship. *The Times* (London) claimed that American periodicals were unfair and opinion was led astray by false statements about India.

Britain's case was now presented to American readers by the Marquis of Zetland in *Foreign Affairs*, and by Sir John Simon himself on 28 August 1930, who addressed the Federal Bar Assocaition in Washington, D. C. In his speech, which was published in *Current History*, he made this plea for American sympathy and support:

> I say boldly that Britain is entitled to the sympathy and support of the American people in the effort she is making to develop self-governing institutions in that Oriental continent.[198]

It is thus interesting to note that at least during 1931-2, American readers were introduced to some facts of the nationalist movement in British India. Potential relations with the new nations, Hindu and Muslim, which might emerge from such a circumstance would certainly be a new experience with little in the past to provide guidance.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. Eric Estorick, *Changing Empire*, Introduction, vii, viii.

2. But thi_ event also led to the formation of colonies in New South Wales, New Zeland and Canada. Estoric, pp. 16-8.

3. Hamum Singh, *American Press Opinion About Indian Government and Politics*, 1919-1935 (Unpublished PhD. dissertation), pp. 1-2.

4. *Ibid.*, p.2.

5. Indian historians believe that the British were the greatest robbers and plunderers that ever disfigured the face of the earth. Talking of this conception of the English people as robbers, there is no belief more interesting than that which is widely held in India about the "*Pietra dura*" work in Taj Mahal and other Mughul buildings. Most Indians believe that the original inlaid pieces were diamonds, rubies, emeralds, sapphires, and similar precious stones, but that they were stolen by the English, who substituted coloured glass. For detail see Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of An Unknown Indian*, pp. 410-11.

6. Eleanor Franklin Egan, "All is Confusion," *The Saturday Evening Post*, CXCVI (6 October 1923), 26; Nicholas Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby, eds., *The Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. 3, p.254.

7. L. K. Rosinger, *India and the United States*, p. 9.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

9. Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, p. 8.

10. Rosinger, op. 13.

11. Ramsay Muir, *A Short History of the British Commonwealth, Vol. II*, p. 47.

12. P. E. Roberts, *History of British India* 1958, p. 193.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

14. Bemis, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-3.

15. H. Furber, "Beginning of American Trade With India, 1784-1812," *New England Quarterly*, XII (June 1938), pp. 258-62. An exceedingly well documented article using the records of the Indian Office Liberary.

16. American Antiquarian Society Proceedings, ns. XXXVII (April 1927), 18-23.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

18. In March of 1917 Ram Chandra, who was to achieve notoriety in the San Francisco trials of the Hindustan *Ghadr* conspiracy, of which more later, writing in the American Journal, *Open Court*, quoted from Brooks Adams, using him as an argument, for the Indian Nationalists.

19. *Open Court*, XXXI (March 1917), 149.

20. P. J. Marshall, *East Indian Fortunes*, pp. 217ff, 255-6.
21. Jawahrlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 324.
22. Walter T. Wallbank, *India in the New Era*, p. 69.
23. Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, c. 1896, p. 288.
24. Howard Cecil Perkins, eds., *Northern Editorials on Succession*, II, 964.
25. John MacCormack, *American and World Mastery*, p. 276.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 278. Other American political leaders who visited India and wrote about it were Ulysses S. Grant and William H. Seward. Rosinger, op. cit., p. 8.
28. Sydney Brooks, "*American Opinion and British Rule in India*," *North American Review*, p. 773.
29. L. Natarajan, *American Shadow Over India*, pp. 11-2.
30. Brooks, op. cit., p. 774.
31. John Quincy Adams, while he was Secretary of State, expressed his conviction that India would one day become independent. William Jennings Bryan, criticized British rule in India, after his first visit to India.
32. Brooks, op. cit., p. 782.
33. Wallbank, op. cit., p. 86.
34. He is said to have predicted to his friends that if he could be appointed before he was forty, he would be viceroy. He assumed office on 6 January 1899, five days before his fortieth birthday, and twelve years after predicting upon leaving the gates of government house, Calcutta, when on a visit to that city during one of his extensive preparatory tranvels, "the next time I enter those gates it shall be as Viceroy." Lovat Fraser, *India Under Curzon and After*, p. 8.
35. Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah Creater of Pakistan*, p. 24; Harold Nicolson, *King George V: His Life and Reign*, pp. 168-71; Symonds, op. cit., pp. 40-2.
36. K. K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan: *A Study of Nationalism*, pp. 23-4.
37. East Bengal contained a population of 31 million, of whom 18 million were Muslims and 12 million Hindus. West Bengal contained 54 million inhabitants, of whom 42 million were Hindus and 9 million Muslims. Aziz, op. cit., p. 24.
38. K. M. Panikkar and A. Pershad, eds., *The Voice of Freedom*, p. 7.
39. It is one of the established facts of history that a partition of bengal came to be accepted by the Congress and Muslim League in 1947 as a logical solution to their impasse.
40. Sir Bamfylde Fuller, *Some Personal Experiences*, pp. 125-6.
41. N. C. Chaudhuri, *op. cit.*, p. 232.
42. Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

43. George V, King of England and Emperor of India.

44. Percival Spear, *The Oxford History of Modern India*, p. 333; Symonds; op. cit., p. 41.

45. Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

46. Fraser, *India Under Curzon and After*, pp. 32-3.

47. Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

48. Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

49. H. Furber, "*Beginning of American Trade With India*," p. 265.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

51. Bemis, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

52. Furber, *op. cit.*, p. 248. He has the following note relative to Jay: "Home Miscellaneous, volume 439, Papers regarding Benjamin Jay, from Bengal Consulations, April and May, 1794. H. J. Miller in December 1796 and Jacob Lewis in 1802 were treated in precisely the same manner. See also in the same volume, Bengal Consulations, 2 January 1797; and Director to Lord Darthmouth, 20 March 1802. Lewis held a commission from Jefferson dated 29 July 1802." *Ibid.*, p. 249.

53. The United States Government paid very little attention to the activities or interests of its citizens adventuring in the commerce of Asia and was not in a position to help them in case of trouble. The reason behind was that the Americans were absolutely without military or naval support, except for an occasional weak naval-training cruise; the nearest naval base of the United States was on the Atlantic coast, the other side of the world. Bemis, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

54. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, 1941, Vol. III, p. 170.

55. H. H. Dodwell, *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, p. 560.

56. Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

57. John Buchan, *Lord Minto: A Memoir*, pp. 288-9.

58. Stanley Wolpert, *Morley and India 1906-1910*, p. 186.

59. The famous deputation of some thirty-five Muslims, led by His Highness, the Aga Sultan Muhammad Shah, presented its demands to the viceroy at Simla on 1 October 1906. The deputation asserted the separatist communal consciousness for the Muslim community. Muslims appealed for permission to return their own representatives to all levels of administration, from local boards through the central legislative council. Without separate electorates, they argued, no Muslim truly representative of his community's interests would be elected by the Hindu majority. They emphasized their national welfare and sensitiveness about the Hindu majority power. The demand for Pakistan was articulated. For detail see Wolpert, *Morley and India, op. cit.*, pp. 188-9.

Another delegation led by Syed Ameer Ali. met the viceroy at Simla on 27 January 1909, calling for a separate Muslim electorate to elect Muslim representative, Dodwell, *The Cambridge History of India*, pp. 566-7.

60. Wolpert, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

61. Cited by Wolpert, "Resolution on Reform Proposals,"24 March 1908, *Aligarh Enclosure*, XXVI, in Government of India's letter, I October 1908, East India Advisory and Legislative Councils, Parliamentary Papers (cmd. 4436).

62. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

63. An English lady, born in London in 1847, head of the Theosophical Society, who in 1893 made India her home and worked for the cause of its poor. In 1914 she joined the Congress and was elected its president in 1917. In 1916 she started a Home Rule Movement, With branches all over the country. Panikkar and Pershad, op. cit., pp. 74-5; R. C. Mojumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. II, pp. 336-9.

64. Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, p. 55.

65. Dodwell, *The Cambridge History of India*, p. 582.

66. Lord Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. III, p. 167.

67. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, H. C., Vol. XCVII (97), 5th Series, 6th Session of 13 Parliament, 8th Vol. of 1917 (20 August 1917), Col. 1695.

68. *Ibid.*, Col. 1698.

69. *Ibid.*, Cols. 1701-2.

70. Edwin S. Montagu, *An Indian Diary*, edited by Veneta Montagu, p. 8.

71. Reports on Indian Constitutional Reforms, presented to both Houses of Parliament, Section 7, p. 144. (Hereafter referred to as Montagu-chelmsford Report).

72. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

73. *Loc.* cit.

74. On 13 April 1919, to protest against the implication of the Rowlatt Act, a massacre took place in the city of Amritsar, at a place called Jallianwala Bag. For detail of massacre at Amritsar and General R. E. H. Dyer's action see David Woolman, "Massacre At Amritsar," *British History Illustrated, Vol. V, part II* (August/September 1978), pp. 46-55; *The Literary Digest*, LXIV (24 January 1920), p. 24; Norman W. Brown, *The United States and India and Pakistan*, pp. 86-87; Edward Thompson, *Enlist India For Freedom*, pp. 18-9; K. M. Panikkar and A. Pershad, eds., *The Voice of Freedom*, pp. 3, 23-4; Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, p. 63

75. Brecher, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-3.

76. Norman D. Palmer, *India: Major Governments of Asia*, edited by George Mcturnan Kahin, p. 258.

77. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 595-601.
78. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. II, Parliamentary Papers, (Cmd. 3569).
79. *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*, Cols. 151-4.
80. *New York Times*, 10 March 1922, p. 14.
81. "Extremists in India," ed., *New York Times* 27 September 1924, p. 14.
82. "Political Evolution in India,"*Foreign Affairs*, IV (January 1926), 228.
83. For details of the Lucknow Pact see A. C. Banerjee, *Indian Constitutional documents*, II (Calcutta 1948), pp. 289-295; R. Coupland, The Indian Problem, pp. 48-9; Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, pp. 45-48.
84. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 600.
85. *Indian Statutory Commission Report Chairman*, Sir John Simon, Report, pp. 138-9.
86. The sessions were held simultaneously at the same place from 1915-22; *The Comrade*, 9 January 1925 (Delhi 1925), p. 19.
87. IOR: L/P&5/8/509.
88. H. L. 61, 60, 12-22 February 1928, Col. 1068.
89. Dr. M. A. Ansari was the president of this conference.
90. *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1928, edited by Nripendra Nath Mitra, p. 9. (Hereafter referred to as Indian Annual Register).
91. IOR: L/P&5/509.
92. *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1928, p. 17.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
94. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims: A Political History 1858-1947*, p. 202.
95. Panikkar and Pershad, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
96. Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
97. Rajendra Parsad, *India Divided*, p. 132.
98. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-pakistan Subcontinent 610-1947*, p. 288.
99. The revised version made two changes which were important to the Muslims. It recommended that Baluchistan also should be raised to the status of a province and the system of communal representation should be re-examined after ten years. This did not allay the misgivings that had been caused in the Muslim mind by the publication of the original version.
100. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, I, p. 96.
101. The text appeared in *Simon Commission Report*, II, pp. 84-5.
102. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Unity of India*, collect writings 1937-1940, p. 404.

103. In January 1923, the boycott manifesto of the All-Parties Conference was held in Madras. See "Boycott in India of the Parliamentary Commission," *Nation*, CXXVI (25 January 1928), 106-8; Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, I, pp. 98-9; J. R. MacDonald, "New India Constitution," *Nation*, CXXVI (4 January 1928), 14-5.

104. It pointed out that Nehru had become a left-wing socialist after his trip to Moscow in 1925; that he preached "Socialism the only remedy for India's ills, to face the modern Imperialism and Capitalism." See "Impossible for him," *Time*, XXIX (15 Feb. 1937), 21. He was also referred to as "always preaching socialism" and as the "Fiery Marxist." See *New York Times* (March 1937). Nehru's attitude was also increasingly toward Nazism and Fascism because of his anti-British and anti-Imperialistic activities. His speech at Lucknow was hallucination for socialism. "Independence Above All, Then Socialism," *News Week*, VII (18 April 1936), Nehru, in an interview to the *New York Times*, explained, "It is a mistake to apply communism to Indian conditions, though he was deeply impressed with the Russian experiment, and they desired to adopt." See Pandit Motilal Nehru, "Why India Boycott the British Commission," *New York Times*, IX (12 Feb. 1928), 12. This article has significance for an understanding of his son's socialism.

105. "God's Englishmen in India," *New Republic*, LIII (25 Jan. 1928), 268-70.

106. *Government of India Act 1935*, p. 29.

107. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, p. 251.

108. The king gave its Royal Assent to the Government of India Act of 1935, which remained unaltered in its principles until the transfer of power to India and Pakistan, in 1947. Bolitho, p. 109.

109. I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, p. 292.

110. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, II, p. 12.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 17.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

113. *The Times* (London), 22 June 1937.

114. *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1937, p. 270.

115. "Indian Report," *Nation*, CXL (2 Jan. 1935), 14-5.

116. "New Viceroy," *Time*, XXVII (27 Apr. 1936), 18-9.

117. H. Mcd. Clokie, "New Constitution for India," *American Political Science Review*, XXX (Dec. 1936), 1152-65.

118. V. P. Menon, *The transfer of Power in India*, pp. 55-6.

119. I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, p. 293. The Letter giving the Congress terms was published in *The Pioneer*, Allahbad, 30 July 1937; C. R. Reddy, *Congress in Office* (Madras 1940), pp.45-6.

120. The evidence collected in the Pirpur and Shareef Reports can not be dismissed lightly, nor the statement of Fuzul-ul-Haq published under the title of *Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule*. The Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces, shortly called the *Pirpur Report*, because the Chairman of the Committee was Raja Syed Mohammad Mehdi of Pirpur (Delhi 1938). The report has been partly reproduced in Gwyer, Sir Maurice and A. Appadori, *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution*, 1921-1949, two Vols., I, pp. 410-16. Report of the Enquiry Committee apointed by the Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to enquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar, drafted by S. M. Shareef, hence commonly called *Shareef Report*. The preface is by S. A. Aziz, who was the chairman (Patna 1939). A statement issued to the press by A. K. Fuzul-ul-Haq in December 1938, later published in the form of a pamphlet, *Muslim Suffering Under Congress Rule*, (Calcutta 1939). Regarding the helplessness of the governors in the circumstances, see C. R. Reddy, *Congress in Office* (Madras 1940), p. 119.

121. Percival S., *op. cit.*, p. 374.

122. MSS EUR: F. 125/143 No. 14, p. 44.

123. S. Srinivasan, "Communal Problem in India," *Empire Review*, January 1941, p. 25; The Times (London), 27 Dec. 1939; Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

124. Full text of Jinnah's statement in *Jamil-ud-Din-Ahmed*, eds., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, vol. I, pp. 112-20.

125. For example, Sir Alfred Watson, *Asiatic Review*, January 1940, p. 65.

126. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, pp. 186-94. Quaid-i-Azam means the great leader.

127. IOR: 104/L/P&S/8/509; I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, pp.113,152-3.

128. *New York Times*, 19 April 1914, part IV, p. 3.

129. *Ibid.*

130. *Loc. cit.*

131. *New York Times*, 16 August 1914, part II, p. 7; 27 August, p. 3.

132. *Ibid.*, 10 Sept. 1914, p. 3.

133. *Ibid.*, 22 Sept. 1914, p. 3.

134. *Ibid.*, 15 Sept. 1914, p. 3.

135. *Literary Digest*, XLII (25 Sept. 1914), 567.

136. *New York Times*, 21 Feb. 1915, part V, p. 9.

137. *Loc. cit.*

138. *New York Times*, 2 May 1915, part V, p. 7., was written on 8 March and not printed until 2 May. It narrated how this mutiny of 1,100 men of the Fifth

Native Light Infantry, the very regiment in which the Mutiny of 1857 had started, failed because of its being touched off prematurely. Even then the men terrorized the city for hours, some remnants for days, and were quelled only by the landing of marines from Russian, French and Japanese cruisers that were at hand. In the inquiry and trials which followed the Singapore Mutiny it became evident that it was more than a revolutionary movement. And that the regiment had historical link with the Mutiny of 1857. It was evident that unrest in the Punjab and other parts of India all had a common plan behind them.

139. *Literary Digest*, XLVI (10 July 1915), 56.

140. *Vide Supra*, p. 25.

141. This word has two spellings, "*Ghadr*" seems the more correct English translation of this Indian word meaning mutiny or revolution. In this letter, however, it was spelt "Gadar" the more useful American form. Har Dayal an Oxford University Graduate, came to the United States in 1911 and had founded at San Francisco the weekly journal *Hindustan Ghadr*, first published on 1 November 1913, to foster revolutionary ideas among Indian immigrants on the West Coast. These had begun to enter the area in 1907 and by 1910 are said to have totalled 30,000 living between Vancouver and San Francisco. Har Dayal was arrested in 1914 on account of his activities and deportation proceedings were instituted against him. He jumped bail, and fled to Switzerland, leaving Ram Chandra as editor of the *Ghadr*. For detail see Giles T. Brown, "Hindu Conspiracy, 1914-1917," *Pacific Historical Review*, XVII (August 1948), 299-310; M. Nadis, "Propaganda of the Gadar Party," *Pacific Historical Review*, XX (August 1951), 251-60. During the war Har Dayal went to Berlin and an Indian Independence Committee was formed under the direction of Alfred Zimmermann, the German secretary for foreign affairs, which resulted in the incorporation of the *Ghadr* movement into Germany's world wide effort against Britain. See HenryLandau, The Enemy Within (New York 1937), pp. 28-9, quoted in Brown, p. 300; Intelligence Office Report, confidential, PS/HS 845. 20211/15; PS/HS 845. 20211/17; PS/RS 845. 20211/20.

142. *New York Times*, 21 July 1915, p. 10.

143. *Ibid.*

144. *New York Times*, 8 Oct. 1916, part VII, p. 7.

145. *The Ballman*, XXVI (17 May 1919), 540.

146. *New York Times*, 9 Jan. 1917, p. 1.

147. *Literary Digest*, LII (24 Feb. 1917), 461.

148. *New York Times*, 13 March, 1917, p. 10.

149. Giles T. Brown, "Hindu Conspiracy, 1914-1917," *Pacific Historical Review*, XVII (August 1948), 299-310; M. Nadis, "Propaganda of the Gadar Party," *Pacific Historical Review*, XX (August 1951), 251-60.

150. David F. Trask, "Woodrow Wilson and the Coordination of Force and Diplomacy," *Newsletter*, XIII (3 Nov. 1981), p. 12. (Hereafter The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Newsletter).

151. *New York Times*, 3 April 1917.

152. Bimala Prasad, *The Origins of the Indian Foreign Policy*, p. 49.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

154. Maurice Joachim, "America's Attitude Toward India's Revolt," *Current History Magazine of the New York Times*, XVI (September 1922), 1028.

155. Philip Woodruff, Men Who Ruled India: *The Guardians*, Vol. II, p. 239.

156. Robert M. Lovett, "India and America," *The New Republic* (1 April 1931), pp. 176-7.

157. The Isolationist's concern was not India's independence but the defeat of the treaty. However, their frequent reference to British imperialism in India turned the attention of many Americans to the question of India's independence.

158. Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest (London: MacMillan, 1960), pp. 46-7.

159. Apart from the Ghadr Party's activities against Britain in Germany, attempts were also made to obtain the Japanese support, but Japan refused to support the movement under its Anglo-Japanese alliance obligations. Lal Gupta, the first Indian agent to land in Japan, where he hoped to purchase military supplies for shipment to India, learned within forty-eight hours of his arrival that the Japanese planned to hand him over to the British. Brown has this interesting reference to another agent, better known in America: "Another agent, Tarkanath Das, tried to convince the Japanese that the war preparations of the United States might actually be directed against Japan." He argued the Japanese to form an alliance with Germany inorder to end what he termed the isolation of Japan in world affairs. See Testimony of T. Das, *San Francisco Chronicle*, 19 January 1918, quoted in Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 306. This is most interesting, both because of that agent's identity and for the light it throws on subsequnt Indian attitudes toward Japan in 1944 in the "Quit India Movement" of Gandhi and Subhas Chandra Bose to strike hard on British imperialism with Japanese help and assistance.

160. M. C. Roy, *India and the United States of America*, p. 9.

161. Thirty-one persons were arrested and charged with conspiracy to foment revolution in San Francisco. *New York Times*, 23 Feb. 1918, p. 6. Ram Chandra, the editor of *Ghadr* was assassinated on the last day of the trial by Ram Singh who had succeeded in smuggling a weapon obtained during the lunch hour, thus circumventing the search of the accused, which it had been the practice to make each day, for weapon. Ram Singh, to complete the melodrama, was in turn shot by the marshal of the court over the heads of the crowd. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 24 April 1918; Brown, "Hindu Conspiracy," p. 309.

162. Robert M. Lovett, "India and America," *The New Republic*, LXVI (1 April 1931), p. 176.

163. In 1947, the "mad violence" was against the Muslims of India.

164. Brown, "*Hindu Conspiracy*," p. 310.

165. "Friends of Freedom," ed., *New York Times*, 7 Dec. 1920, p. 12.

166. *Loc. cit.*

167. *Los Angeles Examiner*, 22 Jan. 1922.

168. India will be a single federal unit under Hindu rule. The Gandhian cry was to send the Muslims of India back to their ancient home, the Middle East. L. S. S. O'Malley, *Modern India and the West*, p. 780.

169. T. A. Raman, *What Does Gandhi Want*? p. 65.

170. J. Nehru, "Report on the International Congress against Inperialism held at Brussels." *The Indian National Congress*, 1927 (Madras: AIC Committee, 1928), pp. 75-6.

171. Panikkar and Pershad, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

172. *Young India*, 15 Nov. 1928. *Newsweek* pointed out that Nehru had become a left wing socialist after his trip to Moscow in 1925; that is why he is preaching the seldom practised "action against Britain instead of Gandhi's passive resistance: and that he had just completed and electioneering tour of India by plane. See "Six-year Negotiation Bring Constitution and Vote," *Newsweek*, IX (20 Feb. 1937), 10. He was referred to as "always preaching socialism" when the results of the elections become known, and the *New York Times* called him "the Fiery Marxist." "Partnership with Imperialism," *Time*, XXIX (8 March 1937), 19.

173. A few books have been written by American historians on the political condition in the subcontinent; these further alienated the Congress Party of India from the United States.

174. *Selection from the Writings and Speeches of William Randolph Hearst*, published privately San Francisco, c. 1948 (*The San Francisco Examiner*), p. 256.

175. "Religion in India's Political Psychology," *Asia*, XXVI (19 Feb. 1926), 148-53; "Religion and Practical Politics in India," *Ibid.*, (March 1926), 242-6; "Hindu-Muslim Relations, 1925," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLI (march 1926), 95-6.

176. J. Coatman, "Hindu-Mohammedan Problem in India," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXXVIII (July 1926), 121-31.

177. "Coming Crisis in India," *New Republic*, LVIII (3 April 1929), 189-90.

178. As early as 1889, the newly founded Indian National Congress established an associated agency in England, conceived with the object of presenting to the British public the views of nationalist India and of winning favour for the programe of the new All-India political organization. For details of

establishment of the British Committee, see the *Report of the Fifth Session of the Indian National Congress*, Bombay, 1889, p. IXXiii.

179. In the United States there was a particularly active nationalist Indian propaganda programme organized by the Indian Home Rule League of America. From 1917-1919, the veteran Congress leader, Lala Lajpat Rai, separated the efforts to elicit support for India in the United States, operating an Indian information bureau and a magazine entitled *Young India*.

180. For Indian leaders trip, see *The Leader*, Jan. 7, May 6 and July 28, 1929; *Visva-Bharati Bulletin*, 11 May 1929, pp. 4, 43; *The Vancouver Sun*, 9 April 1929; The *New York Times*, 30 Nov. 1930, 2 Dec. 1930; *The Yale Review*, March 1930, pp. 491-501.

181. "Gandhi and Others," ed., *New York Times*, 31 Dec. 1929, p. 20.

182. *Ibid.*

183. *Nation*, CXXX (1 Jan. 1930), p. 5.

184. During the decade the average number of references to the Indian problem found in American periodicals was approximately forty-seven for each year, exclusive of 1930 and 1931 when 143 and 100 were found respectively.

185. *Nation*, CXXX 91 Jan. 1930), p. 5.

186. "What Next in India," *Nation*, CXXX (1 Jan. 1930), 25-6.

187. "Lord Irwin's Blunder," *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.

188. "Appeal to Our Fellow Citizens by the Indian Independence League of America," *World Tomorrow*, XIII (March 1930), p. 112.

189. "Today," *Los Angeles Examiner*, 14 May 1930, p. 1.

190. "Tracy Says," *San Francisco News*, 4 June 1930, p. 6.

191. Simon Plan for United States of India," *Literary Digest*, CVI (5 July 1930), p. 11.

192. *Ibid.*

193. *Ibid.*

194. "Deadlock in India," *Asia*, XXX (July 1930), 476-81.

195. *Congressional Record*, 71 Cong., Special Session of Senate, 73, (July 1930), 220.

196. *Congressional Record*, 71 Cong., Special Session of Senate, 73, (July 17 1930), 214.

197. *New York Times*, 21 July 1930 p. 14.

198. "British Policy in India," *Current History*, XXXIII (October 1930), 128-30.

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192. *Ibid.*

193. *Ibid.*

194. "Deadlock in India," *Nation*, CXXXI (July 1930), 474-5.

195. *Congressional Record*, 71 Cong., Special Session of Senate 43, July 1930, 220.

196. *Congressional Record*, 71 Cong., Special Session of Senate 73, July 17 1930, 214.

197. *New York Times*, 21 July 1930, p. 14.

198. "British Policy in India," *Current History*, XXXIII (October 1930), 128-30.

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3

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF INDIA

A Vision of Empire

During the First World War, Woodrow Wilson indentified the struggle for overseas markets and raw material as a cause of war. During the Second World War, Franklin D. Roosevelt viewed the continued existence of the colonial empires as a possible cause of future wars.[1] He favoured the independence of the colonies in the not too distant future. The anti-colonial attitude of the United States gave impetus to the decolonization of the European colonial empires, which is one of the transformations of this age. Roosevelt foresaw the possible independence of colonial people only after a period of tutelage by the parent states. He was quite certain that independence should be the ultimate goal for the colonies generally. In studying the colonial question during the war, Roosevelt and many other Americans increasingly believed that the principle of self-determination would work in favour of the creation of independent states out of the European colonial empires. Though he did not foresee the fragmentation that would occur in the period of decolonization, Roosevelt should be regarded as one of the fathers of the post-war world of politically independent nations.

Winston S. Churchill held the extreme view among Englishmen that the future world would be based in large measure on the power, prosperity, and prestige of the British empire, as it had in the nineteenth century. As Roger Louis has written in the preface to his book:

> When I was in the last stage of this book I asked A. J. P. Taylor, who had read the manuscript, whether he might now have

> second thoughts about one of the concluding passages of *English History,* 1914-1945. The passage is: 'Future historians may see the war as a last struggle for the European balance of power or for the maintenance of the Empire. This was not how it appeared to those who lived through it'. His reply, I think, will be of general interest: 'The archives now reveal that Great Britain was fighting the Second World War in order to recover the British Empire and even ...to add to it. Those who did the actual fighting had simpler aims. They fought to liberate the peoples of Europe from Germany and those of the Far East from Japan. That spirit dominated after the war. The British did not relinquish their Empire by accident. They ceased to believe in it.'[2]

Churchill's ideas often reflected the experience not only of the earlier period of the First World War but also of the Victorian age, when he had spent his formative years in India, in the campaign in Africa against the Mehdi, and in the Boer war. He had witnessed, in his view, the benefits of peace and progress conferred by England on the Indian subcontinent, a war against religious forces in the Sudan, and the struggle at the turn of the century which tested the resilience and the magnanimity of the British Empire. The British reconciliation with the Africaners proved to be one of the political cornerstones of the twentieth century Commonwealth. During the Second World War, Churchill as Prime Minister faced the supreme challenge of collaborating not only with the leaders of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, but also with the United States and the other Allied powers. Churchill is remembered, above all, as a great champion of the English-speaking world. But it is equally important to bear in mind he was a British imperialist. He had a strong sense of guardianship of the dependent peoples in the Empire.[3]

There existed the vision of an Anglo-American colonial alliance. The two most powerful components of the English-speaking world would work together to secure the peace and provide a benevolent guardianship over backward peoples. This idea appealed especially to those Americans who believed that there existed a kinship between the United States and the British Empire based on race and common

culture. There were specific manifestations of this impulse of the British to promote American involvement in the colonial world and an alacrity on the part of some Americans to accept the responsibilities. There existed throughout the interwar years and the Second World War a substantial sentiment on the part of Americns in prominent positions who believed that Britain managed her affairs in Africa and Asia with a sense of justice and fair play that distinguished her from the continental colonial powers. Americans were critical of some aspects of the British Empire, but the British were old friends and national allies. During the war time period the theme of collaboration developed in a new way as the American military began to study the problem of post-war security and the question of bases. In contrast to some officials of the State Department who favoured decolonization and independence, the General Board of the Navy and the Joint Chief of Staff Strategic Survey Committee saw good reasons for the continued existence of the British Empire. British withdrawal from colonial regions would create areas of instability and uncertainty. Throughout the war there was a similarity of ideas about the post-war world held by the United States Navy and the British Colonial Office.[4]

Contrast of Personalities

The American people elected Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932. He was to hold that office longer than any other man in the United States and to lead his country through the great depression and World War II. Roosevelt was a man of cosmopolitan ideas. He served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson, Democratic vice-presidential candidate in 1920, and later as Governor of New York and had supported Wilson's views on the League of Nations and collective security. He came to the presidency well-schooled in the difficult art of American politics and, as well, acclaimed as the president of the "forgotten people."

Roosevelt was democratic in manner and conviction; he had a strong and active faith in the possibilities of human understanding and trust. His sense of fair play and honesty were built on respect for the common man, and he shared America's pride in her revolutionary heritage and her antipathy to colonialism. In the early years of his presidency, Roosevelt considered the relationship between the United

States and the Philippines. He also was a gradualist. His assumption that the affairs of colonial peoples were directly related to the possibilities of world peace in conflict with the principle that colonial affairs were within the domestic domain of the ruling country, and thus separate from international relationships. Roosevelt's policy toward the Philippines did not challenge this principle of international law and was not accepted as a model by other countries with colonies. The President felt that if his diplomacy could help to achieve independence for India, the largest and most important British colony, a precedent would be established whereby the United Nations could presuade other European countries to transfer power to their colonies after the war.

In January of 1933, the Hawes-Cutting Act providing for the commonwealth of the Philippines had been passed by Congress over President Hoover's Veto. The Philippines legislature declined to accept this act, objecting to the provisions that the United States would retain the option of keeping certain military and naval bases in the islands after actual independence.[5]

On 2 March 1934, Roosevelt stated in a message to Congress:

> In keeping with the principles of justice and in keeping with our traditions and aims, our government for many years has been committed by law to ultimate independence for the peoples of the Philippine Islands ... we believe that the time for such independence is now at hand.[6]

In answer to the Congress of the Filipino legislature, Roosevelt's message recommended:

> As to military bases, I recommended that this provision be eliminated from the law and that these bases be relinquished simultaneously with the accomplishment of final Philippine independence.[7]

Twenty-two days later, Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This was a unique act in the annals of colonial history. The law authorized the Philippines legislature to provide for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention:

> ... to formulate and draft a constitution for the government of the commonwealth of the Philippine Islands which would be submitted to the Philippine people for ratification.[8]

On 15 November 1935, the newly elected Philippine Government took office under the new constitution and Roosevelt sent the following message:

> Please convey to President Quezon and the Filipino people on the occasion of the birth of the Commonwealth of the Phillipines my sincere congratulations on this great forward step in the establishment of popular self-government and express to them my confidence in their ability to carry out successfully the final steps in the accomplishment of their complete independence.[9]

In an address at Notre Dame University on 9 December 1935, Roosevelt said:

> I consider it one of the happiest event of my office as President of the United States, to have signed in the name of the United States the instrument which will give national freedom to the Philpppine people.[10]

In the same speech, F. D. R. referred to the new Constitution of the Commonwealth as "a tribute to the genius of the Philippine people" and their "regard for fundamental human rights." Roosevelt told the American people:

> We have a clear right to congratulate ourselves ... because we have chosen the right course with respect to the Philippine Island.[11]

Roosevelt, however, established a pattern of non-intervention from the outset. The Tydings-McDuffie Act was not just a promise of the Philippine independence; it was also as much of a guarantee as any government could give. The law required no further action by congress, yet it bound the president to make the proclamation of independence on 4 January 1946.

On the other hand, the British were not concerned with American idealistic generalizations, for the elementary human rights of all peoples to be independent like the United States.[12] Their aim was to maintain the British rule, and a divided subject population was thus in their interest. In particular, the British used these divisions in Indian society between Hindu-Muslim communities, in an attempt to head off the challenge from the emerging Hindu-Muslim nationalist movement. It virtually symbolized the old system of "Imperialism" which Roosevelt wanted should be ended. Churchill's perception of the problem was entirely different. When the president spoke of trusteeship regimes in the Far East (Hong-Kong etc.) and other parts of the world, the Prime Minister immediately suspected that the United States was trying to dismember the British Empire. Throughout the war, Churchill regarded the question of "trusteeship" as merely a cloak for American expansion. When he made his famous speech in November 1942 that he had not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, Churchill meant in part that under no circumstance would trusteeships be created out of British colonies.[13] The President made no secret that he deplored British Imperialism in India and in all other parts of the world. He found it easier to talk to Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek than Churchill about the future of the Muslims and Hindus of the British India. Roosevelt's sentiments were genuine. With an "almost boyish relish" he would speak of American constitutional history and how the problems of India might be solved by learning the lessons of the American revolution.[14]

To Churchill, and many other Englishmen, Roosevelt's ideas about India were not only sentimental but fatuous. He seemed to know nothing of the complexity of the situation in India or the grave nature of British responsibilities. For his part, Roosevelt made his views clear. He took a definite stand throughout the war on behalf of India and colonial peoples everywhere. But he did not intervene directly. His scheme for creation of trusteeship regimes in places such as Indo-China and Korea represented one of the few concrete ways in which he attempted to alter the colonial *status quo*. In the view of Roosevelt's biographer, James MacGregor Burns:

> Roosevelt treated Churchill and the question of India in the same way that he dealt with Southern Senators and the issue of the American Negro. He subjected them to monologues and proclaimed his liberal intentions but his words were greater than his deeds.[15]

Roosevelt had a shrewd sense of what might and might not be politically possible, and he refused to pursue an issue that would interfere with wartime cooperation. He aimed at stabilizing, not undermining, the colonial world. He wanted a peaceful transition to independence. Time and again in conversation Roosevelt would dwell on the question of a "timetable for independence" in India and in all European colonial areas.[16] The demand for a timetable was a distinctly American contribution to the process of decolonization.

Churchill was devoted to the interests of the British Empire, which was hardly surprising. Indeed, if that were not so, he would have had small justification for accepting and serving as Britain's Prime Minister. Churchill's devotion to the British Empire cannot be put aside so simply, however. His loyalty to Empire transcended political, even national obligations. Churchill's views had a significant effect upon Britain's relationship with the United States, on actions of the United States during the war, and on shaping the post-war period.

Churchill was an Englishman in the grand tradition. His father was the younger brother of Duke of Marlborough. His youth coincided with the closing years of the Victorian Age. His first commission had been with the 4th Queen's Hussars. Thus from the first he learned loyalty to the Crown and served the monarchy. He had participated in the defence of the Empire in India, in the Sudan, and in South Africa. Through succeeding years, as Home Secretary, First Lord of the Admiralty, Minister of Munition, Secretary of State for War and for Air, Colonial Secretary, he served the interests of king and country. By the time Churchill became Prime Minister, he had developed deep feelings about and commitments to the British Empire as its staunch defender. "King and Country, in that order," Lord Moran has written, "that's about all the religion Winston has. But it means a lot to him."[17] Churchill believed that imperial powers, in maintaining colonies, helped guarantee world stability. Churchill had less stringent philosophy. His

approach was a practical one. In contrast, Rossevelt believed wholeheartedly that world peace would never be assured until the great powers recongized the rights of all people throughout the world, in Asia as well as in Europe, to take their proper place in the international community and achieve freedom and self-respect.[18] Churchill lacked that sense of liberality regarding other peoples that Roosevelt expressed on so many occasions. When Churchill thought of the Chinese, for instance, he thought only of the colour of their skin.[19] A typical statement by Roosevelt with regard to other races was:

> We now are, and we should continue to be, strong brothers in the family of mankind — the family of the children of God.[20]

Addressing the White House Correspondents Association, Roosevelt once declared that no race of people should be masters over their fellowmen, and that each nationality had the right to its own nationhood.[21] Roosevelt was a unique individual, a complex person, and often a mystifying and unpredictable leader who defied easy categorization. He was both an idealist and a realist. He wrote of himself, "I dream dreams but am, at the same time, an intensely practical person."[22] Roosevelts's idealism expressed in the Four Freedoms[23] and many other statements, was founded on a deep faith in the ability and capacity of the common man to govern himself. Although his idealism was based on a firm faith, he never translated it into a logical political philosphy or doctrine.

He embraced the ideology of freedom not with the "domestic passion of the true believer who possesses a creed and ends up being possessed by it,"[24] but with the easy assurance of a man who slowly fashions his political faith, reshaping ideas with new experiences and changing times. Roosevelt combined an active faith in human nature with an intellectual distrust of comprehensive plans and long-run programmes.

Roosevelt's idealism was a patchwork of attitudes and ideas about honour and decency. His pattern of actions was characterized by flexibility and pragamatism. These characteristics contributed to his greatness as a democratic leader. With his dreams he could summon people to follow him, with his lack of urgency he encouraged full debate

of the question, and with his flexibility of means he could accommodate the push and pull and compromise of the democratic process.

Rexford Tugwell wrote that Churchill did not hesitate to make Washington the British-American headquarters, with the clear implication that Roosevelt had the British Empire in his keeping. His trips to see the President were made without comment or complaint about the journeys' length, difficulty, and inherent danger. His words addressed to the American people were gauged to stir them towards great common efforts. As well, his behaviour toward the President bespoke confident trust and friendship. Tugwell commented that this amused the President, who saw through the Prime Minister's strategy well enough and did not allow it to affect his decisions.[25]

Churchill and Roosevelt headed the most powerfull alliance the world has ever known. Together they guided the grand coalition through the most destructive war the world has yet seen. As allies they made decisions that had repercussions around the globe. They maintained a remarkable level of sympathy and understanding. Numerous and frequent letters and cables crossed the Atlantic, mutual admiration was evident in them, as well as humour and conversational intimacy, exemplifying a deep and still-growing friendship. But despite these message, meetings, a multitude of common aims and feelings, there was one issue on which Roosevelt and Churchill were never to agree. That issue was colonialism.

From Isolation To Intervention

In 1930's the mood of America was isolationist, the concern domestic, the overriding problem the depression. The Tydings-McDuffie Act did not challenge the isolationsts who were anti-colonial and focused on keeping America disentangled from Europe. For his first five years in office, Roosevelt said little about America's relations with European countries. Although F. D. R. was an idealist, he was also a pragmatist. Many of the most articulate isolationists were also the staunchest progressives. To achieve the goals of the New Deal, the President needed the goodwill and support in Congress of men such as William E. Borah, Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., Gerald P. Nye and Burton K. Wheeler.[26]

Isolation thus became the keynote of the United States foreign policy during Roosevelt's first term in the White House. In recent years historians such as William Appleman Williams who leaned toward a new-left view have agreed that even in the Depression era, Americans were more involved in world affairs than they realized. Such involvement was relative, however.[27] In comparison to Cold War diplomacy between 1945 and 1980, Roosevelt's policies in the 1930's appear to reflect the nation's desire for non-intervention. His policy was to steer clear of European and Asian embroilments while consolidating American influence in the Western Hemisphere. In Congress the desire to retreat into isolation was perhaps even stronger. Meanwhile, various anti-war organizations such as the Veterans of Future Wars and the Fellowship of Reconciliation sprang up and gained strength.[28]

In 1934, Congress passed the Johnson Act, which forbade American citizens from lending money to, or buying securities from, foreign governments in default of the United States.[29] In 1935, the President and Democratic spokesman in Congress argued for American membership in the World Court, but the Senate rejected the resolution with a vote 7 shy of the needed two-thirds majority, and this in a Senate with 68 Democractic members.[30] Spurred on by the book of Helmuth C. Englebrecht, entitled *Merchants of Death*, the Nye Committee report was made public in 1935.[31] In an over-simplified interpretation of history, it pictured the United States as having been hurled into World War I by grasping money-changers and unprincipled dealers in weapons.

Partly because of the Nye Committee,[32] Congress responded aggressively to preclude further American involvement in European affairs. In 1935 it approved the Pitman Resolution, which prohibited exports of American arms to war-torn areas. The resolution also prohibited American merchant vessels from carrying munitions into such areas and withheld protection from Americans who travelled on ships belonging to belligerents.

As the Italian divisions prepared to invade Ethiopia, Congress passed a joint resolution, known as the First Neutrality Act, that required the President, in the event of foreign war, to withhold shipment of arms to or for all belligerents,[33] to strengthen its resolve of

non-involvement. On 29 February 1936, Congress passed the Second Neutrality Law, which extended the first act for 14 months and, in addition, forbade loans to belligerent powers.[34] In May of 1937, Congress formulated a "permanent" neutrality policy in the Third Neutrality Act, which indefinitely extended the arms embargo and the prohibition against loans. It also included a provision which forbade American citizens from taking passage on the vessels of belligerent countries.[35]

Unfortunately, the impact of these acts was not what Congress had hoped. They benefited aggressor nations by increasing the difficulty with which those attacked could secure necessary arms. In a sense the legislation only delayed the day of reckoning when Americans had to decide whether or not to join other democratic nations in opposing totalitarian expansion.

F. D. R. made no real effort to prevent Congress from building this formidable isolationist wall. Indeed, it was erected under laws that carried his signature. If Roosevelt did not fully accept the isolationist beliefs, he had bowed to the priority of domestic reform first. Thus, this masterful politician had passively allowed Congress to curtail his normal powers as Commander-in-Chief and to jeopardize his prerogatives for the administration of American foreign policy.[36]

Meanwhile, the continued Japanese invasion of China posed real problems for the United States. Like Hoover, Roosevelt felt constrained to watch helplessly.[37] On 7 July 1937, the Japanese intensified and broadened their invasion, and in the midst of a full-scale military attack against China, Japanese war planes sank the American gunboat "Panay" off Shanghai. Even in the face of this action, the majority of Americans were still opposed to any overt action by their government. A Gallup poll reported that more than 70 percent of Americans opposed any intervention. And more than a two-thirds majority in Congress voted against imposing any sanction against the Japanese. In fact, most Americans breathed easier when they learned that the Japanese government had apologized and offered to pay damages for the "Panay."[38] A strong isolationist policy still prevailed.

Due mostly to the worsening international situation, between 1937 and 1940, Roosevelt took an increasingly firm stand against German and Japanese expansion in Europe and the Far East respectively. On 5 October 1937, in the "Querantine Address," Roosevelt spoke to an audience in Chicago of the "rampant reign of terror and lawlessness" and declared that neither isolation nor neutrality would shield the United States from its effects.[39] This speech sparked a public debate which lasted for 27 months. Time and events strengthened the President's position. The rapid fall of Holland, Luxemburg and Belgium in the spring of 1940 demonstrated the contempt Hitler had for weak and neutral countries. As France surrendered to Germany in June of 1940, many Americans began to wonder if the Atlantic Ocean, like the Maginot line, provided more the illusion than the reality of security.

The year 1939 found the United States in a rapidly changing world. The Nazi menace to western civilization was replacing the depression as the overriding issue in American public life. American policy makers found themselves increasingly devoting time to foreign affairs rather than to domestic issues. On 6 January 1941, speaking before Congress, Roosevelt called for a world founded upon "Four Freedoms."[40] This speech expressed most simply and eloquently the political idealism and goals of Roosevelt.

The fall of France brought World War II closer to America. Now, England alone stood between the United States and the Nazi juggernaut and the British were under severe pressure. Amerians were now forced to confront the realities of the war as it affected their own national interest. In 1941, Churchill urged Roosevelt to provide supplies to the British so desperately needed but for which they could no longer pay.[41] Roosevelt considered the appeal and then formulated a plan of action. In January 1941, Roosevelt submitted to Congress his scheme for what became known as the "Lend-Lease" programme. In the debate which lasted for two months, one-third of the members of both Houses argued for fortress America, objecting to sending goods abroad that might be needed to protect American shores. However, the majority of progressive isolationists who had supported Roosevelt's New Deal legislation were shifting from their alignment with the isolationists.

When the votes were tallied, the administration had won a clear victory in both Houses. The count (260 to 165 in the House; 60 to 31 in the Senate) indicated the strength of the minority dissent.[42]

This was understandable for it would be difficult to imagine a more complete reversal of the Neutrality Acts than the Lend-Lease Act. In theory, it represented a radical break with the ideas of non-involvement; in practice, it gave enormous and unprecedented power to the President. Under lend-lease, the President was authorized, under the terms he thought proper, to lend, lease, sell or barter arms, ammunition, food or any defence articles or any defence information to the government of any country whose defence the President deemed vital to the defence of the United States.[43]

In contrast to democratic politics, in the realm of foreign policy it is more difficult to have a full, long-lasting discussion of views either internationally or within a country. This is especially true when those involved are under the pressure of war. The long debate about isolationism, which had focused on such issues as America's geographic position and whether or not German planes could cross the Atlantic, had done little to help establish or clarify the priorities for America's foreign policy. The debate on isolationism ended when the Japanese bombs dropped on Pearl Harbor; the American people and the United States Congress coalesced behind their President. Then Roosevelt led the American people out of isolation into recognition of their international obligations and their new role of world leadership.

Although Roosevelt relied on his cabinet members and advisers to supply him with specific information, these men had to await the President's decision before they could take action.[44] This was not the case when the President was dealing with the leaders of other countries. In terms of Roosevelt's hopes for the independence of India, the resources which he was accustomed to using to establish programmes and plans were not available to him in 1941, because the national mood between 1919 and 1939 had leaned toward isolation. But Roosevelt was a prophet of hope and confidence, not a harbinger of disaster and despair. His flexibility was underwritten by superb self-confidence in his ability to meet future problems when they arose. At

times, it seemed that the President credited his fellow men and events in history with this same flexibility, which they often did not have.

The involvement of the United States Government in British India prior to 1941 was minimal. The policy of isolationism had not encouraged such involvement, and international law had specifically discouraged it. Under international law a colony was denied dealing in foreign relations and was considered in conjunction with the international affairs of the ruling country.[45] Thus India was a British colony, and in 1919 the Government of India had been granted fiscal and budgetary autonomy within the British Commonwealth.[46] This granted India the right and responsibility to enter into trade agreements with sovereign nations. Thus, even at the beginning of World War II, India's colonial status was ambiguous under international law. During the thirties, the Indian national struggle for dominion status continued. British policy seemed to India to be one of indifference towards Indian independence. For Britain there were other concern. The inter-war years focused on domestic concern such as depression and the ominous development on the continent.

In a study of "American opinion regarding the Indian nationalist movement", Harnam Singh concluded that in the period between the two World Wars the public opinion in America "was generally sympathetic to India's aspirations, an attitude influenced by the American tradition of extending sympathy to those who struggle to achieve the cherished ideals of freedom." This tradition, the scholar noted, "was given expression by a number of papers at various times and often as a reply to British criticism of their pro-Indian approach."[47]

In 1940-41 the revised general belief in London was that the outcome of the war and perhaps even the continued tenability of the British Isles depended upon American intervention. Full scale entry of the United States following the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941, was greeted with enormous relief that Great Britain and her Empire no longer stood alone.[48] And it was assumed that in this war, as in the last, the British sea-power and American sea-power as needed would protect the coast of India.[49]

Coming of Federation

When World War II broke out, Britain had no official policy to deal with the problem of India's unity and freedom. Soon after the declaration of war Britain announced its policy. The policy was to grant India freedom with safeguards upon the creation of unity through the federation of autonomous provinces and principalities. The objective was freedom with unity, but on terms directed by Britain.[50] After the declaration of this policy, *The Nation* commented that the British Government seemed "determined to follow a naked and stupid imperialist policy."[51] The *Christian Science Monitor* thought it vital that Britain adjust her differences with India as soon as possible. The paper reminded its readers that on October 28 Sir Samuel Hoare had given a warning rather than a conciliatory note to Hindu leaders. The reason being claimed was that Britain also had to consider the Muslims and the Princes who were aiding in the war effort. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, at this point declared his unconditional support for the British war effort. He made this significant comment:

> Britain has always respected the Muslim views, partly as a check to Hinduism and partly from consideration for their influence with their coreligionists in Palestine, Asia Minor generally, and Northern Africa.[52]

Jinnah opposed the idea of federation which would have resulted in majority rule under the guise of parliamentary system of government.

In September 1939, the Working Committee of the Muslim League emphasized that such a constitution based on the principles of federalism was totally unsuitable to the peoples of India, which was composed of various nationalities and did not constitute a national state.[53] The Committee expressed its concern that if the British Government desired Muslim cooperation and support at this critical stage, then it should assure the Muslims justice and fairplay in the Congress governed provinces, where their persons, liberties, properties and honour were in danger and their political, economic, social, and cultural rights were being callously trampled upon. The Committee appealed to the Muslims to stand solidly in the Muslim League with a

solemn and sacred determination to make every sacrifice, upon which would depend the future destiny and honour of 90,000,000 Muslims of India.[54] The resolution on federation scheme indicated the Muslim refusal to agree to this statutory scheme. It made clear that they did not endorse the "Federal Objective" of the British Government. They expressed that the demand could not be dismissed as mere "Windowdressing." The Muslim League leaders had convinced themselves that the Congress meant to accept the federal scheme if certain undertakings were given, and that Muslims under that scheme would be permanently at the mercy of a Hindu majority raj.[55] The Muslim opposition to the federal scheme appeared to owe something the "Pakistan scheme" which achieved some publicity a few years later.

But at this time, there were many Muslims who hesitated to go so far; instead of a single united India inspired by common aspirations they wished to reorganize the subcontinent into a number of homogeneous zones loosely held together.[56] It is interesting to note here that the British statesman John Bright, in a speech to the House of Commons on 24 June 1858, had proposed to divide India into five presidencies each of which:

> Would have its finance, its taxation, its justice and its police department as well as its works and military departments, precisely the same as if it were a State having no connection with any other part of India and recognized only as a dependency of this country ... If at any future period the sovereignty of England should be withdrawn, we should leave so many presidencies built up and firmly compacted together, each able to support its own independence and its own government.[57]

By December 1937, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, was convinced that the strongest opposition to federation would come from the Muslims.[58] Their experience with provincial Congress rule would frighten them from participation in a federation to which the Congress would be a party; albeit at truncated strength. There was also a strongly anti-Muslim thrust in Congress policy at the level of the High Command, the Working Committee, which sought to exercise a paraconstitutional control over provincial governments. The latter

were to hoist the Congress flag, sing the Congress anthem "Bande Mataram"[59] a notoriously anti-Muslim song, and apply Gandhi's principles of education.

The theme of the "Bande Mataram," the novel *Anandamath* (The Abbey of Bliss) was bluntly anti-Muslim. Chatterjee, the Hindu novelist who is generally claimed as one of the fathers of Indian nationalism, assiduously propagated anti-Muslim ideas in his popular stories. In the novels one comes across the community of children (children of Kali) who believed in no caste distinctions and whose sole purpose was to destroy every vestige of Muslim rule in India. One also sees Jivananda with sword in hand at the gate of a temple exhorting the children in the following words:

> We have often thought to break up this bird's nest of Muslim rule, to pull down the city of the renegades and throw it into the river--to turn this pig-sty to ashes and make mother earth free from evil again. Friends, that day has come.[60]

The community children went about burning Muslim villages, plundering Muslim property and killing Muslims wholesale. What is interesting to note is that Hindu leaders in this novel made it clear that they were not fighting against the British, who had come to India to free the country from Muslim tyranny and misrule. Toward the end, when the children had won against the Muslims, the holy man who was guiding and inspiring the movement appeared and instructed the leader of the children to abandon fighting and cooperate with the British. The British in God's good time would purify the country and hand it over to Hindu rule. Though the plot of the novel deals with themes of a bygone age, it leaves a clear impression on the minds of its readers that Hindu were still bitter towards Muslims. It was in this novel that the famous song, "Bande Mataram" (Hail Mother), appeared. One can understand why the Muslims later (during 1937-9) objected vehemently to the Congress governments' adopting it as a national anthem. This was a Hindu revolutionary song, which invoked divine assistance against the Muslim and the British and roused the people to drive both out of India.[61] Despite Muslim protest it continued to be the Congress song till 1947.

The Governor of Bombay, Sir Roger Lumley, attested that there was genuine fear among the Muslims in his province, and Liaquat Ali Khan, the Secretary General of the Muslim League also expressed that the same was true of Bihar.[62] There was a widespread search for an alternative which would secure an honourable status for the Muslims in the future policy of India. The idea of Pakistan was gaining ground.

The federation set up by the Act of 1935 was the closer rather than the looser type. Hindu unitarianism had prevailed, particularly in the composition of the federal legislature.[63] The Muslims objected to it because, to them, a strong centre meant an increase of Hindu strength. They were also opposed to the central government having the power of interference in the criminal administration of the provinces, as this would have enabled a national Congress Cabinet to paralyze the administration of a Muslim province.[64]

Thus the Muslim League found the federal scheme to the "fundamentally bad, most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal..."[65] and rejected it. However, it undertook to work the provincial part of the constitution "for what it was worth."[66] The Congress turned down both the parts of the Act, but decided to contest elections and to wreck the federation from the inside.

British political leaders could not afford to ignore the Muslims of India any more than the Hindu leaders could afford such ignorance. The British answer to the Hindu demand for immediate independence was that there were complications. Britain had commitments to the princes and to the minorities which could not be repudiated.[67] Much was to be heard of these arguments as time went on, and while it was very easy to assume that they were mere propaganda, it must be realized that in India among the classes concerned they seemed very real commitments which it was devoutly hoped Britain would not be forced into surrendering for one reason or another. The Indian leaders wanted Great Britain to state in clear terms and assure India of her independence after the war. In the early months of the war, there was a significant change in the British leadership. Winston S. Churchill became the British war Prime Minister and his attitude was not encouraging for Indian independence. He expressed his views on the matter by saying that he would not become the first Minister of His

Majesty's Government for the purpose of liquidating the British Empire. Churchill's views regarding the British Empire and many other matters were considered "reactionary."[68] Churchill's Government thought that the Viceroy could carry on the administration in India without any major political abstacle, and prosecute the British war efforts without the cooperation and support of the Indian leaders. They were confident that sooner or later the Viceroy would need their assistance. The Government, both in Britain and India was aware of this fact and confidently believed it could easily suppress any national movement in India which would create a hindrance to the British cause and policy. This cleavage between the British Government and the Indian leaders caused political confusion in the country. The Indian leaders were fully aware of the fact that the government efforts would not succeed by force alone. Hence the political controversy became sharper as the war progressed. The Hindu-Muslim political parties were not united in themselves. The Congress Party emphasized that the British Government would assure India of her independence soon after the war. But the governments, both in Britain and India in 1940, postponed all such important issues to a future date. The British Government in January 1940 clearly stated it would do no more than offer India Dominion Status. Britain also explained that Muslim minority interest should be protected before they would give any thought to Indian independence. Another thing was that the British had to safeguard the interests of the other minorities such as the Untouchables and the Indian Princes. In a speech at the Orient Club, Bombay, on 10 January 1940, Linlithgow explained: "His Majesty's Government have made it clear, both through statements issued by myself, and in Parliament, that their objective for India is full Dominion Status, Dominion Status, too, of the Statute of Westminister variety."[70] The issue of the transfer of power during war time was not an easy problem to settle. More important was how the British could leave these minorities at the mercy of Congress, the wholesale Hindu party which was clamoring for immediate independence. Congress claimed British qualifications were an example of a policy of divide and rule. Moreover, the Congress was making constant efforts to take full advantage of the deteriorating international political situation and British imperial involvement in it. Nehru claimed that "there are only two parties in the country: the Congress and the British."[71] Jinnah replied with increasing assertiveness that the Muslims were a third factor. Then he expostulated in October

1937 that "the majority community has clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus."[72]

When in October 1939 the British Government refused to kneel down before the Congress' war aims demand of immediate independence, then the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned. The provincial government took over the administration of the respective provinces in accordance with section 93 of the 1935 Act of the Government of India. The Congress policy demanding immediate independence had disastrous results on the Indian political scene. It contributed to the Muslim League's development of the idea for a separate state. Moreover, the Congress ministries during their rule had increased communal tension and strengthened the forces of separation, which brought deep discredit to Congress.[73] Muslims were denied equality of opportunity and were deprived of their rightful place in the administration. Symbols of the Hindu raj and culture were adopted in government institutions paid by all taxpayers.[74] Moreover, if the federation was to be controlled by a Congress dominated legislature then the Muslims would have nothing to do with it. From 1938 the Muslims began to demand a constitutional review *de novo* of schemes that would weld the Muslim provinces into something very like a separate nation.[75] Already the Hindu India and the Muslim India were naturally and georaphically separate.

For the first time when the first responsible Indian governments were installed in the provinces, the Congress tasted the heady wine of power. For the first time the Muslims realized what this meant to them.[76] In short, "there was every sign that the new constitution signified a Hindu raj, pure and simple."[77] Now it is easy to connect Congress rule with the emergence of the idea of Pakistan. Such an authority as a former Secretary of State for India L. S. Amery believed that it was the conduct of the Congress ministries which drove the Muslims to separation.[78] The significance of the Congress demand was that it would have given the Hindu majority the power to impose a constitution on the minorities. What the Hindu leaders did not realize was that any imposition of a federal constitution which was not voluntarily accepted by the Muslims would lead to disruption and an irretrievable split in the country. Thus by the end of 1939 it was widely

believed that if the Congress Governments had lasted much longer, communal fighting would have broken on an unprecedented scale. The idea of a "civil war" had been an almost inconceivable idea so long as British rule was still unquestioned, but now many Indians were saying that it was coming,[79] "slowly but relentlessly the Congress was forcing the Muslims of India into separation."[80] The Muslim reaction to Congress rule may be said to have led directly to the idea of Pakistan. The Congress policy during 1936-39 was a colossal failure, and it was only the jaundiced eye of its leaders which read in this defeat the signs of a triumphant nationalism.

Naturally, now the Muslims leaned toward the British and signified their unconditional willingness to help Britain in its war efforts against the aggressive Germany. In March 1940, Jinnah stated:

> After the war was declared, the Viceroy naturally wanted help from Muslim League. It was only then that he realized that the Muslim League was a power. For it will be remembered that up to the time of the declaration of war, the Viceroy never thought of me but of Gandhi and Gandhi alone.[81]

The Second World War transformed All-India politics. It accelerated the British departure from India and built up the Muslim League to a position of equality with the Congress. The war caused to be placed before the Cabinet the "somewhat revolutionary" proposal that the British Government should declare that it would spare no effort to bring about Dominion Status within a year after the conclusion of the war, and would set up whatever machinery those concerned agreed upon as appropriate to work out a new constitution immediately on the conclusion of the war.[82] The proposal was considerably watered down as a result of Churchill's oposition and the draft which finally emerged as Linlithgow's August Offer was an unratifiable document. The Congress rejected it and two months later, under Gandhi's leadership launched the civil disobediance campaign. By the end of November 1940 it had spread all over India.

In June 1940, the fall of France brought a considerable change in the European war theatre. This added difficulty made the British situation very critical. In consequence, there was also a significant

change in the British Government's policies toward the Indian political atmosphere. On 7 August 1940, the Viceroy Linlithgow made a four-point declaration: (1) That the British Government would give India Dominion Status after the war; (2) that a constitution representative of all India's political elements would be formed; (3) that the Central Executive (viceroy's Council) would be expanded and (4) that protection would be given to the minorities' interests.[83]

The Viceroy's statement did not meet the Congress demand for immediate independence. The British Government had two reasons for their action. First, the Muslims were not in agreement with Congress on its federal type of Government. Second, in the middle of the great war in which the British Commonwealth was fighting for its very existence, it seemed unreasonable to demand immediate independence. The Viceroy made the statment primarily because the British Government needed a great contribution to the war from India, and it had not been forthcoming. The Congress was completely dissatisfied with the way in which the British Government was thinking about the minorities problem. When in October 1940, Gandhi launched his civil disobedience movement, the government took stern measures against the Congress. It put the Congress leaders into jail until the end of war to stop their violence against the minorities. But the Congress leaders ceased to believe that the British promises were sincere. They claimed that the British Government did not intend to set India free. An Allied victory would merely enable it to rivet more firmly the chains it did not mean to break.[84] "We cannot fight" was Nehru's constant cry, "to defend a freedom we do not possess."[85] Nehru saw this as a modest demand for the acknowledgement of India's right to freedom and as a prerequisite to cooperation during the war.[86] "The fifteen executive members of the Congress Working Committee, called for a statement of British war aims ... in regard to democracy and imperialism, and of how they would apply to India and ... be given effect in the present."[87] What the Congress wanted was to transfer power solely into its own hands. Gandhi, who was in undisputed control of Congress, expressed this view with unusual candour:

> The British Government would not ask for a common agreement, if they recognised any one party to be strong

> enough to take delivery ... If (the Congress) does not weaken and has enough patience, it will develop sufficient strength to take delivery. It is an illusion created by ourselves that we must come to an agreement with all parties before we can make any progress.[88]

The Muslim League, while gratified at the assurance that no constitution would be adopted without its consent, could not accept the August offer since it promised inadequate representation to the Muslim League in the government.[89] In brief, the British wanted to win the war first and to transfer power afterwards; the Congress demanded power at once, and a Hindu-Muslim settlement afterwards; the Muslims insisted on a Hindu-Muslim settlement first and the power afterward. This pattern of behaviour was to persist throughout the war, in the demand by Britain that Muslim must accept democracy as understood in the west, without foreseeing that this would lead to political strife and civil war.[90]

Thus by the beginning of 1940 Muslim politics had taken a new and significant turn. The departure from the pre-1937 policy was remarkable. The Muslims no longer wanted an Indian federation. No longer was it a question of merely voting in favour of or against a certain or even any federal scheme. Federation would not do at all. The greater the Hindu emphasis on a strong centre, the greater the Muslim opposition to any centre. The more the Congress emphasized the principle of majority rule, the more the Muslims talked of self-determination. As Congress travelled towards the idea of a united India, so did the Muslim League turn towards "Muslim independence." The political unity of India, which had been taken for granted by the Muslim League before 1937, was no longer looked upon as an axiom. Hindu insistence on unity and nothing but unity had produced the Muslim reaction of opposing this unity at any price. By this, the Indian political situation had undergone a fundamental change. Never again was it to be the same.

Atlantic Charter

While the political differences continued between the British Government and Indian leaders, there occurred important historic

events which further connected India and the United States. On the morning of 9 August 1941, President Roosevelt met Prime Minister Churchill for the first time. According to Elliot Roosevelt, India came into the conversation that night at dinner on board the *Augusta* and the discussion became heated.[91] Roosevelt had brought it around to trade barriers, and the Prime Minister let it be known that the Empire trade agreement must stay, to which the President reportedly replied:

> Those Empire trade agreements -- It's because of them that the people of India and Africa, of all the colonial Near East and Far East, are still as backward as they are.[92]

On 14 August 1941 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill made their famous declaration of the Atlantic charter with its "Four-Freedoms."[93] It was immediately percieved in India that an incongruity could be pointed out between this declaration of war aims and India's position in the Empire. Here was the ghost of self-determination all over again. Then the Indian leaders asked the British Government whether or not the Charter in general and its third article in particular, which said,

> ... they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them...[94]

was appliacable to India. To this Prime Minister Churchill said that neither the Charter nor the third article would be applied to India.[95] It was not unnatural therefore that Indian leaders began to wonder whether the Charter was only for the benefit of the white races.[96] Although India was politically broken into various parties and groups, all had one object in common, eventual freedom and independence from imperial domination.[97] The nationalists, both Hindu and Muslim seized on it, of course, as a clinching proof of British dishonesty.[98] The resentment was turning to bitterness and after two years of war a wider gulf emerged between Britain and India. It was significant that not even the advice of the U. S. ambassador, Guy Winant, to whom Churchill sent a copy of his proposed speech, could influence the British. Winant believed that the passage denying the application of the 3rd article to

India, "would simply intensify charges of Imperialism and leave Great Britain in the position of a donothing policy."[99] Churchill refused to modify the passage. He stated that the Charter had in mind the conquered nations of Europe and not those areas owing allegiance to the British Crown and advancing towards self-government.[100] Immediately there was a furor in India. The Indian Council of States expressed its "deep discontent" and asked the Viceroy to convey to Churchill that his attitude to India "was likely to prejudice the war efforts of India at this crucial juncture."[101]

To this, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull held different views on India than those expressed by the Prime Minister. They were observing with interest and sympathy the Indian struggle for freedom. Roosevelt, on the other hand, had no such limited views. During the "Atlantic Charter Conference" he told Churchill:

> I can't believe that we can fight a war against fascist slavery, and at the same time not work to free people all over the world from a backward colonial policy ... The peace cannot include any continued despotism. The structure of peace demands and will get equality of peoples. Equality of peoples involves the utmost freedom of complete trade.[102]

Thus, when he added to Churchill's draft the statement he and the Prime Minister wished to "see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them," Roosevelt was thinking not only of the occupied countries of Europe but also of colonial peoples throughout the world.[103] On one occasion the President told his son, that "Great Britain signed the Atlantic Charter. I hope they realize the United States government means to make them live up to it."[104]

During the war years, Roosevelt, through the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms speech, and other speeches indicated that he believed the progressive achievement of self-government in the colonial countries was important to establishing and maintaining the peace. Roosevelt felt that these points of international law, although perhaps relevent in the 1700's and 1800's, had lost their validity by 1940. With this in mind, the President therefore established a precedent by

suggesting that India be invited to sign the Declaration of the United Nations on 1 January 1942. After some resistance, Churchill agreed to this.[105]

A considerable controversy was thus raised in America, where most opinion inclined to the view that Churchill had declared the Atlantic Charter did not apply to India. The Americans considered the British betrayal of the Atlantic Charter, a sinister scheme to further Britain's Imperial ambitions. In the State Department it was denounced as "Churchiavellian."[106] *The New York Times* had earlier commented that dominion status was sure after the war, but the problem was how to give India a satisfactory wartime status. It remarked that India was part of the effort in which America was engaged and yet "Except for the professional Britain-baiters among us, India may seem far away."[107] It advised:

> No American isolationist can make it a matter of indifference to us whether Gandhi obstructs the British war effort or the Indian Viceroy, the Marquis Linlithgow, is willing and able to rally the civil and religious factions of the country over which he rules. Freedom for such a country is not easy to win or keep. Yet it is undoubtedly a part of the indivisible freedom for which Britain is fighting and to which the United States is committed.[108]

Churchill's statement and intentions were criticized widely, not only in the United States but also in the British Parliament.[109] The Indian reaction was very bitter:

> It is difficult to exaggerate the disquieting effect of ... Mr. Churchill's statement in September, 1941, that the Atlantic Charter was primarily intended to apply to Europe. The Nationalists seized on it, of course, as clinching proof of British dishonesty.[110]

Once again, the American voice inspired a message which brought hope to the Indians, th . the promises of the Atlantic Charter might cover the whole world.[111] At this point, Mr. Churchill told Roosevelt, "Mr. President, I believe you are trying to do away with the British Empire."[112] But Churchill's growl refused to echo Roosevelt's

optimistic baritone, and Churchill spoke for the *Raj*. Meanwhile, others in Britain thought along the same lines. Amery stated that there could be no more typical instance of loose thinking than the clamour for what was called the application of the Atlantic Charter to India. He added that the protest against the Prime Minister's perfectly clear explanation that Article 3 of the Charter primarily referred to the restoration of national life in Europe and in any case did not qualify in any way their own declaration as to India's future with which it was in complete harmony. After all, what did that Article say? It said that among the principles on which the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt based their hopes for a better future for the world was respect for the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they might live. Did this give renewed impetus to India? "It gives no indication as to whether India is to be regarded as one people or several — in the very spirit of the Atlantic Charter. We should make it clear that we [British] wished India to enjoy that position under a constitution framed primarily by Indians, for Indians, in accordance with Indian conception."[113] As regards British misinterpretation about the Atlantic Charter was great as its advantage and importance had been in it the seeds of severe controversy in the Indian field.[114] The British regarded the American interpretation and sympathy for the free world as that of American interest in the British colonial Empire. However, the British colonial (Indian) policy was not tied to a proposition of the American interpretation. The British took it that the United States will regard themselves as likely to be best judges of what their "best interests" are.[115]

On the other hand, in the House of Commons' debates it was argued that the Prime Minister should revise his remarks about the Atlantic Charter, so that Americans could become aware that its underlying principles were actually being applied to India, and the whole world.[116] Anyhow, at home and abroad, Churchill came under the fiercest criticism directed against him during the entire war. The statement by the Prime Minister and the position taken by President Roosevelt concerning the Atlantic Charter led to most unfortunate pronouncements and diminished the amity each had felt towards the other.[117]

Diplomatic Contacts

With developments resulting from the war in Europe it was recognized that India had a position of increased importance to the United States as a source of material essential to the implementation of the coordinated programs of this government for national defence and for extension of aid to the British Empire. With the view therefore to increasing the effectiveness in 1941, the problem was one of better American representation in India. Because India was a British colony, the British would not grant the United States an ambassadorial mission within that country, since an ambassador implies sovereignty in the conduct of foreign relations. American representation in Indian was confined to a small consulate, the head of which carried the rank of Consul General. It was a lonely, isolated and understaffed post without the prestige or position of an embassy. As if to add insult to injury, in 1931, the Government of India had transferred the capital from Calcutta to New Delhi, The American Consulate, however, had not been permitted to move, and so, for over 10 years, it had been 1,000 miles from the centre of government. But American representatives were also without opportunities to gather information from personal contact with Hindu and Muslim leaders. They only submitted reports based primarily on the local newspapers published in English, many of which were controlled by the Government of India. It is not surprising that the United States Government found itself wanting in information and policy towards India on the eve of Pearl Harbor.

Whatever the motivation, on 17 April 1941, the British Government repuested the United States to allow an Indian with the rank of Agent-General to be attached to the British Embassy in Washington. His function would be to advise the Embassy on Indian affairs "and to deal with non-political question in Indo-American relations."[118] Such a representative was certainly preferable to no representation, but he added little prestige to India' position because of his low rank and the fact that he was chosen by British officials with a keen eye to insure that he would not embarrass them. In reorganizing and accepting representation on this basis, the United States Government tended more to recognize the colonial position of India than to affirm the hope for Indian independence in the near future.

After his appointment, State Department officials manoeuvred to afford the Indian Agent-General as much autonomy as possible.

The State Department chose this opportunity to push for more adequate representation for the United States in India. Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed British Government that America welcomed Indian representation to the United States and that their request demonstrated their recognition of the establishment of more effective representation between the two governments. Hull said that this emphasized:

> ... the inadequacy of United States representation in India occasioned by the unwillingness of the Government of India to permit the United States Government to reside or maintain offices in Delhi.[119]

The British Government consented to stationing the American office in New Delhi, but objected to the title of Commissioner requested by the Secretary of State, claiming that India's constitutional position did not permit a representative of this stature. They proposed instead the title of Agent-General, suggesting that the two appointments be made simultaneously. They further requested that the appointments be made on an informal rather than a formal basis.[120] The title of Agent-General was not designated in the United States foreign service. The Secretary of State, therefore, informed Britain that for the President to obtain authorization for the appointment of an Agent-General in India it would be necessary to seek Congressional legislation, either to create such an office or to amend the 1931 Consular Act. As this would involve unnecessary delay, the Secretary of State asked Britain to reconsider the original request.[121] On 15 July 1941, the State Department was informed that the Government of India agreed to the appointment of a Commissioner from the United States, with the personal rank of Minister, or Diplomat-Agent, and that he be permitted, together with secretarial and clerical members of his staff, to reside and maintain offices in New Delhi.[122] But they again requested that the appointment be on an informal basis.[123] The office in New Delhi was designated as the Commission of the United States of America, but was referred to as the American Mission.

On 21 July 1941, it was announced in both London[124] and Washington[125] that Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai had been appointed Indian Agent-General to the United States. The following day it was announced that Thomas M. Wilson, Consul General at Calcutta, a successor to that underpaid Seamen's agent of 1784,[126] would be United States Commissioner to India with the rank of Minister, a "quasi diplomatic status."[127] The New York Times commented:

> It was obvious that Great Britain, in view of her war policies, desired to give India recognition in the diplomatic family of the Commonwealth and that the United States was prepared to meet her desires in this respect.[128]

On 16 September 1941, Thomas M. Wilson presented to the Viceroy an informal letter of introduction from the President rather than a letter of credentials and, therefore, prepared to move from Calcutta to New Delhi.[129] In October 1941, the United States established quasi-diplomatic relations with the British Indian Government. During the war period, the United States diplomatic mission served a valuable purpose in informing the Indian people of the United States war aims and American ideals. The Indian people became interested in the United States by their direct contacts with American soldiers, who were stationed in India. The personal wartime contacts assisted in creating friendly relations between the two countries. In future relations with India, the United States Government took full advantage of this informal designation. The next two representatives to India were introduced to the Viceroy with the titles of "President of the United States's Personal Representative in India." While they were never formally granted the title or position of ambassador, in all but technical language, a personal representative of a head of state is an ambassador.

One cannot help wondering, in the light of subsequent events, whether in reality it was the United States that suggested this representation as the price for the application of the Lend-Lease Act to India. It was suggested at the time that Thomas Wilson's appointment forecast American aid to India, and confirmation was soon forthcoming.

Moreover, a further sign of increased recognition of India as a political entity where American interests required special treatment may

be found in efforts initiated by the American Government to conclude during this period a treaty of commerce and navigation with the government of British India.[130] Early in 1942 the British indicated that they preferred that work on this treaty be suspended until after the war, and hence the matter was in abeyance.

Then the issue of American representation in India was only symbolic of the much broader issue of American intervention into British Indian affairs which had become increasingly complicated during this period. The State Department believed that the pressure of the war in the Middle East would soon make India's partnership in the allied effort more important and concluded that the United States should remain silent no longer. On 5 May 1941, Adolph Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, and Wallace Murray, head of the Near Eastern Division of the State Department, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull expressing this opinion and including their suggestion:

> To that end the Government of the United States hopes that His Majesty's Government will promptly explore the possibility of bringing India into the partnership of nations on the terms equal to the other members of the British Commonwealth.[131]

Two days later, Secretary of State Hull broached this topic to the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, (who as Lord Irwin had been the Viceroy of India) who responded by describing the Indian situation in idealistic terms. He assured Hull that Gandhi would not cause concern because he was unwilling to aid Hitler, that popular sentiment in India towards Britain was very good and that the provinces enjoyed full self-government within the central government with the viceroy primarily controlling only national defence and foreign policy. He concluded that it was not deemed feasible, or even necessary, to make further liberalizing concessions at the moment.[132]

In contrast, reports from Wilson throughout the spring of 1941 had emphasized the rapid deterioration of the political situation in India and the jailing of Indian nationalists. He wrote that the impasse between the British and Indian nationalists could be resolved, except that the officials entrusted with Indian affairs both in England and in India seemed to lack will and determination. He suggested that perhaps

the American Government could provide the needed impetus. However, he cautioned that the American move must be unobtrusive and preferably through unofficial diplomatic channels. He wrote:

> The Government willingness to allow things to worry along with superb confidence that in the end they will win out—anyhow, appears fatuous, but if successful it will confirm the confidence of the English in their special ability always to be able to muddle through ... but to the onlooker at present it looks like foolhardiness.[133]

The American ambassador to Britain, John Winant, wrote on 1 August 1941, that London might be receptive to the American suggestions. He, like Wilson, was concerned with the British Government's failure to move towards a solution of the Indian situation. In his report he emphasized the importance that India might hold in the Pacific war effort. He recommended that in the policy statement soon to be discussed concerning an agreement for cooperation and alliance between Australia, New Zealand and China, the United States might suggest something including India. Towards that end, he encouraged the Secretary of State to inquire about an agreement to grant the right of dominion status, with a pledge to implement this status within a given period after the war. He also mentioned that the favourable effect this would have on American public opinion should be emphasized to the British. Winant advised the State Department that the political situation in London was more favourable then than it might be later on:

> In my opinion a number of the Cabinet would favor such a plan. When the Indian question was up at a Cabinet meeting some time ago the Prime Minister was opposed to taking action. Unless the idea was suggested by you I doubt if this subject would again be pressed for further consideration.[134]

The State Department concurred with Winant's suggestion and drafted a telegram instructing him to present his suggestion to the Prime Minister and the foreign Office. The telegram was cancelled by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles the following day, 6 August 1941. He expressed concern about American intervention and counselled for an indirect approach:

> In my own judgment this Government is not warranted in suggesting officially to the British Government what the status of India should be, but were the President disposed to take the matter up I should imagine that he would wish to discuss it in a very personal and confidential way directly with Mr. Churchill.[135]

An opportunity for such personal diplomacy did not immediately present itself and whatever beneficial results it might have had were soon lost. On 9 September 1941, Churchill made his famous speech before the House of Commons, qualifying Article Three of the Atlantic Charter, saying:

> At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing any alterations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institution in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British crown.[136]

Few statements could have been less welcome in India. According to Churchill's pronouncement, the war was to oppose German imperialism and bring the right of self-government to the people under the yoke of Nazism. It was not necessary to apply the same principle to British colonies, including the people of India.

Churchill sent Winant a copy of his speech the day it was given. Winant recounted that he tried to convince the Prime Minister to eliminate this provocative statement, arguing that it ran counter to the interpretation given the Atlantic Charter by the public in Britain and the United States. He also warned that it would intensify the charges of imperialism and the criticism of Britain's position in India. The ambassador's efforts failed. He wrote:

> We took up a few minutes before he actually had to appear in Parliament to make the address. He told me that a vote of the Cabinet was in support of that passage, and he took the

> position it was a matter of internal British politics. I was not able to change his determination to use this section of his statement.[137]

The State Department was incensed at the "fact that Churchill had now offered an interpretation of the Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration" without consulting the President.[138] Some officials in the Department suggested that the Prime Minister's presumptous attitude gave added justification for the American Government to make an effort to assist in the problem involved in the Indian situation. In a memorandum forwarded to Welles, Murray added the supporting arguments that a British declaration of dominion status for India would gratify American public opinion and that India's contribution to the war effort could be important, considering her strategic position between Russia, China and the Middle East. Considering India's vast supply of manpower and her economic potential, the united and active support of the people of India might become crucial.[139]

Again, Welles and Hull vetoed this suggestion. Welles countered with the argument that public opinion in the United States was generally unconcerned with India, the issue being important primarily to the United States Communist Party and the Irish, who sought to discourage the United States-Britain alliance. He considered the situation one of expedience. The British had ruled India for over 100 years, and it was the considered opinion of those who knew the Indian situation that any immediate change in the status of India would create internal dissension on a very wide scale. The Department"s suggestion would, therefore, not serve to unite India but would divide it, and Welles commented that certainly American officials were not familiar enough with India to counter British authorities. Furthermore, Welles note that:

> ... given Churchill's attitude, intervention by this Government, even in the manner suggested, would be interpreted as taking advantage of the British in time of crisis.[140]

He, therefore, recommended against intervention unless:

> ... we are convinced that some steps of this character are required from the standpoint of our own national policy, and of our national defense.[141]

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States' entry into the war on the side of the Allies, the United States showed greater interest in India because of her strategic position in the Far East and the Middle Eastern war operations, and her tremendous manpower and significant resources. The United States was also interested in India's struggle for freedom because it realized that a free India would have relieved the Allies of their anxiety as to what India might do, and also would have fought against Japan in the Far East. President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were privately saying "... everything that the most enthusiastic support of India's freedom could have expected, and ... were convinced that the American people were with us."[142] The United States was interested to see that the British Government would at least give to the Indian leaders the necessary assurance of independence after the war, so that they could cooperate with the Allied war cause.

Disappointed in Churchill's attitude, the Indian leaders and their sympathizers continued to look for assistance. If words could not persuade, perhaps example might. Several months before Churchill discouraged Atlantic Charter hopes, a speaker offered in the House of Commons a new formula to replace representations that something would be worked out for India at war's end. He found his inspiration in the promise which Americans had extended to their Asian dependency:

> I am suggesting that the matter be approached from a new angle and that we declare that, a definite number of years hence, independence will be granted. There is a precedent, which must not be driven too far, set by the United States of America with regard to the Philippines, whereby, in 1946, full independence will be given to that country.[143]

American interest in the world at large had been expanding rapidly as Roosevelt turned his attention to grand strategy.Winant's effort to influence Churchill on the Charter speech, like Roosevelt's

promise to the Philippines, evidenced the newly enlarged American spirit.

The alliance with America had been the heart of Britain's war strategy and diplomacy. Early in the war, Churchill had decided that without American participation, victory was difficult at best. After the United States entered the war, Churchill followed Roosevelt's lead whenever he was unable to persuade F. D. R. because he thought nothing was more important than preserving the alliance. He also believed that the two countries were unlikely to disagree fundamentally. After the war ended this spirit disappeared. But before the war was over, both of them were gone. The fact they were fighting the same enemy was enough to hold the two countries together during the war, but when the fighting ended, that sense of a common purpose disappeared. America's traditional suspicion of Britain had been submerged during the war, but it returned soon afterward. H. G. Nicholas claims Britain desired the reality, if not the form of an (Anglo-American) alliance.[144] While the ambition for some sort of merger with the United States was not new, it is clear the concept re-emerged in the 1940s to become a primary principle of British Foreign Policy. The central theme of diplomacy for Churchill's coalition government, this policy remained a major consideration for the Labour Government during the mid-1940s although somewhat less emphasized. During the period cited (6 September 1939 through 7 December 1941) the Indian problem, in so far as it existed, was regarded by the American State Department as the exclusive concern of Great Britain. American representation in India was effected through consular and quasi-diplomatic officers. In the political sphere, the United States Government may be said to have had no policy toward India during this period.[145] After 7 December 1941, with the entry of the United States into the war and the ultilization of India with Great Britain as a base of operations against the Japanese, American involvement in India was such as to warrant the formulation of a definite policy. In the formulation of that policy it was necessary to consider two factors: first, the continued recognition by the United States Government that any change in the Indian constitutional position could be affected only through the willingness of Great Britain to permit such a change. The second, in a manner satisfactory to both nations of India (Hindu and

Muslim), any solution to the Indian problem would be in accord with the third article of the Atlantic Charter. The realization was stated by Cordell Hull in his address of 11 September 1943: "It is the belief of the American people that all peoples who with a decent respect to the opinion of mankind, have qualified themselves to assume and to discharge the responsibilities of liberty are entitled to its enjoyment."[146]

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle For Europe*, p. 635.
2. Wm. Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay Preface*, vii-viii.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
5. *Congressional Record*, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 92:2 (17 January 1933), 2068.
6. *The Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. 3 p. 118.
7. *Loc. cit.*
8. *Congressional Record*, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 78:5 (19 March 1934), 4831.
9. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. 4, p. 455.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 494.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 495.
12. Quoted in Sir Norman Angell, "A Re-Interpretation of Empire, United Empire," 435 (Sept-Oct. 1952); Schlesinger's review appeared in the *Nation*, 2 Nov. 1946.
13. Louis, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
14. Nicholas Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby, eds., *The Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. II, p. 90.
15. James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom*, p. 549.
16. Louis, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
17. Lord Moran, *Churchill Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran*, p. 207.
18. Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The anti-Colonies Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, *"Political Science Quarterly"*, LXX (March 1955), p. 18.
19. Moran, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
20. *Loc. cit.*

21. Samuel I. Roseman, *The Public Papers and Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. xiii: *Victory and the Threshold of Peace*, p. 354.

22. Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 609.

23. FRUS, 1941, I, 367; *Congressional Record*, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 87:1, 464.

24. Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 605.

25. Ruxford G. Tugwell, *The Democratic Roosevelt* p. 608.

26. Seling Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse--Its Twentieth Century Reaction*, p. 230.

27. D. Gerald Nash, *The Great Depress.on and World War II: Oragnizing America 1933-1945*, p. 91.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Congressional Record*, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 78:6, 6201.

30. *Congressional Record*, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 79:1, 755.

31. *Ibid*, part 9, p. 9827.

32. During 1934 American isolationism was whipped into virtual hysteria by the investigation of the Nye Committee. Established by Congress to explore the causes of the American entry into World War I, the Committee which was headed by isolationist Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, focused its attention on manufacturers. Operating under the assumption that wars were caused by economic forces, the Committee charged that the United States had been tricked into World War I by munitions makers. Although the evidence Nye and his staff collected hardly warranted such a conclusion, the Committee's work had an enormous impact on the American public and stiffened isolationist resolve. See D. Gerald Nash, *The Great Depression and World War II: Organizing America 1933-1945*, pp. 92-3.

33. *Congressional Record*, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81:8, 7824.

34. *Congressional Record*, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 80:2, 2292.

35. *Congressional Record*, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81:4, 4077.

36. For the immediate time, the isolationist mood of the Americans was also revealed in Roosevelt's diplomacy in the Far East. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 provided for Philippine independence after a ten-years period of transition Thus, as the Nazis stepped up their persecution of Jews and other minorities, a steady trickle of German Jews sought refuge in countries around the world. Although many beseeched the United States to allow them entry, Congress refused to modify the existing quota, which allowed 15,000 immigrants to enter the country each year. Roosevelt was sympathetic to their plight but hesitant to take overt action. As a result, while about 120,000

German-Jews were permitted to enter the United States as refugees between 1933 and 1941, millions more found the door closed and eventually perished in Nazi death camps. See Nash, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-4.

37. In 1933 Japanese armies marched into the five northern provinces of China, in direct violation of the Open Door agreements, the Nine-Power Pact of 1921, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1937.

38. nash, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

39. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt And American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, p. 148.

40. First, the freedom of speech, everywhere in the world. The second, freedom of worship, everywhere in the world. Third, the freedom from want, which meant economic understandings which would secure every nation a healthy peace-time life its inhabitants, everywhere in the world. And fourth, the freedom from fear, which meant the end of wars. See *Congressional Record*, 77th Cong., 2nd Sees., 87:1, 464.

41. Great Britain had spent \$4.5 billion of its \$6.5 billion in dollar reserves, and lacked funds to pay for further largescale purchases of military supplies in the United States. See Nash, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

42. *Congressional Record*, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 87:1, 2178.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 2170-3.

44. Roosevelt's search for information was an extraordinary and effective performance. He did not rely on the traditional administrative hierarchy and channels to provide him with information. From a variety of official and unofficial sources, from letters, memoranda, gossip and casual conversation, Roosevelt gathered his own private storehouse of information. The first task of an executive, as he evidently saw it, was to guarantee himself an effective flow of information and ideas ... Roosevelt's persistent effort therefore was to check and balance information acquired through official channels by information acquired through a myriad of private, informal and unorthodox channels and espionage networks. At times he seemed almost to pit his personal sources against his official sources. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal*, Vol. II pp. 522-3.

45. John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, Vol. I, p. 18-9.

46. H. C. 31st. 1st Sess., 116:5, 1919, Col. 703.

47. Singh, *The Indian National Movement and American Opinion*, pp.355-6.

48. Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. vi.

49. R. Coupland, *The Cripps Mission*, p. 6.

50. R. J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, 1917-1940, p. 316.

51. *The Nation*, CXLIX (11 Nov. 1939), 511.

52. "Britain, India, and War," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 Nov. 1939, p. 14.

53. Resolution passed by the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, on 18 Sept. 1939: Prem 447/3. Between 1937 and 1939 the British design of federation was frustrated by the success of the Congress in the provinces and its subsequent attempt to resolve the dualities of the Indian problem by direct confrontation with the Muslims and the Princes. The Congress' purpose was to create a *de facto* unitary government and proclaim its freedom. The process of devolution defeated both the British objective and the Congress purpose and it steadily advanced towards division of India. For detail see Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, pp. 316-7.

54. Prem 4 47/3.

55. Cab 21/614 18/5/4 part II.

56. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 31.

57. James E. Thorold Roger, ed., *Speeches by the Rt. Hon. John Bright, M. P.* pp. 26-8.

58. Zetland to Linlithgow, 6 Dec. 1937, *Zetland Collection* (hereafter Z. C.), IOL, London.

59. Anti-Muslim sentiment and a passionate religious nationalism found their most influential statement in the novels of Bankim Chandra Chatterji (1838-1894). Possibly he used Muslims as villains in *"Anandamath* (The Abbey of Bliss) in 1862 in his famous poem *"Bande Mataram."* One of the Characters in the poem invokes the goddess Kali as both deity and motherland protector:
Mother to thee I bow
Who hath said thou art weak in thy lands,
When the swords flash out in twice
Seventy million hands,
And a seventy million voices roar
thy dreadful name from shore to shore.
See Bankim Chandra Chatterji, translated by Nores Chandra Sen-Gupta, p. 78; William Theodore de Bary et al., eds., Indian Tradition, pp. 709 -14.

60. Chatterjee, p. 78.

61. An ex-civilian characterized it as "an appeal to the lower instincts and ideals of Hinduism in its most demoralizing aspects," Sir J. D. Rees, *The Real India*, p. 175.

62. R. J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-1945*, p. 3.

63. R. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement*, p. 144.

64. William Barton, "The State and the White Paper," *Empire Review*, January 1934, p.21.

65. Resolution No. 8 of AIML of 11-12 April 1936, Resolution of the All-India Muslim League from May 1924 to December 1936 (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 66, 7.

66. *Loc. cit.*

67. "India's Leaders Mark Time," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 Dec.1939, p. 2.

68. D. S. File 111 41/3-1246 CS/D,National Archives, Washington.

69. Telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 21 Jan. 1942: MSS. EUR F. 125/22, L/P&5/509: ff8-15, IOR.

70. WP(42)42 R/30/1/1: ff 27-9; The marquess of Linlithgow: Speeches and Statements, p. 228.

71. De Amaury Riencourt, *The Soul of India*, p. 339.

72. *Loc. cit.*

73. IOR: MSS.EUR F. 125/143, p. 1.

74. *Vida Mandirs*, (Hindu temples of learning) were opened. Schools began the day by saluting the Congress flag, by singing the "*Bande Mataram*" a notoriously anti-Muslim song, and by puja (Hindu worship), or the worshiping of Gandhi's portrait, a practice deeply obnoxious to Muslims. For detail see Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, pp. 29-30.

75. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, pp. 312-3.

76. Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

77. H. G. Rawlison, *The British Achievement In India: A Survey* p. 214.

78. L. S. Amery, *Asiatic Review*, January 1941; *My Political Life*, Vol. III, p. 109.

79. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement*, p. 187; Fredrick Birkenhead, *The Earl of Birkendhead: The last Phase* p. 246.

80. I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 109.

81. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. I p. 154.

82. C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright, eds., *the Partition of India*, p. 90.

83. 59 Wp (42)42 R/30/1/1: ff 27-9; Mansergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 88.

84. Coupland, *The Cripps Mission*, p. 10; Edward Thompson, *Enlist India For Freedom* p. 28.

85. Coupland, *op. cit.*; p. 19.

86. R. G. Coupland, *Diary: India*, 1941-1942, 29 Jan. 1942, Coupland Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, London.

87. Resolution of the Congress Working Committee on the War Crisis, 14 Sep. 1939; M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, eds., *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-1947*, II, pp. 484-8.

88. Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorari, eds., *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-1947*, II, p. 600.

89. On 8 August 1940, the Viceroy Linlithgow, made an offer on behalf of the British Government to expand the Executive Council immediately by including representatives of political parties, and to set up a War Advisory Council containing representatives of Indian States and of other interests. He announced that after the war, an Indian constitution with due regard for the rights of the minorities.

90. See India Correspondent's despatch, *The Times*, 22 Jan. 1941.

91. Elliot Roosevelt, *As he Saw, It*, p. 36. One does not know how far to credit Elliot Roosevelt's account. While Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt wrote people who heard many of the conversations recorded herein, interpreted them differently, accordingly to their own thoughts and beliefs. p. ix.

92. p. 36.

93. The Atlantic Charter reaffirmed the "*Four-Freedom*" which Roosevelt had enunciated early that year, renounced territorial aggrandizement, promised equal access to trade and raw materials, and pronounced "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." FRUS, 1941, I, 367. The quoted protion is from Aricle III of the Charter; Telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 30 Jan. 1942: MSS.EUR F. 125/22.

94. The United States Congress, Senate, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Document 123, p. 1; Telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 30Jan. 1942: MSS.EUR F. 125/22; Theodore A, Wilson, The First Summit, p. 188.

95. PRO: Prem 4 46/12 XC/A; *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 220.

96. Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 14 May 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 220-2.

97. *Ibid.*

98. Coupland, *The Cripps Mission*, p. 13.

99. Winant to Hull, 4 Nov. 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III 181-2. (Diplomatic Papers).

100. Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle For Europe*, p. 633.

101. It should be remembered that the "Council of State was composed of a hand-picked group chosen because of their loyalty to the British Crown and that Congress and Muslim League had refused to name even one man to membership, the significance of their protest. See "India Council Votes Deep Discontent," *Christian Century*, LVIII (3 Dec. 1941), 1492.

102. Elliot Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, p. 37.

103. Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 633; DS File 845.00/1261 PS/PLS.

104. Elliot, *op. cit.*, p.122.

105. Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

106. Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 637.

107. "In Far-Away India," *New York Times*, 24 Nov. 1941, p. 16.

108. *Ibid.*

109. On 11 September 1941, MPS Silverman, Sorenson, Davies and Cove, all spoke to the point that Atlantic Charter's provisions should apply to India. H. C. 374 Deb. 353. In the same year (25 Nov. 1941) the American press had given considerable publicity to the issue of Atlantic Charter. DS File 740.00 11/16960a.

110. Coupland, *The Cripps Mission*, p. 13; Diary.

111. PS/FPJ 845.00/1462.

112. Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 635.

113. Extract from "India and Freedom," by L. S. Amery, Prem 4 45/6, pp. 317-19.

114. Prem 4 42/9

115. Prem 4 42/9; Telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 2 Jan. 1943: MSS.EUR F. 125/24.

116. 308 H. C. Deb. 100-103.

117. 845.00/1261 PS/PLS.

118. *FRUS*, 1941, III, 170.

119. Letter Halifax to Hull, 28 May 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 170-1.

120. Letter Halifax to Welles, 28 June 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 171-2.

121. *Ibid.*, Letter Welles to Halifax, 2 July 1941, pp. 172-3.

122. *FRUS*, 1941, III, 170-1.

123. *Ibid.*, Memorandum of conversation Halifax to Welles, 15 July 1941, p. 174.

124. *The Times* (London) 21 July 1941, p. 4.

125. *New York Times*, 21 July 1941, p. 3.

126. Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

127. *New York Times*, 22 July 1941, p. 5; DS File 711.45/126-44.

128. *New York Times*, 22 July 1941, p. 5.

129. Tel. Hull to Winant, 16 Sept. 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 174-5.

130. 711.45/12-6-44.

131. Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State, Berle, 5 May 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III 177-8.

132. *Ibid.*

133. Tel. Wilson to Hull, 16 June 1941: 845.00/1237. Unpublished files of the Department of State, maintained in the National Archives in Washington, D. C. (Hereafter referred to as unpublished documents, National Archives).

134. Tel. Winant to Hull, 1 August 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 178-9.

135. Memorandum Welles to Hull, 6 Aug. 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 181.

136. H. C. 374, Is., 9 Sept. 1941, Col. 69.

137. Tel. Winant To Hull, 4 Nov. 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 181-4.

138. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-5.

139. Memorandum of Department by Murray, 7 Nov. 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 184-5.

140. *Ibid.*, 186-7.

141. Memorandum Welles to Hull, 15 Nov. 1941: *FRUS*, 1941, III, 186-7.

142. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, II, 1483.

143. Ammon, MP for North Camberwell, H. C. 371, 1s., 22 April 1941, Col. 65. The speaker was one of the ardent *"friends of India"* in the House.

144. H. G. Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 60.

145. DS File 711.45/12-6-44.

146. *Loc. cit.*

4

ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK OVER INDIA 1942

British Respond

To appreciate the extent of American influence in Great Britain in the early years of World War II, it is necessary to recall the circumstances in which the British found themselves during the perilous year of 1940. In 1940-41, the widespread belief in London was that the outcome of the war, and perhaps even the survival tenability of the British Isles, depended on American intervention. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the full scale entry of the United States into the war was greeted with enormous satisfaction and relief because Great Britain and her empire no longer stood alone.[1] India became a vital base for operations in the Pacific and South-East Asia and those favouring a new initiative toward India began to exert pressure for change. Within a month Churchill was approached from three main quarters: the Labour members of his cabinet, the President of the United States, and the Indians themselves.

Almost everywhere Americans were viewed as the "unbiased judges of democracy" and the British people of all classes began to look into the New World as the saviour of the old.[2] America, as a belligerent and as the chief foreign supplier for the allied efforts, became centrally involved in the strategy and planning of the war. At the same time, the importance of India could no longer be discounted as peripheral to the war effort, nor could the American interest in India be dismissed as interference in the internal affairs of the Empire.[3] The United States now assumed a more active role in British-Indian relations. While Churchill was in Washington, (22 December 1941-14 January 1942) Roosevelt raised the issue of India's political future with him in a personal

conversation, in which he got a full taste of the Prime Minister's inflexibility on the Issue.[4] Churchill himself has recounted:

> The President had first discussed the Indian problem with me, on the usual American lines, during my visit to Washington in December, 1914. I reacted so strongly and at such length that he never raised it verbally again.[5]

Under the combined pressure of the worsening military situation, dissension within his own Cabinet, and pressue from America, Churchill realized the difficulty of sustaining his do-nothing policy on India. His concern was a product of the deteriorating situation in the East. The President was also anxiously watching the war situation in the Far East. By 25 Feburary 1942, Singapore had already surrendered to the Japanese and it was doubtful how long Burma could hold out.During this time, when the Japanese were practically hammering at the gates of India, the political differences among the British, the Hindu, and the Muslim leaders were reaching a climax.[6] *The Christian Science Monitor*, commenting upon the awakening of Asia accomplished by Japan, stated that:

> President Roosevelt had revoked Winston Churchill's exclusion of India from the Atlantic Charter by significantly declaring that the Eight Points apply to the whole world.[7]

The President was backed by much American comment and sharp criticisim of Britain. Kate Mitchell stated in *Pacific Affairs* that British policy in India during the two years of war already had been dominated by commercial motives and was to blame for India's defenceless position, despite her great economic potential.[8] These ideas were remarkably similar to those credited to President Roosevelt. Prevailing American opinion such as existed seems to have been strongly sympathetic to India and very critical of Britain. America, perhaps, did not need to look into the future as carefully as did Britain, and American opinion leaves the impression of being interested only in the immediate defeat of the Axis, and in particular Japan, no matter what the result.

There was strong British reaction to American criticism and the *New Republic* referred to suggestions from London that citizens of one of the United Nations ought not to criticize the war efforts of another.

To this the United States replied that in such a war such criticism was necessary. Referring to India, the *New Republic* stated that only free men could fight for their homes but they did not do so in India, where the division between Hindu and Moslem communities had been an obstacle to such freedom. The *New Republic* felt, that "this obstacle [had] been used as an excuse for inaction than as a challenge to ingenuity which would find a solution."[9]

More noticeable in 1942 was the involvement in Indian affairs of China, in the shape of a visit by Chiang Kai-shek and his wife in February. American comment saw in Chiang's parting message to India, a message to Britain, "to quit stalling on the subject of India's political freedom."[10] Chaing said:

> I hope Britain, without waiting for any demand on the part of the Indian people, as speedily as possible will give them real political power so they will be in a position to develop further their spiritual and material strength. The Indian people thus would realize that their participation in the war was not merely to aid anit-aggression nations to secure victory, but the turning point in their struggle for their own freedom.[11]

In a meeting with Jinnah, Chiang Kai-shek told him that "he [Chiang] knew nothing of the political and constitutional problems of India, but in a parting message he has advised British Government to give real political power and freedom to India."[12] Jinnah then mentioned that "India is not one national state; its two major nations being Hindu and Muslim, and one third of India is being under princes."[13] Moreover, commenting upon Chiang's statement, Jinnah told to the Associated press:

> ... we cannot accept the machinations of those who speak in the name of freedom for Hindu India only. We want our Hindu brethren to be free but do not want to be ruled by them; both Hindu and Muslim nations should be free equally in their respective homelands and zones, any attempt militating against Pakistan's demand will lead to the gravest disaster in India at this critical moment. I trust the British Government and public will not be carried away by generalities in which the Marshal has indulged after a fortnight's visit of India.[14]

Churchill entirely disagreed with Chiang's views and did not consider them relevant to the Indian political situation. In his telegram to Roosevelt, he wrote:

> We do not agree with Chiang Kai-shek's estimate of the Indian situation. The Congress Party in no way represents India and is strongly opposed by over 90 million Mohammedans, 40 million Untouchables, and the Indian States comprising some 90 millions, to whom we are bound by Treaty. Congress represents mainly the intelligentsia of non-fighting Hindu elements and can neither defend India nor raise a revolt—I earnestly hope therefore, Mr. President, that you will do your best to dissuade Chiang Kai-shek from his completely misinformed activities, and will lend no countenance to putting pressure upon His Majesty's Government.[15]

British spokesmen often stated that the Muslims in India would not tolerate self-government in that country, whether as a dominion of the Empire or as an independent state, because as a minority they feared rule by the Hindu majority. For this reason, if for no other, the Secretary of State for India, Amery said, that "Britain can not give India full self-government: the result of such a gift would be civil war and anarchy, or at best a partition of India into a Pakistan and a Hindu State."[16] Another such spokesman was the Duke of Devonshire, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for India, in the House of Lords, on 3 Feburary 1942, who said in part:

> The Claim of the Congress ... is contested, and always will be contested, by the overwhelming majority of the great Moslem community ... who remain unalterably, and I think I can truthfully say increasingly, opposed to being governed by the Congress Party ... Sooner than accept Congress rule, the Moslems have now formulated a demand for the partition of India under the name of Pakistan. In the face of these facts—and very hard and stubborn facts they are---to whom are we to hand over the Government of India?[17]

The Muslim leadership applauded such British official statements as "the British have not been ungenerous masters."[18]

Now, the Muslim community as a whole consistently indicated that its one fundamental political interest was complete protection against Hindu domination, and that protection could only be secured through the Pakistan scheme. No other solution would be acceptable.[19] The establishment of a completely independent Pakistan in the north-west and north-eastern zones of India, with full control of defence, foreign affairs, communications, customs, currency and exchange, etc., would be the only solution to the Indian problem.[20]

> It was quite evident that the United States and China expected some British action and a number of sources attributed changes in India to American and Chinese pressure.[21] It may be noted that the State Department had also been pressed by twelve influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led by Senator Robert M. Lafollette, to ask Britain for an immediate pledge of post-war self-government for India.[22]

Shortly after this, there crept into American comment the first note of dissatisfaction with India as well as Britain. Despite Japan's steady advance, in the opinion of *The Nation*, Britain and India were not approaching matters realistically. It agreed with *The London Tribune*, a journal close to Sir Stafford Cripps, that: "No half-measures have any value now. The Indian revolution is on ... This is not opportunity knocking at our door—it is history battering it down." Yet it did not agree with Nehru's curious statement on minorities, that:

> The question of minorities does not really arise in the present crisis, and in any event all reasonable and possible protection will be given to them. Eventually there will be agreement or the matter may be referred to an international tribunal—or ultimately the problem will be solved by conflict. The risk has to be taken; there is no other way.[23]

In its opinion this approach was "unreasonable and dangerous." It was through wooing Hindus, by insisting upon a one-sided immediate independence, ignoring the Muslim's interest, that India was plunged into the horrors of civil war. Thus, when liberal and pro-Indian Americans urged limited autonomy for India they did not do so in terms of complete independence, and no thought seems to have been

entertained that even less than this might in fact prove an acceptable desire. This may have been true at the beginning of 1940,[24] but Japan had moved far and fast, and so had Indian thought.

If events were moving fast in the East, they were certainly not moving fast enough in England to satisfy Americans. Resentfully Hearst asked: "Is it anything less than utter insanity for the British to hesitate to give "Dominion Status" to India?" Japan was advancing and offering freedom and India would not decline at her hands what Britain refused. Using the teachnique so common to his journalism, the following was set in capital letters: "HOW MUCH BETTER TO GIVE TO INDIA THE LIBERTY THAT ENGLAND AND AMERICA CLAIM TO HAVE AS THEIR IDEALS AND OBJECTIVES IN THIS WAR." This continued to be the Hearst argument.[25]

The war situation worsened rapidly. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the first effective naval action by the United States in the Pacific was The Battle of The Coral Sea on 8 May 1942. The intervening months were the darkest of the war for India. The Japanese tide swept through South East Asia, conquering the countries designated as members of the "co-prosperity sphere."Just as the attack on Pearl Harbor had temporarily removed the American threat to Japanese ambitions, so the battle of Singapore exposed the weakness of British defences. Britain never regained her position of dominance in Asian waters. With the fall of Singapore on 15 May 1942, Britain had lost the war in the Pacific. From that moment on, the British position was maintained only under the umbrella of American power.

Churchill was cloistered with Roosevelt in a White House conference room when the news of the fall of Singapore reached him. The vulnerability of India must have been in the thoughts of both men, and with good reason. In the three short weeks that followed, the Japanese war machine swept up the Malayan peninsula into Burma, capturing Rangoon, Under these circumstances the President had already discussed India with the Prime Minister on 25 February 1942, and sent a cable to Ambassador A. H. Winant in London. In his cable, the President said it was his understanding that, because of the political differences between the British Government and the Indian people, the latter would not be enthusiastic in joining the British defence against the Japanese. He asked the ambassador to talk to Prime Minister Churchill

about British-Indian relations in the light of the new war situation in the Far East and to send him a report. The next day Winant sent a reply from London to the effect that the Prime Minister would communicate with the President directly and without delay. Churchill, however, was not sympathetic to the President's suggestions on the Indian problem, which he interpreted as interference in a British domestic matter. The Prime Minister said:

> The United States had shown an increasing direct interest in Indian affairs as the Japanese advance into Asia spread westward. The concern of the Americans with the strategy of a world war was bringing them into political issues on which they had strong opinions and little experience. Before Pearl Harbor, India had been regarded as a lamentable example of British imperialism, but as an exclusive British responsibility. Now that the Japanese were advancing towards its frontiers the United States Government began to express views and offer counsel on Indian affairs ...[26]

Now, after a long talk with the Prime Minister about the Indian situation and with the rapid Japanese advance toward South East Asia, Winant realized the importance of the Indian problem. Then, on 26 February 1942, he sent another cable to the President about the realities of the manpower problem in India. He wrote:

> The Prime Minister will not take any political steps which would alienate the Moslem population of over 100 million. About 75% of the Indian troops and volunteers are Moslems. Of the balance less than half, or perhaps 12% of the total, are in sympathy with the Congress group. The fighting people of India are from Northern Provinces, largely antagonistic to the Congress movement. The big populations of the low-lying provinces of the Center and the South have not the vigor to fight anybody.[27]

Meanwhile, regarding the defence of India against approaching Japanese invasion, Harriman, Naval adviser to the President in London, advised the President by telegram:

> Danger is of offending Moslems who, besides being a 100 million strong, constitute the main fighting part of the Army.

> Whatever happens, they will not allow themselves to be governed by majority produced by the Congress Caucus and the Hindu Priesthood. ... Evidently it would be unwise to risk wrecking the existing Army and alienating the Moslems of the north at the moment when Moslem aid is the main protection forthcoming for the threatened regions.[28]

Moreover, Winant asked the President to make some declaration to satisfy the Moslems, which would be helpful in the United States and not bring about a breakdown. Regarding his suggestions, he hoped that the President would not press him unduly because of his better judgement on the general war situation concerning "what is most likely to beat the enemy, which is his aim."[29] Then, he asked the President no to disturb British policies at a moment when things were increasingly aquiver. He concluded his argument within a reference to the telegram from the British Governor of the Punjab:

> British declaration that India will at future date be given right to secede from Empire. Responsible section of Moslems who are majority hold [in Punjab] unshakeable view that until constitution acceptable to Moslem India is devised, Britain must continue to hold the ropes. They will certainly be worried that constitution on lines contemplated would place power in hands of Hindus whom they already suspect of pro-Japanese tendencies. They will therefore be diverted from working for defence of India as a whole and seek to align themselves elsewhere. Unprecedented intensification of bitterness between Sikhs and Moslems, between whom relations are already dangersouly strained, will result.[30]

The President was not willing, however, to bow completely before the Prime Minister's position on this issue. During the week before the fall of Singapore, Roosevelt instructed Winant to sound Churchill out on the possibilities of a settlement between the British Government and the Indian political leaders. Despite Churchill's preference for keeping America out of the Indian situation, he realized that he could not ignore the increasing reliance which Britain would have to place on United States military aid in the Pacific. In a letter to the Viceroy, Churchill emphasized that the pressure of American opinion necessiated action. He wrote:

> It would be impossible, owing to unfortunate rumours and publicity and general American outlook, to stand on purely negative attitude ...[31]

Churchill, therefore, informed Winant and Harriman that he planned to appoint a special War Cabinet Committee to make suggestions on the issue of India. On 4 March 1942, Churchill wrote Roosevelt that he was contemplating a declaration on post-war dominion status, but reaffirmed that Britain could not abandon its obligations to the Muslims, Untouchables, and the Princes of India. To reinforce his arguments, in the following week, Churchill sent a series of letters to Roosevelt presenting some of the problems in India. Churchill argued the case for maintaining the *status quo* and preserving the tranquility of the Indian army of non-fighting Hindu elements, which could neither defend India nor raise a revolt. The letters emphasized the contribution of the loyal Muslim community to the Indian army, on whom everything depended, and stressed the problems in the army which might arise if the communal issues were to be raised.[32] The authors of these letters included Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, a Muslim member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and the British Governor of the Punjab. The important part of these communications was that Churchill submitted no evidence which mentioned only the importance of the Congress Party or its perspectives.

On March 10, Roosevelt suggested a broad Indian policy to Churchill, encompassing the entire Indian community. In his suggestion to the Prime Minister, the President drew from American history a rather lengthy analogy, which drew parallels between the Indian situation and that of the American experience after independence. He pointed out that America's first attempt at self-government under the Articles of Confederation [in intermediate stage between autonomous states and a Federal Union, lasting from 1783-1789] was a temporary measure, "to remain in effect only until such time as experience and trial and error could bring about a permanent union."[33] Roosevelt also stressed that America's federal government was established by a group of sincere patriots, and not by a parliament.

Relating this example to India, Roosevelt suggested that the five or six years of war might become the period when the different groups

in India could pass through their period of the Articles of Confederation. He assumed that if the Indians were allowed to form an interim government for the duration of war, they would be in a position to form a stable and united federal government after the war.

> ... my principal thought is that it [Indian federation] would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent Government for the whole country—this consideration to be extended over a period of five or six years, or at least until a year after the end of war.[34]

The President envisioned a body of representative Indians speaking for different groups, covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies, which in the interim of the war would have governmental responsibility "both executive and administrative." Roosevelt concluded his argument saying:

> Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.[35]

Churchill was not impressed by this example from American history and did not consider it relevant to the Indian situation. In his memoirs, he worote:

> ... states which have no overseas colonies or possessions are capable of rising to moods of great elevation and detachment about the affairs of those who have.[36]

And, again in reference to Roosevelt's letter, he commented:

> This document is of high interest because it illustrates the difficulties of comparing situations in various centuries and scenes where almost every material fact is totally different, and the dangers of trying to apply any superficial resemblances which may be noticed to the conduct of the war.[37]

The President's strong plea for a liberal policy and his idealistic approach was virtually nullified by the tone of his (Roosevelt) opening and closing paragraphs. He opened the letter saying:

> ... and I am grateful that you have kept me in touch with it. As you can well realize, I have felt much diffidence in making any

> suggestions, and it is a subject which, of course, all of you good people know far more about than I do.[38]

He ended his latter, on an equally humble note, reassuring Churchill that he would not interfere and would trust his judgment:

> For the love of heaven don't bring me into this, though I do want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except in so far as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making.[39]

Meanwhile the Cabinet Committee appointed by Churchill was still considering the possibility of opening negotiations with the Indian leaders. The overriding demand of the Congress Party was for a promise of independence in the near future. The leaders also hoped that the British would underscore the sincerity of such an offer by designating a specific date for India's independence. The Cabinet Committee countered this demand with the offer of dominion status as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities, with the right to secede from the Commonwealth.[40]

Since the Indian nationalists had hoped for dominion status as a result of their participation in the First World War, this was not a starting declaration, although in timing, it was more clearly spelled out than ever before. The right to secede from the Commonwealth was a concession from the British, but it would be difficult to imagine a fully self-governing country without such a right.

Agreement on a basic constitution was a prerequisite to the transfer of power. Thus, some scheme for choosing the leaders who would write the constitution had to be suggested. But, for the British, the more immediate question was the cooperation and support of the Hindu-Muslim leaders during the war. This raised the problem of some arrangement for the immediate participation of their leaders in the Government of India.

Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for India, originally proposed linking these two issues together with the establisment of a Defence Council for the duration of the war whose members were to be charged with the responsibility of drafting the constituion of India. This Defence Council was to be formed by the leaders of the different communities, parties and princes, who would be elected by some form

of proportional voting by the existing members of the provincial lower houses. The attractiveness of Amery's scheme was the dual responsibility of the Council, defence in the interim, and the framing of the constitution for the future. This would have given the Congress Party very compelling reasons to cooperate. If they wished to become part of the constituion-making body for India, they would not only have had to take up positions on the Defence Council, but in order to do so, they would have had to re-enter the provincial governments which they had left in 1939. This dual responsibility was unfortunately omitted in the final draft.

Amery commended this plan to the Viceroy on the basis that it left his executive and legislative position untouched. His argument did not convince the Viceroy, who insisted that the new body would either be in dangerous conflict with the Executive Council or the Council would become subservient to it. Furthermore, Linlithgow argued that it would infect the army and the conduct of the war with the whole constitutional and communal controversy. As his alternative, the Viceroy returned to the August offer, calling for a renewed attempt to bring leaders of the parties together into the Executive Council to discuss a settlement.[41] Cripps also advised the Viceroy that:

> ... in my view, negotiations between the Moslem League and the Congress were out ôf question at present unless a third party also that they should be asked to put brought them together and that he [viceroy] was the only possible third down in writing, [sic] Congress, how far it was prepared to go in meeting the moslem demands, and the Moslem League, exactly what demands it made, so that he might compare the two statements and attempt to bridge the difference by negotiation ...[42]

Like Cripps, Linlithgow had come to realize that the Muslim League would resent any promise of a constituent assembly, (or Executive Council) without the prior settlement of the constitutional problem, for such a declaration would further inflame Muslim opinion, of which Jinnah's call for a day of deliverance was an ominous indication. But, now, there was little chance of a Hindu-Muslim agreement upon a constituent assembly, and to defer to the Congress demand would only make Congress more unreasonable and antagonize

the Muslims who were still, after all, working within the provincial sections of the 1935 Act.

This concept of a preliminary exchange of idea was dropped by the Cabinet Committee, which chose to focus attention on the future constitution of India. They were particularly impressed by the recent demand of Jinnah that the Muslim majority provinces in northern India be granted a separate government and their own independence as a nation, to be called Pakistan. In recognizing this demand the Committee proposed that each province be given the option to secede from the Indian Union once the independent government of India was established.

Linlithgow's immediate response to this proposal was to suggest that the Indian states also be granted the choice of adhering to the Union or not. The Viceroy took this opportunity to confer with General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief in India, and several governors of the northern provinces. The consensus of the governors of the provinces of the Muslim majorities was that the situation would be worsened by the offer of a local option. They correctly believed that this would be interpreted as the acceptance of Pakistan, and the effect on the Sikhs in the Punjab might seriously upset internal security. In light of these suggestions, the Viceroy reversed his original position. He not only dropped the idea of the option for the princes, but suggested that the draft declaration omit the idea altogether, leaving to the Indian constitution-making body the responsibility of producing a constitution acceptable to the various parties and interests.

The Cabinet Committee, however, was wedded to their original scheme. The draft declaration included Pakistan's right to secede from the Indian Union. The principal features:

(a) explicit acknowledgement that the future Indian dominion can secede if it so wishes;

(b) setting up the most suitable future constitution-making body immediately after the war if Indians had not previously come to an agreement on the subject themselves;

(c) option to any province not wishing to accede to the new constitution to stand out;

(d) the whole field of British obligations, as well as such continued military assistance as India might need, to be dealt with by a separate treaty to be concluded with the constitution-making body and to come into force simultaneously with the new constitution ...[43]

This proposal strayed far from Amery's original suggestion in both form and emphasis. The focus was on the future; clear promises were made without any specific commitment for the present. The main reason for India's leaders to cooperate in the governing of their country for the remainder of the war would have to be derived from the hope that these future promises would be fulfilled. These promises, which purported to be all things to all groups in India, had a divisive rather than a unifying effect.

The conflicting proposals of Amery and Linlithgow for the participation of the Indian leaders in the Government during the interim period gave rise to controversy within the War Cabinet Committee. On March 10, they abruptly concluded their discussion, papering over their disagreement with a loosely-worded article (3) which read:

(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the defence of India as part of their World War effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the reponsibility of the Government of India with the cooperation of the peoples of India. His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task, which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.[44]

No definite agreement was reached between the Viceroy and the War Cabinet on the details of the policy to be pursued. Although it was Sir Stafford Cripps who was to negotiate the settlement, it was the Viceroy who would have to implement the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, there was apparently no understanding between the War Cabinet and Cripps as to the extent which he might go in granting concessions to possible demands. It was a curious move to have sent Cripps to India without specific instructions on the limit to which he could go in bargaining, and without a specific policy decision on the question of the interim government, which would have to be resolved in the final agreement that he would sign. Indeed, he was now supposed to proceed to India to find among the Indian leaders and the officials of the Government of India the unity of purpose that had eluded the British Cabinet Committee. An atmosphere charged with so much uncertainty held scant prospect for success.[45]

A copy of the War Cabinet's draft declaration reached the State Department shortly before Churchill announced the Cripps Mission in the House of Commons. As Churchill put it:

> He [Cripps] carries with him the full confidence of His Majesty's Government, and he will strive in their name to procure the necessary measure of assent, not only from the Hindu majority, but also from those great minorities amongst whom the Moslems are the most numerous and on many grounds pre-eminent ... This was, of course, subject to the fulfilment of our obligations for the protection of minorities, including the depressed classes, and our treaty obligations to the Indian States, and to a settlement of certain lesser matters arising out of our long association with the fortunes of the Indian sub-continent.[46]

Wallace Murray, Head of the Near Eastern Division of the State Department, appraised the proposals in a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Summer Welles. With considerable enthusiasm, Murray endorsed the declaration as a genuine effort on the part of the British to meet the situation in liberal terms acceptable to the Indian leaders. Indeed, he predicted that the document would be acceptable to the Indians on all counts. He expressed the opinion that dominion status with the right to secede would satisfy the Congress, while the

right of the provinces to secede from the Indian Union would satisfy the Muslim League. His optimism was reinforced by the fact that he read into Article (e) the assurance that Indian leaders could form a cabinet-style government, with the exception of defence, in the interim period of the war.[47] Murray's memorandum convinced the President and his adviser that a solution to India's problem would be found without further American intervention.[48]

Unsuccessful Missions

The British Empire had survived one world war with its Indian Empire intact, but political change in India could not again be long delayed after the cataclysmic events of World War II. With the end in sight, debate in England began to be concerned with form and timing with communalism and conflicting indigenous claims. The when and how of Independence replaced the why.

In order to achieve the earliest possible realization of self-government in India, the British Government proposed that steps be taken to create a new Indian Union which would have the full status of a dominion with the power to secede, if it so desired, from the British Commonwealth.

Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, a constitution making body would be set up. It was suggested that this body would be elected, under the system of proportional representation, by an electoral college consisting of the members of the Lower Houses of all the Provincial Legislatures, for which elections would be held. The native states would be invited to send representatives to this constitution-making body in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of representatives of British India as a whole.

The British government undertook to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed on two conditions. First of all any province or provinces which were not prepared to accept the new constitution, would be entitled to frame by a similar process a constitution of their own, giving them the same full status as the "Indian Union. Native states would be similarly free to adhere to the new constitution or not. In either case, a revision of their treaty arrangement would have to be negotiated. Secondly, a treaty would be signed, one to be negotiated between the government and the constitution-making

body, to cover all matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands, particularly the protection of minorities in accordance with the British Government's past undertakings.

Until the new constitution could be framed, the British Government would retain control of the defence of India as part of their World War effort, but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and material resources of India should be the responsibility of the Government of India in cooperation with the peoples of India. Finally, the British Government invited the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations.

In January 1942, Cripps became leaders of the House of Commons and promised that the government would "shortly" do "something about India." *Time* feared that "shortly" would not be soon enough.[49] *Newsweek* told of S.C. Bose's flight to Germany, and feared that temporizing would turn his followers loose in India.[50] *Life* called India the richest prize whose fate was no longer entirely in the hands of the India Office, and remarked somberly: "The ruler for whom it works and from whom it buys has always heretofore been the most powerful ruler in the world."[51] America was clearly worried and impatient; *Time* commented: "To much of the outside world, the British government seemed like the Heifetz of all fiddlers while the Rome of all Romes burned."[52] Dissatisfaction with British policy was widespread and found expression in the House of Representatives where Bartel J. Jonkman of Michigan referred to editorial comment protesting the British stubbornness which had originally lost America, and now threatened to lose India. He concluded:

> So much now depends upon India, so much of world history and the survival of democracy in the world that it would seem that the British well can afford to be less stubborn, to yield to India's demands lest in the end she may lose all.[53]

On 3 March 1942, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles announced that a U. S. technical and economic mission was being sent to explore India's resources, thus acknowledging its strategic

importance. It was headed by Colonel Louis Johnson, former Assistant Secretary of War, who had been brought out of retirement. The other members were Henry F. Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State, who was to handle general economic survey; Arthur W. Herrington, President of the American society of Automotive Engineers, to advise on armoured vehicles and automotive production; Henry Beyster to advise on the organization of plants; and Dirk Dekker of the Illinois Steel Corporation to advise on the training of unskilled workers for semi-skilled and skilled jobs. Plainly important things were afoot for India.[54]

Hearst called the sending of this technical mission "a futile and fatal gesture, "because there was"... no promise of liberty, no mention of democracy–only assistance to the people of India in suporting the continued domination of the British Empire."[55] Yet at the same time the Hearst Press chided the Indians for refusing to fight alongside the British unless they were assured of liberty, commenting: "If the Japs get there, while they are still arguing about their payment the Indians will never get the faintest idea of liberty."[56] Naturally, Churchill declared, "we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion,"[57] by Japan.

Churchill emphasized the dangers of communal unrest which a British declaration might provoke. A communication from Jinnah demanded that if Britain intended "any major constitutional move then a separate Pakistan should be recognized."[58] The *Dawn*, the Muslim League's paper, stated that "the League would accept an interim arrangement provided nothing is done to torpedo or prejudice the Muslim claim for a national homeland and that, regardless of numbers, the major political parties should be given equal say in the government of country."[59] Sir Firoz Khan Noon, a Muslim member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, urged British resistance to a "Hindu solution" [Churchill's phrase] "irrespective of pressure from outside quarters which regarded the British Commonwealth from a different angle." The India Office military adviser warned that "any indications of change in command authority would have an unsettling effect on the Indian army."[60]

Roosevelt was not to be put off. On March 11, he sent Churchill a long statement of his "private views" [Churchill's term] about India, suggesting that America's post-revolutionary experience might contain a

useful lesson.[61] Roosevelt argued that a stopgap Article of Confederation offered a hopeful precedent for a temporary Dominion Government for India. In his memoirs Churchill cited the President's memorandum as illustrating the American propensity for preaching from inapplicable parables.[62] But as Sumner Welles was to point out, the proposals made to the Indians by the Labour Government four years later were "almost identical in principle with those of Roosevelt's suggestions."[63]

Churchill had not waited for the President's advice. Cumulative pressure at home and abroad already made a major gesture towards India seem desirable; the Japanese entry into Rangoon on March 8 made it imperative.[64] On one side the War Cabinet faced irresistible clamour from the U. S. Government for an immediate declaration of Britain's intentions towards independence for India. On the other hand, the Prime Minister seized on the device of a high-level mission to the Indian leaders as a tactic both to appease Britain public opinion and delay a potentially catastrophic decision.[65]

Eight days after the announcement of a United States military and supply mission for India, Churchill announced in the House of Commons that Sir Stafford Cripps was going to India on a mission designed to resolve India's political crisis.[66] It seems fairly certain now that Churchill sent Cripps to India in response to pressure from America and from elements in his own Government led by Cripps himself.[67]

The conclusion is inescapable that the Prime Minister exploited the mission to confuse his domestic critics, to ease the pressure from President Roosevelt and American opinion; and, in his own phrase, to "gain time" on the Indian problem.[68]

Now that something was actually to be done about India, the American press began to warn of the need for caution. *The New York Times* remarked: "No moment could be less suited than the present for a calm solution of one of the thorniest and most complicated questions in the world."[69] The *San Francisco News* columnist, Raymond Clapper, wrote from India that the arrival of Cripps might be worth several divisions, but warned that it was difficult for Americans to have an intelligent opinion on the problem of India, complicated as it was by age-old political and religious conflicts between Hindus and Muslims.

"Beyond hoping and urging some adjustment to relieve the situation" he wrote, "there is not much that Americans can contribute to discussion." He found that "the most difficult complication arose from the Muslim minority's objection to any change which might give power to the Hindu majority under Nehru."[70] The *New Republic* likewise warned that reckless handling might provoke civil war between Hindus and Muslim.[71] The *Nation* continued its new critical note of India, and the paper felt it would be happier:

> ... if there were signs that responsible leaders were taking positive steps to resist Japanese aggression instead of waiting for Britain to confess its past crimes, as Mr. Gandhi suggests. They seem to forget that the immediate reason for defending India is not to save the British Empire but to save India itself from new conquest and worse exploitation.[72]

Obviously both the conservative and liberal wings of American thought were fearful lest a wrong step be taken in India that would further imperial its [Anglo-American] war effort, and, while American liberals had been and were quite sure of what should and could have been done for India in the past, they were now less sure it could be done at this time.

In March 1942, President Roosevelt was concerned about the war situation in the Indian Ocean and the failure of the Indian people to cooperate with the Allied war effort. American public opinion was sympathetic to the cause of Indian independence.

It is difficult to determine whether the Prime Minister made the announcement of the Cripps Mission because of the Japanese threat to India, or because of President Roosevelt's suggestion. In all probability both factors were important. Moreover, one may also argue that the internal cabinet crisis also contributed to the final formulation of the Cripps Mission.

Anyhow, when the Indian leaders heard the announcement of the Cripps Mission, they believed that the British Government was sincere in its efforts to solve the Indian problem and, if such a solution were possible, they were willing to cooperate with the government. Furthermore, there was a prevalent sentiment in India that Churchill might have been influenced by Roosevelt, and hence induced to send

Cripps to India. Indian leaders also hoped that Churchill too might have been influenced by Chiang Kai-shek's Indian visit.

Soon after the announcement of the mission, Cripps asked Churchill to recall the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, from India, partly because his policies had already become unpopular, and partly becuase Cripps feared that he might run into difficulties with the Viceroy. The Prime Minister flatly rejected this request.

Cripps in India

On 23 March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in New Delhi to discuss the draft declaration with Indian political leaders.[73] The Cripps Mission was received by the Congress with enthusiasm, becuase Cripps had close links with its leaders.[74] Friend met friend [Cripps-Nehru] and the representative of Britain's might faced the representative of the Indian Congress people demanding to be free.[75] Cripps was aptly described once as "the Nehru of England."[76] Cripps was obviously well-fitted for a role as mediator by his legal training, his following in Britain, and his well known sympathy for the Congress leaders.[77] Cripps's conception of his mission can be reconstructed. He had helped to formulate his own terms of reference, even though aware that they would not be wholly satisfactory. Cripps apparently shared the general understanding that the most urgent matter was to assure Indian cooperation in the defence of India against Japan. He did not lack self-assurance about his skill as a negotiator.[78]

Cripps carried with him a sense of mission. He went out as an emissary bearing a scheme agreed upon by the War Cabinet, but the fact that it was essentially his own scheme, devised and developed over the last four years, made him something of a missionary come to proclaim a new order. Among the characteristics that he shared with Linlithgow were piety and self-importance, so that their conflict of political philosophies was almost certain to produce a point-counter point relationship. Professor Coupland then in India studying the constitutional problem, was well placed to appreciate the piquancy of their encounter, for which his diary entries serve to set up the stage.[79]

Cripps had taken to India the draft of a proposed declaration which Britain was prepared to make, provided sufficient acceptance could be found for it there. The objective of the draft declaration was

the creation of a new Indian Union which would constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal in every respect, and in no way subordinate in any way in domestic or external affairs, Cripps' mission was to obtain acceptanc of this. Most American commentators agreed that he was a good choice for this difficult task. The actual proposals were kept secret for a week, and the *New York Times* described the negotiations going on in Delhi as the decisive battle of the war.[80] By the close of the month the proposals were out and hit the headlines.[81] Cripps told Nehru that "if the Indian leaders will accept my terms then I would be such a Tremendous Figure in England that I could do everything."[82] A. D. K. Owen, a Welsh socialist and a part time leader writer for *The Times*, who had become Cripps' aide in February 1942, went so far as to say that "if he brought this settlement off, Cripps would certainly replace Winston."[83]

The draft declaration contained the following important points:

(a) After the war, steps should be taken to set up in India an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.

(b) Provision should be made for the participation of the Indian states in the constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government should undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed.

(d) The constitution-making body should be composed of all political factions in the country.

(e) During the critical period which then faced India and until the constitution could be framed, His Majesty's Government should inevitably bear the responsibility for, and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of its World War effort. However, the task of completely organizing the military, moral, and material resources of India should be the responsibility of the Government of India with the cooperation of the Indian people.[84]

The essence of the proposals which Cripps presented and the variations which grew out of his discussions in India, was that the British undertook to grant full independence to India if a constituent Assembly demanded it after the war. Some concessions to the desire of the Indians to participate more fully in their own government were proposed, and others developed in the course of the negotiations.[85] In return it was expected that the Indians would support the war effort for the duration of the war.[86] Gandhi rejected and criticized the virtual invitation to the Muslims to create Pakistan. This Hindu reaction was accurately foretold by Gandhi in an interview with Cripps on March 27, two days after Cripps opened negotiations with the Congress Party:

> After a brief study [of the proposals] I said to Cripps, why did you come if this is what you have to offer? If this is your entire proposal to India, I would advise you to take the next plane home.[87]

Cripps found Gandhi's antagonistic attitude to the declaration's clauses favourable to the Muslims. Gandhi expected that the Congress would reject any such clauses.[88] It was the considered opinion of the Muslim League's Working Committee that Gandhi's movement was directed not only to coerce the British Government into handing over power to the Hindu oligarchy, but also to keep them from carrying out their moral obligations and pledges given to the Muslims and other peoples of India. Above all, Muslims feared that the constitution would force the Muslims to submit and surrender to Congress's terms and conditions.[89]

On 30 March 1942, Cripps delivered a radio broadcast to the Indian people. In his speech, he mentioned that the British Government was willing to transfer authority to India. He said "We hope and expect to see an Indian Union strong and united, becuase it is founded upon the free consent of all its people; but it is not for us, Britons, to dictate to you..."[90] Referring to the Muslim League's demand for an independent Pakistani state, however, he pointed out that the different political parties were not in complete agreement as to whether India should remain united or should be divided. It was, therefore, important for the leaders of all the political parties to reach an agreement on the question of Indian unity. Cripps also said that if the Indian leaders were

to request any assistance from the British Government in setting up a new constitution, Britain would be willing to help.[91]

Several principal issues divided the Cripps Mission from the leaders of the Congress Party. The most important was for the future of the question of the constitution-making body. The constition-making body was the real test, since it required the participation of all the religious and racial groups in the political parties of India. After the war, once this body had been established, it could decide the entire problem of the constitution, including methods of safeguarding the interests of the minorities and the Indian princely states. It was, therefore, important for all the political parties to decide whether they would agree on the establishment of such a constitution-making body after the war or not.

On April 2, the President of the Congress Party, Maulana Azad, submitted to Cripps the Congress Working Committee's rejection of the proposals. The resolution found the declaration unsatisfactory on several major counts. The Congress could not accept the provision for the non-accession of the provinces and the states to the Indian Union. They forecast a dark picture of the non-adhering states becoming enclaves where foreign authority would still prevail and barriers to the growth of Indian democracy would be erected. While the Congress had adopted the position that they would not force people to remain in the Union against their will, they objected to the provision for the non-accession of the Muslim provinces on two counts. First, the Congress leaders believed that this provision would discourage the Muslim League from exploring the possibility of working for a united India. Indeed, the option for the provinces was a new and major step on the part of the British towards the affirmation and recognition of Pakistan. With such a possibility within reach, it was hard to see how the Muslims would be willing to settle for less. Of course, any successful settlement or interim working agreement which achieved cooperation would undermine both the claim and the hope of Pakistan. Secondly, the Congress leaders found the declaration dangerously lacking in provisions for the protection of minorities. What had been conceded was that Muslims in provinces where they already enjoyed a majority of the population would have the chance to form their own nation. This was a markedly different question from the protection of the rights of

individual members of minority groups throughout India. The true minorities, the Muslims dispersed throughout Hindu majority areas of India, the Hindus living in the northern parts of India, and the Sikhs of the Punjab, were not provided for in the British scheme. This proposal was to form the basis for the future government of India and its constitution-making body. In 1946 and 1947, it was translated into reality much as the Cabinet had suggested.

The first American press reaction to the proposals was entirely favourable. Two democratic Senators and a Democatic Congressman said that they were as pleased with the announcement, which they saw as being in harmony with the Atlantic Charter and likely to stiffen India's resistance to the Japanese.[92] *The Los Angeles Times* felt that by giving most to the elements from whom most aid in the war was needed-the Muslims and the Princes–it put first things first.[93] Kate Mitchell said that "it was a definite step forward since it set a time for dominion status–after the war," and agreed that the Indian people should draw up the constitution, but she felt that it did not give them adequate control of the interim government and defence.[94] *The Christian Science Monitor* was of the opinion that despite imperfections, the plan offered India "so much of what Indians have long desired that it is hard to see how even Mr. Nehru might wish to shoulder the grim responsibility of rejecting it."[95]

But rejection was already casting its shadow,[96] and the *New York Times* warned that "an evil destiny marches steadily nearer," and that Nehru and Gandhi, by their hestitation might produce world "catastrophes for which they would not be remembered as friends of human freedom."[97] *The San Francisco News* felt that "only unthinkable stupidity [could] prevent further negotiation, "and urged the necessity of unity, compromise and speed.[98] *The Los Angles Times* questioned whether concessions could safely be made, and thought that allowing India

> ... to handle her own defence might prove worse, from the general war standpoint, than for England to continue to attempt it with no more native cooperation than she now has–which, incidentally, is considerable.[99]

The Christian Science Monitor warned:

> Indian leaders do not understand public opinion in the United Nations today if they think they can press extreme demands for a rearrangement of India's defence set-up without causing misgiving among many of the most ardent of India's friends.[100]

The Nation, which thus far had ranked as an ardent friend of the Congress, commented upon the objection of Hindus to that feature of the proposals which made possible the non-accession of Muslim majority provinces to the proposed Indian dominion:

> We agree that it will be extremely unfortunate if the unity of India is impaired, but any attempt to force minority provinces to adhere to union against their will would result in an even less auspicious start for Indian independence.[101]

When the terms of the draft declaration became generally known, *the New Republic,* another of India's staunch friends, found the British plan good, and said that it showed "signs of the hard thinking that is characteristic of British civil servants at their best."[102] After Cripps held his news conference, *Time* wrote that Britain had "turned the pages of history ... at last ... after all the painful years," since there was no doubt that Britain had granted dominion status after the war and the right to secede.[103] But one dissenting voice was heard, that of the *Christian Century,* India's third staunch friend, which did not find the proposals offered much beyond the 1940's August offer, and said that status after the war was far short of India's demand of *purna swaraj* (complete independence). Furthermore, the proposal made Pakistan possible which, in the words of Leland Stowe, an American correspondent in Delhi, might turn India into "a continent spotted with political measles." *The Christian Century* found it amazing that Cripps had lent himself to such proposals.[104]

While the fate of the Cripps proposals appeared to be hanging in the balance, the President of the United States made a special appeal to the Indian leaders of the various groups in favour of its acceptance. He wrote:

> We Americans hope that the Cripps proposals will result in a settlement of the Indian question in such a manner as to enable India to participate to the greatest extent in the

prosecution of the war alongside the United Nations in seeking the defeat of the Axis powers.[105]

British experts on Indian constitutional problems accepted the proposal as quite reasonable and as conceding all that could have been conceded at that time.[106] The significant feature of the proposal was the effort to placate both the Congress and the League. The idea of one federal union was given primary attention, while the right of the Muslim majority areas not to join the proposed federal union, on the basis of self-determination, was not ignored. Both the major political parties agreed that the principle of India's independence formed the basis of the proposal.

However, on 3 April 1942, the Congress Party rejected the proposal on the following grounds:

(a) The right of the Native States to accede or not to the proposed federal union;

(b) The right of any province not to join the proposed union. This was characterized by Gandhi as a sin.

(c) The proposal was vague, altogether incomplete and appears to be a vital change in the present structure's comptemplated. [This refers to the interim period, i.e. until the framing of the constitution after the war.]

Gandhi characterized the Cripps proposal as a "blank check written on a failing bank."[107] He advised Cripps to take the first plane home" if he had nothing more to offer. Indeed, Cripps ignored Gandhi and said that "he was desirous of bringing about a state of chaos while sitting at Wardha eating vegetables.[108] As for Cripps, he had convinced himself that if he failed it would be because of Gandhi's non-violent creed and his personal power over the Congress. Although Nehru and Azad were prepared to accept the proposals, they were powerless before the determined opposition of Gandhi.[109] Gandhi's paper *Harijan*, had started a violent campaign against the proposal even when many Congress papers had hailed them as a reasonable offer.[110] Cripps himself declared several times that his proposal was rejected by the Congress at the behest of Gandhi.[111]

The Muslim League was on the whole satisfied with the proposals and accepted them in principle.[112] The provinces' right not to join the proposed federal union implied the recognition of Pakistan. But the League's position was extremely delicate. The Congress Party had already launched accusations that the Muslim League was cooperating with the imperialist war aims of Great Britain. In these circumstances the League informed Cripps that it would accept the proposal provided the Congress Party accepted it. So, when the Congress Party rejected it, the League also followed suit. It took the occasion, however, to state that its rejection was due to the fact that there was no clear acceptance of Pakistan in the proposal.[113] The British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, blamed the Congress Party, in a statement on 7 April 1942, in New York, for the breakdown of the Cripps Mission and the political deadlock. The Congress leaders were convinced that Halifax's statement meant that the British were not interested in a solution of the problem.

Johnson Intervenes

The differences which developed between Cripps and the Hindu and Muslim leaders over defence and the matter of a constitution making body, resulted in an impasse. At this point, an interesting American figure appeared on the scene during Cripp's talks, that of Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's personal representative with the rank of "minister" to India. He entered the negotiations, conferring privately with the Congress, the Muslim League and Cripps, who invited his help and participation in seeking an acceptance formula for the negotiation. His arrival in New Delhi on 3 April 1942, delayed Cripps' departure from India for more than a week. Diplomatic circles noted that:

> The United States is in a position ... to assure Indian leaders that the United States will support a move for greater independence for India after this war, as it successfully supported Ireland's endeavors to obtain a more independent status after the last.[114]

Johnson was a forceful southern lawyer-politician, a former Commander of the American Legion and Assistant Secretary of War, who had made a reputation as an advocate of preparedness. His ability

is indicated by his appointment as President Truman's Secretary of Defence after James Forrestal's tragic death. That a person of his standing should have been sent to India in such a capacity, bears witness to the American persuasiveness to advance beyond a 1941 British concession to India and allowing an exchange of quasi-diplomatic representatives between Delhi and Washington.[115] Johnson's nomination to this unusual post was communicated to the United States "Commissioner" in India on March 11, the day the British announced the Cripps' Mission, and to the British Government a few days later.[116] The initial State Department announcement mentioned the desirability of having an American "technical mission" in India to expedite war production, and the State Department agreed formally with the British that Johnson should not act as a plenipotentiary. But neither the American nor the Indian press nor he himself treated his role as that of a technician.[117]

Roosevelt was familiar with Johnson's capabilities as a political operator, with his agreeable personality, and his determination to remove all obstructions to the conduct of the war. A letter from the President which Johnson carried to Azad, President of the Congress Party, expressing Roosevelt's hope that India would accept the Cripps offer and join the war on the side of the democracies, and "guaranteeing that India would receive full self-government after the war,"[118] put Johnson fully in the picture. [119]

Johnson was a highly visible expression of American hopes on the Cripps mission. On his arrival in India, Johnson rapidly renewed his acquaintance with Cripps and extended an offer to aid in the negotiations, which was accepted. His presidential commission and considerable charm quickly won the confidence of Congress leaders. His participation revived interest in the negotiations, and it was widely believed in India that he was trying to mediate between the British Government and the Congress Party at the instance of President Roosevelt.[120] Johnson then told the Viceroy, Linlithgow, that:

> It was the President's determination and the determination of the American people to support Great Britain to the end of the war, to the utmost and to preserve the integrity of the British Empire and that there must be no doubt in anybody's mind in India that America would see the war through. If America was

> convinced that Congress was solidly supporting the war effort, the sympathy she had previously had for Congress would continue: if, on the other hand, it appeared that Congress was saving face, or hedging or taking action to slow down the conclusion of the war, it was not too much to say that America would hate [the] Congress.[121]

In response to an interjection of Nehru, Johnson added:

> America would have the leading place at the peace table, [and] that her attitude toward India at that table would be determined by the wholeheartedness or otherwise of the Indian war effort. If he himself were associated with the Peace Conference he would do his best to see that an India which had already backed the war effort obtained America's fullest support in attaining her ambitions.[122]

In short, Johnson was the *amicus curiae* in the proceedings, mediating between Cripps and the Congress leaders (Nehru, Azad, Gandhi etc.) and advising both sides on key issues in a proposed new Indian-British arrangement. An irritatable report, made by the Viceroy to Churchill, which evoked Hopkins' disclaimer, credited Johnson with working out a proposal between Cripps and the Indians to place an Indian at the head of the Defence Ministry.[123] The British refusal to confirm this concession played a part in the breakdown of the negotiations.[124] There is, however, some difference of opinion about the importance of this item in the collapse of the talks. It has been argued that even if the concession had been made to one party, other reasons would have been found to terminate the negotiations.[125] It was reported that Johnson had nineteen interviews with Cripps and sixteen with Nehru,[126] and Johnson was credited with spurring on the negotiations.[127] America was in a hurry and taking some satisfaction in, at least, being in a position where it could do something in a matter which, in its opinion, should have been cleared up long ago.

On 4 April 1942, Johnson advised Washington of the situation concerning the negotiations over the defence position. He stated that Cripps was advising the Prime Minister that the final decision must be based on one of three courses of action:

(a) No further changes or concessions;

(b) modify draft declaration by granting India a Defence Minister if protected by agreement in writing that the Minister could take no action contrary to Empire war policy as exercised by the Commander-in-Chief who would remain;

(c) convert the present Defence Ministry into a War Ministry which would be left under the Commander-in-Chief and then create a new office of Minister of Coordinator of Defence placing in it relatively innocuous matters such as defence, public relations and appointing an Indian thereto.[128]

Johnson's further assessment of the situation indicated that he and Cripps were in agreement and able to reach a settlement with the Congress leaders, but that they were likely to fail because of the opposition of Churchill, Linlithgow and Wavell, who did not want to yield to the Indian leaders on defence. The days from April 7 to 9 were full of speculation and negotiation. It was reported that India was to have an Indian Defence Minister, and that Wavell would continue as Commander-in-Chief, just as MacArthur was Commander in the Pacific. The President was credited with initiating this plan through Johnson who in turn saw both Cripps and Nehru on April 9th, while the members of the Congress Working Committee paused half an hour for the Nehru interview.[129] Johnson asked President Roosevelt to use his authority to help bring about an agreement. In a dispatch to the State Department, Johnson indicated that Cripps had indirectly asked him for Roosevelt's intervention with Churchill to modify the Draft Declaration for the sake of a settlement.[130] Johnson wrote:

> Cripps violently opposes (a), prefers (b), but believes that War Cabinet, Commander-in-Chief, and Viceroy will all oppose both (b) and (c). Unless the president feels that he can intercede with Churchill, it would seem that Cripps' efforts are doomed to failure. Cripps so believes too.[131]

The following day, acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles cabled Johnson that the President rejected his suggestion to intercede in the negotiations, becuase this would further complicate matters. The cable read:

> I have discussed personally with the President your telegram ... The President asked me to let you know, however, that he does not consider it desirable or expedient for him, at least at this juncture, to undertake any further personal participation in the discussion. You know how earnestly the President has already tried to be of help. It is feared that if at this moment he interposed his own views, the result would complicate further an already overcomplicated situation.[132]

On April 9 Nehru issued a press statement shattering the belief that all had been going well in negotiations. He said that American comments in the press, which he called "homilies and patronizing advice" that India did not accept, amazed him and he could only understand them on the basis of American ignorance of India. While he personally admired President Roosevelt, the people of India had not asked for his intervention in their problems, which they recognized they must shoulder themselves.[133]

It is tempting to speculate that Roosevelt's interjecting himself personally into the discussions would have brought success to the Cripps Mission and, therefore, that his refusal was a disastrous diplomatic mistake. The Preisdent's decision was, however, understandable in terms of the advice and information available to him at that moment. Churchill's aloofness and rejection of Roosevelt's advice a few weeks previously, coupled with Murray's optimistic appraisal of the Cripps' proposals and their likely success in India, were the two prominent pieces of information presented to the President. Johnson's first telegram home, which assessed the situation in starkly different terms, did not provide a firm enought basis for such a leap to action. All of Johnson's letters expressed confidence in his own assessment of the situation and the rightness of his choice of action. In this communication, he suggested only one form of action; for the President to put pressure on Churchill, which Roosevelt was understandably reluctant to do without further information. Nonetheless, Johnson was a man of action. He continued his efforts in India despite the unfavourable response from Washington.

Cripps-Johnson Formula

At this point, Cripps turned more directly to Johnson for assistance in negotiating with the Congress. For the first time, Johnson's

ill-defined role in the negotiations attracted the attention of the Indian press. As for Cripps, he appeared to be over-sensitive in denying American intervention, characterizing Johnson's position as more a friend than an official. Nonetheless, the Indian press, commented that with American troops in India and the allied command in Washington, to say nothing of Churchill's visit to the United States, there was little reason why any British statesman should find the presence of American officials and their advice on India embarrasing or derogatory to British "Imperial" prestige.[134]

Despite the uneasiness, Johnson's efforts created in certain government circles in India and London a ray of hope for both sides in the negotiations.[135] The Johnson formula, [in fact, this was a formula drafted by Linlithgow and Cripps] arrived at after discussions with the various parties, turned the Cripps formula in its head. Johnson suggested that the duties and responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief and the War Department be defined specifically and after this all remaining positions were to fall to the Indian Defence member.[136] Then, the Cripps-Johnson formula was defined in two paragraphs which read:

(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as war member of the Executive Council.

(b) A War Department will be constituted which will take over such functions of the Defence Department as are not retained by the Defence Member.[137]

This offer of a Defence Ministry had many political difficulties. Johnson, whose pro-Congress attitude was quite well known, observed in a despatch to the State Department that the Muslims and the Sikhs, who formed the main stay of the Indian army, feared that any outright concession of the Congress' demand for a Defence Ministry would result in a Hindu Defence Minister. This might lead to chaos and confusion.[138] But, Cripps then thought that Congress would come in on this formula because Johnson had understood this from them. To this,

the Viceroy, Linlithgow, asked Cripps how Congress had come to know about this formula. Cripps replied that Johnson had shown it to them. Linlithgow recorded in his Diary that:

> I at once protested against Congress having been shown the draft, and said that the fact that Johnson had shown it to them made the position all the worse, given the U. S. A. position in the business. If I were now to differ from the draft, my position might well be rendered intolerable, as I ran the risk of being held up in the U. S. A. as the obstacle to a settlement.[139]

Cripps then replied to the Viceroy that matters had reached a climax in which something had to be done about it and generally glazed over the incident.[140]

The Congress Working Committee considered this approach to be far more promising than the previous proposal. With renewed enthusiasm, they endorsed the Cripps-Johnson proposal and suggested only a few minor changes in working it out, specifically clarifying that the Commander-in-Chief's position would be limited to the duration of the war, and that the Viceroy should give a pledge that he would not exercise his veto power.[141] They wrote:

> (a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member, but certain functions relating to the conduct of the war will be exercised, for the duration of the war, by the Commander-in-Chief, who will be in control of the war activities of the armed forces in India and who will be an extraordinary member of the National Cabinet for that purpose.[142]

With this approach seemingly agreed upon, both sides were encouraged by the prospect of a successful settlement. Yet, the crucial question remained to be answered; what specific functions were to be allotted to each side in the new list of proposal? On April 10, the negotiations met in an atmosphere charged with anticipated excitement. Cripps presented the previously agreed upon proposal, but with some crucial alterations which restored the Commander-in-Chief's position on the Executive Council and extended his duties, not just for

the duration of the war, but until the new constitution came into operation. This new Cripps' proposal included the clause:

> (b) In the event of any new functions failing to be discharged in relation to Defence or any dispute arising as to the allocation of any old functions, it shall be decided by His Majesty's Government.[143]

This new Cripps-Johnson formula, which clarified and secured the position of the Commander-in-Chief, contained only one short paragraph regarding the Defence Minister, which indicated that he had been demoted to his pre-Johnson status:

> (c) The Defence Member shall be in charge of all other matters relating to Defence in the Defence Department and those now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department in addition to other important matters related to Defence.[144]

The Defence Minister was to have very limited powers, and no list of duties was attached defining the position.[145] When the Congress members asked for the illustrative list, Cripps only referred them to the old list for the Defence Department, which they had rejected on April7, four days before. The bitterness of the Congress leaders was acute. Azad wrote:

> Thus, you said that substantially there was no change between the old list and any new one that might be prepared. If this was so, and we were to go back ultimately to the place we started from, then what was the purpose of our searching for a new formula? A new set of words meaning the same thing made no difference.[146]

In this manner the second Cripps-Johnson formula was rejected. As a result Cripps could only tell Johnson that there was nothing more he could do, for his powers had been rescinded. With embarrassment Cripps told Johnson that he could not change the original draft declaration without the Prime Minister's approval and that Churchill had cabled him that he would give no approval unless Wavell separately sent his own code cables giving unqualified endorsment to any change Cripps desired.[147] Thus, the fate of the mission depended upon the Viceroy, the Prime Minister, and Congress. Now Cripps had

been made so powerless that he could not move, while Linlithgow, Churchill and Congress acted together to hammer the nails into the mission's coffin. The whole assumption upon which the negotiations were based had suddenly vanished. The Congress leaders were dismayed. On 11 April 1942, the Congress Working Committee completely rejected the proposals and issued a statement explaining its position to the Indian people. It said that the British proposals were rejected because they did not meet the national demand for immediate independence. The rejection was complete, uncompromising, and related to the whole set of proposals. What Cripps now told them was that the British proposals which were essentially nothing more than the Viceroy's August offer of 1940 (i.e. membership on the Executive Council with the over-riding power of the Viceroy absolutely intact).

So far as the Muslim League was concerned it found the proposals unacceptable for the following reasons:

(a) The Muslims were not prepared to live in one Indian Union as a minority. The non-accession provision was "purely illusory" because the creation of Pakistan was relegated only to the realm of remote possibility.

(b) The proposals set up only one Constitution-making body with a view to the creation of one Indian Union. The League believed in Pakistan and, therefore, in the establishment of two separate Constitution-making bodies. The method and procedure of electing the Constitution-making body what might be affected were such as "to negative" the professed object.(sic)[149]

The Cripps' proposals demonstrated the British attitude concerning the possible creation of Pakistan after the cessation of hostilities and promised nothing directly to the Congress. The Muslim League, in its demands, insisted that the British should first recognize the principle of Pakistan there and then as a condition for Muslim cooperation in any future provincial government.[150] Nonetheless, it was generally believed that, despite this condition, the Muslim League was

prepared to accept the Cripps' proposals had the Congress accepted them.[151]

There was another factor in the attitude of the Congress Party. The Cripps Mission had to deal with the Congress as the representative of all peoples of India and had accepted, in principle, that the Muslim majority areas had the right not to join the proposed federation. It was quite likely, therefore, that the Congress leaders believed they had more to gain from an understanding with the Japanese who were promoting Subhas Chandra Bose, an enthusiastic champion of the concept of one Indian federation.[152] It was only natural for the Congress to expect that if British and American troops withdrew from the subcontinent, the fate of India would lie at the mercy of the Japanese puppet, Bose.[153] It may be noted that Bose had strongly urged the Congress leaders to reject the Cripps' proposals.[154] After Bose's appeal, Gandhi refused to support the Cripps Mission by calling it Britain's moral wrong.[155] As for the Congress leaders, they were not at all worried about the extreme tension between the Hindus and the Muslims at a time when the Japanese were knocking at the gates of India. Gandhi wrote in *The Harijan*:

> We have not asked the British to hand over India to Congress or the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance, to anarchy. Then all parties will fight one another like dogs or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to reasonable agreement.[156]

Regarding Congress cooperation with the Japanese plan of invading India, Subhas's demands, and the unsatisfying situation in India, on 4 April 1942, Harry Hopkins sent a cable to the President. He wrote:

> The Japanese will in return no doubt give to the Hindus the military support necessary to impose their will upon the Moslems, the Native States and the Depressed Classes.[157]

Gandhi claimed that the Congress leaders were inviting the Japanese to eliminate British imperialism from India.[158] The Viceroy's letter sent to the Secretary of State for India, elucidates the attitude of Congress towards the Muslims and the Japanese. The Viceroy wrote:

> These brave Indian soldiers belong to the Northern races and are, in the main, Moslem by faith. If at any time, in the future, as a result of the constitutional process to which we are committed the British withdraw their troops from India, the Hindu parliamentarians would be rapidly dominated by the moslim warriors. If Mr. Gandhi could get a compact and adequate Japanese army placed at the disposal of the Congress for the purposes of holding down the Moslems and other non-Hindus, furnished to him in return for assistance to the Japanese in making a free passage through India to try to join hands with the Germans, and then [Gandhi] would be able to set up Hindu ascendancy all over India. It has been shown that he was ready to negotiate with the Japanese on the basis of their having such a free passage, but this would not by itself be enough for him. The Japanese would also have to lend him an army or he and his friends would speedily be overthrown by the martial races. It has occurred to me that Your Excellency might be willing to reflect a little on some of these points.[159]

Regarding the Japanese threat to India, the Muslim League once more declared that the Muslims were ready and willing, as before, to shoulder the burden of defending the country; singly, or in cooperation with other parties. But this time, the British Government completely ignored their offer.

The Congress indicated a willingness to the British to defend India, if its terms were met.[160] On the rebellious attitude of the Congress and Gandhi's open invitation to the Japanese to attack India and to strike at British imperialism, *The New York Times* observed:

> Britain cannot tolerate anarchy in India while her own life is at stake, nor we can in this country urge her to do so.[161]

The New Republic and *The Nation,* which had all along strongly denounced British imperialism in India, now assumed a critical attitude towards the Congress Party.[162]

President Roosevelt was greatly disappointed by the pro-Japanese attitude of the Congress Party and the Gandhian threat of the loss of India.[163] When Clement Attlee informed Roosevelt of the decision of the Government of India to arrest the top Congress leaders,

and hoped that the United States would share the feelings of the British Government; Roosevelt decided not to make any reply. However, the State Department categorically declared that American troops in India were purely for the defence of India, and that they would not in any way interfere in the internal disturbances of the country unless American lives were in jeopardy.[164]

On 27 July 1942, Cripps made a broadcast to the American people, in which he charged that Gandhi's actions were calculated to bring the greatest aid and comfort to the Axis powers.[165] When some American liberals charged that the obstinacy of the British Government had led to this crisis, Bertrand Russell criticized the ignorance of the American liberals on the Indian situation:

> They do not know that one of the points on which the Cripps Mission broke down was the unwillingness of the Hindus to admit that Muslims have the same right to independence from Hindus as Hindus from the British.

He further pointed out that:

> Immediate independence with all the confusion resulting from a transfer of government in the middle of war would probably end in the enslavement of both India and China by Japan.[166]

The Congress rebellion, however, was destined to failure. The very fact that the Congress was pro-Japanese in sentiment served to turn the Muslims quite anti-Japanese. The Muslims were naturally alarmed that Bose, an ex-president of the Congress Party, was invading India with the aid of Japanese and so they went all the way with the war efforts of the government.[167] According to the American Consulate General in Bombay, "the policy of the Congress 'insane' leaders was such great hatred of Muslims that they felt the only way to smash them was to allow Japan to come into India."[168]

In July 1942, Leopold S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India in London, made two radio broadcasts, one to the people in England and the other to the American people, explaining that the Churchill Government was eager to solve the Indian crisis, Amery ascribed failure in bringing about negotiation to the extreme demand "Akhand Hindustan" [United India] of the Congress Party.[169]

The Muslim League had given their most earnest and careful consideration to the announcement made by Churchill in the House of Commons on the 11 March 1942, that Congress did not represent all factions of Indian people and that his Government hoped for the immediate participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country.[170]

On the same day, the Muslim League Working Committee issued a statement appreciating that the British Prime Minister, in his pronouncement, had made it clear that the draft declaration embodied only the proposals of His Majesty's Government and their decision; and that the proposals were subject to agreement between the main elements in India. This maintained the validity of the Declaration of August 8th 1940, which had promised to the Muslims that neither the machinery for the framing of the constitution should be set up, nor the constitution itself should be enforced, without the approval and consent of Moslem India.[171] The Committee, while expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan was implicitly recognized by providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India, regretted that the proposal of His Majesty's Government embodying the fundamentals were not open to any modification, and therefore, no alternative proposals were invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government, with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the Committee had no alternative but to say that the proposals in their present form were unacceptable to them.[172]

The British draft proposals indicated that, in all probability, the Indian Union would not be maintained once the British handed over authority to India. On the other hand, if Indian Union was enforced, a gross injustice would be done to the Muslims, who were demanding Pakistan as a separate state for themselves. They were unwilling to constitute one Indian Union composed of the principal nationalities, Hindus and Muslims. The Indian Muslims objected to the British draft proposal, therefore they rejected them.[173]

On 20 October 1942, in a long interview, one of the most nationalistic Hindus, Rajagopalachari, stated that no interim settlement was possible without accepting the principle of self-determination for Muslims and thus reaching a settlement with Jinnah's viewpoint.[174]

Another Hindu, the Mahasabha leader, Mookerjee, discussed the proposal of Muslim self-determination and the possibility of recognizing the principle of Pakistan in those areas where the Muslims constituted a majority.[175] But, on 1 May 1942, the Congress resolution emphatically repudiated the Muslim League's demand for the right of self-determination for the Muslims and thus closed the door for the settlement of the communal problem, which was a condition for the attainment of the freedom for India. The Congress stressed its theory that the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem could only follow the withdrawal of British power from India. On this point, the Muslim League refuted the Congress claim at its Bombay Session of 20 August 1942. It indicated:

> Whereas if the Congress demand is accepted it would bring the 100 million Muslims under the yoke of the Hindus Raj which must inevitably result either in anarchy and chaos to complete strangulation and annihilation of Muslim India and all that Islam stands for ... If any such attempt initiated by the Congress shall be made from any quarter to intimidate, coerce, molest or interfere in any manner with the moral life of the Muslims, the Muslims will be compelled to offer resistance and adopt all such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their life, honour and property.[176]

Nevertheless, the Congress insistence on United India and the Muslims demand for Pakistan, generally kept the fundamental problem alive and these two parties apart.[177] Moreover, Jinnah, in a statement commenting on British policy and the Congress anti-Muslim attitude said:

> I can only say that Britain would be making its greatest blunder if she surrenders to Congress in any manner detrimental to Muslim interest ... Nothing is going to move us from our purpose of achieving our goal of Pakistan ... Mr. Gandhi has worn the mask well all these [last 22] years and tried in a consummate manner, to fool the Muslims. It is quite clear that Gandhi wants the British Government to accept that Congress means India and that Gandhi means Congress. He wants the British Government to come to terms with him as the

> spokesman of all India regarding the transfer of power to the self-styled, self-titled Indian National Congress.[178]

Then, in his demand for Pakistan, Jinnah told General Stilwell that if the British would declare that they were prepared to grant independence to India immediately, Pakistan to the Muslims and Hindustan to the Hindu, and that if Congress would not accept these terms, Pakistan would at least be granted and the rest of India would remain under British rule. Such a declaration, he said, would bring the Congress to terms within two months time.[179]

When, on 11 April 1942, the two major political parties rejected the British draft proposals, the other minorities also rejected them, for reasons very different from those of the Congress Party.[180] At this point, Dr. Ambedkar, the leader of the Untouchables, and Rao Bahadur M. C. Rajah declared in a joint letter to Cripps:

> We are all of us absolutely convinced that the proposals are calculated to greatest harm to the Depressed Classes and are sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule. Any such result which takes us back to the black days of the ancient past will never be tolerated by us and we are all determined to resist any such catastrophe befalling our people with all the means at our command.[181]

It is interesting to note that Cripps adopted a different style to conduct the negotiations. Instead of gathering all the members at a conference table and assuming the role of mediator, Cripps chose to see each of the leaders individually in a series of private interviews.

Cripps and Johnson Go Home

Whether it was a wire from London which forced Cripps to reverse his original offer, or simply confusion arising over the ill-defined term "new national government," which came to mean very different things to different parties, the results were unfortunate. In August 1940, the Congress leaders had found the offer completely inadequate. In the Spring 1942, they found it equally lacking. It is indeed curious that the Cabinet should have sent Cripps all the way to India to present a proposal that the Congress had categorically rejected 20 months before. The Indian leaders, exhausted and disillusioned, wondered if the Prime

Minister had sent Cripps to India only to soothe public opinion in England and in America.

Churchill's initial reaction seemed to give some support to this view. On 11 April 1942, Cripps wired Churchill on the rejection of the proposal and said he was leaving for home. Churchill, apparently judged that enough had been done to educate American and other opinion about the purity of British intentions and Indian unreasonableness, and approved the recall of Cripps. Roosevelt objected emphatically, but the Prime Minister refused to extend the mission. Churchill was satisfied with the result of the Cripps Mission. The same day, on 11 April 1942, Churchill wired back to Roosevelt, expressing the beneficial effect that Cripps' efforts would have on public opinion in the United States and Britain. In another telegram to Cripps, Churchill said:

> You have done everything in human power and your tenacity, perseverance and resourcefulness have proved how great was the British desire to reach a settlement. Yet you must not feel unduly discouraged or disappointed by the results. The effect throughout Britain and in the United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defence is a great advantage. I am very glad you are coming home at once, where a most cordial welcome awaits you.[182]

Thus, on 12 April 1942, Cripps left New Delhi for London. Churchill then wired Roosevelt, sending him both Cripps' telegram and his own response. The President was dismayed at the breakdown. Roosevelt clearly had interpreted the War Cabinet's draft proposal as granting India self-government during the war. He then shared the Indians distress at the failure. On April 12, he sent a wire to Churchill stating his forceful opinion.

Rejecting Churchill's point of view, the President claimed that opinion in the United States could seriously hamper American-British relations. He wrote:

The feeling is held almost universally that the deadlock has been due to British Government's unwillingness to concede the right of self-government to the Indians notwithstanding the willingness of the

indians to entrust to the competent British authorities technical military and naval defence control.[183]

Roosevelt commented further, "I feel that I am compelled to place before you this issue very frankly." He said:

> It is impossible for American public opinion to understand why, if there is willingness on the part of the British Government to permit the component parts of India to secede after the war from the British Empire, it is unwilling to permit them to enjoy during the war what is tantamount to self-government.[184]

The President also expressed his concern that if India should be invaded by Japan, the British would be held responsible by American opinion for abandoning the talk too quickly. Roosevelt pleaded with Churchill to instruct Cripps to postpone his departure and asked him personally to request Cripps to resume negotiations and to make a final effort to find a common ground for understanding. Churchill responded to Roosevelt with a large and successful threat of his own, in addition to intimating that:

> Anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart and would deeply injure both of our countries at the height of this terrible struggle.[185]

Quite simply, the threat was that Churchill would resign if coerced over the question of India. He added:

> I do not feel I could take responsibility for the defence of India if everything had again to be thrown into the melting pot at this critical juncture.[186]

It is interesting to speculate that, if Roosevelt's letter of March had carried the strength of conviction and threat of American public opinion characterized by this communication, there might have been a different outcome. Churchill's rather pithy but revealing comment in his memoirs was, "I was thankful that events had already made such an act of madness impossible."[187] On the same day, Churchill replied to Roosevelt, informing him that Cripps had already left India, thus indicating that the situation was closed as far as Churchill was concerned. The Prime Minister ended his letter to Roosevelt by saying

that he would not show the President's letter to the Cabinet unless Roosevelt request him to do so.[188]

The President had found that his efforts with Churchill on the issue of India had yielded no results. However, Roosevelt hoped that continuing pressure for a solution of the problem could be maintained by his representatives in India. Moreover, it was quite clear in India, in Great Britain, and in the United States, that Roosevelt's approach to the solution of the Indian crisis was an idealistic and not a practicable one, because the President thought that the American type of democracy would work successfuly in India, and entirely forgot the irreconcilable differences between the two communities, Hindus and Muslims.

Democracy, except among a people exceptionally self-restrained and with long political experience, usually means the utmost exploitation of power by the majority. In this case it was known that "the Muslims fear for their existence, they fear the pressure of the Hindu mass movement behind the Congress' command."[189] It was clear that the Muslims were not a minority but a nation; that democracy for all India was impossible; and they were anxious not to let the Hindus into a position in which they could control India.[190] So the Muslims would not get a square deal under a Hindu Raj.[191] In his memoirs Churchill regarded Roosevelt's ideas as naive:

> The President's mind was back in the American War of Independence, and he thought of the Indian problem in terms of thirteen colonies fighting George III at the end of the eighteenth century. I, on the other hand, was responsible for providing the peace and safety of the Indian continent ...[192]

The fact remains that the United States was earnest in its appraoch to the Indian crisis. Churchill and Roosevelt had different ideas on solving the colonial problem. Churchill was interested in preserving the British Empire, while Roosevelt sincerely visualized a future family of nations based on the democratic principle of the equality of all nations. His proposal that India be a single national unit prejudiced the Muslim's demand for Pakistan, which was now their article of faith.[193] But Roosevelt seriously said in a message to Harry Hopkins for Churchill, that:

> I still feel if the component groups in India could be given now the opportunity to set up a National Government in essence similar to our own form of government under the Articles of Confederation with the understanding that following the termination of a period of trial and error they would be enabled then to determine upon their own form of constitution and to determine, as you have promised them already, their future relationship with the British Empire, probably a solution could be found.[194]

To this type of proposal for the solution of the Indian problem, the Muslim reaction was natural. The Muslim League Working Committee cabled to the British Government that:

> Muslim India will without doubt revolt against any such decision, for these proposals clearly mean virtual transfer of all power and authority to Central Government on the basis of India as single national unit enjoying Dominion Status in action thereby establishing the Congress of Hindu Raj for all political purposes. Real object of these Hindu leaders is to coerce British Government to surrender and torpedo Pakistan demand. This will be clear breach of pledges of His Majesty's Government reaffirmed by Amery in Leeds speech on February 4th... Committee trust that British Government despite present difficult war situation will not submit to coercive methods adopted by Hindu India and will remain true to their pledges.[195]

Johnson assumed that agreement could not be reached because of the British Government's behind-the-scenes attitude, which amounted to a stab in the back for Cripps, and a refusal to go along with his [Johnson's] proposal.[196] In any case, two schools of thought developed as to the reasons for the failure of the Cripps Mission. One school placed blame upon the Congress Party. It became the accepted belief of another school that skillful British propaganda was responsible for this, and that the negotiations in reality failed because Britain had refused real autonomy. Cripps himself felt that there were only three chances out of seven for a successful outcome of his mission. He was not greatly surprised. According to him the "failure of the mission [was] entirely due to the efforts of Gandhi and four or five other members of

the Congress Working Committee who, although not particularly sympathetic with Gandhi, were willing to go along with him in their opposition to the Cripps plan since it coincided with their own narrow political views ... their ends were entirely selfish."[197]

Johnson believed that the British Government sabotaged the negotiations at the last stage becuase Cripps told Johnson that he could not go beyond the original Draft Declaration without the Prime Minister's approval and that Churchill would give no approval unless both the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief of India agreed.[198] But a refusal to change the Draft Declaration did not mean that the British Government sabotaged the proposal; Cripps himself had declared just after his arrival in India that he could not go beyond the Draft Declaration.[199] The Congress press, however, launched a vigorous propaganda campaign about this alleged sabotage immediately after the breakdown of the negotiations, primarily to win American support because of the United States view of the British imperialism. Commenting upon the real reasons for the failure of Cripps' proposals, the American Consulate from Ankara cabled the Secretary of State:

> ... reason for failure was difference of opinion between Hindus and Moslems. It is claimed that England's refusal to accept their different demands has pleased both parties particularly the Moslems, since acceptance of Congress Party's demands might have nullified Moslem project for establishing Pakistan. While both Hindus and Moslems place blame for their differences on England, it would be unjust to place all responsibility on her, as profound differences existed even before arrival of England in India ...[200]

Edgar Snow commenting on the Indian political situation, sent a detailed report from India to the State Department. He wrote that he had been told by Brigadier Jehu, that it was the Commander-in-Chief's fixed policy not to make any settlement with the Congress during the war because:

> The Moslem are our big worry. They are the people we depend upon in the army, who are fighting splendidly and are loyal to us. If we make an arrangement turning over the country to the Congress ... the Hindu Priesthood machine would never be

> tolerated by this fighting race, Muslims might mutiny. At this stage the Japs are promising everything to the Hindus.[201]

Cripps' proposals showed that the British were prepared to grant Pakistan after the cessation of hostilities, which was "quite impossible" for Congress to accept.[202] Again, it is not clear whether Johnson came to India with any previous understanding between the United States and the Congress leaders, but he definitely sided with Nehru in the assumption that the latter could control the Congress policy.[203]

No one seems to have asked why the Johnson mission failed, and why American diplomacy could not accomplish what American Opinion had so long advocated. In the final avalysis, American interest in the solution of the Indian problem was not concerned with the ultimate result, but with the broad principle that India must be saved from the Axis. As Ann O'Hoare McCormack pointed out, America was interested in India "because India was a battlefield in the American war against Japan." Johnson ... appealed to Nehru not for the sake of Britain, nor even for the sake of India, but primarily because India's decision is of the highest importance to us.[204]

India's decision was indeed of great importance to the United States, since the rejection apparently forced a change of strategy, and Japan had to be approached via the Pacific rather than via India, with momentous results. Indian Congress desired American pressure upon Britain for immediate independence and resented appeals for cooperation with her, which was a dilemma for America. America could not be sure that immediate independence would aid her purpose. The *San Francisco News* commenting upon the Japanese naval victory in the Bay of Bengal as well as the failure of the mission wrote:

> Indians and Britons pick this perilous moment to deadlock again their bitter negotiations for unity during the war and Indian freedom after victory. The rights and wrongs of such a confused situation are not to be judged by Americans. But Indians should know that American sympathy, which was on their side when the negotiations began, has been shifting with every additional Cripps' offer of compromise.[205]

Post-Mortem

The British and American press both made clear that the blame for the failure of the Cripps Mission rested with the Congress Party and not with the Muslim League. Congress leaders resented these comments expressing a widespread resentment against American interference in a family quarrel.[207] Nehru remarked that the Americans could only understand some simple truths and did not know as much about India as they should like.[208] Gandhi stated in his paper *Harijan*, that Britain must leave India to her fate, and that American troops must go too. He wrote: We know what American aid means. It amounts, in the end, to American influence, if not American rule, added to the British."[209] Commenting upon Gandhi's remarks, in his radio broadcast to the people of United States, on 27 July 1942, Cripps said:

> Mr. Gandhi, in one of his recent statements, has declared: we do not want these allied troops for our defence or protection. If luck favours us, the Japanese may see no reason to hold the country after the allies have withdrawn.[210]

Cripps went on saying:

> We offered the representative Indian political leaders immediate office in the Viceroy's Executive Council, a body of ministeres like those who advise your President. Mr. Gandhi has demanded that we should walk out of India leaving the country, with its deep rooted religious divisions, without any constitutional form of government and with no organized administration. No responsible government could take such a step–least of all in the midst of war. The Moslems, of whom there are at least 80 millions, are deeply opposed to Hindu domination as are also the tens of millions of depressed classes. To have agreed to the Congress Party or to Mr. Gandhi's demand would have meant inevitable chaos and disorder. This is not merely my assertation, it is stated by Mr. Gandhi himself.[211]

Cripps claimed that recently Gandhi had stated:

> Anarchy is the only way. Someone asked me if there would be anarchy if the British go. Yes, it will be there. But I tell the

> British give us chaos. I say, in other words, leave India to God.[212]

> Cripps further remarked, "I regret profoundly he has taken this attitude, and I know that the Indian people as a whole do not support it."[213]

Not until June 7, when an American journalist pressed Gandhi for an answer as the effect of his proposal upon China, did he say that allied troops might stay. Some other Congress papers also accused America of duplicity. "The Cripps Mission," said the extremist *National Herald*, "was the result of American pressure. It was a stage-managed show to buy off world opinion and foist preconcerted failure on the people of India."[214] The intense anti-American attitude of Gandhi was another important factor. Gandhi told General Stilwell that American diplomacy was under British control, and that the voice of those liberal Americans in the United States was being stifled by the British.[215] He condemned American aid to India's war effort. He wrote in *The Harijan*, on 26 April 1942: "It [American aid to India] amounts in the end to American influence if not American rule added to the British ... I see no Indian freedom peeping through all this preparation for the so-called defence of India." Gandhi claimed that America, instead of working for world peace, deliberately identified herself with the present struggle. "She could have remained out ... Even now she can do so if she divests herself of the intoxication which her immense wealth has produced."[216] On 9 August 1942, Gandhi wrote in *The Harijan* that the Americans had made common cause with the British; and shared therefore responsibility for what the British were doing in India. After Pearl Harbor, a reaction to the Anglo-American war effort was exposed, when in an interview RajKumari Amrit Kaur, Secretary to Gandhi, burst into the open:

> Sympathy for America? Why take it from me ... If these gangsters, Britishs and Americans, defeat Japan, then the only Asiatic power would be crushed out of existence. Why send a message of sympathy to the United States, all these people are war-mad and it is best that Bapu ji [Gandhi] keeps mum. Sympathy for China? Of course we have that but it won't do any good if Japan is crushed.[217]

Gandhi completely dominated the Congress Party at this time. Cripps repeatedly charged, after the failure of his mission, that Gandhi was the moving spirit in the rejection of his proposal.[218]

Colonel Louis Johnson's mission had also failed. By May 6, Johnson was in an Indian hospital, laid low by a nasal infection from the dust, complicated by fatigue from overwork, and perhaps psychosomatic trauma from frustration. Ten days later he left India with Washington's reluctant consent, turning political affairs over to his able deputy, a Foreign Service Officer and leaving behind for terminal interviews the busy technical mission under the direction of Grady, who was to be heard from later.[219]

On May 14, it was announced that Johnson would return to the United States because of his health, and would then resume his work in Delhi. He did have an operation on May 16 and flew back to the United States, but he did not return to Delhi. Thus, like Cripps, he felt that he had failed. In retrospect, "it seems unfortunate that Roosevelt sent a military man to India as America's chief diplomat during this political crisis, who judged the situation in military terms."[220] Johnson certainly possessed many virtues, such as optimism and forthrightness, which made him more assertive in a situation that might have baffled a more contemplative man.

Although many of Johnson's ideas were good, in diplomacy, as in politics, good ideas are only a beginning. The art of translating ideas into action takes keen sensitivity to the full range of subtle relationships involved in the situation and the ability to juggle and manoeuvre them together. Johnson had neither the talent nor experience for this difficult task. Perhaps, such as "tell Churchill to order the Viceroy," and "insisting upon its acceptance by the British," betrayed his naivete in the art of diplomacy and his affinity for the military approach to human relations. He relied heavily on Nehru as if he were the Commander of the Congress army rather than a political leader. His lack of intuition in dealing with politics was reflected in his failure to foresee the difference of relationship between the Congress and the Muslim League. He, therefore, failed to alert the State Department to these communal developments. His failure to understand the strongest difference of Hindu-Muslim relationship was a tragedy on his part. Therefore, Churchill informed Hopkins that "Johnson's views and presence in India

were not seen as helpfull by the British Government. On 11 July 1942, he was elected President of the General Dyestuff Corporation, and his Delhi post remained vacant.[222]

American opinion, which at the time of the failure of the Cripps Mission, had been disposed to blame Congress had now come round again to blaming Britain and championing the Indian cause.[223] Kurt R. Mathusch attributed this partly to Churchill's September statement that "his government is prepared to meet the Indian demands."[224] He felt that: "Nothing could have been better calculated to arouse Americans to speak up than the advice to shut up."[225] Some now began to apportion blame to America for India's treatment, alleging that by her silence America accepted responsibility for what was going on there.[226]

At this point the *Christian Science Monitor* said the suspicion grew that a few Indian leaders had risked the future of their country for political aggrandizement. To those who felt the matter could have been handled differently, it suggested that they ask themselves:

> ... whether any method was open that would at the same time have satisfied the Congress Party, the Muslims, and the depressed classes, guaranteed real freedom–and have done all this immediately.[227]

The New York Times urged Britain to be merciful to offenders,[228] to prepare for dominion status, to respect Indian pride, and to end racial inferiority, since India must still be rallied to the allied cause.[229]

But India was of great concern to the United States since her troops were there; therefore *The Nation* wrote:

> We beg the President to intervene and offer his services as mediator between the leaders of the Indian parties and the government of India. If he made his offer in collaboration with the two chief nations allied with Britain–Russia and China–it would carry great weight with the British and Indians alike. It is, we believe, the last and only hope of averting a tremendous defeat.[230]

The idea that America might do something to convince Indians that they were assured of independence after the war grew. The reports of the *New York Times* correspondent, Herbert L. Mathews, illustrate

this. He had discovered that Indian distrust of Britain was fundamental to the problem. Many Americans at this time were sure that without a settlement in India the war would be lost, and the move for mediation was reportedly growing stronger.[231]

The State Department was cautious in its handling of the situation. This was indicated in Secretary Hull's statement that the United States Government had made known its views informally to both sides but "was mindful of the problems of independence in a country as large as India, where the minority problem was especially difficult of solution."[232] At any rate American opinion was now completely dissatisfied with the Indian political deadlock.

The breakdown of negotiations made an impression upon Roosevelt, who again held that a government similar to that U. S. Articles of Confederation would be a proper solution for the existing Indian tangle. If such a move failed, only then would public opinion in the United States be satisfied that the British Government had made a fair attempt at the solution of the Indian problem, and that responsibility for the failure must be placed upon the Indian peoples.[233]

As before, the President's prescription for the solution of the Indian problem took little account of the deep-seated suspicion and distrust that characterized Hindu-Muslim relations on the subcontinent. For his part, Churchill did not believe that a government on the model of the Articles of Confederation was the proper solution of Indian problem during the critical period of the war the antagonistic feeling between the Hindus and Muslims. He recorded in his *Memoirs* that he was happy that the march of events had rendered it impossible for him to try the course of action suggested by the President, which he characterised as an act of madness. He observed:

> The human race cannot make progress without idealism, but idealism at other people's expense and without regard to the consequences of ruin and slaughter which fall upon millions of humble homes cannot be considered as its highest and noblest form.[234]

At this point, replying to Roosevelt's suggestions, Viceroy Linlithgow expressed the opinion that unless there was better American understanding of some phases of the Hindu-Muslim controversy, peace

would be made more complicated. He pointed out that American comments on India seemed shortsighted. For much that had been written so far assumed that India could be placed in something like a watertight compartment. American commentators, he said, appeared to believe that what was necessary in India was to make certain domestic concessions or changes and this would automatically solve the problem. The Viceroy said that India was a subcontinent with several states, various groups, and a large Muslim population. In this connection he thought the Americans either had no knowledge of the critical problems or were incapbable of understanding the situation.[235] On the other hand, the Viceroy publicly expressed his disapproval of the Pakistani scheme, which the Cripps' proposal had indirectly conceded.[236] This was an attempt to appease the Hindu members of his council. The Viceroy's statement, whether by design or otherwise, strengthened the hands of those Hindus, Sikhs and others who were anti-Pakistan. The purpose of the Viceroy's statement was, in the eyes of some, designed to stiffen Hindu elements opposed to the Pakistan movement, and thus reduce, if not eliminate, the chances of agreement between Hindu and Muslim moderates.[237] At all events, the Viceroy's remarks appear to be a direct reflection of Churchill's statement: "We mean to hold our own," and affords evidence that at that time the British were willing to resort to any shift or expedient in order to hold India.

For weeks the British had insisted that the Indian parties must first come to agreement, but the Viceroy indicated approval of the only plan that offered a basis for agreement among the various political parties. In a long interview with an officer of the mission, Jinnah said:

> Viceroy's statement was just another example of the policy the British have been following in India for the past fifty years. It was clearly an attempt to encourage Hindus and particularly Hindu Mahasabha to insist on United India and oppose Pakistan. If the British were really sincere in wanting to transfer power to Indians, the whole matter could be settled within three weeks or even less.[238]

Jinnah regretted that:

> a section of public opinion in England and the United States is proposing schemes which overlook the Muslim claim of

> Pakistan. The position of the Muslim community is different from that which the people of England and United States have been told to believe.[239]

Even the *New York Times,* which certainly could have been regarded by the British as most reasonable, and by Indian leaders as pro-British, had remarked that every attempt to solve the Indian problem was "one beat too late," and that it now required a psychologist to solve the problem, which was a lesson for the rest of Asia where a similar situation could develop. "We of the Western world shall not return to our former status in Asia," it wrote, therefore it was time to decide what should be done with the Netherland Indies, Malaya and Thailand.[240]

In November 1942, before the close of the year, the American Government made an apparent effort to satisfy public opinion by announcing that a career diplomat, William Phillips, who had been the American Ambassador to Italy until a year before, was to fill the place left vacant by Johnson, and that he would retain his rank of Ambassador as a courtesy because of his long service. The appointment was regarded as one of "profound importance in view of the political and military problems related to the current Indian situation." It was immediately recognized that there was more to this than appeared on the surface, and that Indian leaders would attach importance to a top man being sent. *Newsweek* commented:

> The United States Government desires to show Britain and the Indian people that Washington hopes to see the principles of the Atlantic Charter applied there at the war's end. On the other hand, Phillips will in no wise embarrass the British in India or encourage the hopes of native political leaders that the United States will intervene actively.[241]

This was likely to be a thankless task, pleasing no one, and was destined to have an interesting, if unfortunate sequel. American public opinion was asking the impossible of the diplomat. A majority of Americans felt that India should be granted independence in 1942.[242]

However disappointing to Anglo-American anti-colonial liberals and to Indian hopes for immediate independence, the Cripps Mission was not without significance. Great Britain had offered some advance in

the direction of a status for India which she could not again withhold successfully. An articulate if not decisive British voice in the dialogue with India had been that of the Labour element in Churchill's wartime coalition, which was to come to power only three years after Cripps returned to Britain.

A characterization of the American role by an Indian writer serves as an appropriate epitaph for the Cripps Mission. Bimula Prasad concluded that even though the Mission failed, "in the long run, Roosevelt's concern with the Indian question was bound to accelerate the march towards independence, especially since this concern was shared by non-official opinion."[243]

The Cripps Mission was followed more extensively in the American press than any events in Indian history. The American press expressed the attitude of the American people in praising Britain for its honesty and courage in attempting to solve the problem of India. Moreover, "the Cripps Mission, in spite of its so-called "failure" has brought closer understanding between the people of the United States and Britain."[244]

Furthermore, the Cripps Mission indicates that United States' interest was not primarily focused on India as India, but on British relations with India. These relations appealed and stirred American nationalism which embraced at once both a sense of community and sense of rivalry with Britain and the British Empire.[245] Also the United States' interest in India arose from the apparent similarity between the attitude of Britain towards Indian independence and Britain's attitude towards the independence of the thirteen Colonies. In 1942, "the American readiness to adopt a critical attitude towards British relations with India derives not only from India herself, but also from the very pattern of American nationalism of 1776."[246] The failure of the Cripps-Johnson mission to India in Anglo-American relations clearly demonstrated that the Hindu-Muslim problem was not as simple as many thought and that there was more of a problem within India than between Britain and India. The adoption of the Muslim demand for a divided India was the only solution to India's problem, where two nations fundamentally different in their culture, language, social order, laws, moral codes and outlook on life, lived for centuries aloof from each other.

In 1942, the British War Cabinet's acceptance in principle of the idea of Pakistan, was the greatest triumph of Muslim nationalism. Cripps' Draft Declaration contained a provision whereby any province could stay out of the proposed Indian Union with the right of forming its own idependent government.[247] This "non-accession clause" was a major, if not a complete, concession to the Muslim demand for Pakistan, although the Muslim League rejected the offer on the ground that the clause did not go far enough to create the Pakistan of their dreams. But the Hindus saw in this clause the seeds of Indian disintegration.[248] Lord Hailey told the House of Lords, that the clause was designed not with a view to creating Pakistan but of impressing on the Hindus the necessity of coming to terms with the Muslims.[249] For the first time, the right of a separate individual state was acknowledged. This was a severe blow to the Congress concept of Indian unity. To Gandhi's slogan "Quit India," Jinnah replied with "Divide and Quit."[250]

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Allieance*, p. vi.
2. DS Files 845.00/1283 PS/PM.
3. Letter Amery to Linlithgow, 5 Jan. 1942: MSS.EUR F.125/11; NO. Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby, eds., The Transfer of Power 1942-47 , pp. 7-9.
4. DS Files 845.00/1288-1/8 PS/KN.
5. Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, P. 209.
6. "The Crisis in India," *Manchester Guardian, London*, 6 January 1942.
7. "Asia Awakens," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 Feb. 1942, p. 14.
8. "India's Economic *Potential*," *Pacific Affairs*, XV (March 1942), 24.
9. "Deadwood at the Top," *New Republic*, CVI (2 March 1942), p. 24.
10. DS Files 845.00/1542 2/5.
11. "Advice from China," *Time*, XXXIX (2 March 1942), 24.
12. FO 371, FS456.
13. *Loc. cit.*
14. IOR L/P&E/8/509; FO 371, PS756.
15. Telegram Churchill to Roosevelt, 31 July 1942: Prem 4 45/4; tel. Churchill to Roosevelt, 31 July 1942: @. P. (42) 334, annex 2 No. 392; IOR L/P&S/12/2315: ff 186-90; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. II, p. 533.
16. Telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 20 Feb. 1942: MSS.EUR F.125/22.
17. *Ibid.*
18. DS Files 845.00/1288-3/8 PS/KN (sic).
19. Reports from American Commissioner at New Delhi, 845.00/300 PS/MP; 845.00/1226 TS/HK.
20. Report American Consulate General, Calcutta, 8 May 1941: DS 845.00/1232 PS/CMP.
21. Telegram Bajpai to Linlithgow, 12 March 1942: MSS.EUR F.125/22.
22. *New York Times*, 26-7 Feb. 1942. It is interesting to note, in the light of subsequent developments during the Cripp's Mission, that in the same place there appeared a report from New Delhi that the Council of State had voted eleven to five urging the appointment of non-official defence members, and that defence be placed upon Indian shoulders.
23. "Haggling over India," *New Republic*, CLIV (14 March 1942), 300.

24. *New York Times*, 11 March 1942, p. 18. The American League of India's Freedom here quoted a letter from Nehru of 10 January 1940, to prove that he did not stand for "immediate" and "complete" independence.

25. "In the News," *Los Angeles Examiner*, 9 March 1942, p. 1.

26. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 208-9.

27. Prem 4 48/9.

28. Telegram Harriman to President, 2 March 1942: Prem 4 48/9, 766-8.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Telegram Harriman to President (Hereafter Naval Person to President), No. 7346/2, 2 March 1942: Prem 4 48/9, 761-2.

31. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 215

32. WP(42)334, Cab 66/27; Fo 371, FS756.

33. Letter Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 March 1942: FRUS, 1942, I, 615-6.

34. *Loc. cit.*

35. *Loc. cit.*

36. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 209.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Letter Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 March 1942: FRUS, 1942, I, 615-6.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 220.

41. V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* p. 117.

42. Quoted in R. J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps and India 1939-1945* p. 17.

43. War Cabinet Conclusions, 3 March 1942: Cmd. 222; FO 371, FS657; Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, p. 119.

44. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 221.

45. Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

46. The Cripps Mission, Appendix I, Survey No. 19, 1-30 Feb. 1942: IOR MSS.EUR F.125/144; Prem 4 26/8; letter Amery to Linlithgow, 8 Aug. and 1 Sept. 1942, Linlithgow's Papers, Vol. II, Dalten Diary, 9 Apr. 1942; Cabs 13 and 24, July 3'-Aug. 1942, Cab 65/27; WP(42)255; Cab 66/25; DS Files 845.00/1588 PS/RV; 845.00/1542 1/5; Time, 21 Sept. 1942.

47. Memorandum Murray to Welles, 30 March 1942: 845.01/160, Department of State, National Archives, Washington, D. C.

48. Ibid.; Moore, *Churchill, Cripps, and India*, p. 77.

49. "Something About India," *Time*, XXXIX (O March 1942), 28.
50. "Axis Propaganda Barrage Badgers Britain on India," *Newsweek*, XIX (16 March 1942), 34.
51. "India; Conquerors Throw Dice for Richest, Oldest Prize of All," *Life*, XII (16 March), 86-95.
52. "How Much Longer," *Time*, XXXIV (March 1942), 26.
53. "Grand Rapids," (Mich.) *Herald*, quoted in *Congressional Record*, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 88:8 (16 March 1942), A 1031.
54. "U.S. Mission to Explore India's Undeveloped Riches," *Newsweek*, XIX (16 March 1942), 27.
55. "In the News," *Los Angeles Examiner*, 9 March 1942, p. 2.
56. Note to Cartoon, "The King's Shilling," *Ibid.*, 3 March 1942, p. 10.
57. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 209.
58. Telegram American Consulate General to Secretary of State, new Delhi, 17 March 1942: DS File 845.01/127. *Dawn* was the Muslim League's publication.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 210-1.
61. Ibid., p. 212. Robert E. Sherwood thought that the only part of the message with which Churchill agreed was Roosevelt's admission that it was none of his business. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* p. 511.
62. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 214.
63. Quoted by Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 512.
64. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 214.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 215. Communication to Viceroy of India, 10 March 1942.
66. *New York Times*, 12 March 1942, p. 18.
67. Cripps was a member of the Cabinet Committee on India, along with Attlee, Lord Simon, Sir John Anderson, Sir James Grigg, and Amery (the sole Conservative). Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 214. In 1939 Cripps had prepared a plan for Indian constitutional changes which he had presented to the Viceroy. Fisher, op. cit., p. 108.
68. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 215.
69. *New York Times*, 12 March 1942, p. 18.
70. DS Files 845.00/1347; "Comment from India," *San Francisco News*, 23 March 1942, p. 10.
71. *The New Republic*, CVI (23 March 1942), 379.

72. *Nation*, CLIV (21 Feb. 1942), 210-1.

73. Telegram Amery to Linlithgow, 10 March 1942: Cmd. 304; Hess, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-3.

74. The week-end at Filkins to which Attlee traced the genesis of the Cripps' offer occurred at the beginning of Nehru's visit to England from June to October 1938. See C. R. Attlee, "*As It Happened*," Ms., in Attlee's Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge: 1/13; R. G. Coupland, *Diary: India*, 1941-42 (hereafter C. D.), 29 Jan. 1942, Coupland Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford; P. S. Gupta, *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement*, pp. 257 -9 L. Barnes, *Empire or Democracy* pp. 265-7; Christopher Thorne, *op. cit.*, p. 61; tel. tel. Linlithgow to Amery, 24 March 1942: MSS.EUR F.125/29.

75. For detail see Estorick, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-7.

76. Diary kept by Cripps and Geoffrey Wilson, 1939-1940 (hereafter C.-W. D.), 14 Dec. 1939, Copy in possession of Maurice Shock, Leicester University, England.

77. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps, and India*, pp. 8-10.

78. Cripps' official account of his mission stated he was given full authority to arrive at a settlement within the terms of the Draft (Cabinet) Declaration, but was responsible personally, for what was put forward to Indian leaders by way of explanation or amplification of details. H. C. Deb. 831.

79. Professor Coupland, under the auspices of Nuffield College, went to India in the autum of 1942 to study the constitutional problem. During the Cripps Mission, Coupland joined Cripps' staff in India and helped him in drafting the proposal for India's future. Coupland kept an unofficial record of the Mission and personal statements of Cripps in his private Diary.

80. "The Battle for India," ed., *New York Times*, 25 March 1942, p. 20.

81. HAD DOMINION STATUS OFFERED TO INDIA AFTER WAR IF SHE COOPERATE NOW," *The New York Times*, 30 March 1942, p. 1.

82. Fielden to Thompson, n.d. (August 1942), quoted in P. S. Gupta, *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement*, pp. 270, 225.

83. C. D., 3 Apr. 1942.

84. Cripps Mission, Appendix I, IOR MSS.EUR F.125/144; MSS.EUR F.125/157; Statement and Draft Declaration by H. M. G., Cmd. 6350 (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1942), p. 4; C. H. Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1857 to 1947* pp. 372-3.

85. Blair Bolls sent a copy of his article to Murray which Bolls wrote in October 1942, for the North American Alliance under the title "Changed Instructions," about the Cripps Mission controversy by Louis Fischer. See DS Files 845.00/1694 PS/HW.

86. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 215-7.

87. Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* p. 108.

88. From Norris S. Hoselton, Secretary in Charge, Office of the Personal Representative of the President of the United States, New Delhi, subject, "Resolution of Working Committee of All-India Muslim League at Bombay on August 20 1942, enclosure No. I, despatch No. 48, 29 Sept. 1942: 840.00/1861 PS/PN.

89. *Ibid.*

90. Hripendra Nath Mitro, ed., *The Indian Annual Register* I, p. 63.

91. *Ibid.*

92. *Los Angeles Times*, 30 March 1942, part I, p. 3. Those quoted were Senator Pat McCarran, Nevada; Senator Elbert Thomas, Utah; and Representative Luther Johnson, Texas.

93. "Putting First Things First in India," ed., *Ibid.*, 31 March 1942, part II, p. 4.

94. *Amerasia*, VI (April 1942), 58-60.

95. "The Offer to India," *Christian Science Monitor*, ed., 31 March 1942, p. 14.

96. "British Offer Draws Hindu Opposition," *Los Angeles Times*, 31 March 1942, part I, p. 2.

97. "India Juggles With Destiny," ed., *New York Times*, 1 April 1942, p. 20.

98. "India Must Fight Fast," ed., *San Francisco News*, 1 April 1942, p. 14.

99. "Hard Sledding for the Cripps Plan in India," ed., *Los Angeles Times*, 2 April 1942, part II, p. 4.

100. "India's Defence," ed., *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 April 1942, p. 14.

101. *The Nation*, CLIV (4 April 1942), 381

102. "Hope for India," *New Republic*, CVI (6 April 1942), 443-4.

103. "Turning of a Page: Britain's offer of full Dominion Status," *Time*, XXXIX (6 April 1942), 26. It may be noted that this is the position taken by Coupland who regarded this press conference as "the crowing point, the really historic moment, in the story of the Mission." *The Cripps Mission*, p. 33. Subrahmanyan, on the other hand, makes much of the fact that there never was an official version of this press conference although official reporters were present. Why Cripps Failed, p. 54.

104. "Will India Accept?" *Christian Century*, LIX (8 April 1942), 454-5.

105. Report Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 2 April 1942: FW 845.00/1288-6/8 PS/KN.

106. R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, II, pp. 274-7; R. Parkin, *India Today*, pp, 299-33. It may be noted here that the Mountbatten Plan, under which power was transferred in the subcontinent in 1947, was identical with this proposal except that it envisaged complete transfer of power after the war.

107. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, II, p. 279.

108. C. D., 31 March 1942.

109. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, II, p. 288.

110. T. A. Raman, *What Does Gandhi Want?* p. 91.

111. Cripps press interview, 16 June 1942, quoted in Parkin, *India Today*, p. 32.

112. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, II, p. 279. The League also felt that its acceptance after rejection by the Congress would accentuate communal feeling in which the minorities' position would be further endangered.

113. Cripps' note, 28 March 1942: Cmd. 413. The Central Intelligence Bureau Secret Report (28 March 1942) on teh Muslim League Working Committee of 27 March observed that Jinnah was prepared to accept the Cripps' proposals in principle and ... there was no serious attempt to challenge his judgment, DS File, Home Pol, 221/40.

114. "Will India Accept?" *Christian Century*, LIX (8 April 1942), 454-5.

115. *FRUS*, 1941, III, 170-6; Vol. I, 1942, 609-13, 616-8. The arrangement is discussed more fully in teh following chapter.

116. *Ibid*, 1942, I, 618.

117. Cf. Washington Post, 16 March 1942, quoting a United Press dispatch datelined New Delhi, March 15: "Observers believed it significant that the United States in exchanging Ministers placed India on the same diplomatic plane as the British Dominions."

118. *New York Times*, 7 April 1942, p. 4.

119. Maulana A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom* p. 119. Both American and Indian press supported that it was to Nehru. See *The Times* (London), 6 April 1942, p. 4.

120. Johnson wrote in a dispatch that the name of Roosevelt acted like magic. *FRUS* 1942, I, 630.

121. Enclosure Pinnell to Turnbull, New Delhi, 6 April 1942: MSS.EUR F.141.

122. The Marquess of Linlithgow's unpublished Diary. (The most secret notes of a conversation on the Cripps Mission). IOR: MSS.EUR F. 125/141, P. 52.

123. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

124. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 216.

125. Lawrence K. Rosinger, *Restless India* p. 76. He considers that the general conditions of the period had much to do with the failure to reach agreement. He places considerable emphasis on the skepticism of Congress Party leaders as to Britain's prospects in the war.

126. "Good-by, Mr. Cripps," *Time*, XXXIX (6 April 1942), 28.

127. "President's Envoy Spurs Negotiations in India," *Los Angeles Times* (6 April 1942), part I, p. 3.

128. Telegram Johnson to Secretary of State, 4 April 1942: *FRUS*, 1942, I, 626-7.

129. *New York Times*, 9 April 1942, p. 5. There was of Course, a "Johnson Formula for Defence," which the Congress Working Committee accepted as a basis for further negotiation and reworded. See Subrahmanyan, *Why Cripps Failed*, p. 70.

130. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 628.

131. Telegram Johnson to Hull, 4 April 1942: *FRUS* 1942, I, 626-7.

132. Telegram Welles to Merell, 5 April 1942: *FRUS*, 1942, I, 627-8.

133. *New York Times*, 10 April 1942, p. 6.

134. Subrahmanyan, *op, cit.*, p. 19.

135. R. J. Moore, *Escape From Empire* pp. 11-2.

136. Linlithgow and Cripps drafted a new defence formula on April 7 and slipped it under Johnson's door. It was intended that Johnson would hand it to Nehru, and, if Congress approve it, the formula would be presented as a suggestion by Congress for British approval. Though Linlithgow thought Johnson "a very pleasant fellow and evidently of good caliber," he would be relieved if we get through this business without some misunderstanding or confusion arising on account of [his] activities and perhaps on the part of the president himself. On the morning of April 8, at 7:30 Johnson gave Nehru the formula and at 10:15 he showed it to Azad. Telegram Linlithgow to Amery, Linlithgow's Note, 7-8 April 1942: Cmd. 550, 553.

137. Linlithgow to Amery, 9 April 1942: Cmd. 559.

138. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 626.

139. Linlithgow's unpublished Diary, IOR: MSS.EUR F.125/141, p. 59.

140. *Ibid.*

141. The Viceroy could not really give such an understanding without violating the exisiting constitution. As a matter of actual practice, the Viceroy seldom vetoed the majority in the Council. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, part II, p. 228. It is to be noted that the acts of the Congress had formed ministries in the provinces without such an understanding.

142. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 229.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 230

144. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

145. FW 845.00/1645 PS/MEL.

146. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 233.

147. Telegram Johnson to Roosevelt, 11 April 1942: *FRUS*, 1942, I, 631-2.

148. Text of Congress resolution in M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 524-6.

149. William H. Wadhams, legal adviser to the Chamber of Princes of India, interview with Murray, DS Files 845.00/1335 PS/MLN; 845.00/1592.

150. For details see Resolution of the All-India Muslim League, April 1942 to May 1943, published by the Hon. Secretary, All-India Muslim League (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 1-7; DS File 845.00/1501 PS/MNP.

151. Enclosure American Consulate to Secretary of State, Panama, No. 1, Dispatch No. 4801, 9 November 1943: 845,20211/20 PS/HS.

152. *Ibid.*

153. During the Cripps negotiations, Japan made repeated promises to Congress leaders about Indian liberty and independence. See DS File 845.01/166.

154. Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 88, (9 August 1942), 6894; Washington Post, 9 August 1942. In fact, Berlin congratulated Bose for having defeated the Cripps Mission by radio propaganda.

155. FW 845.00/1365 PS/FPJ.

156. "Foreign Troops in India," *The Harijan*, 26 April 1942.

157. Telegram Hopkins to President, 4 April 1942: Prem 4 48/9.

158. "Are You not Inviting the Japanese?" *Harijan*, 3 May 1942; FW 845.00/1365; WSC to FDR, 13 August 1942: Prem 4 45/4.

159. Letter Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 24 August 1942: Prem 4 45/4; DS File 845.00/1375.

160. Telegram American Consulate to Secretary of State, Calcutta, 25 July 1940: DS File No. 1649.

161. *New York Times*, 3 August 1942.

162. *The New Republic*, 17 August 1942; *The Nation*, 22 May 1942, p. 144.

163. Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington's report to President on the Political and Military situation in India, DS 845.00/1351.

164. Department of State Bulletin, 15 August 1942 (hereafter cited as Bulletin).

165. Tendulkar, *Gandhi*, Vol. VI, pp. 171-3.

166. *Nation*, 5 September 1942, p. 200. Kingsley Martin, Norman Angell, and other British liberals similarly criticized Americna liberals for their ignorance about the Indian problem. Nation, 20 August and 21 November 1942.

167. Attlee wrote to Roosevelt that despite Congress Party propaganda, 50,000 volunteers were joining the Indian army every month. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 722.

168. Telegram (strictly confidential) American Consulate General to Secretary of State, Bombay, 19 August 1942: DS 845.00/1483 PS/DWR.

169. Akhand Hindustan means "a single unit undivided India." In order to resist the Pakistan movement for an undivided India, the Hindu leaders considered violence as a necessary and justifiable counter step. See Bombay Chronicle, 7 July 1942; DS Files 845.00/1251 PS/MW; 845.00/1250 BS/BW; FO 371.

170. DS 845.00/1588 PS/RV.

171. Resolution of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee, Prem 4 48/5; DS 845.00/1332.

172. FO 371, 2431/122/45; Prem 4 48/5, p. 397.

173. Prem 4 43A/3.

174. Jinnah stated that he would gladly treat with Rajagopalachi's faction if it were able to develop any real strength. DS Files 845.00/865; 845.00/1439 PS/FPJ.

175. 845.00/1639; 845.00/1646 PS/LMB.

176. Resolution of All-India Muslim League Working Committee, Bombay, 20 August 1942: DS 840.00/1861 PS/PN.

177. 845.00/1627 PS/HW.

178. Muslim leaders warn Britain against surrender to Congress Party, Reuter, Bombay, Message of 22 June 1942: NND. 30032.

179. General Stilwell's conversation with Jinnah (strictly confidential), DS 845.00/1357.

180. "Attitude to the Cripps Proposals," Prem 4 46/12.

181. *Ibid*.

182. Telegram Churchill to Roosevelt, 11 April 1942: FRUS, 1942, I, 633; Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal, 11 April 1942, Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 217.

183. Telegram Roosevelt to Hopkins for Churchill, 12 April 1942: Prem 4 48/9; tel. Roosevelt to Hopkins, 12 April 1942: IOR R/30/1/1: ff 5-8.

184. Prem 4 48/9; IOR R/30/1/1: ff 5-8; Manasergh, *The Transfer of Power*, p. 759; FO 371, A2421/122/45.

185. Draft of 12 April 1942: Prem 4 48/9; Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 195.

186. Prem 4 48/9; telegram Churchill to Roosevelt, 12 April 1942: *FRUS*, 1942, I, 634-5.

187. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, 218-9.

188. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

189. "Some Reflection on India," Archive of Sir Percy James Gigg, PJGG 5/1-3(a), Churchill College, Cambridge.

190. PJGG 8/3/5 (a).

191. A. V. Alexander's Papers, AVAR 6/2, Churchill College, Cambridge.

192. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 219.

193. Cab 66/22, WP(42)110; FRUS, 1942, I, 633.

194. Telegram Roosevelt to Hopkins for Churchill, 12 April 1942: Prem 4 48/9.

195. IOR L/P&3/8/509.

196. Telegram Johnson to Roosevelt, 11 April 1942: *FRUS*, 1942, I, 631-2; Nation, 19, 26 September and 14 November 1942.

197. Cripps did present a written report to the Cabinet, in which he blamed the failure to achieve a settlement on Gandhi. IOR WP(42)283; L/PO/6/1050; Cab 66/26; DS 845.01/189 PS/RV; Ronald Segal, *The Anguish of India* pp. 102-3.

198. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 631.

199. Amery categorically denied the charges of sabotage. H. C. Deb. 383, Col. 614; Louis Fisher, elaborate thesis on this sabotage (*The Nation*, 19 Sept. and 26, 1942), was rebutted by Graham Spry, a member of Cripps' staff in India. *The Nation*, 14 November 1942.

200. Telegram American Consulate to Secretary of State, Ankara, 16 April 1942: DS 845.01/166.

201. Approximately 70% of the Indian troops and volunteers were Muslims and only 12% of the total were Hindus. For details see DS Files 845.00/1290 PS/2HA; 845.00/1714 PS/VMC.

202. It will be convenient to say that Congress Party shut the doors to the possibility of compromise because of its qualified hostilities to Pakistan scheme. DS Files 845.01/221; 845.00/1382; 845.00/1381 PS/MNP.

203. DS 845.00/1350.

204. *The New York Times*, 8 April 1942, p. 18.

205. "Japan Moves on India," ed., *San Francisco News*, 11 April 1942, p. 10.

206. "Comments from India," *San Francisco News*, 15 April 1942, p. 14; DS 845.01/189 PS/RV.

207. *The New York times*, 11 April 1942, p. 12.

208. Quoted in Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, pp. 290-1; telegram Amery to Halifax, 17 June 1942: IOR R/30/1/12; L/P&J/8/596: f 155; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. II, p. 223, 244.

209. Broadcast to the people of United States, 27 July 1942: DS 845.01/166; IOR L/1/1/751.

210. "What would happen after complete transfer of power to India,?" telegram Merrell to Secretary of State, 16 July 1942: DS Files 845.01/166; Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 193.

211. IOR L/P&J/596: ff 138-43; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power,* Vol. II, pp. 130, 135.

212. *Ibid.*

213. *The New York Times,* 24 April 1942.

214. NA, NND. 30032.

215. *The New York Times,* 5 August 1942.

216. T. A. Raman, *What Does Gandhi Want?*, pp. 85-6. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur was Health Minister of the Government of India from 1947-1957.

217. Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, II, p. 279.

218. FRUS, 1942, I, 651. In August 1947 Grady became the first American Ambassador to India.

219. FDR to Johnson, 7 May 1942: Roosevelt Papers, PSF box 91.

220. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 629.

221. *The New York Times,* 11 July 1942, p. 7.

222. Telegram Halifax to Linlithgow, Washington, 25 Sept. 1942: IOR L/P&S/12/2633: f 157; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power,* III, p. 42.

223. "American Public and India," *Amersia,* VI (25) October 1942), 397-408; DS 845.00/1566

224. *Amersia,* VI (25 Oct. 1942), p. 397.

225. *Ibid.*, p. 401. This was apparently particularly true of *The New York Post.*

226. "Violence in India," *Christian Science Monitor,* 12 Aug. 1942, p. 14.

227. Raymond Clapper stated that the Congress Party was acting like a friend of Japan, and that Gandhi did not see India as necessary to the allies. "Captial Comment," *San Francisco News*, 7 August 1942, p. 18.

228. "India's Revolt Hangs Fire," *The New York Times*, 13 August 1942, p. 18.

229. Louis Fischer, "What Gandhi Wants," *Nation*, CLV (21 Oct. 1942), 123.

230. "No Victory Without India," *Christian Century*, LIX (21 October 1942), 1278-9.

231. *The New York Times*, 23 July 1942.

232. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 637.

233. Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 219-20. The Prime Minister Pinpointed the problem by observing in his memoirs that millions had lost their lives in the communal riots during the transfer of power in 1947.

234. DS 845.00/1853 PS/HCW.

235. DS 845.00/1750 PS/SMS.

236. "Britain Ready for Indian self-rule," *The Christian Century*, 22 Dec. 1942, 584; DS Files 845.00/1760; 845.00/1750 PS/SMS; 845.00/695; 845.00/1566; 845.00/1760.

237. DS 845.00/1749 PS/LMB.

238. DS 845.00/695; 845.00/1566; 845.00/1760

239. *The New York Times*, 23 July 1942.

240. "Ambassador to India," *Newsweek*, XXVIII (21 Dec. 1942), 28.

241. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 744-7.

242. Bimula Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy* p. 213.

243. The Sense of community means, the feelings of common language, similar laws, comparable institutions and sometimes identical necessities in foreign affairs. But the sense of rivalry derives from the history of revolutionary separation from Britain, and the monuments, memorials and symbols which form childhood shape the content and th concepts of so much of American political thinking. The sense of community and the sense of rivalry are both deep-seated and have their emotional content.

245. "India as a factor in Anglo-American relations," War Cabinet, 27 July 1942: Cab 66/26 WP(42)318.

246. Cmd. 6350 of 1942; Ambedkar, op. cit., pp. 476-8; Hess, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-4.

247. Symond, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

248. Congress Resolution of 2nd April 1942, quoted in Symond, *op. cit.*, p. 64. .

249. H. L. 122. 5s, 29 April 1942, Cols. 771-2.

250. Resolution of the All-India Muslim League from April 1942 to May 1943 (Delhi: Hon. Secretary of A.I.M.L. n.d.), p. 2.

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230. "No Victory Without India," Christian Century, LIX (21 October 1942), 1278-9.

231. The New York Times, 23 July 1942.

232. FRUS, 1942, I, 637.

233. Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 219-20. The Prime Minister Pinpointed the problem by obserbving in his memoirs that millions had lost their lives in the communal riots during the transfer of power in 1947.

234. DS 845.00/1656 PS/HCW.

235. DS 845.00/1730 PS/SA15.

236. "Britain Ready for Indian self-rule," The Christian Century, 22 Dec. 1942, 584; DS Files 845.00/1760, 845.00/1750 PS/SA15, 845.00/695, 845.00/1566; 845.00/1760.

237. DS 845.00/1749 PS/LMB.

238. DS 845.00/695; 845.00/1566; 845.00/1760

239. The New York Times, 23 July 1942.

240. "Ambassador to India," Newsweek, XXVIII (21 Dec. 1942), 28.

241. FRUS, 1942, I, 744-7.

242. Bimula Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy p. 213.

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245. "India as a factor in Anglo-American relations," War Cabinet, 27 July 1942. Cab 66/26 WP(42)315.

246. Cmd. 6350 of 1942; Ambedkar, op. cit., pp. 476-8; Hess, op. cit., pp. 43-4.

247. Symond, op. cit., p. 64.

248. Congress Resolution of 2nd April 1942, quoted in Symond, op. cit., p. 64.

249. H. L. 122, 5s, 29 April 1942, Cols. 771-2.

250. Resolution of the All-India Muslim League from April 1942 to May 1943 (Delhi: Hon. Secretary of A.I.M.L n.d.), p. 2.

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ANOTHER ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA 1943-1945

Phillips goes to India

In 1942 the failure of both the Cripps Mission of conciliation and the efforts of Colonel Louis Johnson to arbitrate between the British and the Indian leaders, produced a serious reaction in India. All the political parties were frustrated because they did not believe that British intentions of granting independence after the war were genuine.

As soon as the rebellion of the Congress Party was brought under control by the British, Franklin Roosevelt reasserted his interest in the Indian situation. Roosevelt was disturbed by the fiery speeches of Churchill and Amery concerning the Indian problem.[1] Nor was he alone amongst American political leaders; Wendell Wilkie bitterly criticized British policy in India, observing that it would greatly injure the moral leadership of America in Asia.[2]

As 1943 opened, the political stalemate in India was a condition dangerous to the Allied war effort. Thus the British made an effort to accommodate Indian demands, so that the campaign against Japan in Asia might be continued. The United States was now deeply involved in India. Shortly after Colonel Johnson left India, the State Department urged that William Phillips, a senior United States representative of outstanding ability, should go to India at the earliest moment. The Department wanted a man capable of supplying them with information vital to the formation of policy and of "sufficient rank to indicate the President's blessing lest the Government of India impede him"[3] Obviously a candidate possessing special talents was needed. Forecasting the necessity for a successor to Johnson, George Merrill, the

Foreign Service officer who had been directing the New Delhi office in this troubled period, had proposed in July that if, as he hoped, a "trained diplomat of great distinction and prestige" were to be named, the former ambassador to Italy, William Phillips, seemed ideal.[4] During the summer the designation of Phillips had been also suggested by Murray and Hull.[5] Six weeks after Johnson's departure, the vacancy caused by him was filled by the appointment of Phillips. In *The Nation*'s opinion it was understandable that President Roosevelt wanted William Phillips in India where there was great need of an American observer.[6] Born in 1878 into a prominent Boston family, Phillips had held a variety of diplomatic posts since 1903. He was a career diplomat: well-known, well-liked and highly respected in diplomatic circles. He had worked in England, China, the Netherlands, and Canada and as an assistant secretary of state under Wilson. For Roosevelt, Phillips served as under secretary of state and later as Ambassador to Delhi. His appointment to Delhi was regarded as one of "profound importance in view of the political and military problems related to the current Indian situation." He seemed ideal for Roosevelt's purposes, which were to demonstrate America's interest in India and to support non-intervention. At the same time, the State Department and White House anticipated that Phillips in contrast to Johnson, would be cautious and inclined to favour a non-intervention policy.[7]

At the time of his assignment to India, Phillips was already serving in London as the chief of the Office of Strategic Services.[8] In this position, he had gained wide acquaintance in government circles in London. The President's blessing was augmented by personal friendship with Phillips which went back to their days at Harvard. For the President to transfer a man of Phillips' competence and experience from the Office of Strategic Services in London to New Delhi at this juncture in the war indicated the importance Roosevelt attached to India. Phillips, indeed in some ways, as recalled by those who had met him, was seemingly more British than the British. As such he appeared to be someone likely to sympathize with Britain's imperial problem during the war.[9] The President certainly hoped this would have the desired effect on Churchill and other British officials. For this reason the Department had Phillips remain in London for full two months after his appointment had been announced. During these two months in London, before his

departure for New Delhi, Phillips met and had discussions with key British figures about India. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was very cordial about the projected trip and told Phillips that the lack of distinguished American visitors to India had left the Americans with little understanding of the intractably complex problems in India. As a consquence Americans, as the whole, did not grasp "the terrific problem."[10] Eden hoped that Phillips would report the whole picture to Roosevelt. Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India, spoke with Phillips on 24 November 1942. The Secretary expressed the opinion that since the Cripps Offer for dominion status after the war, the initiative for settlement in India rested completely with the Indian leaders. Amery told Phillips that "the British Government had abandoned the idea of trying to solve the Indian problem for the Indians, in the realization that Indians themselves must come together."[11] Amery urged Phillips to try to persuade the Indians themselves to pull together, though he believed that the Muslims would require two separate states, a North-West block and a North-east block. He predicted that the Indian princes would wish for two or possibly three separate states; and certainly the Hindus would be again divided into separate units. Amery foresaw a committee representing all states presiding over this confederation. The Secretary suggested that anything Phillips could do to persuade the Indians to achieve a confederation of states would be very helpful.[12]

In his conversation with Phillips, Sir Stafford Cripps concluded that little could be done until after the war. He was outspoken in his criticism of the Viceroy and revealed to Phillips the interesting fact that several members of the War Cabinet, including himself, had begged the Prime Minister to recall Linlithgow before Cripps' Mission to India.[13] The Lord Privy Seal offered this information privately and confidentially. Publically, Cripps' statements, both in England and America, fully endorsed the policy of the Prime Minister. Brenden Bracken asserted that trade unionism and the increase of wages throughout India were the basis of all the present prblems.[14]

Such behaviour was in keeping with the British tradition that the Cabinet present a united and unanimous position publically despite the differences that occur in private meetings. The solidarity of the Cabinet

deprived American officials of leverage against Churchill's policy. The War Cabinet, which combined members of both parties in England, augmented the problem by removing the loyal, but often critical, opposition. The role of the "Loyal Opposition" had been relegated to the Press. Churchill resented criticism from Americans.

The Prime Minister expressed his resentment to Phillips at a luncheon at Number 10 Downing Street on 16 December 1942. Churchill centered his anger on Wendell Wilkie, who had criticized the British policy towards India in a speech. The Prime Minister "insisted that Wilkie was not a man to be trusted."[15] Phillips reminded Churchill that criticism of political leaders was accepted in America and often "given in friendly background." But this did not mollify Churchill. Phillips commented in his diary, "I realized that once Churchill had made up his mind nothing could change it."[16]

The Prime Minister treated him, in Phillips words, as one of his own senior diplomats to whom he looked for the solution of a difficult problem. The glitter of the great man's personality apart, on the subject of India, Phillips found it difficult to fathom Churchill's mind. He recounted:

> In one phrase he reiterated his public assertion that he would never part with any potion of his Empire. Yet in another phrase he referred to the offers of freedom which had been made to Indians, meaning, I suppose, the ill-fated mission to India, headed by Sir Stafford Cripps earlier that year.[17]

The problem of division within India was spelled out to Phillips by many in Britain. Their duty could not be fulfilled merely by walking out and leaving the millions of minority groups to muddle through to a solution. As a result of his conversation in London, with a reservation concerning Churchill, who was "less liberal-minded than the general feeling here in official and unofficial circles," the new ambassador was able to report to Roosevelt in December that he had found that there was "a complete readiness to give effect to the principles of self-determination to India, if only the Indians could agree among themselves on the form of government for an independent India."[18]

Contrary to London's expectations, Phillips proved to be a severe critic of British policy in India and was to figure in an incident which added to the strains in Anglo-American relations. This will be related in due course, as will the repercussions on these relations, caused by famine in Bengal and growing American interest in post-war commercial links with India.[19] It seemed that perhaps the simple cry of anti-imperialism and the majestic example of 1776 might not, after all, provide a sufficient and ready solution.

On 20 November 1942, Secretary of State Hull forwarded instruction to Phillips. The letter expressed American policy towards British India in idealistic tones. Hull Informed Phillips:

> The President and I and the entire Government earnestly favor freedom for all dependent peoples at the earliest possible date practicable.[20]

The Secretary expressed the hope that Phillips could encourage both sides to reach a practicable settlement. But in negotiating such a settlement, Phillips must not embitter Anglo-American relations. Hull wrote:

> Therefore, we cannot bring pressure, which might reasonably be regarded as objectionable to bear on the British. We can in a friendly spirit talk bluntly and earnestly to appropriate British officials so long as they understand that it is our purpose to treat them in a throughly friendly way. A settlement arising from such friendly and nonpartisan conversations with both sides, would probably be most practicably as well as most desirable.[21]

The Secretary's concern over the Indian situation was again disclosed in his statement:

> In the light of the foregoing, I think it can be truthfully said that with respect to the British-Indian relationship, the President and I have given constant attention to the most difficult question, that is the freedom of India, and we have observed all

> developments from week to week and endeavored to give the fullest attention feasible to the situation.[22]

Phillips had heard about the Hindu-Muslim differences in India and warned Hull not to expect too much of him under the difficult terms of his instructions, which in essence instructed him to persuade the parties in the direction of a settlement without appearing to exercise pressure or act as arbitrator.[23] On December 17 the Viceroy delivered a speech in Calcutta which seemed to Merrill and other observers to indicate a shift in British policy from acknowledging the possibility of Pakistan to seeking to maintain unity. Merrill viewed the speech as a British attempt to sabotage the efforts of moderates to reconcile the Muslim League with other Indian groups in the interest of presenting a united front to the British. Earlier reports from the Delhi mission had observed that Jinnah feared the American government's pressure on the British might lead to a settlement unfavourable to the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan.[24]

The instructions sent to Phillips were unrealistic. Churchill had spurned every friendly attempt by the American Government. Hull was aware that this tactic and style of diplomacy had proven wholly unproductive for Roosevelt in his dealings with Churchill. However, Hull's instructions seemed to indicate that he still hoped that the same tactics might prove successful between Phillips and Linlithgow in India. It was indeed a faint hope, but an avenue which America had not fully explored.

The Indian situation was the ticklish task. Liberal American opinion, however, doubted Phillips' suitability, and *The Nation* could not:

> ...help wondering why Mr. Roosevelt selected, for this important post, an old-line diplomat who will seem to the Indian leaders to bear a strong resemblance to the British officials they have known so long.[25]

This surely was another recommendation, since Phillips had to deal with the existing British imperialism. Had it been Indian leaders who were to be met, the situation would have been different, and might

have warranted another appointment. In point of fact, the "correct" Phillips was shortly to appear as a wolf in sheep's clothing to the British. To those few Indian leaders whom he met, he conveyed the idea that he was really a lamb merely attired somewhat like the British wolf.

President Roosevelt was quick to discourage unwarranted conjectures concerning the appointment, and announced at his press conference that, "Mr. Phillips ... would not carry to India any special plan or formula for the solution of the Indian problem."[26] Such explanations were unconvincing, and *Newsweek* commented:

> But Indian Nationalists will read something more into the assignment of a top diplomat career man, who was twice under Secretary of State. Even though Phillips carries no formula on an Indian settlement, this does not preclude his attempting to work out some scheme composing British and American views on India.[27]

This was exactly what much American opinion had been clamouring for. While it was soon evident that the United States had not abandoned its "hands off policy." The sixty-four year old ambassador, "a patient, conservative diplomat who has never ruffled feathers nor interfered with history,"[28] was destined to disturb considerable plumage as a result of his Indian mission.

Before Phillips' departure for India, the President was reported to have said to his son Elliot at Casablanca in January 1943:

> India should be made a commonwealth at once. After a certain number of years–five perhaps, or ten–she should be able to choose whether she wants to remain in the Empire or have complete independence.[29]

Roosevelt evidently subscribed to the Liberal school of American thought on India as expounded in *The Nation* and *New Republic*, and attached a somewhat different meaning to the words "commonwealth" and "dominion status" than did Britain. Nothing is said of Roosevelt's mentioning this to Churchill, but no doubt Churchill had some idea of his views, and was forewarned of what to expect from the Phillips

mission.[30] Certainly the authorities in India adopted a particularly immovable attitude.

In January 1943, Phillips' appointment was warmly welcomed in official and non-official circles in India as one that would facilitate the transaction of business between the United States and India.[31] It was felt that it would be "a great advantage that the business of reporting upon conditions in India to the American Government ... should be in the hands of a diplomat of Phillips' great ability."[32] Indian newspapers were gratified at the appointment of a representative with the rank of ambassador.[33] The *Manchester Guardian* called it an admirable choice and referred to his "unusal knowledge of England and British institutions."[34] Obviously here was an attempt to please both Britain and India.

The new presidential representative went to India "as a diplomat, not as a negotiator," and it was understood by the well-informed that "Washington [was] not going to interfere in the internel situation as long as the British [did] not want them to."[35] Phillips, as we have seen, had been sent to India with British approval including the blessing of the British Embassy in Washington, and the high hopes of Americans interest in Indian affairs. Instead Phillips, for all his old-school-diplomatic and East-Coast-elite backgrounds, soon came to conclusions which, in Roosevelt's words, were "amazingly radical for a man like Bill."[36]

Feat of Diplomacy

Phillips arrived in India on 8 January 1943. Following accepted protocol, he spent his first three days in India as a guest of the Viceroy. Phillips' credentials were accepted, which granted him the rank of ambassador, while holding the title of Personal Representative of the President of the United States in India.

Phillips arrived in India when a food shortage was uppermost in public attention, and the significant fact for him was that the presence of American forces in India was being blamed for it.[37] Phillips was disturbed by a growing anti-American feeling in the country. He realized that the failure of the United States in this situation would further

undermine the favourable impression of America in India. He wrote to the State Department about the prevailing political and economic situation of India. The American Government had been quick to declare that its forces in India were "solely to prosecute the war and had been warned to avoid scrupulously any participation in internal troubles there." In fact, American troops had been instructed not even to resort to defensive measures in the teeth of rioting and political unrest unless their own personal safety or that of other American citizens was endangered.[38]

On 21 January 1943, it was reported from New Delhi that Phillips was studying the food situation, "the most pressing problem of the moment." He conferred with Sir Jermey Raisman, finance member of the Viceroy's Executive Council and informed quarters stated that it was likely lend-lease agreements would soon be signed between the United States and India.[39] Indeed food was to be India's great problem for the next two years, yet it was not starvation but a fast that was the major problem of his mission.

On his arrival at New Delhi, Phillips made a short statement to the press and answered some of the correspondents' questions, reserving his reply to others. Of the purpose of his mission he stated:

> I have come to study and to learn as much as I can of the India of today--the India of the future which has such an important role to play in world affairs--and I shall report my findings to Washington.[40]

He said that he hoped to see the representatives of all of India's political parties as he toured the country, but reserved his reply as to how he intended to see those Congress leaders who were in jail because of their "disobedience movement" and whether his mission gave him a right of insisting on seeing them.[41] He agreed that it was correct to say that he did not come with any "cut-and-dried formula" for the settlement of Indian political difficulties, "but would not say whether or not he would try to find a formula."[42] When asked whether he was ambassador to the Government of India or his Majesty's Government, he replied, "Neither," and explained as the State Department had done, that his rank was only a courtesy.[43]

Phillips claimed that his chief responsibility was to report to Roosevelt the Indian situation as fully and accurately as possible. Therefore, he opened the doors of the American Mission to Indians who wished to express their ideas to him. The Personal Representative of the President of the United States rapidly became a center for Indian hopes and expectation. He spoke with what he recalled as hundreds of people, official and private, and visited or was called on by representatives of every political and religious faction and all the principal Indian leaders who were at liberty. In his diary, he recorded nearly a hundred of these interviews. Phillips, was of the opinion "that there was no group in India, excepting the British, who do not wish independence in some form."[44] Soon he was regarded by the British as an unwelcome irritant. On 22 January 1943, Phillips wrote to President Roosevelt about his observation after two weeks in India.[45] He reported that he found the attitude of the British in India far more conservative and rigid than in London. He wrote:

> While in London I got the impression that the English people were ready and even eager to grant dominion status to India if only the Indians would agree among themselves with regard to the form of their government. I cannot say so much of Churchill ... But here in India the situation appears to be the reverse. The British whom I have met seem unaware of the changing attitude in England and cannot really envisage a free India fit to govern itself.[46]

Phillips characterized Viceroy Linlithgow as an advocate of Kipling's view of India. Phillips commented that "the Viceroy represents England of old school, of the tradition of Empire, of Britain's responsibility to govern backward peoples."[47] This attitude had convinced the Indian leaders that the British promises were worthless and had engendered almost universal distrust of the British.

Phillips' report was discouraging. The hope that the situation in India would prove more flexible than in London or the Viceroy might prove more malleable than the Prime Minister had vanished. The responsibility of a successful settlement being engineered by Phillips without offending the British had diminished, if not disappeared.

During the following week, on 26 January 1943, Phillips broached to Linlithgow the subject of a new attempt to form a provisional government in India. Phillips suggested that he had gained the impression from various Indian leaders that a new approach was needed.[48] He asked the Viceroy about the possibility of re-opening negotiations with the hope that new confidence in the British Government's intention to grant freedom to India might lead to new initiatives for settlement among the Indian leaders. Phillips told the Viceroy that the American people were keenly interested in India and would welcome dominion status for India. The Viceroy claimed that he was always ready to re-open negotiations if there was any likelihood of success, but he cautioned Phillips that, "our first thought must be to win the war."[49] The Crown's representative suggested that after Phillips had been in India longer he would appreciate the immensity of the problem.[50] Regarding Phillips extreme concern with the Indian issue, in a long, rambling telegram the Viceroy explained his views to Amery:

> Americans have neither a Colonial Empire nor experience of one. We have both, and on a large scale ... And I should be wary of paying too high a price for a hypothetical American undertaking to take a share in defence of areas which hitherto we have held with exceedingly light forces, and the fate of which will always in practice be likely to be subordinated to the policy of Great Powers.[51]

Roosevelt's remarks on this occasion were not known to the British, or no doubt the Prime Minister would had a few words to say. By observing this, the Viceroy seems to have forgotten President Roosevelt's announcement "that the Philipines would be independent by 1946,"[52] made before Pearl Harbor, established the notion of a "time table" and this was applied as a test of British policy.

As it was, Linlithgow in New Delhi had quickly become disillusioned with Phillips, whose arrival he had greeted with relief, "he has admirable manners, is most friendly, and seems to me better really than anything we could reasonably have hoped for." The President's representative became in the Viceroy's eye's a centre for discontented [Indian] politicians. He rejected Phillips request to be allowed to visit Gandhi. Yet another American, Linlithgow believed, had turned out after

all to be sentimental in his approach and unable to grasp the complexities of Indian politics.[53] It made no difference that the Foreign Office, from its more settled vantage-point in London, viewed Phillips' activities sympathetically, nor was the U. S. official Richard Law's opinion as conveyed by Amery, that India was now indeed the business of the United States as well as Britain.[54] Linlithgow continued to be highly suspicious of American intentions generally, and was certain that the Willkie-Luce group and others had their eyes on trade possibilities in India. Even the increasing number of U. S. diplomats being posted to India was part of a scheme, he believed, "to dig in this country with a view to the post-war period." In consquence, he foresaw a major struggle over such matters as air routes and oil resources taking place between Britain and the United Staes, and denounced as "profoundly unwise ... and (potentially) very expensive for us." He described the Foreign Office line as one "treating the United States as if they were children and could not bear to hear anything unpleasant. American uneasiness lest we should move over into the Russian camp," he added, "is a factor that ought not to be overlooked where we are considering what we hold in our hand,"[55] a bizzarre touch in the light of history was coming from a Viceroy of India.

The Foreign Office, on its side, winced at some of Linlithgow's opinions, believing that New Delhi failed to appreciate the complexities and significance in a correct perspective.[56] In his resentment over American interference, however, and in his essentially pessimistic view of India's future, the Viceroy continued to the end of his time in office to have Churchill behind him.

It was apparent to Phillips that any hope of persuading the Viceroy to re-open negotiations rested on presenting a reasonably specific proposal which had been endorsed by the Indian leaders. No suggestion could hold the prospect of agreement or success unless the position of the Hindu-Muslim leaders was known.

Phillips and the United States soon became involved in the Indian political dilemma. On 20 February 1943, Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador Halifax held a conference, in which "the first open concern" was expressed by the United States on Gandhi's behalf.[57] It was explained that this was not intervention. "On the

contrary, there appeared to be concern lest such an interpretation should be placed on the meeting."[58]

During the following week, Phillips drew up travel plans for visiting Bombay and the Punjab. The itinerary was approved by the Viceroy. Phillips then asked Linlithgow for permission to visit Gandhi, who was in detention at Poona, during his trip to Bombay.[59] The Viceroy questioned Phillips closely about his intervention. Phillips repeated that his responsibility was to report the Indian situation to the President and that he could not fulfil his mission for Roosevelt without seeing Gandhi. After these arguments, Linlithgow confided that as Gandhi was in his second week of fasting, a serious situation had developed and was causing the British Government deep concern.[60] Gandhi had threatened British imperialism by announcing his 21-day fast, which he started on 9 February 1943. Actually Gandhi's decision to fast was not a symptom of desperation, but an attempt to arouse the nationalists from the defeatism and inertia into which they had sunk. When Jinnah was asked by one of Phillips' staff to comment upon Gandhi's fast, Jinnah replied that Gandhi had made a mistaken political move in fasting and that nothing would come of the action.[61] Regarding Gandhi's fast Phillips recounts:

> He [Linlithgow] gave me the impression that he felt bitterly towards Gandhi, that he had done everything possible to prevent any such happening and that should Gandhi undertake to fast, it would be solely on his own responsibility.[62]

The Viceroy told Phillips that, "the Government had no intention of allowing the fast to alter their policy."[63] The Viceroy also expressed the opinion that in the existing state of affairs his [Phillips] interview with Gandhi would create confusion in India. He requested Phillips to comply with the government's policy and to avoid such an interview with Gandhi.[64] The Viceroy, however, agreed that Phillips might tell the press that his request for an interview with Gandhi had been rejected by the authorities. Under these circumstances, Phillips postponed his interview tour and on the eve of his departure from India, he gave this information to the press.[65]

However, the effect of request and refusal caused the Indo-Anglo-American public to believe not only that the American Government and the British Government had seriously disagreed upon the management of Indian affairs, but that the British had refused what appeared to Americans to be a reasonable request. Phillips complained to the President that the Viceroy would not change his policy and release Gandhi, and if he were to die the situation would be difficult to control. The Indians, he wrote, "turn to us to give them help because of our historic stand for liberty."[66]

At this critical moment Jinnah was not permitted by the British Government to appeal to the American people and Government about the Muslim desire for independence. In doing so the British expressed the Justification of their policy in India to the people of United Kingdom and United States.[67] Churchill's and his government's policy at this critical time was described by the *Manchester Guardian* as "a victory for logic but not for statesmenship."[68] On 17 February 1943 Phillips called on the Viceroy to express the American Government's deep concern over the politcal crisis.[69] Linlithgow stated that, "he and the British Government were united in the firm conviction that their present policy was right."[70] The Viceroy countered Phillips' suggestion that Gandhi be released by saying "this would be interpreted by the Indian public as weakness and is therefore to be avoided." Linlithgow expressed the belief that Gandhi would not die, but he also commented that he felt that if Gandhi died, "the atmosphere would clear in six months for the better as Gandhi had sabotaged all effort by the British Government."[71]

Now the Congress leaders realized the firm British policy and the tension of the situation. They appealed to the Muslim league that it must do something for the release of Gandhi and other Congress leaders. This move admitted the right of self-determination for the Muslims. All eyes of were turned to Jinnah. Hindu leaders impressed upon Jinnah that:

> Gandhi now realized he had made a mistake and that he would be prepared to reconsider and retrace his steps if he were given the opportunity to do so and that he had changed his attitude towards Pakistan and would be willing to come to settlement on the basis of Pakistan but the British Government

> were preventing a Hindu-Muslim settlement by refusing to allow people of position and standing to establish contact with him [Gandhi with Jinnah] for this purpose.[72]

The *Bombay Chronicle* of 28 May 1943 had the following headline: "Jinnah must lead campaign for Jail Delivery."[73] On the other hand, Jinnah now commented on the Congress policy of claiming to represent the entire body of Indian opinion. He made it clear that in his judgment there would never be Congress rule in India without a settlement on the basis of Pakistan. He concluded by saying that "a Congress government over the whole of India could be maintained only by British bayonets."[74]

Therefore, Jinnah pointed out that if Gandhi were to write him a letter and abandon his policy and program culminating in revolution, if he was willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan, then he would be willing to bury the past and forget it.[75]

The Indian leaders believed that Jinnah's Delhi speech was made on the basis of assurances, perhaps well meant, that Gandhi was willing to come to terms on Pakistan, and that Gandhi, prompted by motives of political trickery, wrote a letter which he knew, astute politician that he was, in many ways did not meet Jinnah's requirements. This incident had served only to irritate Jinnah and widen the breach further between Hindus and Muslims. Later Jinnah felt that:

> He had been tricked by Gandhi and admitted that he had been placed in an embarrassing position. The Government of India had also been embarrassed by Gandhi's action.[76]

Moreover, it also had furnished ammunition to Indian national Congress and their supporters throughout the world who overlooked no opportunity of saying that the British were being imperialists by playing their old trick of divide and rule. Above all, they said that Britain did not desire a settlement in India and that the British were using every method possible to keep the Hindus and Muslims from getting together. Therefore, this incident was an unfortunate chapter in the history of Hindu-Muslim relations. The Congress Party gained very little profit by Gandhi's tricks and made more difficult any settlement with

the Muslim League. Regarding the Gandhian move, *The Evening News* of Indian illustrated Jinnah's statement:

> This letter of Mr. Gandhi can only be construed as a move on his part to embroil the Muslim League to come into clash with the British Government solely for the purpose of helping his release, so that he would be free to do what be pleases thereafter.[77]

Proposing a flexible scheme for this difficult problem, Coupland said:

> Whatever British shortcomings may have been, it was Indians who had been mainly responsible for the frustration of hopes. National unity was the necessary preliminary to dominion nationhood. India could not achieve nationhood unless agreement could be reached on the national constitution, first, between the Hindus and Muslims of British India and secondly, between the provinces and the States.[78]

Coupland continued his discussion by stating:

> The cause of the recent widening of the gulf between Hindus and Muslims is unmistakable. It was due to the Congress Party's desire to take the British Government's place by itself. If this was a national desire on the part of a revolutionary nationalist organisation the Muslim League's reaction to it was also natural. For it meant a permanent Hindu Raj not only in the seven Hindu-majority provinces but also at the Centre. Rather than that, the League, with the bulk of Moslems behind it, was committed itself to Pakistan.[79]

On 4 August 1943, K. M. Munshi, former Cabinet Minister from the Congress Party in an interview recounted:

> In his judgment Pakistan was a very real and live question. He believed that it has caught the fancy of the man in the street and has intensified anti-Hindu feeling among Muslims ...The Hindu-Muslim controversy has reached such a point that

> Pakistan should be conceded to the Muslims, as otherwise there can never be any real peace or settled government in India.[80]

Moreover, regarding the incident of British refusal to deliver Gandhi's letter to Jinnah, *Hitavada* criticised editorially:

> Incidentally, this latest rebuff of the Government of India proves that Mr. William Phillips has been unable to influence Mr. Churchill's Indian policy in the right direction.[81]

At this point Phillips wrote to the President that Churchill seemed to "prefer not to transfer any power to an Indian leaders either before or after the war and that he wanted to preserve the status quo."[82] On 29th May issue of the *Free Press Journal, The Bombay Sentinel* and the *Bombay Chronicle* had adopted a similar line, although somewhat less sarcastic. Before this widespread bitterness against the British, on 26th April Jinnah addressing to the annual Conference of the Muslim League stated:

> Nobody would welcome it more than myself if Mr. Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you it will be the greatest day both for Hindus and Mussalmans. If he has made up his mind what is there to prevent Mr. Gandhi from writing direct to me? He is writing letters to the Viceroy. Why does he not write to me direct? Who is there that can prevent him from doing so? What is the use of going to the Viceroy and leading deputations and carrying on correspondence? ... I cannot believe that they will have the daring to stop such a letter if it is sent to me.[83]

Jinnah added that "such a letter" from Gandhi must concede Pakistan in which case the British Government would not "have the daring to stop such a letter."[84] Furthermore, in his interview with the American Consul, Donovan, Jinnah expressed the view that "his Delhi speech was in reply to private assurance from responsible Hindu opinion that Gandhi had experienced a change of heart on the Pakistan issue."[85]

This trend alarmed the Raj, so the Viceroy in his December 17 speech pleaded for genuine Indian unity and protection of the minorities no matter how small. This signified the support for the Hindu Mahasabha, which fanatically stood for a united India under Hindu rule. In Phillips' views, "it was the old 'divide and rule' game. Plus qu'il change."[86]

The British action through its severity at the same time intensitfied the nationalist feeling and made the minority parties more willing to compromise with the League in its demand for a two-nation India. There were indications that the various Hindu elements were willing to come to an agreement with Jinnah just so long as they got rid of the British. Two Indian national governments however retrogressive and impractical the ideal would be in practice, better than an India united under the British.

Gandhi did not die but successfuly terminated his twenty-one day fast on March 3rd. American comment soon described it as "futile,"[87] and a failure.[88] Amidst all these Gandhian mannerisms one fact clearly stood out, that now the Muslim League was the strongest Indian party as a result.[89]

Phillips made an extensive tour of India and found that the strength of the Muslim League was rapidly growing. Meanwhile Phillips had several long interviews with Jinnah, whose position, on the Pakistan question as well as others, was rather difficult for Phillips to understand. But he was impressed by Jinnah's brilliant intellect and his support of the war efforts. Phillips believed that the Pakistan plan was not economically sound, though he conceded that the plan had the support of the Muslims. While Phillips believed that Jinnah has been exploited by the British in their divide and rule policy, he did not believe the frequent accusations of pro-Congress groups that Jinnah was playing the British game.[90] In his last interview with Jinnah, Phillips felt that Jinnah had shown his desire for the all-India Cabinet government if the interests of the Muslim minority would be protected by an arrangement allowing the Muslims as much representation in the Cabinet as the Hindus.[91] Jinnah told Phillips that "Pakistan is in every way practicable and the only solution of Indian problem." Jinnah went on, "why should Hindus object to Pakistan when they have as their share three-fourth of

India including most of its wealth." He argued, "in comparison Pakistan would be poor but would be a block of 40,000,000 comprisinng a state within the British Commonwealth."[92] Phillips thought the maintenance of Indian unity against the idea of Pakistan was of the greatest possible importance and that partition of India without Britain to control the resulting position would constitute a most serious threat not merely to the peace of India and the East but probably to the world as a whole.[93] On the whole, Phillips found Jinnah to be courteous, charming and brilliant, while he remained sceptical of the Pakistan scheme.

After interviewing Jinnah, Phillips reported to the State Department saying "position of Muslim League was merely defensive, which I interpreted as meaning that right to Pakistan must be maintained."[94] Meanwhile Phillips suggested to the Viceroy that some transitory solution between Hindus and Muslims would be of great assistance to the President. The Viceroy was on the whole satisfied with the outcome of their conversations but did not reveal that Phillips would consider justifying his mission by proposing some sort of transitory solution. He thought Phillips might prove less conservative when he got to Washington.[95] Several editorials, including the Congress papers, such as the *Hindustan Times* and *Dawn*, criticized apparent American indifference. The Muslim League's *Dawn* took the occasion to reiterate its opposition to any intervention, probably reflecting its realization of the official hostility to the Pakistan demand. While much of the Congress press was critical of the United States, the *Hindustan Times* affirmed that Indians should seek to resolve their differences with the British on their own, and without external assistance.[96]

On 7 April 1943, an obscure announcement appeared in the *Times* (London) to the effect that Phillips, who had met Jinnah for the first time on the afternoon of the 6th at tea, was returning to the United States.[97] The storm created by Phillips' activities and his mission, now seemed to be over in India. The following day this interesting comment appeared in *The New York Times:*

> United States Ambassador William Phillips will leave for Washington at the end of April to convey to President Roosevelt what he described today as some thoughts on the

> Indian situation looking toward benefiting the United States' position in the ultimate attack on Japan.[98]

This announcement aroused as much speculation as had his appointment some four months earlier. It was felt by *The New York Times* that Phillips had made a favourable impression on both Indians and British, a "feat of diplomacy" under the circumstances, and that he would make as fair a report as possible.[99] There was criticism that he had not talked with Gandhi, but this was not his fault. At his final press conference before his departure he stated:

> I should like to have met and talked with Mr. Gandhi and Nehru. I asked and was told by the proper authorities that they were unable to grant the necessary facilities.[100]

That he made his press statement to American and Indian journalists, to the exclusion of British, would seem to indicate that he was more than a trifle piqued at not obtaining the permission. *The Times*, however, commented that it was "probably without significance," and that there was reason to believe the Viceroy knew of his desire to make the statement, "as an answer to the criticism in America of his mission, on the score of his not having seen Gandhi and other Congress leaders then in detention."[101]

In London "well informed sources" were not surprised at the refusal and stated that if permission for a visit had been granted "it would have caused great speculation and excitement throughout India would have led to rumours and wrong conclusions."[102] In Washington, Secretary Hull declined discussion and, when asked if Phillips' return was significant, merely stated that he had been planning to come home for some time.[103] Phillips himself stated that the "initial stage" of his mission might be considered ended. It appeared to have done so on a note of failure. Phillips felt that the United States Government could not afford to regard the Indian crisis as of no concern. He expressed to the President that the Indian situation bore so directly upon the American effort against Japan that the United States must press for a solution, if only a temporary one. Moreover, Indian public opinion had looked towards America for assistance. The fact that America had not rendered it had engendered in the Indians a new racist resurgence which could

be extremely dangerous to the Anglo-Saxon world in the long run. Phillips emphatically denied, despite Gandhi's statements, that the Hindus were pro-Japanese.[104] However, to the chagrin of these men, (Gandhi, Nehru etc.) the Phillips' mission failed to alter the course of Anglo-American policy.

Phillips saw hope for a solution of the Indian problem in the appointment of a new Viceroy. He pointed out that the Viceroy (Linlithgow) was a shallow and stubborn Scot, who had considerably reinforced Churchill's prejudices. A sympathetic Viceroy who would entertain and report Indian opinion on the crisis would be in a position to further a solution to the problem.

Phillips implied that the United States should exert pressure to secure the appointment of a Viceroy who would be responsive to Indian feelings, one whose accurate and unbiased reporting to the Prime Minister might in a short time effect a resolution of one of the United Nations' most critical Problems.[105]

Continuing Dilemma

The strong American dissatisfaction with the continuing Indian political dilemma was noted by the British Government, and on 5 March 1943, Colonel Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, had pointedly admitted in a speech at Oxford that he was more interested in what British thought of the British Empire than in what the United States thought it.[106] Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, came to Washington for a conference with President Roosevelt and Secretary Cordell Hull which, he stated, made him "feel a great deal better."[107] It seems more than likely that India was mentioned, the British Government's position explained, and that a reassurance of non-intervention was obtained. It shall be noted that this occurred just prior to Phillips' return.

In New Delhi, Phillips pondered the possibility of a constructive approach to negotiations. When in London, he had been given the impression that the roadblock to Indian independence was the result of the inability of the Indian political leaders to reach agreement among themselves. Shortly after his arrival in New Delhi, Phillips learned that

the situation was far more complex. It was clear at once that Gandhi had not moved an inch about Pakistan or towards Jinnah,[108] while the Pakistan scheme had become more popular.

Jinnah's task of rallying the Muslims around him and strengthening the League was greatly facilitated by certain Congress miscalculations. After the failure of Cripps' mission the Congress was frustrated. Its bid at controlling India had come to naught, leaving it impatient and bitter. The result was the disturbance of August-September 1942, which Gandhi called an "open rebellion." Gandhi's final message to members of the Congress Party was "Do or Die." The Congress alone stood for "Quit India," for no other party, not even the Hindu Mahasabha, supported this. The Congress paid a heavy price for the attempted rebellion. The widespread disorders which ensued aimed at disorganizing the war effort. The revolt failed, but it sent all the Congress leaders to prison, thus giving Jinnah a rare opportunity of consolidating the League. From then onwards the Muslim League for nearly three years was reaping the harvest of the folly of its rivals. Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, stoutly opposed the "Quit India" demand and considered it an attempt by the Congress to win India for the united Hindu rule. The revolt was as much anti-Muslim as anti-British.[109] It left the Muslims with no alternative except that of strenthening the Pakistan platform. Jinnah had skillfully exploited Congress' mistakes and miscalculations and had turned into a political victory for the Muslim League every error of judgment the Congress Party made.

Virtually unopposed by any effective popular organization, the Muslim League's influence had expanded rapidly. It was growing apace in popularity and power. On April 16, League's paper *Dawn* was quoted as declaring that "if the promises of freedom to India made during the last World War provided any bitter memories, enthusiasm cannot be whipped up by the evasive American understanding of British platitudes."[110]

As the frustration with the British increased among the Congress leaders, the opinion was expressed by many that it might be worth sacrificing "Pakistan" to the Muslims in order to rid India of the British,

because "it was evident that British were standing on the way of a Hindu-Muslim settlement."[111]

On 31 August 1944, the British Governor of the Punjab, while addressing the Governors' conference, regarded:

> The Pakistan scheme was the most dangerous development that had occurred since the British connection with India had begun. If it were adopted there would be violent disturbances and possible civil war. Our main aim should be to divert the Muslims from Pakistan in its crude form.[112]

The Crown's representatives in India were not willing to give an easy consideration to the idea of Pakistan.[113] The Governor of Bengal, R. G. Casey, in a letter to the Viceroy stated:

> I believe that a considerable amount of work will have to be done on the Muslims if they are to be weaned away from the Pakistan idea. If it were your wish that I should pursue the matter here in Bengal, I believe that I might be able to influence a certain section of the Muslims here away from the Pakistan idea by discreet conversations in the course of the next six months or so–and I believe that I could do so without raising any ill-feeling or running the risk of being accused of taking sides. I fully realise the risk of any of us being able to be accused of being partisan.[114]

Casey went on saying:

> ... I think that Pakistan is nonsense, but I believe, on the present outlook, that it is an inevitable stage on the journey ... I would envisage it being said privately but authoritatively to Jinnah and to any other Muslims of consequence who are worth talking to–that if the Muslims want Pakistan, they can have it, so far as we are concerned. I would not hide the fact that we think it is a mistake ... if they decide they want Pakistan, we will give exactly the same treatment and consideration to Pakistan as we propose to give to Hindustan.[115]

The Congress leadership was isolated from these developments and unable to explore the possibilities for settlement. The deadlock was thus perpetuated.

Phillips wrote to the President, "I should imagine that the Viceroy and Churchill are well satisfied to let the deadlock remain as long as possible."[116] In his letter to the President, Phillips urged that the United States should take the initiative for a settlement of the Indian problem. He recommended that, with the approval of the British Government, an invitation should be addressed to the leaders of all Indian groups, on behalf of the President of the United States, to discuss the political problems of India. He emhasized that this conference should be called under the patronage of the King-Emperor, the President of the United States and the Soviet Union, and Chiang Kai-shek, in order to bring pressure on the Indian politicians to end the deadlock.[117] He argued that such a conference should be presided over by an American who would enjoy the confidence of all groups and exercise influence in harmonising the endless divisions of caste, race and political views. The King-Emperor should give fresh assurance of the intention of the British government to transfer power within a specific date after the war. He advised that, as a token of good faith, a provisional government with limited powers should be constituted representing important political parties of India. By assuming this position, America would be expressing interest in India's independence, guaranteeing the British offer for independence after the war and applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the underdeveloped world. Phillips contended that if the United States failed to act, the Indian leaders would think that the Charter was for the white race. He wrote:

> I feel strongly Mr. President, that in view of our military position in India, we should have a voice in these matters. It is not right for the British to say that this is none of our business when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the struggle with Japan. If we do nothing and merely accept the British point of view that conditions in India are none of our business, then we must be prepared for various serious consequences in the internal situation in India which may

> develop as result of the despair and misery and anti-white sentiments of hundreds of millions of subject people, the people of Asia–and I am supported in this opinion by other diplomatic and military observers– cynically I regard this war as one between Fascist and Imperialist powers.[118]

Phillips made some critical, forthright statements about Britain's Indian policy. He believed that unless the United States could induce Britain to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, his presence would not add to American prestige in India. Phillips suggested that:

> It is high time for the British to make an effort to improve conditions and reestablish confidence among the Indian people that their future Independence is to be granted. Words are of no avail, they only aggravate the present situation, it is time for the British to act.[119]

Phillips indicated the Indian parties must get together, and the British must consent to end the deadlock, no matter how much Churchill and the Viceroy might want to keep things intact.[120]

Severe criticism broke out from the Indo-British leaders on Phillips' proposals. Similar objections to those heard at the time of the Johnson mission were made of Phillips' proposal.[121] Both the Hindu and Muslim leaders hoped that the United States would not intervene in the Indian deadlock. The *Hindustan Times* commented on 13 April:

> ... we must make certain that no one in this country has asked or will ask active intervention by the United States in Indian problems in the interests of national freedom.[122]

The Muslim League was still more outspoken, and in its organ *Dawn* of the same date commented:

> The Muslims of India will have no intervention, no arbitration, no interference by any outside agency--American, Chinese or Russian or all three rolled into one. Let this be very clear. As already said, this is not pigheadness but because Muslims demand rights which they claim admit of no arbitration.[123]

Indian parties were agreeable, in varying degrees, that pressure be put upon Britain. But they wanted nothing in the nature of arbitration which might detract from their bargaining power with her and, which was perhaps more important, with each other.

This assertion from *Dawn* [124] serves to remind of the growing power of the Pakistan movement to which some attention was now given. Referring to the Muslim League conference in Delhi early in May, *The Nation* went so far as to say that it had "come close to justifying Enaldn's wartime policy in India." Congress, as has been noted, maintained that if the British got out of India, the factions would get together. *The Nation's* comment was:

> Short of firing in the streets, the Moslems who met at New Delhi last week under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah went as far as they could to repudiate that comfortable interpretation.[125]

On the other hand, the Viceroy flatly rejected Phillips' proposal for a conference of Indian leaders and his request to see Gandhi, which heightened Phillips' frustration. In Washington, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles argued against supporting Phillips' proposal.[126] He saw little reason for America to strain relations with Churchill over a situation which did not directly involve her. Consistently, Welles had relied on British advice about India. Welles suggested that action be forestalled until the Department could talk over basic policy questions with Phillips. Wallance Murray, State Department Advisor on Political Relations, argued that the Department should support Phillip's proposal for a conference of Indian leaders and his request to see Gandhi. Murray felt that such a move was important in terms of our future relations with India and all of Asia. He contended that "if his Government did not take a stand in such a situation, the Asians would lose faith in the words of the President."[127]

There was no easy way for the United States Government to rescue Phillips, for his dilemma was a direct product of American policy towards India. It was a policy which imprisoned both Roosevelt and Phillips within the British approach to India. While Roosevelt had clearly

supported the idea of independence, he refused to act in opposition to Churchill for two practical reasons.

First, to act in opposition to Churchill might have resulted in America having to accept responsibility for the transfer of power in India. This could not have been achieved without cooperation from the British civil servants who headed the government and army of India; unless the United States Government would have been willing to send to India hundreds of American civilian and military officials. This would have been unrealistic considering America's already over-extended global commitments.

Secondly, any action which embarrassed Churchill's Government would tarnish Anglo-American relations. America's commitment to the war effort made this very undesirable, even if she had sufficient resources to intervene directly in the Indian situation.

Given these factors, it is clear why Roosevelt could not support Phillips. Even if he had, the limits of the American Government's commitment to involve itself actively in the Indian independence movement would have been exposed. As things stood, the prospect of Churchill conceding to a request for Roosevelt was as dim as that of Linlithgow conceding to Phillips; the only effective way for Washington to have supported Phillips' proposal would have been for Roosevelt to apply direct pressure on the British. If the State Department had allowed Phillips to say that he had the government's support, but had taken no further action, such an appeal to the Viceroy would have had little more meaning than Phillips' previous appeals. Thus, no matter what response Washington made to Phillips, the Indian leaders would have been embittered by the discrepancy between America's ideals and her willingness to act. The time for sympathy and well-phrased words had passed; the Indian leaders now wanted results. While the State Department probably realized, and even shared, the frustrations of Phillips and the Indian leaders, it could only repeatedly voice America's sympathy from within the prison walls of the realities which constrained American action.

On 14 April 1943, Secretary Hull wired Phillips saying that he (Hull) had no objection to Phillips making the request of his proposal to

the Viceroy, but without the support of the Department.[128] Phillips made the request with the expected outcome.

In his memoirs Hull devotes considerable space to a defence of his position on India, noting that the State Department was faced with a grave dilemma since it was believed on the one hand that failure to take action in the Indian crisis would have unfavourable repercussions on the war effort in the Far East while on the other any attempt by the United States Government to bring pressure to bear on the British was considered likely to give rise to controversy which could endanger Allied unity.[129]

Under Secretary Sumner Welles also went to some lengths to justify his position on India and to correct misunderstanding by his critics. After his resignation from the Department in 1943, he made it clear that he favoured eventual self-government for India, writing that "a continuation of the present impasse after the war will seriously endanger the peace and stability of all of the Far East." Welles' continued resentment towards pressing for what he considered unduly precipitate action to force an immediate British decision on independence was reflected in his coupling as equally obfuscatory "ultraliberalism in other countries, such as the United States" with "diehardism in England."[130]

While the senior statesmen have had an opportunity to defend their views for the benefit of posterity, little has been written about the efforts of the lower echelon officials to guide the activity of the American foreign policy mechanism in the direction of assistance to Indian aspirations. There emerges from an investigation of incidents in the formulation of United States policy towards India an awareness that the marked defensiveness exhibited by both Hull and Welles was caused not only by the clamour of elements of the American public and the complaints of Indian nationalists but perhaps more meaningfully in the world of diplomacy by internal pressure from their subordinates within the Department of State. They form a solid cumulative background for the eventual official attitude of the United States Government toward the Indian struggle for political freedom and British resistance to change. At neither level was there marked awareness of the depths of Hindu-Muslim feeling in India.

When it was learned in India that Phillips was returning to America to report to the President, pressure on him increased. Phillips wrote to the Department saying:

> The press repeatedly points out that I have had interviews with everyone of consquence except with the leaders of the largest political party.[131]

Phillips' silence was unfavourably commented upon in the press and was interpreted by the Congress as proof of at least tacit American support for the British against India. The State Department felt it necessary to defend itself at this point against the charge of American policy favouring British rule against Indian independence. Sumner Welles' letter in reply to Professor Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard had this pertinent reference to India:

> ... the present military situation in the Far East is one in which all of us, including the people of India, face grave perils. The future constitutional status of India is a tremendously complicated and delicate problem. The United States Government is, of course, anxious to give full assistance to its solution.
>
> The people of India have been most solemnly assured that as soon as the necessities of war permit they will be given the opportunity to choose freely the form of government they desire. Wise men, vitally concerned both with the welfare of the people of India and with the defeat of our enemies, may differ as to the possibility of fighting the war and solving India's historic problems at the same time. But to make active intervention in the Indian situation a test of liberalism, as some have done, presupposes a definition of liberalism which, I must confess, is beyond my comprehension.[132]

Frustration:

American frustration with Phillips may have been more than real. President Roosevelt had the reports, which were the object of Phillips' mission. At the end of April Phillips left India for the United

States, and spent most of the summer of 1943 on leave in Washington, after first making a direct attempt to get Roosevelt to see the urgency of the situation. Phillips pointed out to the President that the "greatest hindrance to a settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims leaders, was the Hindu objection to the creation of a separate state of Pakistan." He informed the President about his concern over the growing impression in India that "America was tacitly supporting Churchill's policy towards India, by the presence of our troops, reinforcing Britain's hold over India." Phillips had suggested that "because of his dealings with the Viceroy his presence in India could serve to agitate this feeling." He argued that "the single dominant factor in British Indian policy is the personal attitude of Mr. Churchill, which is almost psychopathic."[133]

Phillips counseled the President that, "unless America was willing to adopt an active and intervening policy towards India, it would be unwise for him to return." The ambassador considered that the "democracies bore the responsibility not only to assist in the liberation of subject peoples but also to aid them in choosing their own form of Government."[134] The President agreed with Phillips' interpretation.

In his oral report to the President in May, again Phillips insisted that the British must act to assure Indian independence at a certain date. The case was desperate, and "in view of our military position in India we should have a voice in this business ... when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the future struggle with Japan." There must be "proof positive to all people--our own and the British included--that this is not a war of power politics but a war for all we say it is."[135]

Churchill visited the United States shortly after Phillips' arrival in Washington. Roosevelt asked Phillips to visit Churchill, who then happened to be staying at the British Embassay in Washington. This request showed that Roosevelt was unwilling to face the Prime Minister again on this troublesome issue. Roosevelt by now fully realize the inflexibility of Churchill in this matter and preferred to have someone else bear the brunt of the Prime Minister's wrath. Phillips said he sensed F. D. R. was having his difficulties with the Prime Minster, especially in regard to India, "and preferred to have me tackle this

particular unpleasantness for him as he had previously been rebuffed."[136] Then on 23 May 1943, Phillips went to see Churchill to give him his impressions of India. Churchill knew the views Phillips held even before the interview, and therefore was not pleased to see him. Phillips described to him the situation as he had found it in India and expressed the need for negotiations to bring about an interim coalition government. The Prime Minister insisted on interpreting Phillips' suggestion as meaning the immediate withdrawal of Britain from India. When Phillips advanced the idea that it would be desirable to give Gandhi and Jinnah a chance to meet and try to solve the future problems of India while the pressure of war was upon them, the Prime Minister's fury was aroused. Phillips recounted that Churchill "got up and walked rapidly up and down in front of me, shaking a finger at me, exclaiming, the answer to you is:

> Take India if that is what you want. Take it by all means. But I warn you that if I open the door a crack there will be the greatest blood-bath in all history.[136]

Four times, as Phillips recalled it, Churchill prophesied the "blood-bath," deaf to the arguments by Phillips that he was not suggesting Britain should pull out of India immediately, but only that attempt should be made to harmonise the two dominant parties together."[137] Phillips felt that Churchill was not pleased with him because of his attitude towards British policy in India. Phillips found it useless to continue the argument, but mentioned again in conclusion to the Prime Minister that he was not suggesting the Britain should pull out of India immediately. The Prime Minister accompanied Phillips to the head of stairs, repeating his warning of blood-bath. "I was puzzled by his attitude," wrote Phillips. "Never had I mentioned the sudden withdrawal of British power and yet he insisted upon assuming that was my proposal. It was only too clear that he held a complex about India from which he would and could not be shaken."[138]

Phillips went immediately from the British Emabassy to the White House where he lunched with the President and reported his encounter. Phillips recounted:

> I said that, now that I realized the difficulties of dealing with Churchill, he [F. D. R.] had my deepest sympathy, to which he laughed and took no exception.[139]

Roosevelt was amused by the account of the Phillips-Churchill interview and was glad that Phillips had spoken so frankly. Phillips, however, refused to return to India unless something could be done to change the British attitude. Roosevelt clearly did not share Churchill's vision of the future anymore than he had done in the year before. During this period he was not prepared to challenge him either. Phillips' recommendations were not taken up. Nevertheless, his analysis of the Indian situation, as we have seen, was to create trouble in the coming year.[140]

During their launcheon at the White House, Roosevelt proposed a new approach to Phillips. The President told Phillips that Secretary Hull had found Anthony Eden receptive to the suggestion that he (Eden) might visit India. Roosevelt had discussed the idea with Lord Beaverbrook who had also endorsed it. The President said he would recommend to Churchill that he send Eden to India "to explore the situation to talk to leaders of all parties and groups, and report to Churchill his findings."[141] If the suggestion was favourably received, Roosevelt told Phillips, then he would like him to be in India during Eden's visit.[142] Meanwhile Phillips should go to Canada as United States Ambassador and be ready to leave for India if the plan was acceptable to the British Government. Phillips liked this plan but observed that his acceptance of the Canadian mission might be interpreted in India that Roosevelt had forgotten the Indian problem, since so many Indians looked to Roosevelt for help during this critical period in India.[143] This situation would then have been somewhat analogous to Johnson's mission during the Cripps negotiations. Phillips could have bypassed the Viceroy to deal directly with Eden. Unfortunately, Eden was not sent to India and, therefore, Phillips did not return.

In the summer of 1943 President Roosevelt and Phillips agreed that little good, and perhaps considerable harm, could come to America's image if Phillips returned to India as long as Linlithgow was Viceroy. Since Lilithgow was due to retire by the end of October 1943, it

seems significant that Churchill while in Washington in June 1943 announced the appointment of General Archibald P. Wavell to succeed Linlithgow. In September, it was announced that, although he would retain his presidential appointment to New Delhi, Phillips was going to undertake War Department work (SHAEF). It was in London with the Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force for Europe.

Secretary Hull, who made the announcement, was quick to add that Phillips' trip to London had no connection with his assignment at Delhi.[144] This restricted use made of Phillips in India reflected the restrained nature of the American official responses to the situation there in 1943, responses that contrasted with Roosevelt's attemtps to influence Churchill, even to coerce him in the preceding year.[145] Hull in particular was anxious to make every effort to prevent this question from becoming a matter of serious contention and general discussion here, and to keep down in this country any sentiments against Great Britain. "We cannot have a serious breach, personal or political, with Churchill now," he noted, "even if we were disposed to do so."[146] Only with these limitations, therefore, was some effort made to influence the events.

There would seem to be justification, however, for the Indian press having taken it as an "indication that the United States was attempting to break the eight-month deadlock."[147] Perhaps the Phillips mission had revealed that, if anything was to be accomplished, London needed influencing at this juncture. The last had certainly not been heard of the Delhi assignment.

Field Marshall Lord Wavell, who took over from Linlithgow as penultimate Viceroy on 20 October 1943, in his "The Viceroy's Journal" noted the double talk of Churchill as far as the independence of the subcontinent was concerned. Before leaving for India, Wavell wrote in his Journal on 8 October, after meeting Churchill:

> I have discovered that the Cabinet is not honest in its expressed desire to make progress in India; and that very few of them have any foresight or political courage.[148]

Lord Wavell noted the racialism in the private, unguarded conversation of Prime Minister Churchill and his circle. There was a strong reaction against American pressure, he says, to shed the imperial cloak. Churchill was determined to hang on at all costs.

Wavell quoted his predecessor, Lord Linlithgow who told him on October 19 that:

> The chief factors of the problem of Indian political progress were the stupidity of the Indians and the dishonesty of the British: We should not be able to get away with it much longer.[149]

In another context Wavell in "The Viceroy's Journal" records the following:

> He [Churchill] accused me of creating a Frankenstein by putting weapons in the hands of the Sepoys, spoke of 1857, and was really almost childish about it. I tried to reassure him, both verbally and by a written note but he has a curious complex about India and is always looking to hear good of it and apt to believe the worst.[150]

As early as July 1943 Wavell formed the view that Churchill "hates India and everything to do with it" and agreed with Amery that he knew "as much of the Indian problem as George III did of the American colonies."[151]

Perparing for his job as Viceroy of India, Wavell drafted a paper for his PSV (D), Private Secretary. The note, outlining how he "should approach this question of finding a solution of the Indian problem if I discarded all normal methods and trusted entirely to my own common sense, suggested an orthodox scenario": a conference of Indian leaders in secret, which later was to become the Simla Conference.

On 17 February 1944, Wavell in his first political declaration announced, "it is up to Indians to decide what arrangement they should make so that these two great communities, and certain minorities, can live together within that unit." He cited "England and Scotland, Canada,

Switzerland, and the United States as historic examples of nations composed of two or more communities with different cultures and religions." Ireland on the other hand, he suggested, "had adopted a sort of Pakistan solution."[152]

Considerable attention was paid to the appointment of Lord Wavell as Viceroy. The *Christian Science Monitor* saw in it an assurance of Britain's interest in the defeat of Japan, and was hopeful "that the atmosphere of British-Indian relations might be improved somewhat by the appointment."[153] The *Los Angeles Times* saw an opportunity for working out an arrangement with Gandhi and the Congress.[154] *The Nation* felt that while it provided evidence that Britain still believed winning the war came first and Indian independence second, yet the change did provide an opportunity for an amnesty.[155] *Newsweek* felt that the appointment reflected the British Government's attempt to ease the political problems in India. As a soldier, Wavell pleased the professional soldiers and thus helped to secure the defence of India, and his connection with the army assured the Muslims of a fair hearing. At the same time he had no serious differences with the Hindus who regarded him as fair.[156] *Time's* New Delhi correpsondent, however, reported that Indians felt the appointment indicated no change in British policy, although there was a glimmer of hope in that a "reactionary politician" had not been appointed as expected.[157] *The New Republic* saw no good at all for India in the move, which, in its opinion, would make no difference to Indian nationalism as Wavell would but carry out policies made in London.[158]

Although the announcement of Wavell's appointment by Churchill in Washington may have been an attempt to assure American opinion that as soon as possible after the war something would be done for India, and that in the meanwhile it would be held against impending attack, much American sentiment remained far from satisfied. Meanwhile, one gleam of hope was discerned as regards the future, in that both Phillips and the American Ambassador in London, Winant, were impressed by the new Viceroy and welcomed his appointment.[159] Britain's India policy had very few supporters in America at the close of 1943.

It was on the 28th November 1943, during the Cairo Declaration, that Roosevelt discussed the problem of India with Marshall Stalin and suggested that it would be unwise at this time to raise the question of India with Churchill. Stalin agreed that this was a sore spot with the British. Then, the President said that at some future date, he would like to talk with Stalin on the question of India; that he felt that the best solution would be reform from the bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line. Stalin replied that the Indian question was a complicated one, with different levels of culture and the absence of relationships between the castes. He add that reform from the bottom would mean revolution.[160]

Phillips talked with Wavell in London and concluded that the new Viceroy was well-intentioned, though cautious, and might be able to open negotiations in India. On 6 May 1944, Wavell released Gandhi from prison and in July, Gandhi gave the press his terms for negotiation with the British. On 22 July 1944, Phillips wrote the Department suggesting that he might talk with Amery, Secretary of State for India, about these new developments in India.[161]

On 25 July 1944, Drew Pearson had published in his *Washington Post* column excerpts from Ambassador Phillips' confidential report to President Roosevelt on India,[162] which apparently had been written on 14 July 1943, shortly after Phillips' return to the United States. He stated that Roosevelt had "repeatedly" postponed tackling this "ticklish problem" and that each time he had discussed it with Churchill he had "received a blunt cold shoulder," and that Phillips, who had been asked by Roosevelt to talk to Churchill about it, had likewise been told by an irate Prime Minister:

> I have always been right about Hitler and everyone else in Europe. I'm also right about Indian policy. Any change in Indian policy now will mean the greatest blood-bath in history.[163]

The publication of the letters caused a great commotion in England and brought cries from British officialdom for the United States Government to disassociate itself from the letter. Since the President shared in general the views expressed in the letter, no public disavowal was made.[164] Indeed, the policy was intensified. Hull noted that the

United States henceforth took all the steps it could to dissociate itself from British activities in India.[165]

Churchill himself was not troubled by this new incident. Pearson, he noted, was known as a "champion professional liar," and there was no point in dragging the President into so minor an affair when he had been understanding and restrained about India generally.[166]

On 25 July 1944, Secretary Hull telegraphed Phillips that Drew Pearson's[167] column printed large portions of the letter[168] which he wrote to the President on his return from India to Washington in 1943.[169] Phillips wired Hull that the British Foreign Office was "considerably annoyed" by the appearance of Pearson's article. Phillips, therefore, felt it was not opportune for him now to see Secretary Amery.[170]

Pearson's article attracted no great attention in the American press at the time, though it did elsewhere.[171] The Government of India censored the article,[172] and hints soon began to come from London that Phillips should resign for "personal reasons." Phillips received an immediate reply that the Department felt for the moment:

> ... your usefulness with SHAEF would be compromised were you endeavor to influence the British Government on matters pertaining to India.[173] The State Department suggested, instead, that Ambassador Winant discuss the developments in India with Lord Amery. On the following day, Pearson's column released parts of a second letter from Phillips to the President, written on 3 May 1943, before Phillips left India.[174] As a result all of Phillips' plans to approach the British were cancelled.

In Washington, the State Department was caught in an embarrasing position. Its officials then had no clue as to how Drew Pearson had obtained the letters and, since they could not find the leak, they had no idea how many more Pearson could get and publish. The letters were uncomplimentary to the British, who were considerably disturbed. On 8 August 1944, Sir Ronald Campbell of the British Embassay told Acting Secretary of State Stettinius that there were three

points which his Government wished that either the President or Mr. Hull would deny publically. The first, that "the damaging reference to the morale of the Indian Army; the second, the unfair reference on the part that Britain was going to play in the war against Japan; and last, Churchill's reference to the fact that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to India."[175]

The British Embassy made three more official requests for a public apology and two informal queries as to the Department's decision within the next few days. The Department officials were uncomfortable. While they regretted the publication of the letters, they saw no way publically to apologize for the publication of the letters without appearing to apologize for their content. This would completely undercut Phillips, destroying his usefulness as America's representative to India and perhaps his career as a diplomat. More importantly, America's policy towards India was involved. Hull wrote Roosevelt saying:

> It is the Department's feeling that it would be impossible to issue a statement satisfactory to the British in as much as we share in general the view expressed in the Ambassador's letter.[176]

This announcement, significant in the light of what soon followed, was the prelude to one of the most interesting controversies involving Anglo-American relations.

On 17 August 1944, it was announced in Washington by Hull that Phillips was resigning as General Eisenhowever's political advisor with effect from September. Hull recalled that Phillips had originally gone to London for a few months, "but his service [had] been so effective that he consented to stay on at the insistent request of both the State Department and General Eisenhower."[177]

On 28 August 1944, Pearson published yet another equally explosive column, stating that Phillips had been asked to leave London because of his letter to President Roosevelt criticizing British policy in India and recommending Indian independence. Excerpts from this letter were repeated, and it was said that Eden had cabled Sir Ronald

Campbell, British charge d'affaires in Washington, to approach the State Department with a formal demand and for an investigation. Secretary Hull repeatedly informed Sir Ronald that the Phillips' letter undoubtedly leaked through former Under Secretary Sumner Welles--which the British, of course, knew was not the case. Hull then went on a vacation and Eden cabled Campbell to obtain from the State Department a public statement repudiating the views expressed by Phillips. Acting Secretary Stettinius and Assistant Secretary Berle stalled, though they had a suspicion regarding the leak. Meanwhile in London, Churchill and Eden were reported to have "put the heat on U. S. Ambassador John Winant," and also had a Foreign Office official ask Phillips if he still held the same views. Then Phillips replied that he did, and that he was more sure than ever that he was right. After this, Eden informed the State Department that Phillips was *persona non grata* in London. Pearson alleged that Eden had said in his cable: "India is more important than a thousand Phillips."[178]

On the other hand, by the end of the month, the Congress entered the controversy. Also on 28 August 1944, Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky, a Democrat who had visited India with five other Senators, stated in the Senate that he had heard with "dismay and deep shock" that the British Foreign Office had declared President Roosevelt's "Personal Special Ambassador, Mr. William Phillips, *persona non grata.*" Chandler announced that it was British objections to Phillips' report on India that had led to his resignation. Calling upon President Roosevelt to submit to the Senate "a full report on conditions in India, he stated:

> Our British allies have taken an incredibly harmful step, which can only injure friendly relations between ourselves and them, in declaring President Roosevelt's personal ambassador, Mr. Phillips, to be *persona non grata.*[179]

Chandler explained that as the British found out what Phillips had told "his commanding officer, the President of the United States, they put obstacles in the way of his work as a liason officer on General Eisenhower's staff." As a result, he said, Phillips had "resigned." Chanlder told the Senate that Britain had not borne, and apparently would not bear, the brunt of struggle against Japan:

> ... yet by her mismanagement of the Indian situation Britain had made for a great discouragement and irritation to General Stillwell and to the heroic Americans fighting in that sector of the world.[180]

Chandler continued, claiming there were real problems in India, but "apparently our British allies do not think that we ought to work about them. What is more, they think that our president should not know about them." Expressing his repudiation of the British claim that India "is none of our business." Chandler called upon his colleagues to remember their duty to the American boys fighting in the Far-Eastern theater of war. In a challenging tone, he concluded saying:

> I ask Senators, my fellow citizens, ... is the Government of the United States of America so weak, are our people so incompetent, has our soverignty become so impaired that even the President of the United States is no longer permitted to knew the truth about conditions in friendly countries with which we have diplomatic relations?[181]

The following day, Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, placed a reprint of the Pearson's article in the *Congressional Record.*[182] This accusation brought immediate replies. The State Department reiterated that Phillips was returning for personal reasons, and denied that the British Government had requested his recall as President Roosevelt's special representative in India. It pointed out that George Merrel, charge d'affaires at New Delhi, still continued.[183] A spokesman of the British Embassy in Washington denied the charge.[184]

On August 30, Republican Representative Calvin D. Johnson of Illinois introduced H.R.629 "protesting the condemnation by the British of Ambassador Phillips." Jn angry tones, he asked that Sir Ronald Campbell and Sir Girja Sahankar Bajpai, agents of the Government of India in the United States, be declared *persona non grata.*[185] "Should they continue their efforts to mould public opinion" concerning the Phillips report. This was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.[186]

British Ambassador Halifax immediately released a disclaimer to the press. On September 1, Sol Bloom of the New York, Chairman of

the House Foreign Affairs Committee told the House of Representatives that neither the British nor the Indian Government had requested or even suggested recall, and that there was no connection whatever between Phillips' resignation and the unauthorized publication of views he had communicated to the President concerning India. He recalled that the Secreatry of State had advised the press on 8 September 1943 that this assignment was for a temporary period, and stated that Phillips had written on 19 July 1944 that he wished to return in September.[187]

On September 2, Senator Chandler released the full text of a telegram from Sir Olaf Caroe of the Department of External Affairs in New Delhi to Secretary Amery in London, describing the Government of India's effort to prevent entry of newspapers or letters carrying the text of Pearson's article and declaring Phillips *persona non grata*. Sir Olaf stated. "we cannot again receive him should he be sent back to India."[188]

Quite naturally the British Embassy in Washington expressed surprise that an American Senator obtained a copy of such a coded message between two British officials.[189]

Considerable attention was naturally paid in the daily press to Senator Chandler's revelation. The *San Francisco News* commented significantly:

> American officials have hesitated to express concern at Britain's attitude during the war in the interest of maintaining Anglo-American unity. Those barriers will be passed soon and all efforts will be aimed at action--diplomatic, political, military or otherwise--that will hasten Japan's surrender. If Indian independence will help, American officials can be expected to press the British to grant it.[190]

It stated that all the world but India was aware of the Phillips report, which was not unusual, since:

> It can now be revealed that Colonel Louis Johnson, former Assistant Secretary of War went to India on another special

mission for Mr. Roosevelt in 1942, returned with word that censorship was far worse than in Germany.[191]

At this point Anglo-American relations would seem to have been at a low ebb. On September 2, Ambassador Halifax called on Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long to request again the American Government's apology for the publication of the Phillips letters.[192] Before Halifax' visit, Long had discussed the matter with Senator Chandler. Long told Halifax that although the American Government did regret the whole incident, it appeared that the situation had changed. Long pointed out to Halifax that no one in the State Department would have had access to a telegram from the Government of India to the Government of Britain. It would, therefore, appear that the leak of information came from within the Ambassador's own Embassy rather than from an American source. Long told Halifax that Senator Chandler had refused to reveal the source of his information, but he had broadly indicated that it was from the British Embassy. Halifax conceded that this was likely the case.[193]

On 4 September 1944, Sir Olaf requested that the American representative in New Delhi, Merrill, call upon him. Sir Olaf said that "he wanted to tell me quite frankly that the telegram was authentic." Sir Olaf added that:

> ... he wanted to make it clear that the telegram was not personal but was sent on behalf of the Government in India and represented others' views as well as his own.[194]

Merrill recounted that he confined his reply to expressing surprise and emphasizing that the letters had been written more than a year before their publication.

On September 5, at a press conference Hull described the situation as "very confused."[195] He reiterated that Phillips, while still in India, had informed the State Department that he could not long remain in London, and reminded reporters of a recent Department announcement that Phillips was returning "for urgent family reasons."[196] He stated that: "... at no time did the Department have any hint from

the British authorities about their feelings one way or the other concerning Mr. Phillips."[197]

On September 7 Representative Leon H. Gavin of Arkansas took the floor to present a lengthy denunciation of the situation. Gavin asserted that in the removal of Phillips, "the arrogance of the British statemanship has reached a new high," removing a person "who had stood out against British blandishments to follow her policy." He reminded "the British Empire forgot that we declared our independence on 4 July 1776, and that certainly we cannot but sympathize with India who, like ourselves, seeks its independence."[198] Givin then focused criticism on what he termed, "the British empire's attempted suppression of the news," claiming that British consuls throughout United States had been instructed to ask local newspapers to counteract Phillips' letter to the President." Gavin expressed approval of the Indian demand for independence and was concerned that the treatment India had received had aroused mistrust and a lack of confidence and cooperation among the peoples of smaller nations. Discussing the importance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, Gavin scorned the British, observing that Britain supported these ideas when they did not affect the Empire, "but when it comes to India for the Indians--well, that is just another story." Gavin then praised the record and performance of Phillips, commenting:

> ... when a fellow like William Phillips appear on the horizon and publically informs the American people that what we need is a diplomatic policy with a backbone to it, he deserve our thanks and recognition.[199]

A lengthy Summary, including the action and speeches given in both Houses and Pearson's articles, was read to the House. Representative Calvin Johnson than quoted Anthony Eden as "declaring Phillips *persona non grata* and saying that India [freedom of India] is more important than a thousand Phillips."[200] In conclusion, Johnson again called for the House to declare the British ministers *persona non grata* and to declare that the Indian Army and people would not participate with any force in the war until they had received a definite promise of independence.

The two governments were deadlocked. The American Government saw no reason to apologize, and the British Government of India clearly refused to do so. Pearson's articles and Sir Olaf's telegram did evade censorship and were published in India, which increased the nationals' favourable feelings of Indians about Phillips and America. The American Government chose to ride with the situation, allowing the dispute to explain why Phillips did not and could not return.

Many were unconvinced, however, among them *New Republic,* which wrote that "an excellent man" was "being forced out because of stating something absolutely true--that the British policy in India has done and will do harm to the success of our arms in the war against Japan.[201] The *Christian Century* likewise considered that Phillips was being recalled and intimated that President Roosevelt had evidently felt differently from Phillips who had written:

> I earnestly hope that the United States will advise Great Britain and India, in the name of justice and righteousness, to seek a reasonable and satisfactory solution, for this affects vitally the welfare of the United Nations. The United States as the acknowledged leader of democracy has a natural and vital role to play in bringing about a successful solution of the problem.[202]

It was hardly fair to state that the President did not agree. All evidence indicates that he did, and that he did all that could be done under the circumstances. Roosevelt did implicitly disassociate the United States from Britan. Secretary Hull too, informed the President that the State Department "shared in general the views expressed in the Ambassador's letter."[203]

Anglo-American relations had been severely strained as a result of this unauthorized publication of a report which, as the *Washington Post* itself pointed out, "really demonstrated that the United States was concerned about India, not only as a base for Allied warfare, but also because of the war aims to which she had subscribed, and with which liberal opinion in Britain really concurred. It was to help clear up this strained relationship that Churchill urged the Quebec Conference."[204]

On his return to the United States Phillips declined to discuss the circumstances of his resignation, but stated that he would report to the State Department after a few days at home.[205] On September 30 he had a conference with the President, the first since his return from India, and it was announced that he would retain his position as the President's Personal Representative to India with the rank of Ambassador.[206]

On November 9, Pearson stated the Phillips had made another proposal for India in a second letter to the President. This suggested a conference, to be held in any city except Delhi, of all Indian political groups under the patronage of the King-Emperor, the President of the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-shek, to discuss plans for future. The invitation to the conference was to be issued on behalf of the President of the United States, and an American "who could exercise influence in harmonizing the endless divisions of caste, religion, race and political views" might preside."[207] No great attention was paid to this further disclosure, and the Government of the United States was keeping to a decision of a "hands off" policy in India. The disclosure was interesting as revealing Phillips' appreciation of the complexity of the Indian problem, and as an outline of the one definite American proposal for its solution. It is significant that in all the furor over the original disclosure, no effort was ever made to deny the authencity of the letters, which evidently may be accepted as genuine.[208]

The source of leaks still remains unresolved, because no satisfactory explanation of the "press leaks" has ever been given. Phillips, on 2 July 1944, had professed his inability to speculate meaningfully about how they occurred.[209] Senator Chandler reiterated on 18 December 1944 that Phillips had nothing to do with the leak.[210] A decade later, Drew Pearson threw a little light upon it in a series of autobiographical articles, in which he stated:

> Phillips reasoned that if India were given some importance to fight she could raise enough troops to crack the Japanese front from Burma and the South, thereby saving many American lives, thanks to a State Department official who wanted to see American lives saved, I was able to obtain and publish that report, together with some intercepted British cables declaring

> that Ambassador Phillips never again would be permitted in India. I think my publication probably hastened dominion status for India ...[211]

This statement at least indicates the motive behind the exposure. The State Department never regretted that the leak occured. Roosevelt and Hull suspected Sumner Welles over this leak.[212] Welles had resigned as Under Secretary in the fall of 1943 under pressure from Hull and in the midst of scurrilous rumours. It was not until 17 March 1945, a little less than a month before his death that President Roosevelt announced officially the resignation of Phillips from his position as personal representative of the President of the United States of India. From this post he had been absent for two years. When Phillips was recalled from his duties in London with the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force–in fact for family reasons–some Americans concluded that was yet another case of Britain interfering in their domestic affairs. Diplomatic officials said "this was without political significance in itself, and that Phillips was going on retired status with the understanding that he could be called back to active service at any time the Department or President desired to give him an assignment."[213] It seems significant that the resignation came long after the controversial events leading up to it were safely forgotten by most people.[214] One cannot escape the conclusion that this was an arrangement whereby the policy which Phillips represented was abandoned without raising again the charge that the administration was subservient to British pressure. Obviously, there had been effort by somebody to exert pressure, either upon Britain or the United States Administration, or both.[215]

The decision of the President not to send Phillips back to India, or to replace him by another personal representative, had undoubtedly been inspired by the fear that the inability of an American of such standing to accelerate, by his presence in India, the attainment by that country of her independence, was likely to damage American prestige not only in India but throughout Asia.[216]

The American Government did not risk another confrontation by attempting to send Phillips back to New Delhi, and its representation there was eventually regularized by the appointment of George Merrill,

who was already on the spot, as United States Commissioner, with the rank of Minister.[217] The American administration did not send another representative of Phillips' stature or rank to India until after its independence, when Henry Grady went to India and Paul H. Alling went to Pakistan as the first American Ambassadors to these countries.[218]

Gandhi-Jinnah Negotiations

Next came the Gandhi-Jinnah meetings ending in a deadlock equal to that existing between Britain and the Hindu-Muslim leaders. American interest in India at this time waned, with the number of periodical references showing a marked decrease. One cannot escape the conclusion that as the Japanese threat receded so did American concern, and when India's two prominent leaders failed to reach agreement, India lost considerable American support. The *Christian Science Monitor* carried one of the few references to the failure. Its correspondent, C. K. Cumming, wrote that "the talks revealed that whatever Jinnah wanted he wanted from the British and not from the Hindus."[219]

During his Indian mission, in a discussion with Rajagopalachari, who had seen Gandhi during his fast, Phillips learned that Gandhi was willing to explore with Jinnah a new approach to the demand for Pakistan. But now Phillips was in London attached to the SHAEF (Political Adviser to the War Department). In early summer of 1944, there was a development in the Indian situation (agenda of Gandhi-Jinnah meeting); and the Department of State advised Phillips to suggest to the British Government that a way out of the Indian deadlock to settle the problem might now be available. Unfortunately, just at this time Drew Pearson uncovered Phillips' letters to the President Roosevelt (referred to earlier) about the Indian situation, in which Phillips had strongly criticized the British Indian policy. Phillips' proposals for the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting were vitiated by Pearson's actions. The British Government resented Phillips' official presence in London because of the views expressed in his letters.[220]

Jinnah's opinion was that:

> Gandhi represented the greatest stumbling block to a Hindu-Muslim settlement and that he did not at heart desire to come to terms with Muslims.[221]

Jinnah considered that the cultural, religious, and social differences between Hindus and Muslims were too great ever to attempt a unified government for the subcontinent of India.

In the ensuing negotiations, the independence of India continued to be a source of differences between the United States and Britain. Roosevelt and Hull sought a United Nations similar to the Pan American Union, and Roosevelt reportedly wanted to give Hong Kong to China, in an effort to do something to win help from the natives of India, Burma and Malaya. Churchill opposed this and sought rather to unify and strengthen the British dominions.[222]

Vice-President Wallace also contributed to American thought of the time on India in a pamphlet issued by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations entitled, "Our Job in the Pacific."[223] He stated that it was not the mission of the United States either to write a declaration of independence or underwrite "other people's declarations of continuing empire," which would seem to have been directed at both Indian leaders and Churchill, along with their American supporters. He continued: "... it is to our interest to approve and cooperate with all trends which lead toward our own standard of government of the people, by the people and for the people."[224] But he did not suggest how Britain should take steps to prepare a definite system of training and set a date on which they would terminate their trusteeship in the Pacific.

Gandhi, following his release from prision in May 1944, had attempted to break the communal deadlock by initiating discussions with Jinnah on the basis of what was known as the Rajagopalachari Award. At first, Gandhi was trying to re-open negotiation with Wavell, but Rajagopalachari urged Gandhi to turn to Jinnah instead of the British Viceroy. Rajagopalachari had been Premier of Madras until the withdrawal of Congress ministries in 1939. At the time of Cripps' negotiations, he had become convinced that Hindu-Muslim differences

should be solved on the basis of Pakistan. The Madras Resolution, which he sponsored, expressed this idea:

> I stand for Pakistan, because I do not want that State where we Hindus and Muslims are not honoured. Let Muslims have Pakistan. If we agree then our country will be saved. If the British raise further difficulties, we will overcome those difficulties ... I stand for Pakistan, but I do not think the Congress will agree to this.[225]

Rajagopalachari was shrewd enough to see that freedom of Indian was contingent upon a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem, and that this problem could not be successfuly tackled without accepting the principle of Pakistan and countenancing some kind of a division of India. He repeated:

> If we want to abolish British rule, we must settle the political differences between Hindus and Muslims by recognizing the Muslim League, which represents the political feelings of the Muslims who want their claims to be accepted, the most important of which is Pakistan.[226]

In April 1942, the Congress Party overwhelmingly rejected his proposal.[227] As a protest, Rajagopalachari resigned from the Congress Working Committee and continued his campaign on an individual basis to explore avenues of agreement on the basis of Pakistan. The times and issues had thus changed between 1942 and 1944. In the two years the Congress leaders realized the facts of reality of Pakistan. In 1943, Ragagopalachari had prepared a formula which could serve as a basis for a settlement between the Congress and the League. In February, during Gandhi's fast in the prison, he (Rajagopalachari) had met him and showed him the formula. Gandhi asked Rajagopalachari for further interpretation, proposals, suggestions and guidance about the Pakistan scheme.[228] Then Gandhi gave his approval to the formula. On July 10, the formula was published. It read as follows:

> Basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League to which Mahatma

Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah agree and which they will endeavour respectively to get the Congress and League to approve.

(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence and will cooperate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period.

(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favor of forming a sovereign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either state.

(3) It shall be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain to full power and responsibility for the governance of India.[229]

Then in July 1944, when the Associated Press reported that Gandhi had finally suggested a Hindu-Muslim partition of India, but one

differing markedly from the dreams of the poet Iqbal or Jinnah's Pakistan proposals, the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* thought his terms could not be fairer, while the *Washington Star* characterized them as "loaded in favour of the Hindus." The radio commentator Raymond Graham Swing hailed the proposal as "one of the most encouraging events of its kind within any of the United Nations since the war," and the *Christian Century* agreed.[230]

In July 1944, Gandhi and Rajagopalachari foresaw the wisdom of making a show of negotiation with Jinnah.[231] With these proposals, on 17 July 1944, Gandhi wrote Jinnah saying that he wished to meet him at a place of his choosing. The first meeting took place on September 9 at Jinnah's residence in Bombay and the discussion continued through September 29. Discussion first focused on the C. R. Formula (Rajagopalachari is referred to as C. R.), but Jinnah found it unsatisfactory on many counts and referred to the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Gandhi could not accept the thesis that the Muslims were a nation. He confessed that "as I imagine the Lahore Resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India."[232] The two Indian leaders found themselves unable to reach an agreement, but as a result of the talks their positions were more clearly presented. In conceding the terms of the formula, Jinnah found the offer "a shadow and husk, a maimed, mutilated, and motheaten Pakistan."[233] Jinnah expressed the claim for Muslim nationhood in his letter to Gandhi on 17 September 1944, which read:

> We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions--in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life. By all canons of international law we are a nation.[234]

This was the expression of the will of the Muslims to form a separate nation on the basis of a common religion and culture. But Gandhi still rejected the "two nation theory," and he agreed that after

India would be freed from British rule a boundary commission should demarcate contignous Muslim majority districts in North-west and North-east India. Further, all the inhabitants of such areas should be permitted to decide through plebescite whether they wished to form a separate state. If the vote would be in favour, a treaty of separation should be drawn up between the successor states in the subcontinent. However, such matters of common concern as foreign affairs, defence, communications, customs and commerce would be the matter for "efficient and satisfactory administration" under a central aauthority made up of boards of representative of both the states.[235] Despite this provision Gandhi had nevertheless recognized the principle of partition which he had branded in 1940 "as a patent untruth with which he believed there could be no compromise."[236] Jinnah having allowed Gandhi to commit this "Himalayan blunder," promptly rejected the offer on the four grounds that he would accept nothing less than the "full" six Muslim provinces for Pakistan, that any plebiscite on the issue of separatism must be confined to the Muslim population, that this should come before, not after, the British departure from India. But Gandhi's slogan was the independence first and Hindu-Muslim settlement afterwards. It was obvious that Muslim India would never submit to the Hindu raj, and the result would be anarchy and chaos. Gandhi himself had stated that "after the British had left they might come to a settlement or they might not and there might even be bloodshed and civil war."[237] This policy had naturally resulted in the British Government adopting their policy against the Congress mass civil disobediance movement.

On the basis of C. R's formula, Gandhi's proposal actually opened the possibility of dividing the Punjab and Bengal as well as other contiguous areas. The C. R. formula also envisioned that Pakistan would be joined to India by agreements of "safe-guarding defence, commerce, and communications and for other essential purposes." Within the framework of the C. R. formula, the offer of Pakistan rested on the prerequisite of the Muslim League's cooperation in the struggle for Indian independence. Specifically, the C. R. formula, called for the League's endorsement of the demand for Indian independence and cooperation in forming an interim government for the period of the war and transfer of power from Britain.

The Hindus considered this a most generous offer for the Muslims, because Gandhi conceded the right of self-determination to the Muslims of North-west India, which was a major step towards Pakistan and one which could not easily be retracted in future negotiations.[238]

Jinnah claimed that this formula was far from satisfying the Muslim League's demand. Arguing on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, he maintained the proposition that Pakistan was a nation with the right to independence, self-government and sovereignty. Pakistan, as the League's resolution conceived it, was a grouping of those regions of North-west and North-east India where Muslims were in a majority into independent sovereign states without any plebiscites. For Jinnah, the issue was the recognition of this principle, for once this principle was acknowledged the Muslims' demand would be recognized as rights, not concessions. The League desired to see Pakistan signed, sealed and delivered before and not after the transfer of power by the British. Jinnah wanted this right from the British not from the Hindus. If the British would leave without prior settlement between the Hindus and Muslims then the Muslims would have to fight the Hindus for the independence of Pakistan. Jinnah found Gandhi a very difficult man to deal with, and so he rejected his presentation of the C. R. formula for many of the same reasons that Congress rejected the Cripps proposals. Jinnah regarded Gandhi's attitude as a negation of Pakistan, and in any case questioned his capacity to negotiate on behalf of the Congress.[239] An ill-defined Rajagopalachari's formula, on the other hand, involved Muslims' taking part, more or less, as a subsidiary branch of Congress Party, in a drive against the British for transfer of power upon the basis of a promise left to be fulfilled by a National Government of Gandhi's conception.[240]

Moreover, article (4) of this formula, which envisioned agreements for defence, commerce and communication, would deprive Pakistan of full sovereignty. In essence, this meant Pakistan would have been granted only "Home Rule" under Hindu India suzerainty. Jinnah wrote to Gandhi on 21 September 1944:

> ... There is no union or federal constitution of India in being, functioning as a sovereign central government. Ours is a case

of division and carving out two independent sovereign states by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance of or secession from any existing union ... There cannot be defence and similar matter of a common concern, when it is accepted that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent sovereign states.[241]

On 22 September 1944 Gandhi answered to Jinnah:

I can be no willing party to division which does not provide for simultaneous safeguarding of common interests such as defence, foreign affairs and the like.[242]

Gandhi's real concern, as he remarked to Rajagopalachari during the talks was "to prove from his [Jinnah's] own mouth that the whole of the Pakistan proposition is absurd."[243]

The two leaders also failed to agree on the question of minority rights in determining Pakistan. Jinnah rejected the idea of plebiscites among the minorities in the Punjab, Bengal and contiguous areas. Again, Jinnah maintained that Pakistan was a nation and the Punjab and Bengal lay within her borders. He would, therefore, not accept the right of the congress leaders to interfere in determining these questions, which he insisted rightfully fell within the jurisdiction of Pakistan. This claim had parallels to the Congress demand concerning the Princely states (that Britain had no right to grant them a separate and special position within independent India). Since they fell within the borders of the Indian nation, the majority would determine their future status.

These conversations came to nothing, but they did give an immense boost to Jinnah's prestige. "Gandhi had not only recognized the principle of partition, but had suggested a mechanism for it." Gandhi had also sought out Jinnah in order to come to a common agreement, following the British example in dealing with the Muslim League on equal terms. The view that the Muslim League was the only Muslim political party to which either the British or the Congress attached any importance thus gained further ground.[244]

B. G. Kher, ex-Premier of Bombay, presiding over the meeting of the Bombay Legislature Congress Party in referring to Gandhi's proposals to Jinnah for communal settlement said:

> ... the principal objection to these proposals was that they conceded "Pakistan" and contemplated a division of India. No one liked India to be divided, but communal disunity was alleged to be an obstacle in the way of parting with power by the British ... If partition was the only condition on which freedom could be achieved by their joint efforts, then however reluctantly, they must arrive at an understanding on the basis of a prospective partition. Pakistan is better than slavery.[245]

As for the general run of Congress partymen, their attitude seemed to be one of reluctant and resentful acquiescence in Gandhi's policy. "They comfort themselves partly with the thought of the significance of the offer, which was perhaps mainly tactical, partly, perhaps, with the reflection that the British, so far as can be judged from Viceregal speeches and other announcements, were not likely to endorse Pakistan anyway."[246]

The majority of Congress opinion was opposed to Pakistan and felt that Gandhi's policy of recognizing the right of selfdetermination for the Muslims was a step too far in advance at that time. Congress opinion asked why, if Cripps' proposals, which envisaged the possibility of the division of India were turned down, it was now necessary to go much further in approaching Jinnah's demand for Pakistan.[247]

There was a difference, however, for the Congress Party leaders had always defined the Indian independence movement on the basis of a specific territory within defined boundries. In contrast, the Muslim claim of separation was on the basis of religion and culture, not territory. Indeed, Jinnah's letter to Gandhi on 25 September 1944 defined the boundries he envisioned for Pakistan saying:

> ... that Pakistan is composed of two zones, North-west and North-east, comprising six provinces, namely Sind, Baluchistan, North-west Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam,

subject to territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon, as indicated in the Lahore Resolution.[248]

Indeed, the area of Pakistan that came to be established after August 1947 was the same that Gandhi was willing to concede in September 1944. However, after the failure of Gandhi and Jinnah to reach an agreement, the political deadlock continued. But British policy had aroused a new hope of independence among the Indian leaders. Realizing the intensity of Hindu-Muslim relations and the Indian political situation, Lord Wavell suggested that the Prime Minister retreat from his idealism of the British Empire and treat India like a partner of the British Commonwealth. He wrote:

> In fact, if we want India as a friendly partner in the British Commonwealth, we must begin treating her much more like a Dominion now. But H. M. G. with neglect ... took a wrong turn with India 20 or 30 years ago; but we cannot put back the clock and must deal with existing conditions and pledges; and I am certain that our present attitude is aggravating the mischief.[249]

Such expressions clearly demonstrated to the Americans and others that Britain was not the principal obstacle to Indian political development; but that the difficulty resided in the intense differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities. "The Viceroy certainly exerted himself to the utmost and showed much skill and patience in trying to induce these elements to combine to adopt the formula."[250] But he was unable to give his blessing to the Muslim League's policy of partition. The Muslim League's adoption of a fundamental policy of partition had introduced a new feature into the situation. The Congress view of partition was exactly the reverse. Therefore, an intense bitterness began to spread again between the two communities. The Muslims were fully determined not to allow those in charge of British diplomacy to reach an agreement with the Hindus at the expense of Muslim interests.

One outstanding fact emerged from this uncertainly. Pakistan was now within the realm of possibility. It was no longer the dream of one "stubborn leader," but the declared goal of Muslim India. It might

still have been a bargaining counter, but at least people had begun to take serious notice of it. Its realization did not now depend on whether the British looked favourably on it or not:

> It depends solely on what military power the Muslims really possess. If they have enough to hold Pakistan against Hindu opposition, then, even should the British prevent its appearing in the paper constitution, it will be established by the Muslims as soon as the British are gone. On the other hand, if they have not enough military power to hold Pakistan against Hindu opposition, even should the British get it put into the constitution; it would be swept out of existence by the Hindus when the British are gone.[251]

So the Muslims began to strengthen themselves. They could not have any military power because they were not free. But the Muslim League's organization was improved, its publicity streamlined, its discipline tightened, and its message carried to all parts of India. Gradually it built up its power, prestige and popularity. Jinnah was no longer only a Muslim League's leader, but he was now the leader, the symbol of the all-India's Muslim nationalism. As the League grew in stature, Jinnah gained in authority. His name was now bracketed with Gandhi, even by the Hindus. The Viceroy, conscious of Jinnah's strength and his following, now consulted him in all important matters. No longer was Gandhi the sole spokesman for India. No longer was Congress the sole repository of patriotism and nationalism. In practical terms, though without confessing it in so many words, everyone knew that within the bosom of India pulsated two nationalisms, one Muslim, the other Hindu. Some even realized that a conflict between the two was coming and would rip the continent from top to bottom.

For two years, from 1942 to 1944, when the Congress leadership was in prison, the Muslim League was building itself into a powerful party. An overwhelming majority of the Muslims had by now declared themselves for Pakistan, so that when Gandhi secured his release in the late summer of 1944 he saw no alternative to negotiating with the Muslim League. The failure of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks was that Muslims did not trust Hindus and refused to accept Gandhi's word that partition would be effected when the British had departed. Jinnah

wanted his Pakistan then and there, before the British went, and had serious doubts if the Hindus would keep their word when once India was free and Congress sat in the seat of authority. The outcome of this negotiation was evident, that Jinnah had won a clear victory by getting Gandhi to recognize Pakistan. This also gave wide publicity to his two-nation theory.

However, even this difference in approach was not an insumountable obstacle to a compromise or an understanding. If the Muslims unitedly and clearly were to insist on total separation [as they actually did and thus won Pakistan], no amount of Hindu or Congress could have stopped them. What must have made Jinnah reluctant to come to any definite and clear understanding with Gandhi at that time was his own position as a leader of the Muslims. In September 1944 Jinnah was not sure whether he could produce overwhelming support for his demand among the Muslims if a possible plebiscite were to be held. Secondly, there was no guarantee that if Gandhi had come to a definite understanding with the League on these issues, that the Congress leaders, after coming out of jail, would abide by the terms of agreement. Finally, as a lawyer and as a hardheaded negotiator, Jinnah could not visualize Pakistan being achieved only because the Congress and the League had agreed to divide the country. The party which had the power, namely, the British Government, was not in the picture. Gandhi suggested that this difficulty could be overcome by the Congress and the League, immediately on the acceptance of an agreement, deciding on a common sense of action for the attainment of independence for India. This approach, Jinnah probably thought, was fraught with risks and dangers. There was the sad experience. It was likely that another struggle might also degenerate into communal warfare.

A Retrospect

While it is readily understandable that British diplomacy did not hold the answer to those problems about which the Churchill-Amery-Linlithgow power center felt so deeply, the widespread publicity which accompanied Phillips' activities contributed greatly at the time and in succeeding years to increase the difficulties for those elements of British authority still wishing to cling to the old ways of Empire. It also served

to affirm and enlarge the commitment of progressives inside the Churchill Government and the British public. As a whole, too, the cause of Indian independence was an important part of the political atmosphere in which Churchill was rejected by the British voters as soon as they had an opportunity to express their preference in national elections.

Anyhow, the Phillips episode gravely shocked the President and the United States Congress. It clearly demonstrated a lack of restraint and respect for the alliance on the part of the British Government. Indeed, it was ironical that after 1941, Churchill had presured Roosevelt to restrain his public statements and actions about India in order not to embarrass the British and strain the alliance, and yet, in 1944, he made a move declaring Phillips *persona non grata* which embarrassed Roosevelt publicly.

"Roosevelt did indeed believe in the danger of British power, as did many of his military and political advisers."[252] He disliked British imperialism, pure and simple as it seemed to him. He complained about antiquated eighteenth century methods of British rule.

The British, however, including Prime Minister Churchill, believed that President Roosevelt's conception of the British Empire was that which had existed at the time of George III. Roosevelt's anti-colonialism was clearly apparent to the British no less than to the American press, many of whom shared his antipathy. Then what had happened to Roosevelt's anti-imperialism doctrine? Indeed Roosevelt's idealistic anti-colonial campaign could not have brought an immediate fruit of liberation for the people of the subcontinent from Britain's imperialistic exploitation. At least Roosevelt's general attitude was comprehensible. In simple terms, the disagreement between Roosevelt and Churchill over India was this: Churchill looked with pride upon the Indian Empire; but the President saw it as a kingdom of a subjected people. Churchill was willing to call a Constituent Assembly and grant independence if the Assembly demanded it, after the war, so as to avoid chaos and bloodshed. In contrast the President did not understand why an Indian government could not be set up immediately.[253] "Mr. Roosevelt was of course in Mr. Churchill's pocket, and India therefore become a stick with which to beat the President."[254] Roosevelt thought

of Britain and India in terms of Churchill and Britain's imperialism. And with Churchill dictating the limits of British policy, the United States and the United Kingdom entered upon the final stages of the war with their differences over India muted but far from resolved.

Very soon after the death of Roosevelt, an important event changed British policies. On 10 July 1945, the British returned a majority for the Labour Party, thus replacing Winston Churchill with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and Leopold Amery with Lord Pethick Lawrence as Secretary of State for India.

Thus ended the Anglo-American relations of the Roosevelt-Churchill period of India. It would be a mistake to assume that, because they closed in this manner, they were futile. The period of intense American concern, during which the outcome had been regarded as a vital American interest, had come to a close. Once more America assumed the role of spectator rather than participant, and the thankless task which American opinion had forced upon its President, and thus in turn upon Phillips, came to be forgotten along with the man who had sought to bridge the gap between American idealism combined with self-interest and the realities of the Anglo-Indian deadlock. It is evident that during this period the British Government had decided to keep the Indian problem none of anybody else's business until the war was over. Neither the American pressure nor the Congress Party's agitations nor the Muslim League's threats, could budge the British imperial policy an inch from its firm stand, even though throughout most of the war period, opposition to British imperialism was an important theme and concern of Americna diplomacy.

So far as the controversy of idealism between Roosevelt and the officials of the State Department was concerned, there is much truth in the view of Chester Wilmot that, for the officials of State Department and for Roosevelt, "it was a case of the enlightened son seeking to reform the wayward father."[255] With considerable pro-British sentiment, members of the State Department conceded that the British pursued their colonial policy with a sense of progress and humanity which distinguished them from some European colonial powers. Nevertheless the British Empire was still an Empire with all of the inherent evils of European colonialism. However, when Roosevelt died in 1945, he was

holding the lid on one of the most explosive controversies within the American Government. In so doing, American created her own dilemma.

In the end, hopes of some Indians that Roosevelt would dramatically alter United States policy proved illusory. Roosevelt was concerned with a multitude of problems evolving from the impending Allied victory in Europe. India seemed unimportant when contrasted with the question of the future of Eastern Europe, the establishment of the U. N. O., and the securing of Allied assistance against Japan. At the second Quebec Conference of September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill avoided India as they planned operations in Europe and Asia.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. *FRUS*, 1942, I, 734.

2. Wendell Wilkie, *One World*, p. 184; Telegram Amery to Linlithgow, 13 Dec. 1942: L/PO/5/42: ff 118-9; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. III, pp.363-4.

3. Memorandum of State Department, 845.00/1421 (Unpublished documents, National Archives).

4 L/P&S/12/2633: f 62; L/P&S/12/2633: f 69; *Daily Telegraph* (London), 2 Dec. 1942; *FRUS*, 1942, 1, pp. 694-5.

5 As an alternative, Murray had suggested the former ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

6 *The Nation*, CLI (16 Jan. 1942), 75; Telegram Halifax to Eden, 3 Dec. 1942: L/P&S/12/2633: f 72-3; L/P&S/12/2633: f 48.

7 Murray to Welles, 17 June 1942: 845.00/1421; Murray to Welles, 22 July 1942: 845.00/1422; Telegram from New Delhi, 22 July 1942: 845.00/1384; Murray to Stettinius, 25 October 1943: 845.00/9-943; Memorandum of conversation by Alling, 4 Sept. 1942: *FRUS*, 1942, I, 728-9; memorandum of conversation by Hull, 2 Oct. 1942, Ibid., p. 736; Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 Vols, 2: 1491; William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* pp. 3-342; *The War Diary of Breckenridge Long: Selections from the years 1939-1944*, ed., Fred L. Israel, pp. 260, 299-300, 311.

8 Prior to the war, Phillips had served as the American Ambassador to Italy, working out United States relations with the new Italian empire without compromising the administration's principles of not recognizing territorial gains won by force. Telegram Linlithgow to Halifax, 6 Dec. 1942: MSS.EUR F. 125/29; *New York Times*, 12 Dec. 1942, p. 8.

9 Chirsttopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind, op. cit.*, p. 207.

10 Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy, op. cit.*, p. 345.

11 Memorandum of conversation, Amery and Phillips, 24 Nov. 1942, Phillips unpublished Diary, Harvard University, p. 120.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

13 Memorandum of conversation with Cripps, 24 Nov. 1942, William Phillips' Indian Diary, Nov. and Dec. 1942, p. 3; Phillips' Papers, Vol. 32.

14 *Ibid.*

15 Phillips, Diary, p. 12.

16 Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, p. 346.

17 *Loc. cit.*

18 Phillips to FDR, 17 Dec. 1942: Roosevelt Papers, PSF box No. 51.

19 During the war years, American export to India increased from 1 percent to 5 percent of the U. S. total, and the American share of Indian's total imports increased from 6 to 17 percent. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

20 Telegram Hull to Phillips, 20 Nov. 1942: *FRUS*, 1942, I, 746-8.

21 *Ibid.*, 747-8.

22 *FRUS*, 1942, i, 747-8.

23 *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 178-9.

24 Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, pp. 344-7; Telegram from London, 19 Dec. 1942: *FRUS*, 1943, IV; telegram from New Delhi, 19 Dec. 1942: 845.00/1750; telegram from New Delhi, 4 Dec. 1942: 845.00/1750; memorandum of conversation by Berle, 30 Nov. 1942: 845.00/1722.

25 CLVI (16 Jan. 1943), 75.

26 *New York Times*, 12 Dec. 1942, p. 8.

27 *Time* XX (21 Dec. 1942), 29.

28 *Time*, XL (21 Dec. 1942), 22.

29 Elliot Roosevelt, *As He Saw It, op. cit.*, p. 74.

30 If the President felt as strongly as his son indicates, then Churchill certainly must have been aware of it at Casablanca. Elliot Roosevelt's account of the president's feelings on this point was born out by Ross McIntire in his *White House Physician*, p. 156.

31 Telegram Eden to Halifax, 28 Sept. 1942: L/P&S/12/2633: f 145; L/P&S/12/2633: f 123; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. III, pp. 53, 118-9, 299-300.

32 *The Times* (London), 15 Dec. 1942, p. 3.

33 *Loc. cit.*

34 *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 18 Dec. 1942, p. 3.

35 *New York Times*, 8 Jan. 1943, p. 9.

36 FDR to Hopkins, 19 March 1943, Roosevelt Papers, PSF box No. 53.

37 On January 7 a large number of civil servants had sent a petition to the Viceroy charging the establishment of the headquarters of the American forces in India had resulted "in and acute rise in rents ..., hire of local conveyances and in a dearth of fruits, vegetables, milik and milik products." *New York Times*, 8 Jan. 1943, p. 9. Three days later the Calcutta *Statesman* commented that the presence of American troops was "not a sole or even a main factor in the rise of prices," but contributory. *Ibid.*, 12 Jan., 12 Jan. 1943, p. 6. Strained relations were developing between British and Americans in India at this time. British

residents felt there was ample evidence that the presence of so many fabulously paid troops did cause the inflation. Americans who knew of their own great food imports felt this was smear campaign.

38 *Congressional Record*, Appendix, 1942, p. A 3266.

39 *The Times* (London), 3 Feb. 1943, p. 3.

40 *Ibid.*, 9 Jan. 1943, p. 3.

41 *New York Times*, 9 Jan. 1943, p. 3.

42 *The Times* (London), 9 Jan. 1943, p. 3.

43 *Ibid.*; Observation by Mr. William Phillips, "Phillips Report," 10 June 1943: R&A 097.3 Z1 092 No. 923, *op. cit.*

44 *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 199.

45 Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 22 Jan. 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 180-3.

46 *Loc. cit.*

47 *Ibid.*

48 Memorandum of conversation with Viceroy, 26 Jan. 1943, Phillips' Diary, pp. 58-9.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

50 *Loc. cit.*

51 Linlithgow to Amery, 2 Jan. 1943: Prem 42/9; W. P. (43)9, CAB 66/33.

52 IOR: L/P&S/12/4624.

53 Linlithgow to Amery, 11 January, 16 March and 2 May 1943, Linlithgow Papers, Vol. 12; Linlithgow to Amery, 28 Jan. and 11 Feb. 1943, *Ibid.*, Vol. 24.

54 FO 371, A2732/93/4. See *Ibid.*, A 1864 and 3779/93/45; Amery to Linlithgow, 19 March 1943, Linlithgow Papers, Vol. 24; telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 2 Jan. 1943: MSS.EUR. F. 125/24; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. III, p. 444.

55 Linlithgow to Amery, 30 January, 2 March, 10 May and 20 August 1943, Linlithgow Papers, Vol. 12; Amery to Law, 31 March 1943, FO 371, A 3155/93/45. On the Viceroy's hostility towards the international Secretariat of the I. P. R. See his telegram to Amery of 6 June and 4 August 1943, Linlithgow Papers, Vol. 25.

56 E. G. FO 371, A 5995/45. London also took wider view than New Delhi of the question of reciprocal Lend Lease from the U. S. A. to India. See Prem 4 46/4A; *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 246ff.

57 When Gandhi was expected to die, Phillips wired the President recommending intervention on Gandhi's behalf. Hull had taken up this matter with Halifax but no result was achieved. Phillips Report, 097.3 Z1092 No. 923, op. cit., p. 58

58 Bertram D. Hullen, *New York Times*, 21 Feb. 1943, p. 21.

59 Phillips' Diary, Memorandum of conversation with Viceroy, 8 Feb. 1943, pp. 73-4; W. P. (43)52 L/P&J/8/600: f 426; letter Linlithgow to Phillips, 8 Feb. 1943: MSS.EUR. F. 125/25.

60 Telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 11 Feb. 1943: MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

61 Report from the Office of the Personal Representative of the President of the United States, to Secretary of State, New Delhi, 18 Feb. 1943: 845.00/1852 PS/HCW.

62 Phillips' Diary, Memorandum of conversation with viceroy, 8 Feb. 1943, pp. 73 4.

63 Telegram Phillips to Hull, 8 Feb. 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 185-6.

64 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 20 May 1943: Prem 4 46/1; telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 19 Feb. 1942: MSS.EUR. F. 125/24; L/P&S/12/2754: f 164; Mansergh, *op. cit.* Vol. III, pp. 689-94.

65 *Loc. cit.*; Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, pp. 380-1; Hess, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-9; telegram Linlithgow to Amery, 29 Apr. 1942: MSS.EUR. F. 125/24.

66 Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, p. 362.

67 Prem 4 46/1

68 *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 5 March 1943, p. 129.

69 Telegram Phillips to Hull, 16 Feb. 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 193-4.

70 Telegram Phillips to Hull, 18 Feb. 1943, *Ibid*, pp. 195-6.

71 *Loc. cit.*

72 Jinnah's reply to Gandhi, 28 May 1943: Prem 4 46/1.

73 Telegram American Consulate H. Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay, 28 May 1943: 845.00/1982 PS/ERW.

74 Telegram Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay 28 May 1943: 845.00/1982 PS/ERW.

75 *Loc. cit.* Gandhi's revolutionary slogan was "Quite India," against the British, a sudden and complete change, without Hindu-Muslim settlement, leaving the Muslim on the mercy of Hindu majority raj. See *The Statesman* (India), 25 Jan. 1943.

76 Telegram Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay, 28 May 1943: 845.00/1982 PS/ERW.

77 *The Evening News of India*, 28 May 1943.

78 R. Coupland, "A Flexable Regional Scheme For India," *Manchester Guardian* (London), 27 Oct. 943.

79 *Loc. cit.*

80 Telegram Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay, 6 Aug. 1943: 845.00/2130 PS/DAB.

81 *The Hitavada*, 28 May 1943; 845.00/1994.

82 *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 205.

83 J. D. Ahmed, Vol. I, *op. cit.* pp. 499-500.

84 Telegram Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay 28 May 1943: 845.00/1968 PS/ERW.

85 *Loc. cit.*

86 The prominent Hindu political figures such as Rajagopalachari, K. M. Munshi, Sir Tej Bahadur Spru and Dr. Jayaker, who had been in the spotlight as mediators between Hindu nationalist groups on the one hand and the Government of India and Muslim League on the other. For detail see, telegram Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay, 28 May 1943: 845.00/1982 PS/ERW.

87 "Futile Fast," *Newsweek*, XXI (8 May 1943), 50.

88 "Gandhi Fail's Again; What Next?" ed., *Los Angeles Times*, 2 March 1943, part II, p. 4.

89 W. L. Holland, "Breaking the Indian Deadlock," *Far Eastern Survey*, XII (5 April 1943), 65-6.

90 Phillips Report, 10 June 1943: 097.3 Z1 092 No. 923, p. 5; Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, p. 359.

91 Phillips' Report, *op. cit.*; telegram Phillips to Secretary of State, 7 Apr. 1943: 845.00/1911 PS/SS.

92 *Loc. cit.*

93 Prem 4 46/12.

94 *Ibid.*; *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 213-4.

95 *Loc. cit.*

96 Telegram New Delhi Consulate to Secretary of State, 13 Apr. 1943: 845.00/1917; Dawn, 13 Apr. 1943; *Hindustan Times*, 13 Apr. 1943; *New York Times*, 14 Apr. 1943.

97 *The Times* (London), 7 Apr. 1943, p. 4.

98 *New York Times*, 8 Apr. 1943, p. 6.

99 *New York Times*, 14 Apr. 1943, p. 11.

100 *New York Times*, 26 Apr. 1943, p. 1. This appeared in a special box in the lower left-hand corner of the front page. Phillips spent the two days before his press conference with the viceroy at his camp near Dhra Dun, where he took part in his first tiger shoot.

101 *The Times* (London), 27 Apr. 1943, p. 6.

102 *New York Times*, 26 Apr. 1943, p. 6.

103 *New York Times*, 27 Apr. 1943, p. 8.

104 Phillips' Report, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

106 *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 19 March 1943, p. 154.

107 *Ibid.*, p. 163.

108 Telegram Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20 May 1943: Prem 4 46/1.

109 See Jinnah's statement of 9 August 1942, in J. D. Ahmed, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. I, pp. 443-5.

110 *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 216.

111 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 20 May 1943: Prem 4 46/1.

112 MSS.ERW D. 977/3, Political Volume Series, I, part I, p. 46.

113 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power, op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 29; L/PO/10/22.

114 Letter Casey to Wavell, 6 Nov. 1944: MSS.EUR D. 977/3, Political Volume Series I, part I, p. 141.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

116 Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 3 March 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 205-6.

117 *Loc. cit.*

118 Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 14 May 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 220-2; Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, pp. 386-9; Report from Washington to Foreign Office London, 26 July 1944: Prem 4 46/12.

119 *Ibid.*, Prem 4 46/12.

120 Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 3 March 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 205-6.

121 Vide Supra, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

122 Quoted in *New York Times*, 14 Apr. 1943, p. 11.

123 "When Moslems is respelled Moslem," Quoted in *Ibid.*

124 *Dawn*, 13 Apr. 1943.

125 *Nation*, CLVI (3 May 1943), 651.

126 Memorandum Welles to Hull, 6 Apr. 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 213.

127 Memorandum Murray to Welles, 6 Apr. 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 213-4.

128 Telegram Hull to Phillips, 14 Apr. 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 215.

129 Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, pp. 1452-1483.

130 Sumner Welles, *The Time For Decision*, p. 302.

131 Telegram Phillips to Hull, 11 Apr. 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 214-5.

132 *New York Times*, 11 Apr. 1943, pp. 1, 28.

133 Phillips' Report, *op. cit.*

134 Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 14 May 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 220-1. Phillips, maintained the "we must not assume that they [the Indian political leaders] will adopt the American or British system."

135 Phillips' Report, *op. cit*.

136 Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy, op. cit*., p. 389.

137 *Ibid*, pp. 386-90. Insofar as Churchill's prophecy of "a blood-bath" referred to strife between Hindus and Muslims were that British rule to be removed, he was proved correct. In August 1947, the transfer of power in India was accompanied by the worst bloodshed in the history of India. Although, many Hindu-Muslim would lay down the blame for this at Britain's own door.

138 Phillips' Diary; Memorandum of conversation with Churchill, 22 May 1943: *FRUS*, IV, 178-301.

139 *Ibid*., p. 94 (Phillips Diary).

140 Christopher, *Allies of a Kind*, p. 362.

141 Phillips' Diary, Memorandum of conversation with the President, 21 May 1943, p. 92.

142 *Loc. cit*.

143 Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, pp. 390-1.

144 *New York Times*, 9 Sept. 1943, p. 19.

145 It should also be noted that there was a marked limit to what the United States would do to put itself out in a practical way on India's behalf. Thus, although officially requested to do so, the administration would make no effort to get Indian immigration into the U. S. A. permitted, along with the new trickle of Chinese being allowed in. FO 371, A 10200/144/25.

146 *FRUS*, 1943, III, 28, 40; Amery to Linlithgow, 20 Apr. 1943, Linlithgow Papers, Vol. 24.

147 *New York Times*, 9 Sept. 1943, p. 19.

148 Directive to Viceroy Designate, 8 Oct. 1943, *Transfer of Power*, IV, 172; *Wavell's Journal*, 7 and 8 October 1943, 22-3.

149 *Loc. cit*.

150 *Ibid*.

151 *Wavell's Journal*, 27 July 1943, 12.

152 Office of the Personal Representative of the President of the United States, to Secretary of State, New Delhi, 21 Feb. 1944: 845.00/2222 PS/LF.

153 "Wavell to New Delhi," ed., *christian Science Monitor*, 21 June 1943, p. 12.

154 "Asian Zero Hour?" ed., *Los Angeles Times*, 19 June 1943, part II, p. 4.

155 *Nation*, CLVI (26 June 1943), 878.

156 *Newsweek*, XXI (28 June 1943), 28.

157 *Time*, XLI (28 June 1943), 26.

158 "Wavell as Viceroy," *New Republic*, CVII (28 June 1943), 847.

159 *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 227-8.

160 Quoted in Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, p. 283.

161 Telegram Winant to Hull, 22 July 1944: *FRUS*, 1944, V, 237-8.

162 "Washington Merry Go-Round," *Washington Post*, 25 July 1944, p. 6.

163 *Ibid.*

164 Hull, *op. cit.*, 1495; Phillips, 889.

165 Hull, 1495.

166 WSC to Halifax, 15 Sept. 1944: Prem 4 27/10.

167 A Prominent *Washington Post* columnist.

168 Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 14 May 1943: *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 220-2.

169 Telegram Hull to Phillips, 25 July 1944: *FRUS*, 1944, V, 239.

170 Telegram Phillips to Hull, 28 July 1944: *FRUS*, 1944, V, 239-40.

171 Only one periodical comment was found, and that in the *Christian Century*, LXI (16 August 1944), 943. After quoting at length from the report the complaint was made that it showed "how far the conduct of the diplomatic and political phases of the Asiatic War has been turned over to our alley."

172 Prem 4 46/2; *New York Times*, 3 Sept. 1944, p. 17. From this date it will be noted that it was not reported until some time later, when the controversy was at its height. The absence of comment until August 29 suggests a possible attempt to hush the matter up. Also see Phillips' Report, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

173 Telegram Settinius to Phillips, 28 July 1944: *FRUS*, 1944, V, 240-1.

174 Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 3 March 1943: *FRUS* 1943, IV, 205-7.

175 Memorandum of conversation sent by Hull to Roosevelt, 15 August 1944: *FRUS*, 1944, V, 242.

176 *Loç. cit.*

177 *New York Times*, 18 August 1944, p. 3.

178 "The Washington Merry Go-Round," *Washington Post*, 28 July 1944, p. 2.

179 *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90:6 (28 August 1944), 7336.

180 *Loc. cit.*

181 *Ibid.*

182 *Ibid.*, 90:10 (29 August 1944), A 3770.

183 *New York Times*, 29 August 1944, p. 7.

184 *The Times* (London), 29 August 1944.

185 *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90:6 (30 August 1944), 7413.

186 *New York Times*, 31 August 1944, p. 9.

187 *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90:6 (1 Sept. 1944), 7497. This statement tacitly acknowledges the authenticity of the views Pearson ascribed to Phillips.

188 *FRUS*, 1944, V, Text of United Press Ticker News Extract, 25 Sept. 1944, pp. 245-6; *New York Times*, 3 Sept. 1944, p. 17.

189 *New York Times*, 3 Sept. 1944, p. 17.

190 *San Francisco News*, 4 Sept. 1944, p. 2.

191 *Ibid.*

192 Telegram Halifax to Eden, Washington, 3 Sept. 1944: L/P&S/12/4629: f 179; telegram Wavell to Amery, 4 Sept. 1944: L/P&S/12; L/PO/19/21; Mansergh and P. Moon, eds, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. V pp. 6-7, 11-2.

193 Memorandum of conversation by Long and Halifax, 25 Sept. 1944: *FRUS*, 1944, IV, 243-5.

194 Tel. Merrell to Hull, 4 Sept. 1944: *FRUS*, 1944, IV, 247.

195 *The Times* (London), 6 Sept. 1944, p. 3.

196 *New York Times*, 6 Sept, 1944, p. 3.

197. *The Times* (London), 6 Sept, 1944, p. 3.

198. *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90:6 (7 Sept. 1944), 7585. See also remarks of Representative Calvin D. Johnson (Illinois), *Ibid.*, (21 Sept. 1944), 8113-5.

199. *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90:6 (7 Sept. 1944), 7585.

200. *Ibid.*, Telegram Churchill to Halifax, 15 Sept. 1944: L/P&S/12/4629: f 109; Mansergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 34-5.

201. "The Murphy Affairs," *New Republic*, CXI (11 Sept. 1944), 293.

202. "Was Phillips Recalled Because of India?" *Christain Century*, LXI (13 Sept. 1944) 1044.

203. FDR to Phillips, 30 Aug. 1944; Hull to FDR, 15 Aug. 1944, Roosevelt Papers, PSF Box No. 92, *FRUS*, 1944, V, 239ff; memorandum, office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 28 Aug. 1944: 845.00/8-644; *Star of India*, 4 June 1944; *Hindustan Standard*, 7 June 1944; *Hindustan Times*, 24 June 1944; *Times of India*, 27 July 1944; *Bombay Chronicle*, I July and 4 August 1944; *Hindu*, 6 June 1944; Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, 269; Hess, *op. cit.*, 146; Christopher, *op. cit.*, 476-7.

204. *The Times*, (London), 26 Sept. 1944, p.3.

205. *New York Times*, 14 Sept. 1944, p. 17.

206. *Ibid.*, 1 Oct. 1944, p. 17.

207. *Ibid.*, 10 Nov. 1944, p. 12.

208. *The Los Angles Examiner* commented on the significance of this lack of reproduction. "The Phillips Incident" ed., 6 Sept. 1944, p. 12.

209 Guy Hope Ashley, *The American Role in Indian Independence, 1940-1947* p. 219.

210 *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90:7 (18 Dec. 1944), 9645).

211 "Confession of an S. O. B.," *Saturday Evening Post*, 229:18 (3 Nov. 1956), 88, 90.

212. Christopher Thorne, *op. cit.*, p. s.

213. *New York Times*, 18 March 1945, p. 5.

214. *The New York Times* reported the item inconspicuously, with but a brief reminder of Senator Chandler, the published correspondence, and the British and State Department denials.

215. Drew Pearson's explanation in a series of autobiographical articles would seem to imply an effort primarily to force some action from the administration. Leopold Amery, British Secretary of State for India charged that Pearson, whom he referred to as "a muk-racking journalist," published the material "apparently for purpose connected with electioneering manoeuvres in his own country." *The Times* (London), 27 Sept. 1944, p. 2. It is interesting to note that at a press conference on 13 Sept. 1943, President Roosevelt had been reported to himself having referred to Pearson in very strong terms as fellows: "The President said he would not hesitate to apply the word lie, that the columnist himself was a chronic liar and not the only one of his kind; that the quicker the press learned how harmful such men were to the country the sooner it would increase its influence." This had reference to Pearson's broadcast of 29 August 1943, in which he stated that Hull wished "Russia bled White." *Newsweek*, XXII (13 September 1943), 79.

216. IOR: L/P&S/12/4627.

217. Telegram Halifax to Eden, 20 Jan. 1945: L/P&S/12/2634: f26

218. WP(45)285, Cab 66/65. This was obvious to any one having business with the American Consulate in the years following 1944. They were then something far removed from "Seamen's agencies" and had become active and efficient for disseminating American information and culture.

219. *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 Oct. 1944, p. 1.

220. Hull, *Memoirs*, II, 1495.

221. Telegram Conovan to Secretary of State, Bombay, 25 Jan. 1944: 845.00/2208 PS/HWL.

222. "Planning a World League," *United States News and World Report*, XVI (9 June 1944), p. 14-5. A few references to India now appear in this magazine for the first time.

223. *New York Times*, 15 June 1944, p. 1.

224. *Ibid.*

225. I. H. qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 209.

226. Speech of 12 Feb. 1944, at Belgaum, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 13 Feb. 1944, Quoted in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 209.

227. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2, 1944, p. 46.

228. Telegram Wavell to Amery, 12 July 1944: L/P&J/519: ff 310-2; tel. Jenkins to Turnbull, 13 July 1944: L/P&J/8/519: f 297; Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 1983-7.

229. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2, 1944, pp. 129-30; Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 210.

230. *American Opinion Report*, Department of State, 5 August 1944.

231. On 8 April 1944, when Rajagopalachari sent these proposals to Jinnah, the Muslim League Working Committee had failed to respond. For Rajagopalachari-Jinnah correspondence of April-July 1944, see J. D. Ahmed, *op. cit.*, III, 127-32.

232. Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

233. *Ibid.*; *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2; tel. Hallet (United Provinces) to Wavell, 20 Jully 1944: L/P&J/5/275: ff 65-6; tel. H. Dow (Sind) to Wavell, 4 August 1944: L/P&J/5/260: f 71.

234. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2, 1944; Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, p. 216.

235. C. H. Phillips and Wainwright, eds., *The Partition of India* p. 215.

236. Gandhi wrote in April 1940, "As a man of non-violence, I cannot forcibly resist the proposed partition if the Muslims of India really insist upon it. But It can never be a willing party to the vivisection ... For it means the undoing of work done by numberless Hindus and Muslims to live together as one nation. Partition means a patent untruth. My soul rebels against the idea that Hinduism and Islam represent two antagonistic culture and doctrines." See Philips and Wainwright, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

237. "Key to Deadlock not in League Hands," *The Statesman* (India), 25 Jan. 1943; 845.00/1902 PS/A, P. 11.

238. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2, 1944, p. 53.

239. Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

240. Telegram Ambassador Winant to Secretary of State, London, 1 August 1944: 845.00/8-144.

241. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2, 1944, p. 145.

242. *Loc. cit.*

243. quoted in Pyarelal, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*, 2 Vols. I, 91.

244. Philips and Wainwright, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

245. B. G. Kher's ples "Pakistan is Better than Slavery," *Sunday Standard* (India), 20 August 1944.

246. *The London Time*, 10 August 1944.

247. Telegram Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay, 10 July 1944: 845.00/7-1040 OMM; *The Hindustan Times*, 21 July 1944.

248. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2, 1944, p. 147.

249. Letter Wavell to Prime Minister, 24 Oct. 1944: Prem 4 46/6, p. 222.

250. Prem 4 46/11, 13 July 1945, p. 535(2).

251. Edwyn Bevan, "The Congress Enigma," *Spectator*, 21 August 1942, p. 168.

252. For detail see *Nation*, 2 November 1946.

253. Moran, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

254. IOR: L/P&S/12/4624

255. Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle For Europe*, p. 633.

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6

FROM DILEMMA TO INDEPENDENCE 1945-1947

Simla Conference

The story of the final year of the struggle and the achievement of Pakistani independence is an epilogue to the story of American involvement in the movement for freedom of the Indian subcontinent. "All [Indian leaders] demanded that for reasons of military necessity, if no other, the United States Government should insist on a more conciliatory and constructive British policy toward India."[1] The Indian nationalists considered it good tactics to continue to appeal to America's anti-colonial sentiments. While the great battles of the final year of World War II were absorbing much of American and British emotion and energy, the pro-independence forces in the United States had not forgotten India's problem. Nor was their interest lost sight of in India. Maulana Azad, Indian National Congress leader, observed that "as the war situation improved in Europe, American pressure for the solution of the Indian problem was renewed."[2] During 1945 the grand alliance of United Nations reached the zenith of its power, and there was no doubt of Anglo-American might. Surely, it is one of the ironies of history that within a year this power had melted away, and the West had begun to suffer a continuing and increasing loss of prestige in the East. Power seems finally to have been its own nemesis.

In April, Rajagopalachari, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* urging a settlement of the Indian problem before the close of the war. He argued that world peace demanded reconciliation in India, but the Indian people themselves could not be united to an independent India. "It is to that end that British statesmen have to be advised, and advised pretty firmly, by their friends abroad." The British were morally responsible to put things right in India and then retire "in favor of a stable democracy."

Since the allies had helped Britain to hold her position, it became their responsibility too. "They must see to it that their role does not degenerate into merely helping maintain British imperialism."[3]

When Wavell became Viceroy, the war was by no means over, but a turning point had been reached and victory was in sight. As peace approached, Wavell knew it would be difficult to delay the transfer of substantial power to the Indian people. With the failure of Gandhi and Jinnah to reach agreement, the political deadlock continued. Nine months after he took office, the Viceroy decided that the initiative to resolve the Indian deadlock should come from His Majesty's Government. He realized that a plebiscite would be a successful process to resolve the issue of Pakistan.[4]

The surrender of Germany on 7 May 1945 strengthened his position, and he was summoned to London for a review of the Indian situation.[5] On 4 June 1945, Wavell flew to London for the purpose of persuading the British Government to make an effort to solve the Indian deadlock.[6] By the middle of May there was talk of a Wavell plan which the Viceroy had taken to London for a settlement of the Indian problem.[7] Early in June Amery made a statement which the *New York Times* found a "fair enough assertion" of India's aspiration, but questioned the qualifications he had set that any change must await the close of the war, and must have the agreement of the main elements not only an agreement between Hindus and Muslims, but of the Princes as well, this would raise grave problems. It warned that events were moving fast, that India would not willingly concede any alien rule, and that the declared objectives of the Western democracies were against such rule.[8]

In London, by threatening to resign as Viceroy, Wavell secured Churchill's consent to a proposal for an interim government. The Viceroy's purpose was that "India would immediately be declared free of control from London and obtain dominion status.[9] The Prime Minister allowed this proposal to go forward, provided that it was put to the Indians on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. His reason for this unwanted mildness, as he later admitted to Wavell, was that "the Indian Committee had told him [the idea] was bound to fail."[10]

On 21 June 1945, Wavell announced that he was willing to create a new Executive Council which would be composed of 21 Indian leaders, including an equal proportion of Caste Hindus and Muslims with the remaining seats allotted to scheduled castes, Sikhs, and other minorities.[11] This proposal, representing a step backward from the concept of Pakistan, as conceded by Gandhi and Rajagopalachari, reflected the theme of Jinnah's earlier demand for 50 percent representation of the Muslim League. However, Jinnah opposed the Viceroy's interpretation of parity, arguing that the Muslims still would be in a minority because the smaller minorities would vote with the Congress Party. He demanded that an additional safeguard should be given to the the Muslims, namely, that any issue which might be felt prejudicial to the interest of the Muslims would not be put to a vote. Jinnah then spoke:

> His Majesty's Government were quite right in saying that a final solution must be by agreement and that no constitution could be imposed. The Muslim League would not agree to any constitution except on the fundamental principle of Pakistan.[12]

After this, the British Government assured the Muslim and other Indian leaders that "the future constitution of India shall be called into being, not by force or threat of force, but by constitutional means alone."[13]

There was, then, to be an Indianization of the Viceroy's Council, excepting the defense member, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Home Affairs ministers. The remaining offices were, for the first time, to be held by the Indian themselves.[14] This began a series of events resulting in the withdrawal of the British and the establishment of the two dominions of India and Pakistan. During all these negotiations the United States Government expressed a friendly concern for an amicable settlement on the dual basis of self-determination and one Indian federation.[15] American influence concerning the Indian problem was noticeable in these negotiations; the proposal for parity between Congress and League nominees within the provincial government suggested during the Simla Conference was similar to Phillip's recommendation to Roosevelt on the same subject in 1943.[16]

The reactions of Gandhi and Jinnah to the Wavell plan once again underlined the wide difference in their approaches to the Indian problem. Gandhi objected strongly to the proposal that the Congress Party be recognized as only representing Caste Hindus. For the Congress leaders, it was hard enough to accept the British recognition of Jinnah's claim that the League represented the Muslims of India at the Centre.[17] It was, therefore, unacceptable to them. Wavell chose to achieve parity by decreeing that the Congress Party represented only Caste Hindus, thereby depriving the Congress leaders of the right to speak for the numerous other groups which represented a substantial percentage of the Congress Party membership and whose support the Congress had enjoyed in previous elections. Indeed, Jinnah had long accused the Congress of representing only the Hindus, but even he had not limited this to Caste Hindus. "He contended that the principle of Pakistan should be recognized first, because if the League once accepted the Wavell plan, the Pakistan issue will be shelved and put in cold storage indefinitely."[18]

With the end of the war in Europe, a victory in which India had played not an unimportant part in wealth and manpower, the question of India's freedom assumed a new urgency.[19] Out of the Viceroy's consultations grew a plan to call a conference at Simla in June 1945, bringing together the Hindu-Muslim leaders in a major attempt to reach agreement on a post-war government for India. American comment was favourable, but noted that the plan did not supersede the Cripps plan of 1942, that the provisions were "admittedly a half-way measure," though it was felt they proved the Cripps offer had not been "phony," and that Churchill, despite his famous statement regarding liquidation of the empire, recognized that change had been accelerated. That he did so in the middle of an electoral campaign was seen as proof that the British people wanted it.[20] In the opinion of the *New York Times* the only way not to liquidate the empire was to transform it into a Commonwealth.[21] The *Los Angeles Times* called it a gesture of strength, not of weakness.[22] *The San Francisco News* felt that India's many friends in America should welcome the move, and that Britain deserved high praise. As a result of world opinion, the Simla Conference unofficially registered the Indian problem at the San Francisco Conference. World opinion had surprised Britain.[23] The *Nation* hoped "the Indian leaders [would] regard the

British plan, not as a trap to compromise them, but as an opportunity to gain a vantage point from which to press forward to full independence."[24]

On 25 June 1945, Wavell convened the Simla Conference of 22 political leaders inviting their cooperation in reconstituting the Viceroy's Executive Council essentially along Crippsian lines. The long-term aspect of the Cripps' offer remained Britain's policy, but its acceptance by the parties was not a condition of the immediate reform.[25]

Jinnah, Nehru, and other leading figures from both the Muslim League and the Congress Party together with less powerful groups, were present. Gandhi did not attend the sessions, but remained near the Conference in order to be accessible to delegates seeking his advice. America was credited with contributing effective .diplomatic efforts toward the release of the Indian leaders from prison and in the organization of the Simla talks.[26]

The Conference opened in a hopeful atmosphere, and it seemed that a resolution of the deadlock might be reached. Wavell stuck to his original proposal asking each party to submit a list of names they would wish to see included on his council. The Congress Working Committee submitted their list: the first name was their President, Maulana Azad, second and third were Nehru and Patel, both Hindus; the remainder of the list included a Parsee, a Sikh and a Christian. At this point Jinnah argued that the Muslim League should have the right to nominate the Muslim members to the council and refused to submit a list of names until his claim of representing all the Muslims of India was acknowledged. Accordingly, only Jinnah would be allowed to nominate Muslims. He refused to join a council where the Congress Party was permitted to have Muslim representatives.[27] The Congress leaders could not agree to Jinnah's suggestion, because it would appear to acknowledge that the Congress Party represented the antithesis of the Muslim League and Jinnah's claim for Pakistan.[28] It would have been a hard task for Jinnah to work with Azad on the Viceroy's Council. On the other hand until Jinnah's rejection of the Simla scheme, Wavell had not realized that any reconstruction of the Executive Council which did not recognize the League's status had become impracticable.

The meeting went badly. Ill-will and mistrust between Hindus and Muslims, the Congress and the League, had festered too long. Congress leaders insisted more strongly than ever on a national government and a unified India. Jinnah stipulated as the *sine qua non* that the League be given the right to name the Muslim members of the Executive Council.[29] The Conference fell apart, confirming divisions which were to haunt the future of the Indian subcontinent. When Wavell accepted the impossibility of a solution, he announced the breakup of the Simla Conference on 14 July 1945, admitting that the parties had been unable to come to an agreement of the basis of a new interim government. Although the Conference had failed, Indian leaders were hopeful about the British Labour Party's victory in the 1945 national elections because its leaders had indicated in their campaign that if they were to form a government it would make efforts to resolve the Indian political deadlock. After the failure of the Simla Conference, the success of any future attempt to achieve a compromise between the Hindus and the Muslims would depend upon the British Government's influencing the Congress Party to modify its extreme claim for one India and the accept the reality of Pakistan.

Just before the announcement of the breakdown of the Simla Conference, which had received considerable coverage in the news magazines, there was a revival of the charge of British divisive policies. H. N. Brailsford wrote in the *New Republic* that the Congress struggle to form a society based on a national idea had failed, "partly by reason of its own mistakes, but chiefly because the British governing class had its traditions of dividing to rule." *Time* likewise emphasized that Britain kept control by playing one group against another. It praised Wavell, however, and his insistence that the Indian problem could wait no longer, despite Churchill's request not to be bothered, and described his effort as a "step of high statesmanship."[31]

The ensuing Simla Conference had collapsed as prophesied. When the announcement of failure came there was considerable recrimination; and although Wavell accepted the blame, he did so in an effort to ease the tension between the Hindus and the Muslims. On 15 July 1945, Sir Stafford Cripps made it clear in his statement, after the breakdown of the Simla Conference, that "there will be no agreement

possible till the Pakistan issue is solved."[32] On this oceasion, Jinnah issued a statement in which he said:

> When his Majesty's Government and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, boldly and frankly come out and expedite a permanent settlement on the basis of Pakistan, which is the major issue and the only solution of India's constitutional problem, the deadlock will resolve itself. I therefore earnestly commend to His Majesty's Government to declare their resolute resignation to the establishment of Pakistan in India. Muslim India will never accept any method of framing the constitution of India by means of one constitution-making body for all India, in which the Mussalmans will be in a hopeless minority, and the conclusions foregone in such an assembly ... any attempt to set up a Provisional Government at the Centre, which would in any way prejudice or militate against the Pakistan demand, will not be acceptable to us ... whereas a United India means slavery for Mussalmans and complete domination of the imperialistic Caste Hindu raj throughout this subcontinent, and this is what the Hindu Congress seeks to attain by constant threats to all and sundry, and this is what we are determined to resist with all that lies in our power.[33]

The blame for wrecking the conference was laid on Jinnah. In India as well as Britain it was Jinnah and the Muslims who were generally blamed for the failure of the Simla Conference. Jinnah came under heavy fire for what his critics chose to call his stubborness and unwillingness to compromise. *The Times,* normally balanced in its views, said that the natural disposition, in spite of Wavell's confession of personal failure, would be to place the blame on Jinnah and the Muslim League.[34] *The Daily Telegraph* ascribed the failure to the ancient hostility between the Muslims and the Hindus.[35] For the *News Chronicle* the responsibility for the failure was "Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jinnah's alone:" but it added, "the Muslim League is no more completely representative of Muslim India than the Congress is completely representative of Hindu India.[36] The *Observer* contented itself with the remark that "the more obvious blame" falls on Jinnah.[37] However, to

Jinnah the Wavell plan meant the establishment of Hindu domination which would kill all hope of Pakistan.[38] The Viceroy, indeed, got considerable praise for this British offer.[39] *Newsweek* and the *New Republic* found it "ironic that the Moslem League should now cause the breakdown in negotiations." It pinned hope for the future upon the results of the coming British elections, to which interest now turned, since: "A British Parliament dominated by Labour and Liberals would be much more inclined to fair and generous treatment of India than a conservative government headed by Churchill."[40]

On the other hand, the crown representatives in India were still determined to oppose the emergence of Pakistan. They were gravely disturbed by the idea of a separate state of Pakistan, looking upon it as an illogical development and a very serious danger for Indian unity.[41]

Soon after the breakdown of the Simla Conference, two important events changed the British position. On July 25th, the Tory Government was defeated in the general elections by the Labour Party, causing the succession of Churchill as Prime Minister by Clement Attlee and of Leopold Amery as Secretary of State for India by Lord Pethick Lawrence. Labour had traditionally befriended the Congress Party and championed the cause of Indian independence, in opposition to the Conservative Party's traditional imperialistic stand. The second event was that on August 14 the Allies accepted the surrender of Japan, bringing to a dramatic conclusion the great Global War. The new Labour Government was thus able to turn its attention and efforts to a permanent settlement for India. On 21 August 1945, Prime Minister Attlee announced that elections for the Provisional Government were to be held in the coming winter months, the first general elections to take place in India since 1937.

The *Christian Science Monitor* doubted this would make much difference to the Indian solution. Should Labour succeed it would but cap a long series of attempts; and, should Labour not win a solution would still to be vigorously sought. Cripps, it was recalled, had failed. An advantage, however, was seen in the advent of a Labour Government, in that there now might be a cessation of semi-informed pressure from non-Indian groups in the United States.[42] The *Catholic World* was more optimistic for both India and Ireland. Of Attlee, F.

McCullagh wrote: "On the question of India and Ireland he will probably do more good in a day than Churchill had done in all his life."[43]

The American press had been anticipating that a Labour victory in England would result in a more liberal approach toward colonial problems. With the defeat of the Conservative Party, it was agreed that the new situation would strongly influence British relations with India. American policy toward the Phillipines, the journalists thought, had contributed to the nationalistic "fire now sweeping Asia."[44] The U. S. Government was now generally pleased on behalf of the Indians and other colonies who now seemed likely to receive their freedom.

Nevertheless, pressure on the new government in London continued, both from its own supporters and from the American public.[45] Despite the failure of Simla Conference, Attlee's Cabinet summoned Wavell again to England, announcing that it "sought after Wavell's return to India from London, elections were ordered to test the claims of the various political parties in India." But many months passed before definitive action was taken again. "The United States assumed a wait-and-see attitude toward this development."[47]

The Congress Party and Muslim League leaders showed their willingness to accept the partial assumption of governmental responsibility in a reconstituted Viceroy's Executive Council, but they were not willing to compromise their respective party's objectives. The Congress Party was interested in maintaining its claim as the only all-India representative, and the Muslim League by its demands was looking forward to the creation of a separate Pakistani state.

The Congress Party was prepared for the coming election focusing on Indian independence. The issue of the day, however, for the Muslim League was the independence of Pakistan, which was, of course, its campaign focus. The Congress campaign failed to meet the issue of Muslim demands directly and therefore had an irrelevant ring. Yet it is difficult to suggest how they could have successfully met this issue. Jinnah's accusation was not only that the Congress Party was prejudiced but that it would treat Muslims unfairly in the future when the British departed, which was a claim impossible to refute.[48] The only effective answer to the charge of prejudice was if its policies and plans

could demonstrate an effective basis for communal cooperation. In short the election was fought on the crystal-clear issue of Pakistan versus Akhand (United) Hindustan.

When the election results were reported in December 1945, the Muslim League had won 86.6 percent of the total vote in Muslim constituencies carrying 446 out of 495 Muslim seats. Compared with the previous election in 1937, where it had won only 108 out of 485 Muslim seats, the increase in the power of the Muslim League was impressive. These elections completely vindicated Jinnah's claim that the Muslims were solidly behind the League, which captured all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly and mot of the seats in the Provincial Assemblies.[49] The main loss of the League was in the North-western Frontier Province where Abdul Ghaffar Khan had considerable (Congress) influence.[50] Both parties claimed victory, but the Congress, despite its over-all strong showing, lost much of its claim that it represented all Indian communities.[51]

The Muslim League formed ministries in Bengal and Sind. With a similar victory, the Congress had won 91.3 percent in the non-Muslims constituencies and formed ministries in 8 of the 11 provinces.[52] On this occasion Jinnah commented: "that the elections proved that Congress was a purely Hindu body, and that in spite of all that money they had spent they had not succeeded in putting up any Muslim candidate or Scheduled Castes." He emphasized "that the Muslims were prepared to face the consequences of anything H. M. G. did, but they were not prepared to compromise" on the principle of Pakistan. He finished by saying "that the only thing to do was to settle the fundamental issue–the creation of Pakistan, before making any further attempt."[53] The effect of the Simla Conference was to increase the prestige of the League. Jinnah had been successful in taking a firm stand.

In New Delhi, the American official Merrill received reports of the Simla sessions through his associate on the Viceroy's staff. Merrill concluded that "the Simla Conference had been an important victory for the Muslim League, which won, at least implicity, acceptance of the principle that no political settlement could be reached without its

consent." This, Merrill believed, "hindered the prospects for a resolution of the communal problem."[54]

India now demanded more attention than before. The stage was now set for a settlement. The British Government was pledged to grant independence. Both the Congress and League had proved their strengths as the successors to British authority.

Prelude to Labour's Plans

The newly elected British Government, within two weeks of the failure of the Wavell's Simla Plan, had theories of its own, loudly proclaimed while in opposition, for a solution of the Indian problem. Now was its opportunity, and there could be no excuse for failure this time on the plea of being a minority government as in 1924 and 1929.[55] There was criticism that it did not act quickly on India. There were those in America who had expected a declaration of immediate independence, as did some within the Labour Party itself and the Indian Congress Party. But the Indian problem was hardly liable to an easy solution which ignored both Indian complexities and British limitations. To some the government's pace seemed hesitatingly slow. It must not be forgotten that to many in Britain and in India, it seemed imprudently fast. Even American criticism of the speed of Britain's departure was not wanting. Considering the many years the problem had been growing in complexity, and Britain's pressing post-war burdens, it is indeed remarkable that a solution of the Indian problem, at least to the extent of British withdrawal from India, was accomplished within two years and eighteen days of Labour's taking office. It should be acknowledged that much was related to the speed of events in India, forcing both parties, the Congress and the League, to stay abreast of the tide.

The King's speech at the opening of Parliament reiterated the pledge of self-government for India.[56] A few days later Lord Pethick Lawrence revealed that Wavell was to come to London for another conference, and the Viceroy's arrival was announced in the American press on August 27. Developing events were very thoroughly reported in the *New York Times,* though occasionally somewhat obscurely. The same was true of the American press at large where there was very little reference to India until the year was well under way.

Before leaving India Wavell announced that elections would be held providing an opportunity to test the strength of the Pakistani idea. While in London he held long daily sessions with the Secretary of State for India.[57] Four days after his return to New Delhi on September 15 he stated over the radio that he was authorized to confer with the provincial assemblies to find out whether the Cripps proposals of 1942 were now acceptable, or whether an alternative scheme was preferred, and to create an executive council immediately following the elections. Anticipating objections to the limited franchise under which the elections were to be held, he warned that alternation of the system would mean a two-year delay. Attlee also broadcast a talk amplifying Wavell's statement and reaffirming the pledge of self-government.[58]

In general American opinion was favourable, though somewhat disappointed that the London conference had produced nothing more dramatic. *The Nation* hoped that India would negotiate the treaty to which Attlee said Britain was giving immediate attention and that he would not blame the Labour government for previous failure. It wrote:

> Only a Britain determined to overhaul its own pattern of national economy can afford to give India freedom: We do not doubt that is the intention of the Labour Government [59]

The *new Republic* called the proposals "half a loaf," given that Labour might have a breathing spell to see what to do next.[60] *Newsweek* commenting on the omission of any mention of independence from the broadcasts, thought nothing short of independence would satisfy India and, referring to the realities Labour now faced, stated:

> A solution to the problem of India sometimes looked easy to Labor Party backbenchers in the days when they could assail the Conservatives for the way it was handled. Last week Labor, itself now facing realities as His Majesty's Government, began to grapple with the problem.[61]

The best it could do was to dust off the more than three-year old Cripps' proposals, and *Christian Century* commented that it was

"impossible to distinguish between Labour and Tory policies toward India."[62]

On the official side Representative Sol Bloom said that he was "extremely happy" at Attlee's promise, and thought it would "make most people in the United States feel that India at last is about to achieve that which she has been striving for." Emanuel Celler felt the action "was in line with the United Nations Charter promise to give self-government as quickly as possible to dependent peoples." The State Department applauded but warned that the test would come over unified acceptance of India.[63]

Any complacency over progress in India was soon disturbed by the prediction of *Time's* London Bureau that there would be an historic "blow up" in India after the elections. Extremists said it would be anti-British while the government said it would be intramural. *Times* hesitated to predict a revolution, but felt that all evidence pointed to the "same alarming conclusion." The causes were resentment at the use of Indian troops in Java and the fact that the Labour government was now seen, not as a new hope for India, but as much like previous governments.[64]

The identification of the United States with imperialism was manifested in the frustration-inspired aggression of Calcutta mobs in late November 1946. Calcutta University students led demonstrations protesting the British decision to bring to trial the officers of Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army. This peaceful protest quickly gave way to several days of rioting in which American, as well as British, soldiers and installations were attacked. An American ambulance driver was killed when his vehicle was isolated by mobs and set on fire. More than thirty American soldiers were injured, while an American army hospital was besieged for more than twenty-four hours. Mobs burned and destroyed nine army vehicles and damaged another fifty vehicles before order was finally restored.[65]

This was seen as "a portent of things to come in Asia."[66] United States officials believed that fate of the colonial system was at stake, as American liberals had long warned, and some comfort was taken in the fact that: "Only the Phillipines, whose independence has been assured

by the United States, seems to be free from turmoil."[67] There were reverberations in the United States, for some Americans felt that enough was not being done by the United States itself to give India her rights.[68]

Attlee now announced that he would send an All-Parties Parliamentary Group to India to talk the situation over with the Indian leaders. American attention to India now showed a marked upward trend. There seemed a desire to re-study the situation in an effort to decide between Britain and India, plus a lack of certainty as to the solution. No longer did it seem merely a question of Britain's refusing to apply a simple formula.

America had a personal interest in the accounts of riots in India, because many of her soldiers were still stationed there and might become involved. Twenty-four such soldiers wished to be transferred from India with all possible speed.[69] Representative Dewy Short of Missouri presented to the House a letter from another, a constituent of his in India, who argued that the value of the goods they were supposed to be protecting did not equal the cost of keeping the soldiers there. Eight had already been injured and one killed while on an errand of mercy.[70] Representative Bender of Ohio reminder the House that eighteen American soldiers were among the injured and urged the recall of troops from India.[71]

News from India continued to be of riots, and *The Philadelphia Inquirer* published a cartoon by Hutton in which snake charmer John Bull, playing on his "Self-Rule proposal," had raised a great two-headed snake from its basket. The angry heads were labelled Muslim and Hindu.[72] *The Nation* wrote: "Out of its golden Indian flask British imperialism has raised genii which it can neither subdue nor appease."[73] *The New York Times* commented: "Indian mobs are not merely fighting each other—they hate foreigners."[74]

On February 19 came news of the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny in Bombay and the burning of a United States flag there by a mob. The following day Attlee announced that a Cabinet Mission was to be sent to India. Clearly the pace had been forced, an All-Parties Parliamentary group no longer sufficed, and the breathing spell was not to be allowed

to continue. W. P. Simms of Scripps-Haward, wrote that the long delayed show-down in India was at hand. The Japanese had left the slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics," which would not die out, and so far as this meant that self-government was inevitable, it was desirable, but Simms raised the question as to whether it might not be setting the stage "for the subtler, more ruthless form of imperialism ... spreading from Moscow."[75] *The New York Times* stated that the age of imperialism was passing, that the new ideas which imperialsim had brought to stagnant populations were now working and commented:

> The Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights are doing their effective work and the most that an American can hope is that they will win over Karl Marx.[76]

Cabinet Mission

In January 1946, a British Parliamentary Delegation, representative of all political parties in Britain, visited India to study political situation. The delegation's report about the Indian situation appears to have had some influence on British public opinion. At this time, Jinnah wrote to one of the Parliamentary delegation members, Lord Pethick Lawrence, reminding the British authorities that:

> .. the British Government should make an immediate declaration of their policy accepting Muslim India's demand of Pakistan which is the only solution of India's constitutional problem. After the principle has been accepted, I am hopeful that the details would not be difficult of adjustment.[77]

The Labour Government was sufficiently impressed with these reports and seemed genuinely interested in the establishment of self-government in India.[78] At this point, Viceroy Lord Wavell wired the British authorities inquiring: "Does His majesty's Government [force] a federation on the Muslims and reject entire Pakistan claims?"[79]

On 19 February 1946, the British Government announced its decision to send to India a special mission (Cabinet Mission) consisting of three Cabinet Ministers to seek, in association with Viceroy Lord Wavell and in consultation with Indian leaders, an agreement on

constitutional issues. On 21 February, two days after Attlee's announcement, Sir Paul Pathrick, Under Secretary of the Indian Office, discussed with Winant the anticipated difficulty of resolving the Pakistani issue in the forthcoming negotiations, but added that the Labour Government remained determined to fulfill its pledges to India. A week later another British official suggested to a member of the American Embassay staff in New Delhi that Jinnah would be willing to accept a compromise on the Pakistani demand.[80]

During the debate in the House of Commons, on 15 March 1946, Prime Minister Attlee announced that he was sending to India a Cabinet Mission with a new proposal to work out arrangements for independence. Attlee stated that during the past 25 years, India had played a substantial role in the defeat of tyranny and should, therefore, have the right to decide her destiny. The Prime Minister, used these words:

> My colleagues are going to India with the intention of using their utmost endeavours to help her to attain her freedom as speedily and fully as possible. What form of government is to replace the present regime is for India to decide; but our desire is to help her to set up forthwith a machinery for making that decision.[81]

The Prime Minister went on:

> I am well aware that ... I speak of a country containing congeries of races, religions and languages, and I know well the difficulties thereby created but these difficulties can only be overcome by Indians. We are mindful of the rights of the minorities ... On the other hand we cannot allow a minority to place a veto on the advance of a majority.[82]

Attlee's address pleased the Congress and caused some misgivings in League circles. Jinnah gave the simile of the spider inviting a fly to its parlour: "If the fly refuses, it is said a veto is being exercised and the fly is intransigent."[83]

The news about the Cabinet Mission was greeted with enthusiasm in the United States, where it was hoped that this effort might form the basis of a solution to the Indian deadlock.[84] It was predicted that the Prime Minister's statement would help the passage through Congress of authorization for a pending British loan. At last, editorialized the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the British Government was beginning to function as a Labour Government should. Attlee's action was found to be "in agreement with the theory held in America that men capable of governing themselves should have that privilege," declared the New York *Herald-Tribune*.[85] His step, an American editorialist said, marked the "epitaph for the old colonial imperialism." "Americans were beginning to be aware of "the internal split between Hindu and Moslem groups," but most commentators confined their remarks on this point to observing that Britain's commission to put India on the road to self-government was faced with "terrific problem."[86]

The Cabinet Mission consisted of Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India; Sir Stafford Cripps, the President of the Board of Trade, now returning to India almost exactly four years after his previous mission and A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty. *The Nation* was not impressed with the Mission's members. Lord Pethick Lawrence was described as a septagenarian, "whose mental arteries have long since hardened", Alexander as a leader of the cooperative movement, "gone nautical", and Cripps as under a cloud. It warned that the longer the birth of the new nation was postponed the more the turmoil would be with which it would be ushered in.[87] Some American interest was now devoted to the Cabinet Mission, though for the most part references to India continued to deal with the Naval Mutiny, riots and hunger.

The members of the Cabinet Mission arrived in New Delhi on 24 March 1946 and almost immediately started negotiations with the leading Indian leaders. The Congress and the League were invited to send four negotiators to Simla to discuss the new proposal. The fundamental principles of the Cabinet Mission Plan were as follows:

(I) A Union Government to deal with foreign affairs, defence and communications;

(II) Two groups of provinces, one of the predominantly Hindu provinces and the other of the predominantly Muslim provinces, to deal with such of the remaining subjects as desired to be dealt with in common;

(III) The provincial governments to deal with all other subjects and to have all the residuary sovereign rights;

(IV) The Indian states to take their appropriate place in this structure on terms to be negotiated with them.[88]

At the Conference, Jinnah countered with his own proposals which were:

(1) The six Muslim provinces (the Punjab, the N. W. F. P., Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam) to be grouped together as one group. It would deal with all matters except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications necessary for Defence, which may be dealt with by the constitution-making bodies of the Pakistan Group and the Hindu provinces.

(2) A separate constitution-making body to be set up for the six Muslim provinces.

(3) There would be parity of representation between the two groups of provinces in the Union Executive and the Legislature, if any.

(4) It would be open to any province of the Group to decide to opt out of its Groups, provided the wishes of the people of that province are ascertained by a referendum.

(5) The two constitution-making bodies would decide whether to have a Legislature or not; they would also decide the method of providing the Union with finance, but in no event should it be by means of taxation.

(6) No major point affecting the communal issue to be decided except by the majority of the members of the two.

(7) No decision, legislative or executive or administrative, should be taken by the Union in regard to any matter of controversial nature except by majority of three-fourths.

(8) The Group and provincial constitutions would provide for safeguards concerning religion, culture and other matters affecting different communities.

(9) A province would have liberty to secede from the Union at any time after an initial period of ten years.[89]

After Jinnah's proposals, the Cabinet Mission was of the opinion that if the negotiations should break down and they were then faced with serious disorders, the situation could be met only by the adoption of one of the five following courses:

(a) Complete withdrawal as soon as possible.

(b) Withdrawal by a certain date.

(c) Appeal to U. N. O.

(d) Maintaining overall control throughout India.

(e) Giving independence to Southern and Central India, and maintaining the existing position in North-west and North-east India.[90]

The important aspect of Jinnah's proposals was contained in clause number (4). In this Jinnah conceded the major question which had prevented agreement with Gandhi in the 1944 talks; that minority groups within Pakistan had the right of self-determination. In fact, the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy resisted this clause sufficiently to deny to Jinnah his ambition for Pakistan.[91] On the other hand, Jinnah was not willing to bow down to the British trick of a single constituent assembly because this would mean abandoning the "principle of Pakistan."[92] The League had now chosen to accept its "truncated moth-eaten" Pakistan rather than submit to a constitution written by the Congress majority.[93] Indeed, Jinnah's proposals were almost precisely those suggested in Rajagopalachari's formula, a fact which seemed to have totally eluded the Cabinet Mission. The British gentlemen focused their attention on some means for bringing their three-tier government into being. The statement issued by the Mission members makes it clear that the delegation had given the most careful and impartial consideration to the Muslim League's claim for a separate soverign state of Pakistan.[95] On 26 March 1946, Sir Edward, a member of Viceroy's Executive Council, expressed his concern to the Cabinet Mission by saying that:

> They considered that a compromise was essential, and a concession to Congress alone would be tantamount to suppressing the Muslims and would prejudice any long-term settlement. On the other hand, the Muslims must not be allowed to dictate. It was first necessary to find a compromise between the extreme demand of Congress for government by majority and the extreme demand of Pakistan as defined by the League. In the interim neither was possible unless League fears were allayed.[96]

Sir Edward went on to say:

> All the members of the Council preferred to see division in India but desired a united India with adequate safeguard in the

clauses of the new constitution. They recognised however that the demand for Pakistan had obtained so much hold on the Muslim mind that it must be examined genuinely to allay their fears.[97]

The Cabinet Mission was now in a position to deliver the goods, and they would therefore be justified in asking Jinnah to present the much more detailed picture of the Pakistan than he had in mind.[98] It was now time for him to convince them. On 16 April 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence opened the interview with Jinnah and explained the purpose and position of the Commission. Jinnah reacted sharply to these arguments and regretted that the Mission had rejected Pakistan which was the only solution of the constitutional problem. "He claimed that 6 provinces should constitute the Pak-zone. If agreement could only be reached by putting out Calcutta and any districts where they lacked a bare majority, he was reduced to a counting of heads which he could not accept." He considered that "the Congress position was a simple one. If the worst came to the worst, if they came to his proposals, they would lose Calcutta and some parts where they had a majority in the districts of the six provinces. They would retain 3/4 of British India."[99] "Mr. Jinnah considered that [Indian] unity was a myth and said that supposing paramountcy [if] went [to] the states [then these] would be bound to come into Hindustan. I say I claim these six provinces and if you want to cut off, I can then consider it. I cannot accept the principle of union."[100]

Then the Viceroy asked Jinnah, "what were the boundaries of Pakistan as he concieved it." Jinnah said "that he wanted a viable Pakistan which would not be carved up or mutilated." He drew the line on the five provinces, but said he was quite willing to consider mutual adjustments. Jinnah added "but Pakistan must be a live state economically."[101]

After Jinnah's interview, the Cabinet Mission had further meetings with Gandhi on 31 April 1946. Then Gandhi turned to deal with Pakistan and Hindustan, implying to A. V. Alexander, that "he had always been a sincere friend of the Muslims, quoting examples." But "he was bound to say that he had never been able to appreciate Pakistan because Mr. Jinnah never given a complete definition of it. As to the

idea of setting up two entirely different states or nations, it was a sin he could not commit."[102] He referred in the course of his statement to the formula to which he had agreed when he was in prison in 1944, produced by Rajagopalachari, and the subsequent use of this formula, with amendments, in his meetings and correspondence with Jinnah at a later stage.[103] Gandhi further emphasized that the population of the Muslim India was really one of converts, all descendants of Hindus. "They are in fact one race and one nation." He claimed that the real difficulty now facing them was the legacy of British rule. "I think you must have sufficient courage in undoing the wrong that has been done to India, to see that you cannot have anything to do with the idea of two nations in India. If the Muslim League refuses to join the Constituent Assembly, a stage will come when you must say that there must be one Assembly."[104] After Gandhi's interview, Cripps commented upon Gandhi's extreme views:

> For my part the position is quite plain that Mr. Gandhi has had one purpose and one purpose only throughout and that is to impose the Hindu majority Raj on the great Muslim minority and to obtain power in the interim Government to that end and to use the talks that are going on to lead along a path which appears to be reasonable but which can always be brought to a breaking point for the Muslims, leaving no alternative but for the Congress to take over. I at any rate am not prepared to let down the Muslims like that.[105]

Again the effort was in vain because the League and the Congress could not agree on the composition of a proposed Constituent Assembly.[106] Meanwhile, Representative Celler wrote to Nehru at this time, and had his letter printed in the *Congressional Record*. He accused Britain of taking advantage of the Pakistan idea, commenting:

> ... The sentiment is growing in the United States that there should be a final settlement that will put an end to British rule. To us it seems unthinkable to have two free Indias--Hindustan and Pakistan. In the United States we fought a bitter Civil War to prevent the setting up of two independent sovereignties.[107]

He assured Nehru that thousands upon thousands of Americans were on his side, instinctively opposed to colonialism, and that they would continue to maintain that Britain must surrender the governmental power to the Indian people.[108] Five days later Celler and eighteen prominent liberals sent a cable to Attlee calling on him to set up an independent "caretaker" government in India.[109] Representative Calvin D. Johnson (Ill) criticized the British policy of dilatory tactics in the Southeast Asian theater of the war as an effort to strengthen their hold in colonial areas. He pointed out that the independence of India was necessary at least for the sake of the one hundred thousand American troops in India who might otherwise be looked upon as the supporters of British imperialism in India.[110] Karl E. Mundt expressed great concern over the fact that both England and the Soviet Union were showing tendencies of imperial policy under the guise of spheres of influence. If that were to be the basis of post-war settlement, the Congress regretted, there was no hope for India's freedom.[111] Representative Joseph E. Talbet (conn.) pointed out that if the independence of India might cause economic hardships to England because of the loss of a market, that the United States should therefore help England in her economic hardship and thus encourage England to offer independence to India.[112]

The United States had in fact become a forum for the cause of India's independence. Though in the later stage of these developments the American scene played little direct role, but public opinion in the United States had become more and more vocal for the independence of India with the turning of the fortunes of the war in favour of the Allies.

Attlee's statement in the House of Commons that India had been offered full independence, with the right of secession from the British Commonwealth, and that the Mission's aim was to achieve the unity of India and the organization of machinery that would make decisions regarding a future course possible, was well received in America. The *New York Times* felt most Americans would wonder that barriers now remained to Indian freedom, and would not be able to understand Mr. Jinnah's position; but the *Times* pointed out that the Mission would have to decide if there were to be two Indias, and

whether or not Mr. Jinnah was bluffing.[113] These statements gave rise to much speculation in the press, including a report on April 12 in the British-owned *Statesman* that the United States favoured submitting the Pakistani issue to international arbitration. Merrill discussed the possibility of U. S. intervention and its possible support of arbitration with Asaf Ali, a close associate of Nehru and a prominent Muslim member of the Congress Party; Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's chief lieutenant; and Major Woodrow Wyatt, private secretary of the Cabinet Mission. Not surprisingly, Merrill found no support for American intervention. Yet, in his report to Washington on April 15, he added another consideration to the formation of a U. S. position: what would the ramifications be on American interests in the Middle East should the United States be associated with a settlement that proved unfavourable to the Muslims?[114]

Americans were only dimly aware of these political developments and communal divisions. In a sample of public opinion conducted in the spring of 1946, 48 percent of the public reported that it was following discussions between the British and Indian parties. When those following developments were asked what Britain should do about India, two-thirds responded that India should be given its independence. While independence and a variety of intermediary solutions were suggested, significantly none of the alternatives considered the Pakistan issue. The ignorance of the public regarding communal politics was underscored in another poll, conducted a few months earlier, in some fifty Iowa communities. In that sample 83 percent could not name an Indian leader other than Gandhi; 70 percent had never heard of Jinnah, and, of the 30 percent who had heard of Jinnah, two-thirds could not name the group or party he headed. When asked if they had heard of Pakistan, 85 percent replied negatively. Of the 15 percent to whom Pakistan sounded familiar, 9 out of 10 could not identify it. The press was partly responsible for this lack of knowledge. The sparse reports on India after the war generally paid little attention to the enhanced stature of the Muslim League. In April 1946, *Time* did a cover story on Jinnah in which he was presented as an aloof, arrogant, wealthy troublemaker. In the *New York Times*, several editorials on India in early 1946 strongly supported British objectives but gave minimal consideration to the difficulties caused by the increase

in communal tensions.[115] But later, in 1946, the idea of Pakistan became more familiar to American thought.[116]

The *San Francisco News* called Attlee's offer "an act of great statesmanship."[117] The *New Republic* called it "rare statesmanship."[118] *Time* wrote: "Britain had offered India self-government before, but never with so few strings."[119] The *Christian Century* stated: "This concession may lead to the most important change in the British empire since the American colonies won their freedom."[120] W. P. Simms commented that the offer was "the msot pregnant event in British history" since the surrender of Corwallis on 19 October 1781."[121]

The Cabinet Mission lost no time in coming to grips with India's problems, and the ,*New York Times* commented:

> While four Foreign Ministers in Paris wrestle with the problems of nearly 400,000 Europeans the British, the Hindus and the Moslems are wrestling with those of nearly 400,000,000 Indians.[122]

By mid-May 1946 it was evident that a second Simla Conference had broken down. The Mission then retired for a brief stay in Kashmir, during which it was hoped India's leaders would evolve a plan of their own. When they failed the Mission produced its own scheme on 16 May.[123] The Mission plan ruled out Pakistan as a practical possibility and instead suggested a loose Indian Union arranged in three tiers. The scheme provided for provinces, sections and the federal centre as a possible way out.[124] It was said that the decisive consideration that led the Mission to reject the Muslim claim was military, and that Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck had given his opinion that, from point of view of strategy, Pakistan was an impossible conception.[125]

Again, the American reception to this three tiers scheme was good. It was called a blue print for a United States of India, which, it was quickly noted, favoured the Hindu side of the argument. *The New York Times* held that a United India was an American interest, since it would contribute to world equilibrium, a major aim of the United States. It warned:

> The world will have reason to be disappointed if the Indian leaders unable to put forth a formula on which they can agree, reject a plan designed to make India free while safeguarding the rights and interests of the separatists in every practicable way save by creating two Indias, each part containing within itself the same cleavage that divided the whole.[126]

The *Christian Science Monitor* felt it "a sure-fire proposal," until one looked at India.[127] Some thought the Indian problem had been solved.[128]

Churchill now commented that the Cabinet Mission had worked with "a zeal which would have been justified if it were to gain an empire and not to cast it away." The *Nation* retorted: "If it makes the end of empire it also marks the beginning of something vastly better from the standpoint of the world's goal."[129] On May 17 acting Secretary of State Acheson praised the Cabinet Mission announcement as a constructive and statesmanlike step.[130]Negotiations broke down over the form of an interim government. On 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Mission announced its decision. Their statement rejected the proposal for "a separate and fully independent sovereign state of Pakistan," on the basis that it would not solve the minority problem. They pointed out that the six provinces demanded by the League failed to include over 80 million Muslims, who would remain in India, and that the non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan amounted to 38 percent of the population in the Western part and 48 percent in the eastern.[131] On the eve of the emergence of Pakistan, it was a sad irony for the Congress leaders that the approach to the minority problem which they had maintained for forty years was now acknowledged by the British as correct. Of course, the statement concerning the Cabinet Mission was irrèlevant. The Cabinet proposals which Cripps carried to India in 1942 had clearly granted the right of self-determination to the Muslims as the means of solving the minority issue in India. The only minority question which remained to be decided was the right of self-determination of the non-Muslims within Pakistan. Jinnah had just conceded this principle. He insisted that the Mission plan was no more than a half-way house to Pakistan; and vigorously warned the British Government and the Congress that,"the quickest way

to the independence of India was to agree to Pakistan."[132] Jinnah went on to say that, "Either you agree or we shall have it in spite of you."[133]

One might argue that the Cabinet Mission's proposal was a compromise between the League's demand for a separate state of Pakistan and the Congress' demand for one Indian Union. It envisaged formation of three regional units under a confederation for a period of ten years, after which time the units might secede from the confederation. This proposal bore a close resemblance to Roosevelt's fond idea of a loose federation for India on the basis of an analogy between the political situation in the thirteen American colonies after their War of Independence (1783-1789) and the existing situation in India.[134] Roosevelt's hope had been that after a period of trial and error the different regions of the subcontinent would form a more perfect union.[135]

The Cabinet Mission then unfolded their most important scheme for writing a constitution on the basis of their three-tier plan. It proposed that the constituent assembly would be divided into three sections: Section (A) consisting of the representatives of the five Hindu-majority provinces; Section (B) of the representatives of the Punjab, North-west Frontier Province and Sind; Section (C) of the representatives of bengal and Assam. Each section would then draw up a constitution for the provinces in its group and would also decide what subjects would be coordinated with another section. A province had to remain in its designated section until after the new constitution came into operation. Finally, the constituent assembly would meet as a whole to settle the union constitution.

The dispute was related to the provinces in Section "B" and "C," which covered the areas in the North-west and the North-east which the Muslims wished to erect into the independent state of Pakistan. The "grouping" of the provinces in these areas offered the Muslims an alternative to Pakistan preserving a unitary India through an association of "B and C" provinces for the citizens of a common background.[136] The Muslims feared that the Congress Party's interpretation of the method by which voting rights were to be exercised would disrupt these provincial "groups," which were to have their own executive and

legislatures and that the alternative offered would never become effective.[137]

The decision of the Cabinet Mission to divide the constituent assembly into three groups, when power was clearly divided between the Congress and the League, is baffling. The Mission claimed that this was the way to reconcile conflicting aims and yet retain a united India under one government. In their determination to deny the principles of Pakistan, they had created two Pakistans. But the Congress President Nehru refused to give any assurance for any such scheme for Pakistan.[138]

The Mission's proposal contained the possibility of achieving Jinnah's full dream of Pakistan. All he had to do was to get the two Muslim majority areas to write a constitution which shared only the three prescribed subjects with the centre and yet shared the optional subjects with each other. Then, when the constituent assembly united, he could pit the two Muslim sections against the Congress' Section A. If all went well, he could enforce a loose federation, if not a confederation.

The delegation members "were greatly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu-majority rule."[139] The delegation, in their statement, revealed the universal and unanimous fear of the Muslims for Hindu-majority rule, that:

> The feeling has become so strong and widespread amongst the Muslims that it cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards. If there is to be internal peace in India it must be secured by measures which will assure to the Muslims a control in all matters vital their culture, religion and economic or other interests.[140]

Moreover, the Mission proposal denied the rights of non-Muslim minorities to self-determination within these two Pakistans. The largest volume of vocal opposition against the groups system came from various minority groups within the provinces of Pakistan who felt that their interests had not been safeguarded.[141] Spearheading this

opposition were the six million Sikhs of the Punjab. The Sikhs protested against the Group system and at first held aloof from the elections to the constituent assembly. The Sikhs believed that the Muslims were out to crush them, and their thoughts had turned to the idea of partitioning the Punjab to escape the threat of Muslim domination. It was a painful decision, for any division of the Punjab would divide the Sikh community. Jinnah explained this situation by expressing that "he did not want to keep Hindus (Sikhs or whatever minorities groups) in Pakistan against their will and they could migrate but he could not reduce the area of Pakistan below the point on which the State could live."[142] Regarding the status of the Punjab and Sikh community, Jinnah reiterated at length pointing out that:

> If the whole of the Punjab were included in Pakistan the rights of the Sikhs as a community would be respected by the Pakistan Government and they would have a real voice in the affairs of the country. They would have as many representatives in the Pakistan Parliament as Sind or the North-west Frontier Province and that if a Sikh proved his ability as a public servant he would be given a position of responsibility. The same would be apply to a Hindu or to the members of the minority communities.[143]

On 6 June 1946, Nehru took the place of Azad as the Congress President. The choice, as usual, was Gandhi's. On July 10, speaking before the Congress, Nehru asserted the idea of self-determination for minorities in Muslim majority provinces. He stated that the grouping scheme would probably never come about and that a much stronger central government than envisioned by the Cabinet Mission Plan was essential to meet the problems of poverty and development within India. Although Jinnah had conceded this principle at Simla, the Cabinet Mission proposals had given him new hope for Pakistan, and he was not going to back off easily.

On 16 August 1946, Jinnah called for a "Direct Action Day" to achieve the goal of Pakistan. Referring to Direct Action, Jinnah said "It is a weapon of self-defence, not a declaration of war on anybody." He justified it claiming; "we made a tremendous sacrifice in accepting a limited Pakistan which is minus three subjects, viz., Defence,

Communications and Foreign Affairs." Commenting upon the long-term plan, Jinnah said, "we were not satisified with it. In fact it was far more favourable to the Congress point of view than our point of view."[144]

The general reaction among the Hindus was that the "Direct Action Day" of the Muslim League was merely bluff and bluster. Bengal was chosen for the biggest demonstration. On the appointed day, Hindu-Muslim violence broke out with all its furies.[145] The streets of Calcutta became the scene of an unprecedented mass slaughter. There were reprisals and counter-reprisals, arousing horror and revulsion in every sane person all over the world.[146] According to official estimates, about 5,000 persons were killed, another 15,000 were injured, and more than 100,000 were left homeless.[147] The Muslims were the main sufferes as they were caught unaware.

Newsweek commented: "It seemed almost as if Moslim and Hindu, divided on nearly all issues, had united to demonstrate that India could not be trusted to govern itself."[148] The *New York Times,* named it "the battle of Calcutta."[149] Actually the Hindu-Muslim riots of Calcutta were the prelude to the "great killing"[150] of Noakhali, Bihar, Amritsar and Lahore. "It shook the British Government which had to abandon its Churchillian reticence."[151]

Direct Action Day widened the breach, perhaps irreparably, between the Hindu and Muslim communities. Jinnah condemned the Congress by saying that "it has done the greatest harm to the people of India, in which the Caste Hindu are in an overwhelming majority, by its pettifogging, higgling attitude during the recent constitutional negotiations. The Congress is full of spite towards the Muslims."[152] Gandhi now spoke out as a universal adviser. He said that "the Congress is the trustee for the people of India." Jinnah answered that "we have enough experience of one trustee that has been here for 150 years. We do not want the Congress the become our trustee. We have now grown up. The only trustee of the Muslims is the Muslim nation."153 Amplyfying his remarks on the part played by the Cabinet Mission, Jinnah said:

> The British Government have undoubtedly gone back on their word. They have played into the hands of the Congress. They

have tried to propitiate the goddess of the Congress and postponed the formation of the Interim Government.[154]

However, the Muslim League condemned the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy as having betrayed the Muslim nation. It added, "that the British Government could tolerate 400 or 500 small Indian states but would not tolerate one Pakistan."[155]

The Muslim dream of Pakistan, including all of the six northern provinces, was lost, and the Cabinet Mission retreated to England, their plan destroyed.

In America the Cabinet Mission was by no means regarded as having failed. The *Nation* felt it had induced both parties to accept the long-term plan for a United States of India and that, while progress was slow, freedom was within sight if Indians themselves would but remove the obstacles.[156] *Newsweek* felt it had "achieved the impossible."[157] *Time*, however, recognized that the Mission left India "precariously set on the road to self-government far from the goal to which they had hoped to lead it."[158] On June 29th Mission departed from India leaving behind a legacy of discord and bitterness.

A few days later, on 4 July 1946, the United States granted independence to the Phillipines. The American Government anticipated that this action would offset doubts about its dedication to self-determination.

Interim Government

In September 1946, the Viceroy decided to form an interim government headed by Nehru and did not invite the Muslim League's leaders.[159] When Nehru assumed office on 2nd September, as the head of the interim government, Muslim League supporters flew black flags on their houses and shops.[160] The millions of black pennants, all over India, only emphasized the differences between Hindu and Muslim neighbours, and excited the enmity which was soon to lead to slaughter. The Muslim reiterated that the only solution to India's political problem was the division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan. The Muslim League expressed its "firm determination to set a free

Muslim State in the Muslim majority zones in the North-west and East parts of India."[161] The Muslim League accused the Congress of adopting her policy and programme me of action to crush the Muslims as being solely responsible for the atmosphere of tense bitterness. "Pakistan now and nothing less than Pakistan was the Muslim nation's answer to Lord Wavell."[162] But the *Nation* felt the Attlee government had "wisely and courageously decided not to let Muslim intransigence upset its timetable for Indian independence."[163] The *New York Times* comment was typical of much American opinion on this partition proposal: "Pakistan is not a workable plan but a dream of political inexperience."[164]

The Congress then entered the Government of India. All the members of the Viceroy's Executive Council were nominated by the Congress.[166] The decision to proceed without the Muslim League was undoubtedly a serious error both in its economic and political consequences. But the Congress had refused to join hands with the Muslims even for the interim period. The League regarded this as a direct breach of a the promise given by the Viceroy that he would proceed with the plan only if both parties accepted it. The League accused the Viceroy also of having promised them that the Interim Government would consist of 5 Muslim League and 2 other members, but of subsequently modifying this proposal to 6 Congress, 5 League, and 3 others.[166] It strongly challenged the Congress' good faith in accepting the long-term proposals, citing the statement of Nehru, the Congress President, on 10 July that "the big probability is that there will be no grouping."[167] The League then withdrew its acceptance of the proposals, called on all Muslims to renounce their titles, and decided on a campaign of "Direct Action to achieve Pakistan ... and to get rid of the present slavery under the British and a contemplated future domination under a Hindu centre."[168] The result was unprecedented communal rioting. In Calcutta 4,700 were killed, 16,000 injured, and 150,000 refugees fled the city. Riots occurred from East Bengal to Bihar, and by early 1947 Punjab, saw a total loss of life from August to February of 12,000 and more than 50,000 homeless refugees.[169]

In Britain Churchill led the attack on the Government policy for the decision of interim government. He connected the installation of

Congress rule with the ensuing "series of massacres" unparalleled "since the Indian mutiny of 1857." He warned that "any attempt to establish the reign of a Hindu majority will never be achieved without a civil war." Cripps had "used his undue influence to give advantage to the Hindus."[170] Later he called it a "cardinal mistake" to have entrusted the Government of India to "the caste Hindu, Mr. Nehru."[171] Lord Templewood, who as Sir Samuel Hoare had piloted the 1935 Act, had already warned the government against forming a government with the cooperation of one community alone.[172] Lord Scarborough had predicted that there would be strong pressure on the British Government from India to transfer power to one party only and he had hoped that such pressure would be resisted.[173] Lord Carraborne took the government to task for having broken its faith with the Muslims in June and having allowed the Congress to take office in August, and asked if anything could be more calculated to destroy Muslim confidence in the good faith of the British Government.[174] The *Economist* asked for the grounds on which this decision had been taken at the moment of maximum conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims.[175]

In these circumstances, the League soon felt that a government entirely in the hands of its opponents was detrimental to Muslim interests and, therefore, on 14 October 1946, five League nominees, led by Liaquat Ali Khan and including one Scheduled Caste Hindu, entered the Interim government against the wishes of the Congress.[176]

When the Muslim League took the decision to enter the interim government there was great satisfaction in the American press, but fear was expressed in some quarters that Jinnah had ordered this to wreck the interim government. In December 1946 India stood on the verge of civil war. Indian leaders were invited to London for talks with the British Government. The United States expressed hope that a settlement could be made and civil war be avoided. It also hoped that a solution might be found within the framework of one federal union.[177]

The ensuing cabinet crisis resulted in the flight to London, of Nehru, Baldev Singh (the Sikh member of the cabinet), Jinnah and Wavell, all in the same plane for a conference with Attlee, of which the *New York Times* wrote:

> Never in the history of our times has there been a more dramatic flight by air than that of the plane bearing Viceroy Lord Wavell and the leaders of the chief Indian factions from Karachi to London. That plane enclosed the whole future of India, for on the parleys on the way and the round-table conference to follow in the British capital depends the momentous issue of peace or war in the East.[178]

But there were no parleys on that flight. Each kept severely to himself, occupied with his own thoughts or his own book. Nor was there any agreement at London. So that with the return of all save Jinnah, crisis came back to India. As H. L. Mathews reported: "the schism was too deep to be settled in London or anywhere else."[179] Siebel in the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* grasped the situation well when he depicted the Attlee Government "On the Tusks of a Dilemma." A charging elephant tossed Attlee high, as he clung to its tusks shouting: "I want to let go."[180] But by the end of London talks, British policy seemed to embrace Pakistan as the only solution to the Indian problem. At this critical time Jinnah warned the British Government not to attempt to bypass Muslim demand for Pakistan. He reminded Wavell and Attlee, that the division of India could only lead the entire subcontinent into happiness.[181] Jinnah continued his arguments suggesting to the British that:

> One thing is clear, that no attempt will succeed except on the basis of Pakistan and that is the major issue to be decided by all those who are well-wishers of India and who are really in the earnest to achieve freedom and independence of India and the sooner it is fully realised, the better. The division of India is the only solution of this most complex constitutional problem of India and this is the road to happinees, prosperity, welfare and freedom of 400 millions inhabiting this subcontinent.[182]

Jinnah made it clear that the Muslims would not participate in any interim or long-term settlement unless:

(1) a declaration is made by H. M. G. that the Muslims have an inherent right of self-determination;

(2) in any, interim government that may be established, the Muslims are given parity with all other communities and are nominated by the Muslim League alone; and

(3) the right of Sind, Baluchistan, the N. W. F. P., Bengal and Assam to secede from the rest of India is determined (subject to such territorial adjustment as may be thought necessary) by a plebiscite of their Muslim residents only.[183]

There was certainly something in the Muslim view that they could not reduce their demand for Pakistan without depriving themselves of the only possible safeguard against Hindu domination.[184]

To break the Indian deadlock the United States shifted its position and became more sympathetic to the Muslim League. Acheson sent identical messages to Merrill and Waldemar J. Gallman, in London, suggesting that they should establish contact with the Indian leaders. Acheson stated that the Congress should accept the British and Muslim League interpretation pertaining to compulsory provincial groupings as the only means of securing the League's participation in the Constituent Assembly. If the groupings meant the end of the Congress governments in Assam and the North-west Frontier Province, that result, Acheson suggested, would be of little importance.

At a press conference on December 3 Acheson affirmed the American Government's hope that the League and the Congress would cooperate, under the general formula of the Cabinet Mission Plan, to achieve a settlement granting all elements of the population their sovereign political and economic rights.[185]

This change in the American Government's attitude apparently resulted from the conviction that the League's demonstrated following in India warranted giving it the assurances Jinnah was demanding. To officials in Washington, Direct Action Day had revealed the extent to which the League could stir the Muslim masses. Jinnah's repeated threats that the only alternative to Pakistan was civil war was registered in America as well as in India and Britain. Also, the Muslim League had

finally managed to gain some attention in America. In November, Jinnah dispatched Hasan Ispahani and Begum Shah Nawaz to New York as unofficial delegates to the United Nations. In speeches before various groups and at rallies organized by the India Welfare League, the Muslim League's representatives advanced the Pakistani demand.[186] The idea of a separate state of Pakistan had little American support at this time.

With the failure of the London Conference, however, doubt was expressed in some American quarters. The first evidence of a decline in American regard was a change of attitude towards Nehru. The *New York Times* commented:

> Pandit Nehru, for the Hindus, now seems to be interpreting its [the Cabinet Mission Plan's] provisions not as they read but strictly for the benefits of his own followers in the Congress Party.[187]

Sumner Welles at this time wrote that India had now passed "from propaganda to responsibility," to use an expression of Lord Citrine, and the prospects were not bright. But responsibility for the impasse certainly could not be laid upon Attlee. He had done everthing to expedite independence. Nor was it just to criticize Britain for her position that she would not force a constitution on "any unwilling parts of the country." He then commented:

> Such blame as may rightfully be ascribed to British policy must be shouldered by those former British Cabinets which stubbornly refused to see that the independence of India could no longer be postponed, and that grave injury to India as well as to the British Commonwealth could only be avoided, as President Roosevelt had warned, by reaching an agreement with the Indian leaders upon the basis for independence before the close of the Second World War.[188]

Welles warned that should the deadlock continue and anarchy ensue, responsibility would rest squarely on the Indian leaders; and if they failed, the cause of all colonial peoples, whose self-government could not be delayed, would suffer. He therefore had this advice:

> This salutary evolution will be even more rapidly promoted if the Indian leaders will set aside their selfish and partisan aims, and concentrate upon the welfare of India as a whole rather than upon communal advantage. The Indian leaders are afforded a single opportunity of making India an immediate power in the councils of the nations, and, by showing that India can govern herself, of helping other peoples to freedom and sovereign independence.[189]

The United States, however, was not yet prepared to accept partition. The State Department sought to help alleviate the disagreements between the league and the Congress over the Cabinet Mission Plan.

The assumption of responsibility by the interim government, the first all-Indian Government in history, marked a tremendous step forward on India's road to independence. America's growing realism extended to her opinions of India itself, which is the more significant as, the *Nation* pointed out:

> We ourselves do not accept the view that Jinnah is just a Whitehall puppet. No doubt Britain has exploited Hindu-Muslim differences in the past, but the communal problem is unfortunately, one that has real cultural and historical roots, and it will continue to plague India long after the British have withdrawn.[190]

In its opinion the solution could only come when sole responsibility had been placed upon the Hindu-Muslim shoulders together. But the historic origins of the communal split were unbridgeable, as A. B. McGinty pointed out in a series of studies in *Current History* on India's past. He wrote thus of the British impact:

> The Moslems before whom the British once stood, hat in hand, begging for trading privileges, were displaced. What harmony had existed between Moslem and Hindu was irreparably shattered. Nor could all the King's men from Hastings to Attlee put it together again.[191]

This was now having its disastrous effect upon the interim government. Robert Neville, *Time's* correspondent, wrote from Delhi that government was running down because of communalism, and that the "frank purpose of many Pakistan-minded Government servants was to undermine the central administration."[192]

As 1946 drew to its close, problems and turmoil increased in the East, and Britain was obviously seeking a way out. Some American doubt now arose as to what would fill the vacuum left by receding British power as the colonial era drew to a close. This does not seem to have been given serious thought during the years of American advocacy of Indian independence. It seems to have been assumed that a free India would carry on in an orderly manner as before, probably as a member of the British defence system, with the possible and desired modification of more trading privileges for the United States. Now it suddenly appeared that the only country to benefit from the emerging turmoil would be Russia.[193] John Foster Dulles had stated on 17 January 1947 in the United Nations Assembly, "that communism exerted a strong influence in India through the interim Hindu Government."[194] Therefore, "Nehru's refusal to agree to the constitution of a Provisional Coalition Government demonstrated his unfriendly attitude and there appeared to be no alternative to Pakistan for Muslims."[195] Even then the British interpretation of Pakistan was a "Provincial Autonomy" and Jinnah's ideal Pakistan was an unthinkable and unworkable proposition to them.[196]

Biggest Surprise

On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Attlee shocked the world when he made an historic announcement in the House of Commons that power would be transferred by June of 1948 to either one or more governments on the Indian subcontinent. The Prime Minister announced that:

> His Majesty's Government will have to consider to whom the power of Central Government in British India should be handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India, or in some areas at the existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way as

> may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people. Although the final transfer of authority may not take place until June 1948, preparatory measures must be put in hand in advance.[197]

In his policy statement, Prime Minster Attlee made it clear that even in the event a fully representative constituent assembly of India failed to draft a new constitution before June 1948, appropriate measures would be adopted to hand over the power to the Indian leaders. In the same statement, the Prime Minister explained the British Government's position concerning the Indian Princely States, he said:

> In regard to the Indian States, as was explicitly stated by the Cabinet Mission, His Majesty's Government does not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under paramountacy to any Government of British India.[198]

After the Indian policy statement, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of Admiral Viscount Louis Mountbatten to replace Lord Wavell as Viceroy of India in order to facilitate the transfer of power to India and Pakistan.[199] Both the Congress and the Muslim League welcomed the British decision to leave by June 1948.

Explaining his "breakdown Plan," Wavell wrote to Mountbatten when he took over:

> I am sorry for you, you have been given an impossible job. I have tried everthing I knew to solve the problem of handing over India to its people and I can see no light. I have only one solution, which I call Operation Mad-House-withdrawal of the British, province by province, beginning with women and children, then civilians, then the army. I can see no other way.[200]

Attlee, who had never liked Wavell, gave Mountbatten essential, decisive, plenipotentiary powers, which if given to Wavell would have brought a much bigger Pakistan, with the whole of Punjab, Bengal and Assam.[201] The point to note here is that even the Muslim League

Legislators' Convention in Delhi on 7-9 April 1946, which amended the Lahore Resolution had in its operative paragraph:

> That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely Pakistan Zones where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay.[202]

In fact, if Wavell's "Breakdown Plan" of partition would have been accepted, it would have created a much larger Pakistan, including the whole of Punjab, the whole of Bengal and the whole of Assam. Moreover, it was Wavell who cleared the ground and set up the sign-post pointing in the right direction for Mountbatten to follow.

At last it had been done. The date for the termination of British rule had been set, as had so often been advocated in America. This announcement, which included the replacement of Wavell by Mountbatten, received a mixed reception. The *Nation* wrote that all now knew Britain had meant it when she said that she would relinquish power.[203] The *New Republic* emphasized that the departure was connected with England's precarious economic conditions.[204] *Newsweek* stressed the danger of civil war as a result of thus laying down the burden.[205] *Time* saw it as the culmination of a movement which had its roots in the tragedy of the Indian "Mutiny."[206] The *Christian Science Monitor* regarded the declaration as a virtual ultimatum to bring about unity along the lines suggested by the Cabinet Mission,[207] a "bold decision," by which a "revolutionary government ... had used revolutionary means to give another people its freedom," and the "first really full-blown emergency of a Labor foreign policy."[208] The *New York Times* also regarded it as an ultimatum, comparable to the United States declaration of independence for the Philippines, and with few parallels in history. Instead of risking a possible civil war by ousting the Muslim League from the Government, as the Congress Party was insisting because of the League's boycott of the Constituent Assembly, the British Government had put India's fate squarely in Indian hands.[209] W. P. Simms felt that Britain's notice to India to patch up her differences by

June 1948, or get on as best as she could "almost certainly" meant civil war and that since China was already having one it meant that half the population of the globe was on the verge of bloodshed and chaos.[210]

The announcement of a date for Britain's departure produced no unity in India. Jinnah would not yield an inch, and the *New York Times* commented:

> It is certain India cannot build her independence on a deadlock. Independence with no ability to control it and no power to maintain it promises only catastorophe.[211]

The *Los Angeles Times* was "appalled" at the prospect of Britain dropping authority, and envisioned a situation worse than China's.[212] The *Christian Science Monitor,* on the contrary, recalled the desire which had been expressed both in India and America that a date for withdrawal be set. Now this had been done, "a fact of tremendous significance," which was not, as much American comment was intimating, "an abdication." Rather "it sought to increase British influence" by keeping the Indian parties guessing as to whom Britain would transfer power. If, for example, the Muslims held up the constitution they might find themselves excluded from authority. On the other hand, if the Hindus were intransigent, Pakistan might be favoured. In any event, as it saw it, India was not to be cast adrift on a sea of power politics.[213]

There was indeed no other alternative to Indian independence. All parties in India were agreed on it; they only differed on whether there should be one independent state or two. World opinion, particularly public opinion in the United States, during and after the Second World War had been exerting steady pressure upon the British to relinquish power in India. In bowing to the inevitable, willingly and gracefully, the British Government showed great political wisdom. By setting a definite date for the transfer of power, they rid themselves of the charge of wishing to prolong their hold on the country by exploiting differences between the major communities in India. On the contrary, they showed that they hoped the shock produced by their impending departure would bring the two main parties together by the very urgency of the need for agreement.

The liquidation of British imperial commitments now attracted much attention. Walter Lippman wrote on the vacuum that was being created, and of the struggle for power within that vacuum which history revealed was bound to ensue.[214] Mark Sullivan empasized that the United States must assume world leadership in Britain's place.[215] Secretary of State George Marshall told a press conference that the American Government fully appreciated the "grave character of the British decision to set a definite and early date for the completion of the process of transferring power to responsible Indian hands," warning that "the Indian internal crisis threatens to prevent India from making its rightful and honorable contribution to the maintenance of international peace and prosperity."[216] With Britain finally on the road to granting India self-government, the Washington authorities generally confined their activities to the "watching brief" of an earlier period, interspersed with occasional statements to encourage the parties in their negotiations and friendly diplomacy when it seemed needed.[217] There was now an increased American concern as to who would take Britain's place in India; a concern which, as has been noted, had previously been absent when Indian independence had been advocated. *Time*, commenting upon the House of Lords' debate over withdrawal, wrote:

> Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. As the British withdrawal became more certain, the Indian factions rushed in with increased determination to inherit the Raj. If civil chaos ensued, who would bring order? The U. N.? The U.S.? The U.S.S.R.?[218]

Increasing communal rioting certainly gave grave cause of concern. The *Christian Science Monitor* wrote forebodingly of the threat of civil war and of the possibility that Russia would feel that she had to step in to restore order.[219] Nor did it find assurance in the reaction of India's leaders to their responsibilities. Of Nehru it wrote:

> We could wish that Mr. Nehru, dreaming of Indian leadership of South-east Asia and intent on his Inter-Asian Relations Conference this month, would show a comparable realism in tackling the questions of Hindu-Muslim relations and minority rights.[220]

To the *New York Times* the outlook about the Hindu-Muslim riots seemed discouraging since every British plan in India had failed, as completely as had the 1919 attempt at suppression at Amritsar, where now 40,000 were homeless as the result of riots.[221]

Mountbatten Plan

Lord Mountbatten, the last Governor-General and Viceroy of India, arrived in New Delhi on 22 March 1947 with a directive to arrange for the handing over of power. It was still hoped that this might be effected through the Cabinet Mission Plan for a united India, but should this prove impossible, then it was hoped that Mountbatten would be able to suggest an alternate plan by October. The new Viceroy brought an entirely new spirit into Congress-British relations, but no unity between the Congress and Muslim League.

Communal feeling in India was however far more bitter than he expected; it appeared indeed to have become an obsession with both Hindu and Muslims.[224] There was communal tension all over the country. Fights were breaking out sporadically, and Bombay and other places had fairly heavy casualities several times. After weeks of friendly interviews with the Hindu and Muslim leaders, Mountbatten evolved a compromise plan providing some chance for a peaceful transfer of power. The Viceroy had reached the conclusion that prospects of agreement on a unified India were negligible and that the only alternative was partition. He realized that in view of the rapid and grave deterioration which was taking place in communal relations in so many provinces, the earliest possible decision was necessary.[225]

Mountbatten readily realized that the Cabinet Mission Plan was dead. His first suggestion to solve the deadlock was to transfer all power to the provinces and then allow them to unite in any way they chose.[226] This idea was short-lived, for its results could have been disastrous. This plan granted neither India nor Pakistan, but would have Balkanized the subconinent into numerous provinces and states. The ability of the provinces to draw together into a union would have been difficult, and such groups of provinces as were formed (1936-39) would have had little or no leverage to pressure the states into a union.

At this point, V. P. Menon offered his plan, which called for the creation of two states, India and Pakistan, each to be granted dominion status under the Governor-General until each could write its own constitution. The plan also provided for self-determination for minorities within Pakistan, recognizing the principle of self-determination as proposed by the Rajagopalachari formula. For the Muslim League, it offered the "truncated" Pakistan, but a Pakistan with full sovereignty. This plan also granted Jinnah's wish that his nation's independence be recognized simultaneously with India's independence, rather than through the two-step procedure whereby India would receive independence and then Pakistan would have to win independence from India.[227]

But when Mountbatten had seen outbreaks occurring and had plumbed the depths of the communal differences which existed, he and his advisers agreed that the timetable would be too slow to avert tragedy. So he signified his willingness to adopt the V. P. Menon's plan.[228] At this point, his recommendations were accepted by the Government in London and the difficult decision was made to accelerate the pace of independence and the present a partition formula which seemed to Mountbatten the most nearly acceptable to the Congress and League leaders.[229]

Nehru, who had been terribly depressed by Mountbatten's first plan, was now easily reconciled to V. P. Menon's plan. He therefore found it easier to reconcile himself to a totally separate Pakistan than a loosely confederated India with an ineffective central government. Other Congress leaders (Patel etc.) were also willing to support Mountbatten's new plan. Gandhi and Azad were more reluctant converts.

Reports of this plan appeared in the American press early in May, the *Christian Science Monitor* being among the first to comment. It pointed out that the division of India, once regarded as artificial, was now seen to be deeper than any British policy of divide and rule:

> India is really complex after all ... Fortunately, no American cry for specific measures unrelated to the whole Indian problem complicates the complex in India as it does in Palestine.

With regard to former American pressure for Indian independence, it stated:

> ... American pressure in the past has been at most a semi-helpful influence. It has been based on oversimplification of the Indian scene. It has assumed that because virtually all Indian, Hindu and Moslims alike, wanted freedom, they would accept it on the same terms. Too many Americans have imagined that a British withdrawal would provide an almost automatic solution.[230] This touched the core of American thought on India, and incidentally of much Indian nationalist thought. When a solution did not automatically follow, disillusionment set in, and there were not wanting those who felt failure must still be due to British machinations. As a result some sought an imperialistic motive in the Mountbatten plan.

On 26 April when Lord Ismay went to London to present Mountbatten's first report that there was absolutely no chance of unity, it was rumored that he carried a suggestion for the partition of India into Pakistan, Hindustan and Rajastan.[231] It was the similarity to Coupland's plan which brought renewed charges of imperialism. *Time* began to wonder whether, after all, there would be an independent India, with a total of 15,000 Hindus-Muslims slaughtered in nine months, almost double the total of American killed in the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. "During the year 1946, 30,000 Hindus-Muslims were killed in the communal riots."[232] These riots demonstrated that only one thing seemed certain, Pakistan was now a reality.[233]

American comment now turned to a serious consideration of this phenomenon and did not like it. The *Washington Post* said it ignored economic factors, and was no solution. In its view it was as impracticable as the creation of a negro state within the United States. It pointed out that the partition of Europe following World War I on ethnic and religious bases, rather than economic, had proved to be no solution.[234] Woodrow Wilson's self-determination was now bearing unanticipated fruit in India.

Mountbatten himself was now recalled to London to explain just how impossible the implementation of the Cabinet Mission plan was.[235] Speculation continued as to what would result, and the *Christian Century* commented:

> All that is clear is that an epochal change is approaching with terrifying speed, and that all India is preparing to meet it in one way or another.[236]

The danger of civil war daily seemed more imminent, and a suggestion appeared in *The Nation* that the immediate declaration of dominion status might prevent this.[237]

On June 2 the Viceroy presented to the Hindu and Muslim leaders a last plea for unity and made a final effort to secure agreement on the basis of the Cabinet Mission's Plan.[238] The following day, after the appeal had been rejected, he produced a compromise plan which he had brought back from London.[239] This came to be known as the "Third June Plan." It involved partition within partition and brought Pakistan into existence.[240] Its acceptance by the Congress and the Muslim League brought enthusiastic reaction from all over the world.[241]

On 3 June 1947, the Viceroy announced that the British Government had agreed to transfer its authority to the Dominions of India and Pakistan, and that the date of the transfer of power would be 15 August 1947. The plan outlined in the announcement was explained as follows:

> (1) Two Indias to be divided as follows. Each having its own Parliament, each having its own Executive, each having complete power to pass laws in so far as its own territory is concerned, and each having its own Governor-General.
>
> (2) Existing laws to continue until altered.
>
> (3) Functional boards to be set up, with some controlling functional board on the lines of a General Purposes Committee to organize their

> work, and their task to be carried on, then split up the common services, obligations and so on, and power to rest in the Governor-General, after consultation with his Executive, to pass orders in council.[242]

On the same day, the Viceroy, addressing a press conference, asserted "that Britain means to quit," and remarked: "I meant it sincerely when I say power will be transferred as completely this year as it ever would have been by June 1948. I am sincere, I am not bluffing."[243] Both Nehru and Jinnah in their broadcast paid a high tribute to Mountbatten for his part in the British Government's plan.

In his "Third June Plan," Mountbatten, sensing the possibility of agreement, moved rapidly to define the method of self-determination. In Bengal and the Punjab, the provincial legislatures were to be divided into two sections; one section of Muslim representatives and the other of the representatives of the minorities (minus the Europeans). If either section voted in favour of partition of the province, the verdict would be irrevocable. Each section would then vote to join either Pakistan or India.[244]

The minority section (Hindus) in both the Punjab and Bengal voted to partition the province and they chose to accede to India. In Assam, the area known as Sylhet, which contained a large Muslim majority, was allowed to express its choice by referendum and acceded to Pakistan. Also, the North-west Frontier Province voted by referendum to join Pakistan. The results were that East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Sylhet and the U. W. F. P. voted to join Pakistan.

The Congress demand for the partition of Bengal and the Punjab was surely designed to make Pakistan so unattractive to the Muslim League that the League would decide a Union centre preferable to a truncated Pakistan. But it was not likely that this stratagem would silence the demand for Pakistan.[245]

So the task of drawing a specific partition line in Bengal and the Punjab was given to a Boundary Commission, which, consisting of two

non-Muslim and two Muslim representatives, was headed by Sir Cyril Radcliff.[246]

In the meantime the Muslim majority districts were regarded as part of Pakistan and non-Muslim majority districts as part of India. Britain undertook no separate arrangements with the 565 princely states. These Native States, whose relations with the British Government were regulated by a series of treaties, were given the option to join either dominions or to remain independent. The British Government, however, expressed the hope that in making their choices the rulers would give due consideration to the wishes of their people.[247]

Nevertheless, it resolved the long-standing dilemma between the two parties. Something then could be done towards implementing dominion status; and progress soon was apparent.[248] The British rapidly increased their efforts for the transfer of power to India and Pakistan.[249]

Mountbatten's dramatic work for the transfer of power was described to the American public. The United States Government appreciated the British efforts for the development toward full self-government in India and expressed great interest and sympathy. It also expressed the hope that this meeting of minds would bring an end to civil disorder and avoid further bloodshed in India.[250] At this point, Gandhi, disturbed strongly by the partition, felt there was a possibility that Pakistan would fortify herself against Hindustan with the assistance of foreign powers such as the Americans and the Muslim States of the Middle East.[251]

On 10 July 1947, the Indian Independence Act was passed through its initial reading in the House of Commons. On 15 July the final reading was passed without a dissenting vote. The following day the House of Lords rushed it through its three readings, and on 18 July it received the royal assent.[252] The *Christian Science Monitor* remarked how impossible such an event had seemed but a short time before.[253]

There remained but the formalities of August 14 and 15, 1947. The Indian Independence Act of 18 July 1947, provided the legal basis for the transfer of power to the two successor governments of India and Pakistan.

The idea of a separate Pakistani state at first evoked little enthusiasm in America. The *Washington Post* wrote of the "crazy quilt" in which Britain would leave India, auguring ill for peace and progress.[254] The *Christian Century* felt a united India might have been possible had dominion status been offered in 1942, and the date of independence firmly fixed then, as it had then urged.[255] *Newsweek* wrote of the "age of unreason," and still feared civil war.[256] The *Nation* called the plan the "Judgment of Solomon," which no one pretended was perfect. It pointed out, however, that dominion status conferred full sovereignty, which few Americans realized, and had this praise for Britain: "Britain, in fact, is retiring from India on terms that contrast very favorably with our self-advertised "generosity" to the Philippines."[257] The *Christian Science Monitor* commented: "In the last few days Britain has won a moral triumph that surpasses the imperial splendors of the past."[258]

More than any other single factor Churchill's support of the Labour Government's plan and his rare tribute to Attlee had convinced the United States that this was the best of all possible solutions for India's millions.[259]

In Congress, Representative Celler deplored the division but agreed that it might prevent much bloodshed. But, he remained among the unconvinced, deplored Pakistan, and saw it as:

> ... an engraved invitation to His Majesty's Government to remain in India. India should remain one nation. Its salvation and its progress depend upon the unity of India. Pakistan is a menacing and overshadowing cloud.[260]

Soon after this came an upsurge of American approval, and an assessment of the problem in terms reminiscent of former British explanations, the correctness of which events in India now seemed to be demonstrating.[261] The *Washington Post*, while not enamoured of partition, felt the British had "fulfilled their pledges handsomely," that they could be acquitted of any charge of "divide and conquer" administration in India, and that the division was fundamental.[262] It was appreciated that partition was the choice of the Indian leaders themselves. *Newsweek* called the solution a "a commonsense plan,"

and a triumph for human reasonableness in solving "one of the most complex of the age's problem," which all but Russia praised.[263] The *Christian Century* came around to the view that: "Never has the ability of British statesmanship to find a way of compromising a seemingly hopeless deadlock been better shown."[264] The Department of State on 10 June 1947 issued a statement expressing the hope "that this meeting of the minds will bring an end to civil disorders in India." It declared that the future constitutional pattern was a matter to be determined by the Indian people themselves. Whatever the pattern might be, "the United States Government looks forward to the continuance of the friendliest relations with Indians of all communities and creeds."[265]

On 14 August 1947, the British Government handed over the power to the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Subsequent developments belong more properly to the history of the two separate nations. On 14 August 1947, when Pakistan came into existence, the place of the Muslim community of the subcontinent was taken by the Pakistani nation and the Muslim minority still living in the Indian union.

The struggle for independence was over on 14 August 1947, when Pakistan became an independent State with Muhammad Ali Jinnah as her first Governor-General. India's cermonies as a dominion followed on 15 August 1947, with Nehru its first Prime Minister and Mountbatten as the last British Viceroy and the first Governor-General of independent India, a position which Mountbatten held until June 1948.

The United States Government has extended full diplomatic recognition to Pakistan from the very day of its birth.[266] On 15 August 1947 when Jinnah assumed power as Governor-General of the new dominion, the United States was the first nation to extend diplomatic recognition and the only foreign power to send an official delegate to the formal ceremonies.[267]

The exchange of diplomatic representatives at the ambassadorial level between these two countries was a forgone conclusion, but the American Government had acted so promptly and with such grace that Pakistan could not but reciprocate with more than the usual degree of goodwill. Pakistan extended cordial greetings to Charles W. Lewis, who

had become temporary charge d' Affairs until the arrival of the first U. S. Ambassador to Pakistan, who had not yet been named. On this memorable occasion the State Department declared that "the closet and most cordial relations will be maintained between the Governments and peoples of the United States and Pakistan."[268]

On this memorable occasion, United States President Harry S. Truman telegraphed to Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan with warm greetings and best wishes, as follows:

> On this auspicious day which marks the emergence among the family of nations of the new Dominion of Pakistan, I extended on behalf of the American people, sincere best wishes to you, and through you, to the people of Pakistan. To you who have labored so steadfastly for this day, and to the other leaders and the people of Pakistan fall profound responsibilities. I wish to assure you that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America. The American Government and the people anticipate a long history of close and cordial relations with your country. We rejoice with you in the prospect for rapid progress toward the advancement of th welfare of the people of Pakistan, and look forward to the constructive participation of the new Dominion in world affairs for the welfare of all mankind.[269]

The United States Congress also appreciated the statesmanship of Jinnah, Nehru and Baldev singh. Their statements on the occasion of the independence of India and Pakistan were published in the *Congressional Record.*[270] Pakistan extended reciprocal good wishes to President Truman, to his Government, and to the American people. Pakistan assured the President and the American people that cooperation would be forthcoming from Pakistan.[271] Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, extended the hand of friendship and cooperation and expressed his hope that American-Pakistani friendship would continue and that these two great nations would cooperate in the international struggle to fashion a world society founded on mutual trust and respect.[272]

On 14 August 1947, in Karachi, sitting on the dais on the right on Jinnah the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, in naval uniform, addressed the first National Assembly of Pakistan and first read the following message from the King of England:

> I send you my greetings and warmest wishes on this great occasion when the new Dominion of Pakistan is about to take its place in the British Commonwealth of Nations. In thus achieving your independence by agreement, you have set an example to all freedom-loving people throughout the world.
>
> I know that I can speak for all sections of opinion within the British Commonwealth when I say that their support will not fail you in upholding democratic principles. I am confident that the statemanship and spirit of cooperation which have led to the historic developments you are now celebrating will be the best guarantee of your future happiness and prosperity. Great responsibilities lie ahead of you. May the Almighty sustain you in your future tasks. Be assured always of my sympathy and support as I watch your continuing efforts to advance the cause of humanity.[273]

The Viceroy said that he spoke today as Viceroy. Tomorrow he would be the constitutional head of Pakistan's neighbour, the Dominion of India. But the leaders of both Governments had invited him to be the independent chairman of the Joint Defence Council, an honour which he would strive to merit.

The Viceroy went on expressing his views by saying that "the birth of Pakistan is an event of history. We, who are part of history and are helping to make it, are not well placed, even if we wished, to moralize on the event, to look back and survey the sequence of the past that led to it."

He concluded that "all this has been achieved with toil and sweat. I wish I could say also without tears and blood, but terrible crimes have been committed. Partition has brought sadness to many, and joy in the ceremonies which are taking place in many parts of India today is not unalloyed."[274]

Following the cermonies Governor-General Jinnah delivered a radio address to the people of Pakistan in which he declared:

> This day marks the end of a poignant phase in our national history and it should also be the beginning of a new and noble era. Let us impress the minorities by word, deed, and thought, that as long as they fulfill their duties and obligations as loyal citizens of Pakistan they have nothing to fear ... We have no occupation beyond the desire to live honourably and let others live honourably.[275]

On this very special occasion, the *San Francisco news* gave its "salute" to India's 400 millions on 14 August, writing:

> Thanks to the character of the British people and the statesmanship of the Labor government nearly one-fifth of the human race wins political freedom without war. Whether British rule was a net gain or loss it long since had outlived its usefulness. Voluntary liberation of the subject peoples makes amends for past wrongs of imperialism of which there were plenty.[276]

On 15 August the *New York Times* remarking on the real significance of the independence, wrote:

> '... the twilight of colonialism everywhere. The whole world of Kipling's imagery sinks into oblivion, the captains and the kings that strutted across the scene of India's history depart, one hopes, never to return.[277]

The *Nation* commented: "England has left India with no ifs and buts and without the shame of a colonial war. Other empires might take note."[278] The whole authority in British India was transferred to the Constituent Assemblies of the Dominions of Pakistan and India. The great dilemma was over and the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent was no more.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. *American Opinion Reports*, Department of State, September 19 and October 5, 1944.
2. Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
3. C. Rajagopalachari, "Reconciliation in India," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIII (April 1945), 422-4. Rajagopalachari, after Gandhi India's elder statesman, was seldom heard from in America.
4. Letter Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 8 January 1945: IOR R/3/1/108.
5. Linlithgow's farewell off-the-record remarks in October 1943 had stated his conviction that the British must continue to rule India for another fifty years. *FRUS*, 1943, IV, 231.
6. DS 845.00/1-846 CS/VJ.
7. *Time*, XLV (21 May 1945), 36; Uma Shanker, "New Hope For India," *Nation*, CLX (9 June 1945), 160; Prem 4 46/12.
8. "Stirrings in India," ed., *New York Times*, 8 June 1945, p. 18.
9. 28 February 1945: Cab 91/3.
10. 31 May and 8 June 1945: Cab 65/53.
11. Cmd. 6652 of 1945.
12. Telegram Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, No. 140. S. C., 26 June 1945: Prem 4 46/11.
13. Prem 8 541/PT. I.
14. IOR: R/3/1/108; The *Dawn*, 29. 1946.
15. Washington to British Foreign Office, No. 6932, 3 Dec. 1946: IOR L/P&J/10/107.
16. Phillips recommended 5 Congress, 5 Muslim League, 1 Hindu Mahashabha, 1 Depressed Class and 1 Parsi.
17. *The Indian Annual Register*, 1945, Vol. I, p. 245.
18. Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
19. Prem 4 46/12.
20. *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 June, p. 1.
21. "The Evolution of Empire," ed., *New York Times*, 15 June 1945, p. 18.
22. "British Indian Move Appears Well-Timed," ed., *Los Angeles Times*, 15 June 1945, part II, p. 4.

23. "Britain Moves in India," ed., *San Francisco News*, 26 June 1945, p. 5.

24. "Another Chance in India," *Nation*, CLX (23 June 1945), 683.

25. R. J. Moore, Churchill, *Cripps, And India*, 1939-1945, pp. 143-4.

26. Memorandum by Berry, 19 June 1945: 845.00/6-1945; Letter from New Delhi, 20 June 1945: 845.00/6-2045; Letter from Bombay, 16 June 1945: 845.00/6-1945; telegram from Bombay, 21 June 1945: 845.00/6-2145; telegram from New Delhi, 21 June 1945, *Ibid.*; telegram from New Delhi, 23 June 1945: 845.00/6-2345; telegram from New Delhi, 19 June 1945: *FRUS*, 1945 6:252; Fosinger, *India and United States*, p. 24.

27. DS 845.00/1-846 CS/VJ; Moore, *Churchill, Cripps and India*, p. 144.

28. Maulana Azad had been the show-boy Congress President for six years. Jinnah thought that Azad had done worst against League and the Muslim movement for Pakistan. See Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims, A Political History*, p. 295.

29. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 144-5.

30. H. N. Brailsford, "Britain's Offer to India," *New Republic*, CXIII (23 July 1945), 91.

31. "Soldier of Peace; Simla Conference," *Time*, XXXIV (16 July 1945), 34, 37-8, 40.

32. IOR: L/P&J/10/19.

33. Extract from a statement by Mr. Jinnah, Annexture 11, 6 Dec. 1945: IOR L/P&J/10/19; Prem 8/541 part 2.

34. *The Times*, 16 July 1945.

35. *Daily Telegraph*, 16 July 1945.

36. *News Chronicle*, 16 July 1945.

37. *The Observer*, 18 July 1945.

38. Mansergh and Lumby, eds., *The Transfer of Power*, pp. 54-6.

39. FO 371, AN 1561, 2241 and 2287/24/45; AN 2273/109/45; *New York Times*, 12 July 1945.

40. "Somebody Failed," *Newsweek*, XXVI (23 July 1945), 48; *Nation*, CLXI (21 July 1945), 51; "Indian Independence Break Down," *Christian Century*, LXII (25 July 1945), 852; K. B. Sayyed, *Pakistan*, p. 131; "Breakdown in India," *New Republic*, CXIII (23 July 1945), 91.

41. Letter from Governor of the Punjab to Viceroy, Secret, No. 561, 16 August 1945: MSS.EUR D 977/6; Note by the Viceroy, 11 Dec. 1946: IOR L/P&J/10/46.

42. *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 August 1945, p. 10.

43. "England, Ireland and India," *Catholic World*, CLXI (September 1945), 495.

44. *News York Times*, *Baltimore Sun*, and other in *American Opinion Reports*, Department of State, August 2 and November 5, 1945. Phillipine independence was proclaimed on 4 July 1946.

45. American pollsters quizzed 700 people late in 1945, asking "Do you think most of the people of India have a reasonably full and fair picture of the United States? Responses in percentages were: *"Don't Know*--46; No--38; *Yes*--16. National Opinion Research Center, University of Denver, *Survey T-40*.

46. Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 160.

47. New York Times, 29 September 1945.

48. Jinnah made innumerable speeches during this hectic election campaign. Some of them are reproduced in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 282-90, 292-305, 307-355, 360-74.

49. Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

50. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, op. cit., p. 301.

51. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 166; DS 845.00/1-846 CS/VJ.

52. *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1946, pp. 229-31.

53. Extract from note of interview between H. E. and Jinnah at New Delhi on 5 June 1946: IOR R/3/1/108.

54. Telegram from New Delhi, 26 June 1946: 845.00/6-2645; tel. from New Delhi, 29 June 1945: 845.00/7-445; tel. from New Delhi, 16 July 1945: 845.00/7-2745; tel. to New Delhi, 1 August 1945: 845.00/7-2545; tel. from Madras to New Delhi, 1 August 1945: 845.00/8-845.

55. W. C. Mackett, "*A Historical Study of the British Labour Party's Indian Policy and Its Liquidation of the Indian Empire,*" (Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, June 1948).

56. *New York Times*, 16 August 1945, p. 1, text 4; San Francisco News, 15 August 1945, p. 2.

57. "Approach to India," *Newsweek*, XXVI (10 Sept. 1945), 60.

58. *New York Times*, 20 Sept. 1945, pp. 1, 2.

59. *Nation*, CLCI (29 Sept. 1945), 299-300.

60. "Half a Loaf For India," *New Republic*, CXIII (1 October 1945), 21.

61. "O Promise Me," *Newsweek*, XXVI (1 Oct. 1945), 49.

62. "Cripps Plan Revived by Labor Government," *Christian Century*, LXII (3 October 1945), 1117.

63. *New York Times*, 20 Sept. 1945, p. 2.

64. *Time*, XLVI (26 Nov. 1945), 32; Ruth Parsons in "Labor Party and India," Far *Eastern Survey*, XIV (21 Nov. 1945), 337/9, stated that it was now clear that

Labour had been behind the previous governments' India policy, and that the change in England was domestic rather than imperial.

65. "Jai-Hind," *Time*, XLVI (3 Dec. 1945), 32; *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta, 29 Nov. 1945; Statesman (Calcutta), 27 Nov. 1945, tel. from Calcutta, 29 Nov. 1945: 845.00/11-2445; *New York Times*, 23-25 November 1945.

66. *Newsweek*, XXVI (3 Dec. 1945), 44.

67. United States News and World Report, XIX (28 Dec. 1945), 16.

68. Representative Celler, complaining of the difficulties experienced by his New York constituents in obtaining visas for India, charged that Britain was using American lend-lease material in the hands of Indian and Japanese troops to subdue independence movements in colonial areas. *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91:9 (12 Dec. 1945), 11927, A 11928.

69. *Newsweek*, XXVIII (4 Feb. 1946), 10.

70. *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 92:9 (22 Jan. 1946), A 169.

71. *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 92:2 (19 Feb. 1946), 1444.

72. *New York Times*, 3 Feb. 1946, part IV, p. 5.

73. "News from India Is Disturbing," *Nation*, CLXII (23 Feb. 1946), 209.

74. "Bad News from India," ed., *New York Times*, 16 Feb. 1946, p. 12.

75. *San Francisco News*, 23 Feb. 1946, p. 2.

76. "Revolt in the East," ed., *New York Times*, 23 February 1946, p. 12.

77. Letter Jinnah to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Annexure, 19 Feb. 1946: IOR L/P&J/10/19.

78. See "Note on Pakistan Scheme," sent by Sir Stafford Cripps on 16 January 1946: IOR L/P&J/10/19.

79. Telegram Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, Now Delhi, 13 Feb. 1946: IOR L/P&J/10/19.

80. Telegram from London, 21, 28 Feb. 1946: *FRUS* 1946, V, 79-80, 83-4; Hess, op. cit., p. 167.

81. IOR: R/3/1/111; Cab 21 12042; *Indian Annual Register*, 1946, 131.

82. Quoted in Chudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 52.

83. Muhammad Ashraf, ed., *Cabinet Mission And After* , pp. 1-3.

84. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 389, 15 December 1946.

85. As quoted by J. P. Chandler, "America Applauds Attlee," in *India Steps Forward*.

86. American Opinion Report, Department of State, 4 Apr. 1946.

87. "India: Eleventh Hour," *Nation*, CLXII (2 March 1946), 248.

88. Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* , p. 46.

89. Mansergh and Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Power,* Vol. Vii, pp. 664-5; IOR L/P&J/5/337: pp. 343-9; Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, 309; Gwyer and Appadorai, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 573-4.

90. Report by the Chief of Staff, 12 June 1946: D.O. (46)68; Cab 21/2042.

91. Top Secret telegram from Cabinet Delegation to Prime Minister, n.d., 1946: Prem 8 541/Pt 3.

92. Telegram Merril to Secretary of State, New Delhi, 21 March 1946: 845.00/3-2146 CS/A.

93. Telegram merril to State Department, 6 March 1946: 845.00/3-646.

94. *The Hindustan Times*, 4 August 1946.

95. Telegram Cabinet Delegation to Cabinet Office, 14 March 1946: Prem 8 541/Pt. 3.

96. Note of meeting with Viceroy's Executive Council, 26 March 1946: AVAR 6/3.

97. *Ibid.*

98. For Jinnah's interview see *A. V. Alexander's Diary,* Appendix XXV.

99. *A. V. Alexander's Diary*, Appendix XXXII, AVAR 6/3.

100. *Ibid.*; Record of interview between Cabinet Delegation and jinnah, 4 April 1946: IOR L/P&J/5/337: pp. 68-73; Mansergh and Moon, eds, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VII, pp. 188-124.

101. *A. V. Alexander's Diary*, Appendix XV, p. 6.

102. *Ibid.*, Appendix XIV, AVAR 6/3.

103. *A. V. Alexander's Diary,* Appendix XIV, AVAR 6/3; note of interview between *Cabinet Delegation* and Gandhi, 3 April 1946: IOR L/P&J/5/337: pp. 66-8; Mansergh and Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VII, p. 117; IOR L/P&J/10/28f: 69.

104. *A. V. Alexander's Diary*, Appendix XIV 6/3.

105. *Ibid.*, AVAR 6/2.

106. Telegram Merril to State Department, New Delhi, 9 April 1946: F. W. 845.00/4 946.

107. *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 92:9 (6 March 1946), A 1156.

108. *Ibid.*, For Nehru's letter to the American people, see Alice Thorner, "India's Passage to Freedom," *Nation*, CLXII (2 March 1946), pp. 253-4.

109. *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 92:10 (11 March 1946), A 1247. The signers were: Pearl S. Buck, Louis Fischer, J. J. Singh, Rep. Emmanuel Celler, Dr. Wm. Ennest Hocking, Dr. James Warbasse, Rep. Charle M. La Follette, Dr. John Childs, Oswald Garrison Villard, Mark Starr, Dr. John Haynes Holmes, Roger N. Baldwin, Dr. Harry W. Laidlder, Lewis Carey, Arthur Garfied Hays, Bruce Bliven.

110. *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., Sess., 90, 8113-4.
111. *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 92:9, A 959, A 1247.
112. *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90, A 5399.
113. "Freedom for India," *New York Times*, 19 March 1946, p. 20.
114. Telegram from New Delhi, 15 April 1946: *FRUS*, 1946, V, 86-7.
115. Satistics prepared by Mildred Strunk for *Public Opinion, 1935-46*, ed., Hadley Cantril (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 328; Chandrasekhar, "What Does Iowa Know of India and China?" *Asia and the Americans*, June 1945, pp. 298-300; *Time*, 22 April 1946, pp. 28-31; *New York Times*, February 23, 25 and June 16, 1946.
116. See "News Review of the Week," *San Francisco News*, 30 March 1946, p. 13; Sir F. Puckle, "Pakistan Doctrine: Its Origins and Power," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (April 1946), 526-38.
117. "Attlee Makes a Promise," *New Republic*, CXIV (25 March 1946), 398-9.
119. "This Is the *Time*," Time, XLVII (25 March 1946), 398-9.
120. "Labor Offers Freedom to Peoples of India," *Christian Century*, LXIII (27 March 1946), 388.
121. *San Francisco News*, 16 March 1946, p. 2.
122. "Pilgrimage to Simla," ed., *New York Times*, 30 April 1946, p. 20.
123. Cmd. 6821 of 1946.
124. *Ibid.*
125. *New Statesman*, 25 May 1946, p. 372.
126. "A Plan for India," ed., *New York Times*, 17 May 1946, p. 20.
127. "India: British Plan, American Style," ed., *Christian Science Monitor* 18 May 1946, p. 14.
128. Polyzoides, *Los Angeles Times*, 19 May 1946, part I, p. 8.
129. "New Chapter in England's Imperial Policy," *Nation*, CLXII (25 May 1946), 613.
130. *New York Times*, 18 May 1946.
131. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, p. 47.
132. Quoted in Hector Bilitho, *Jinnah*, p. 160.
133. *Loc. cit.*
134. Roosevelt had referred to this in his letters to Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek in 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, I, 637, 716.
135. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* , pp. 325-6.
136. The grouping plan was acceptable to the Muslims because it recognized the Punjab, and Bengal, as Muslim-majority entities. They acquired less than this in

the ultimate partition: both provinces were divided when the frontiers of Pakistan were defined in 1947.

137. Cab 21/2043 Pt. I, 298; India's statement by Cabinet Mission, Cmd. 6861, 1946; *The times* (London) 7 Dec. 1946; Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-8.

138. Cypher telegram Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 30 July 1946: Cab 21/1042.

139. "Statement by the Cabinet Delegation and His Excellency the Viceroy, IOR R/3/1/111.

140. *Ibid.*

141. V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* , p. 272. It would be better for a Sikh historian to narrate how Baldev Singh died as a broken-hearted man and how Tara Singh undertook a "fast unto death" against Hindu domination and barely escaped with his life.

142. *A. V. Alexander's Diary*, Appendix XV, p. 7.

143. Memorandum merril to State Department, New Delhi, 19 May 1947: 845.00/5-2047 CS/A.

144. Telegram Merril to State Department, New Delhi, 12 August 1946: 845.00/8-1246; IOR R/3/1/135; *The Dawn*, 1 August 1946; *The Hindustan Times*, 4 August 1946.

145. For example see Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* , p. 319.

146. For detail see Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* , p. 106.

147. Sir Francis Tucker, who was in charge of the military operations during the riots, has held all the three, the Congress, the Muslim League and the Sikhs, responsible for the Great Calcutta killing. For detail see Lieut-General Sir Francis Tucker, *While Memory Serves* , p. 156; Moon *Divide and Quit*, p. 58.

148. "Mass Fratricide," *Newsweek*, XXVII (26 August 1946), p. 38.

149. "blood-Stained Calcutta," ed. *New York Times*, 20 August 1946, p. 26.

150. So named by the Calcutta *Statesman*.

151. "Churchill and Wavell's Breakdown Plan," *Dawn Overseas*, 8 January 1982, p. 7.

152. "Mr. Jinnah Goes Back to Pakistan Cry," *The Hindustan Times*, 28 July 1946; IOR R/3/1/135.

153. *Ibid.*; Also for detail see Central Intelligence Report, Department of State, 18 August 1946: 845.00/8-1846 CS/H.

154. The *Dawn*, 29 July, 17 August 1946; *The Hindustan Times*, 31 August 1946; IOR R/3/1/135.

155. The *Dawn*, 29 July, 17 August 1946; *The Hindustan times*, 31 August 1946; IOR R/3/1/135.

156. "British Cabinet Mission to India," *Nation*, CLXIII (6 July 1946), 3.

157. "On to Independence," *Newsweek*, XXVIII (8 July 1946), 40.

158. "14 Weeks, 7 Knights," *Time*, XIVIII (8 July 1946), 35.

159. Despatch Merril to Secretary of State, Bombay, 23 August 1946: 845.00/8-2346 CS/HH; 845.00/8-2948 CS/HH; 845.00/8-3046 CS/V.

160. Ian Stephens, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Strategic Service Unit, War Department, 845.00/2-646 CS/H.

161. "Interim Government Unacceptable," The *Dawn*, 29 Jan. 1946; IOR R/3/1/108.

162. *Ibid.*; Mansergh and Moon, eds, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VIII, p. 138; text of the two Resolutions passed by the A. I. M. L. Council at Bombay on 29 July 1946: IOR 4/3/1/135: ff 6-7.

163. The *Nation*, CLXIII (7 Sept. 1946), 255.

164. "Outlook in India," ed., *New York Times*, 14 Sept. 1946, p. 6.

165. Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 69; *Times of India*, 16 Aug. 1946.

166. Memorandum by Secretary of State for India, 31 July 1946: C.P. (46)315; Cab 21/2042; IOR R/3/1/135; R 311/108: ff 132-8; letter Jinnah to Wavell, Bombay, 31 July 1946: IOR R/311/116: ff 104a-104b; letter Donovan to Secretary of State, Bombay, 28 August 1946: 845.00/8-2846 CS/V; "Last Thing I Seek is Bloodshed," *Time of India*, 13 Sept. 1946.

167. Statement at Press Conference in Bombay. Text in Bannerjee, *Making of the Indian Constitution*, vol. I (Documents), p. 241; Muhammad Ashraf, ed., *Cabinet Mission and After*, pp. 359-360, 371; Mansergh and Moon, The *Transfer of Power*, Vol. VI, p. 708.

168. Despatch Donovan to State Depart, Bombay, 2 August 1946: 845.00/8-256; *Times of India* (Bombay), 29 July 1946; Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 698; tel. F. Wylie (United Provinces) to Wavell, 17 August 1946: IOR L/P&J/5/275: ff 117-8; Mansergh and Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VIII, pp. 246-7.

169. The statistics given by Sir Stafford Cripps in the House of Commons, 12 Dec. 1946; Parliamentary Debates, H. C. 21 October 1946, Cols. 296-7; DS 845.00/10-2346 CS/R; The *Statesman*, 29 Oct. 1947; Syonds, *op. cit.*, p. 69; tel. F. Burrows (Bengal) to Wavell, Calcutta, 17 August 1946: IOR L/P&J/8/577: f51; L/P&J/5/275: ff 117-8; tel. Burrows to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Calcutta, 23 August 1946: L/P&J/8/655: ff 95, 97, 97-107; Mansergh and Moon, eds., The *Transfer of Powers*, Vol. VIII, pp. 293-304, 323.

170. H. C. 431, 5s., 12 Dec. 1946, Cols. 1363-1369.

171. H. C. 435, 5s., 6 May 1947, Col. 669.

172. H. L. 142, 5s., 18 July 1946, Col. 590.

173. H. L. 142, 5s., 18 July 1946, Cols. 616-617.

174. H. L. 145, 5s., 26 Feb. 1947, Cols. 1050-1051.

175. *Economicst*, 24 August 1946.
176. Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
177. State Department *Bulletin*, Vol. XV, No. 389, 15 Dec. 1946, p. 1113.
178. "Karachi to London," ed., *New York Times*, 2 Dec. 1946, p. 24.
179. Herbert L. Mathews, *New York Times*, 8 Dec. 1946, part IV, p. 6.
180. *Ibid*.
181. The *Dawn*, 21 Sept. 1945.
182. IOR R/3/1/106.
183. *Ibid*.
184. Extract from private and secreat letter, Viceroy to Secretary of State, No. 43, 20 Nov. 1945: IOR/3/1/108.
185. Telegram to London, 30 Nov. 1946: *FRUS*, 1946, V, 97-8; tel. from London, 2 Dec. 1946, *Ibid*., pp. 98-9; tel. to Bulletin, 15 Dec. 1946, p. 1113.
186. *New York Times*, November 16, 24, and 26, 1946.
187. "Deadlock on India," ed., *New York Times*, 8 Dec. 1946, part IV, p. 10.
188. "India's Crisis," *Washington Post*, 18 Dec. 1946, p. 11. This seems highly significant in the light of events outlined in the previous chapter and bears out that President Roosevelt's position had been substantially the same as that presented in the Phillips' letters, that he had desired a settlement, even to the Phillips' letters, that he had desired a settlement, even to the extent of independence during the war, but had not been able to achieve it due to the British Government's seeing otherwise.
189. Willes, "India's Crisis," *Washington Post*, 18 Dec. 1946, p. 11.
190. "The Indian Crisis," *Nation*, CLXIII (7 Dec. 1946), 636.
191. A. B. McGinty, "Clive's Conquest of India," *Current History*, ns., XII (January 1947), 55.
192. "Reprieve from Disaster," *Time*, XLIX (13 Jan. 1947), 34.
193. "Ferment in the Far East," ed., *New York Times*, 22 Dec. 1946, part IV, p. 8.
194. *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93:1 (21 Jan. 1947), A 489.
195. Letter Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 2 Jan. 1947: MSS.EUR D. 977/9, P. 2.
196. *Ibid*., p.3; tel. Washington to British Foreign Office, No. 6932, 3 Dec. 1946: IOR L/P&J/10/107.
197. Great Britain, *Indian Policy Statement of 20th February 1947* , p. 3; H. C. 433, 5s., 20 Feb. Cols. 1395-8; Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, p. 321.
198. Great Britain, *Indian Policy Statement of 20 February 1947, op. cit*., p. 3; H. C. 433, 5s., 20 Feb. 1947, Cols. 1395-8.

199. Cmd. 7047; H. C. 433, 5s., 20 Feb. 1947, Cols. 1396-1398.

200. Quoted by Yehia Syed, "Churchill & Wavell's Breakdown plan," *Dawn Overseas*, 8 Jan. 1982, p. 7.

201. *Loc. cit.*

202. Quoted by Mohsin Ali, "Battle for Pakistan was won in polling booth," *Dawn Overseas*, 26 March 1982, p. 7.

203. "Passage from India," *Nation*, CLXIV (1 March 1947), 236.

204. "Sunset," *New Republic*, CXVI (3 March 1947), 8.

205. "Sun Also Sets," *Newsweek*, XXIX (3 March 1947), 37-8.

206. "In Four Generations," *Time*, XLIX (3 March 1947), 35.

207. Savelle R. Davis, "Britain Acts to Cut India Ties," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 Feb. 1947, p. 1.

208. *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Feb. 1947, p. 1.

209. "Ultimatum to India," *New York times*, 21 Feb. 1947, p. 2.

210. *San Francisco News*, 22 Feb. 1947, p. 2.

211. "India's Divided House," ed., *New York Times*, 24 Feb. 1947, p. 18.

212. "Bill of Divorcement for Mother India," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 Feb. 1947, p. 4.

213. "Indian Independence--A Deadline," ed., *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 Feb. 1947, p. 14. This seems to have been substantially more correct than much Americna comment, to judge from Alan Campbell-Johnson's *Mission With Mountbatten*. This work reveals that Britain had in fact sent its very best team to arrange for the transfer of power, and to work conscientiously for it.

214. "Today and Tomorrow," *Washington Post*, 13 Feb. 1947, p. 7.

215. "Knell of Empire," *Ibid.*, 4 March 1947, p. 9.

216. Department of State *Bulletin*, 9 March 1947, p. 450; *New York Times*, 26 Feb. 1947, p. 2.

217. Telegram Halifax to Foreign Office, Washington, 24 March 1946: Prem 8/244.

218. "Gravest Danger," *Time*, XLIX (10 March 1947), 29.

219. Henry Sowerby, "Threat of Civil War Darkness India's Horizon," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 March 1947, part II, p. 9.

220. "Operation Scuttle," ed., *Ibid.*, 8 March 1947, p. 14.

221. "More Bloodshed in India," ed., *New York Times*, 9 March 1947, part IV, p. 8.

222. Mansergh and Moon, eds., *the Transfer of Power*, Vol. IX, p. 660.

223. For detail about the story of this Mission see Allen Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten*, pp. 65-6; Lord Ismay, Memoirs (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 420.

224. Prem 8/541, part 10.

225. *Ibid.*; DS File 845.00/6-447 CS/A; "The Viceroy's Message to Indian People," *The Statesman*, 4 June 1947; Mansergh and Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Powers*, Vol. X, pp. 142-3.

226. IOR L/P&J/10/79.

227. V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* , p. 360; Mansergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. X, pp. 742.

228. Menon, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-5; Leonard Moley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* , p. 127.

229. *Washington Post*, 7 June 1947, quoted by Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-5; Process for transfer of power on the basis of Dominion Status, memorandum by Secretary of State for India, I. B. (47)79, 26th Meeting, Minute 2. IOR L/P&J/10/79.

230. "Two Indias in one World," *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 May 1947, p. 15.

231. "Birth of Pakistan," *Newsweek*, XXIX (19 March 1947), 44; Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 72; Ismay, *Memoirs*, p. 42p; Prem 8/541, part 10.

232. Prem 8/541, part 7.

233. "Centrifugal Politics," *Time*, XLIX (19 May 1947), 31-2.

234. "Pakistan," ed., *Washington Post*, 20 May 1947.

235. "Impossible Takes Longer," *Newsweek*, XXIX (26 May 1947, p. 44.

236. "India Moves Toward Communal Split," *Christian Century*, CLXIV (28 May 1947), 677.

237. Shiva Rao, "India Drifts Toward Civil War," *Nation*, CLXIV (31 May 1947),653 4.

238. Cab 21/2038 B.

239. Viceroy's Papers, I.B. (47)78, 79, IOR L/P&J/1079.

240. Telegram Cabinet Delegation to Cabinet Office, 12 June 1947: IOR R/3/1/134; Cab 21/2038 B; Indian Policy Statement, Cmd. 7136; 1947.

241. Cab 21/2038 B; for detail see *The Statesman*, 4 June 1947; "The Final Plan," *The Times of India*, 4 June 1947.

242. Cab 21/2038 B, 18/2/9; DS File 845.00/6-447; "the Viceroy's Message to Indian People," *The Statesman*, 4 June 1947.

243. "Complete Transfer of Power By This Year," *The Statesman*, 5 Jun3 1947.

244. Broadcast Statement by H. E. the Viceroy, 3rd June 1947: IOR L/P&J/10/80, R/3/1/150: f 252; Cab 21/2038 B; "Plans For Partition of India," *The Times* (London), 4 June 1947; "Partition," *Manshester Guardian*, 4 June 1947; Mansergh and Moon, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. XI, pp. 1-6, 86-94.

245. DS File CS/A 711.45/5-2347; Mansergh and Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, pp. 12-3.

246. Inward telegram to Political Department, 24 July 1947: IOR L/P&J/10/82.

247. DS File 845.00/6-477 CS/A; "The viceroy's Message to Indian People," *The Statesman*, 4 June 1947.

248. One can not help wondering what might have been the result had Mountbatten been able to seek a solution earlier. He reportedly felt that it was a great pity, if he were to have had this job, that he could not have taken it on eighteen months earlier. See Allan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten*, p. 69.

249. Prem 8/541 B, part 10.

250. Telegram Secretary of State to Prime Minister Attlee, 10 June 1947: Prem 8/577; "Last Days of empire," *Newsweek*, XXX (7 June 1947), 36.

251. Private and secret letter from Lord Mountbatten to Lord Listowel, 27 June 1947: IOR L/P&J/10/99; Prem 8/550, Annex C.

252. Indian Independence Act of 1947, 10 & 11 GEO. 6. CH. 30, L/P&J/10/124: ff 2-12; H. C. 439, 10-11 July 1947, Cols. 2441-6; H. C. 150, 5sc., 10-18 July 1947, Cols. 817-8; "Le Roy Le Veult," *Newsweek*, XXX (28 July 1947), 34; Mansergh and Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, PP. 170-2, 233-249.

253. "Passage to Independence," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 July 1947, p. 14.

254. "India in the Plural," *Washington Post*, 5 June Monitor, 12 July 1947, p. 14.

255. This seems to overlook that it may have been necessary for India to reach the impasse that it did in order to accept the Third June Plan of a separate state of India and Pakistan and that such an impasse would have been calamitous in the years 1942-1945.

256. "Age of Unreason," *Newsweek*, XXIX (9 June 1947), 41.

257. "Divided India," *Nation*, CLXIV (14 June 1947), 702.

258. "India: Triumph and Challenge," *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 June 1947, p. 12.

259. "A Gamble but U. S. back it," *The Daily Mail* (London), 4 June 1947.

260. *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93:12 (19 June 1947), A 2969; *The Statesman*, 5 June 1947.

261. Prem 4 27/9B.

262. "India in the Plural," ed., *Washington Post*, 5 June 1947, p. 6; Department of State *Bulletin*, 22 June 1947, p. 1249.

263. "Demonstration of Reasonableness," *Newsweek*, XXIX (16 June 1947), 38.

264. "British Propose to Partition India," *Christian century*, LXIV (18 June 1947), 755.

265. Department of State *Bulletin*, 22 June 1947, pp. 1249-50.

266. *Dawn*, 22 August 1947.

267. Grady to Marshall, 8 August 1947: DF 701.45 F 11/8-847, DSNA; Marshall to Charles W. Lewis, Charge d'affairs at Karachi, 9 August 1947: DF 701.45F 11/8-847, DSNA; Lewis to Marshall, 10 August 1947: DF 701.45F 11/8-847,

14 August 1947: DF 845 F.01/8-1447, 16 August 1947: DF 845.00/9-1647, and 16 August 1947: DF 701.45, F00/8-1647, all in DSNA.

268. DS SC/V 711-45F/8-2347.

269. Telegram Truman to Jinnah, Department of State, 7 August 1947: 845.458/8-747 CS/A.

270. *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 93, p. 6341.

271. *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 101: 4, 4306; telegram Jinnah to Truman, 17 August 1947: 845F.485/81747 CS/A.

272. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. XVII, No. 425, 24 August 1947, p. 396.

273. NBKR 4/3/1, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge, London; *The times* (London), 15 August 1947, Mansergh and Moon, eds., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, pp. 780-1.

274. *Ibid.*, for the full text of the Viceroy's address see Mansergh and Moon, *op. cit.*, Vol. XII, pp. 780-3.

275. Memorandum American Embassy to State Department, Karachi, 16 September 1947: 845.00/014 XR.

276. "India Is Free--And Weak," ed., *San Francisco News*, 14 August 1947, p. 18.

277. "India Is Free," ed., *New York Times*, 15 August 1947, p. 16.

278. "India's new Dawn," *Nation*, CLXV (23 August 1947), 175.

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7

CONCLUSION

The spring of 1947 was a period of crucial importance in the history of that phenomenon known as the "end of British imperialism." It came to its end in a manner that set the pattern of the post-war years. American idealists who sided with colonial peoples attacked it. British Fabians attempted to reform it. Its dissolution was a triumph for those Americans, including Roosevelt, who believed that independence was a natural and desirable goal. Thus, if it was true for Lord Curzon and others in 1919 that the sun never set on the British Empire, then the summer of 1947 must have marked the moment of passing for the British Empire.

India's independence in which many American officials, political leaders, and journalists had believed, and had argued ought to be a paramount American objective, had finally been achieved. In the terminal acts of the Indian drive for independence, the United States, in contrast with its earlier deep involvement and interest, remained more in the background. Americans, of course, welcomed the event of partition, and newspapers everywhere gave it front-page coverage. President Truman sent congratulations to the two new dominions and their peoples. In a message to the American public on 15 August 1947, which also happened to be the second anniversary of V. J. Day, Mountbatten related the events from Britain's withdrawal to the Allied pledge in the Atlantic Charter.[1] Mountbatten's remarks were ironic, considering Churchill's wartime stand, but the British could now claim fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter.

Unfortunately, the British claim of the peaceful transfer of power was only a half-truth scarred by immeasurable human tragedy. The story of the independence of the subcontinent did not end on 14

August 1947. As Radcliff announced his award on August 17, a bloody war of succession broke loose. In the Punjab, rumour, fear and the desire for revenge escalated into mass hysteria. Millions fled in terror from their ancestral homes towards an unknown destination. The numbers of Muslims feeling from the East Punjab and Hindus and Sikhs from the West Punjab were about 12 million. Centuries old communities saw neighbour turned upon neighbour in a blind fury which gave no quarter. Men, women and children were tortured, mutilated and slaughtered as the Punjab became a battlefield. Trains going between Delhi and Lahore were attacked. Witnesses reported incidents where up to 2,000 were killed on one train between these cities.[2] At the lowest estimate, before the year was over more than 2 million people had perished and 12 million had became homeless in these mad communal massacres. Indeed, it was one of the greatest massacres in history. The cost of partition in human suffering was immeasurable. It was mainly the Muslims who suffered against the organised and planned Hindu-Sikh aggression.

Bengal contained many of the ingredients of the Punjab: a partioned province, its communities nearly balanced in numbers and mass migration. In contrast to the Punjab, Bengal remained relatively peaceful. It was the considered opinion that once partition had been conceded, communal violence would vanish. But this did not prove to be the case. It might well be said that the American role in the Indian independence movement had considerable effect upon the final outcome, as it at least demonstrated that both British and American opinion were in substantial agreement that India should be granted self-government. The role of U. S. public opinion was, for example, noted by the British team which arranged for the transfer of power in India. Allan Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten's Press Attache, the first such officer on the Viceregal staff, commented with reference to Attlee's announcement of 20 February 1947:

> The American comment was particularly interesting, in so far as the British Raj was almost as traditional a target for American criticism as George III himself. American opinion underwent an emotional jolt of its own.[3]

He also indicated that there was some English sensitivity to American charges of imperialism. Clement Davis, the Liberal leader, commenting upon the August 15 settlement, reportedly said that:

> In his view both the Russian and American case against our imperialism in India was forever destroyed, and no amount of special pleading from either quarter could reinstate it.[4]

Mountbatten himself indirectly acknowledged American influence in his recorded speech broadcast on American V. J. Day. He said:

> Two years ago today, I had just returned from the Potsdam Conference, and was in the Prime Minister's room in 10 Downing Street, when the news of the Japanese surrender came through. Here as I speak to you tonight in Delhi, we are celebrating an event no less momentous for the future of the world–India's Independence Day. In the Atlantic Charter, we, the British and Americans, dedicated ourselves to champion the self-determination of peoples and the independence of nations. Bitter experience has taught us that it is often easier to win a war than to achieve a war aim; so let us remember August 15th–V. J. Day--not only as the celebration of a victory, but also the fulfillment of a pledge.[5]

This reference to self-determination and the fulfillment of the pledge given in the Atlantic Charter was a tribute paid by India's last Viceroy perhaps unconsciously to the influence of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt upon the granting of India's independence. The ideological hostility toward British imperialism inherent within both democratic administrations represented the attitude of a considerable segment of American opinion, particularly that amongst the liberal establishment press and contributed, in large measure, to the birth of the subcontinent as a politically independent region.

As the first nation to revolt against a modern empire, the United States stood in a unique position. The American Revolution had indeed been heard round the world; and the words of the Declaration of Independence had inspired generations of colonial peoples. Moreover,

American's avowed idealistic aims in World War II, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, encouraged nationalist leaders to look to the United States for inspiration, guidance, and support.

The critical test for America in India occurred during the war years. By the summer of 1945 India's independence had become a certainty; and the Truman administration, to its credit, encouraged the Attlee Government in its determination to withdraw quickly. Yet, during the war, when the United States had been in a position to influence Indian developments, Roosevelt declined opportunities and suggestions to advance an unequivocal policy and to pressure the Churchill Government. During the Cripps Mission, Roosevelt waited until Churchill had already decided upon the recall of Cripps before attempting to salvage a settlement. That gesture took some courage, but it came so late that Churchill could easily brush it aside. Prior to the crisis of August 1942, George Merril and other American officials in India repeatedly warned that only Roosevelt's intervention could avert widespread unrest and suppression. Chiang Kai-shek, who had just visited India, implored Roosevelt to use his prestige and leverage to insist upon a mediated settlement. Beyond informing Churchill of Chiang's plea, Roosevelt took no action.

In 1943, Phillips attempted to bring about a change in American policy, seeking Roosevelt's mediation and the guarantee of a political settlement; and, after failing in those endeavours, attempting to get at least endorsement of his effort to visit Gandhi and Nehru. Phillips, however, gained little support from Washington.

It would have been difficult to force a modification in Churchill's policy. The Prime Minister's warning that intervention risked an open rupture between the two allies, as well as the military situation of 1942-3, led Roosevelt to retreat from the Indian question. Yet most American diplomats in India, several officials in the State Department, and many journalists recognized the importance of the Indian question and believed it should be given priority over Anglo-American harmony. They argued that Britain's dependence on the United States made it unlikely that America's insistence that power be transferred to India's leaders would have produced none than a temporary rift between the allies. Louis Johnson, Phillips, Howard Donovan, Merril, and, at times, Adolph

Berle and Sumner Welles, all argued that intervention was worth the risk.

Undoubtedly the United States played an important part in speeding up the transfer of power from Great Britain to its two new Dominions. This is not to conclude that there was any specific American pressure for the selection of one month in 1947 over another as the ideal time for the transfer to occur. This judgment arises rather from the cumulative effect of the insistence, dating back at least to 1941, that Great Britain should copy the American promise to the Phillipines and either set a specific date when the Indians would be granted complete independence, or at least undertake to win Indian confidence in the British intention to liberate the country at war's end. By that time, as has been indicated, communal jealousies had been allowed to fester too long, and the differences between the Congress Party and Muslim League were irreconcilable.

Considering the atmosphere surrounding the final negotiations over the transfer of power, the persistent American demand for British action must be regarded as one factor among a number which led Mountbatten and the Attlee Cabinet to decide to accelerate the timetable for independence. The wholesale communal blood-riots led to the advent of India and Pakistan as independent and divided Dominions. Under these circumstances the partition of India was inevitable. The threat of further bloody rioting and unrest impressed Mountbatten so much that he determined to offer partition before Indian exploded into civil war.

The birth of Pakistan has been one of history's most remarkable examples demonstrating the principle of national self-determination, as Beverley Nicholls has put it:

> Much falsehood has been spread about the aims of the Muslim nation in claiming sovereign independence for their homeland. Perhaps the Americans have heard more of this false propaganda than others.[6]

There were times when the views expressed on the Indian situation by the U. S. press and some U. S. politicians jarred on Muslim

ears and made them wonder why they should appear to be taking sides. It must be admitted, however, it was in fact proved by the visit of Isphahani-Begum Shah Nawaz delegation which toured the States in the cold wheather of 1946, that the fault was not so much that of the Americans as of the Muslims here in America, who had made very little effort to present their case before the American public. These two able envoys of Jinnah found in the Americans sympathetic listeners to the Muslim side of the case, and after their visit a noticeable change was visible in the general trend of American public opinion.

Now in August 1947, Pakistan was no longer "mere politics" but a living nation in full enjoyment of its sovereign rights. Now it started receiving unreserved sympathy and support from the American people. The new relationship into which their respective Governments entered, with the exchange of diplomatic representatives, advanced this understanding on a larger scale than any publicity campaign could have done.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. Department of State *Bulletin*, 24 August 1947, p. 396; *New York Times*, August 14-16, 1947.
2. Michael Brecker, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, p. 363.
3. Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten*, p. 23.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 151; Menon, *Transfer of Power*, p. 415.
6. Quoted in DS File CS/V 711.45F/8-2347; *Dawn*, 22 August 1947.

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Notes for Chapter 7

1. Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1947, p. 399; New York Times, August 14-16, 1947.
2. Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, p. 363.
3. Campbell-Johnson, *Mission With Mountbatten*, p. 33.
4. Ibid., p. 216.
5. Ibid., p. 151; Menon, *Transfer of Power*, p. 415.
6. Quoted in DS File CS/V 711.45F/8-2247, Dawn, 22 August 1947.

APPENDIX A

WILLIAM PHILLIPS' LETTER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT[1]

March 3, 1943

Gandhi has successfully completed his fast and the only result of its has been increasing bitterness against the British from large sections of the people. The Government has handled the case from the legalist point of view. Gandhi is the "enemy" and must not be allowed to escape from his just punishment and at all cost British prestige must be maintained.

Indians look at it from a different angle. Gandhi's followers regard him as semi-divine and worship him. Millions who are not his followers look upon him as the foremost Indian of the day and that since he has never had an opportunity to defend himself it is a case of persecution of an old man who has suffered much for the cause which every Indian has at heart–freedom for India. And so presumably Gandhi comes out of the struggle with an enhanced reputation as a moral force.

The general situation as I see it today is as follows:

For the British viewpoint their position is not unreasonable. They have been in India for 150 years and except for the mutiny in 1857, generally speaking, internal peace has been maintained. They have acquired vast vested interests in the country and fear that their withdrawal from India would jeopardize those interests. The great cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras have been built up largely through their initiative. They have guaranteed the regime of the Princes, who control territorially about one-third of the country and one-fourth of the population. they realize that new forces are gathering throughout the

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1. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1943, Vol. 4, Letter Phillips to Roosevelt, 3 March 1943, pp. 205-207.

world which affect their hold over India and they have therefore gone out of their way, so they believe, to offer freedom to India as soon as there are signs that the Indians themselves can form a secure government. This the Indian leaders have been unable to do and the British feel that they have done all that they can in the circumstances. Behind the door is Mr. Churchill, who gives the impression that personally he would prefer not to transfer any power to an Indian Government either before or after the war and that the *status quo* should be maintained.

The Indians, on the other hand, are caught in the new idea which is sweeping over the world, of freedom for oppressed peoples. The Atlantic Charter has given the movement great impetus. Your speeches have given ecouragement. The British declarations that freedom would be granted to India after the war have brought the picture of Indian independence as never before in the thoughts of the entire Indian intelligentsia.

Unfortunately, as the time approaches for ending the war, the struggle for political prestige and power between the parties has increased and this has made it more difficult than ever for the leaders to be willing to reach a compromise agreement. And furthermore, Gandhi and all Congress leaders, not to mention the fifty or sixty thousand Congrss supporters, are in jail and as Congress is the strongest political party, there is no one available to speak for it.

There is thus a complete deadlock and I should imagine that the Viceroy and Churchill are well satisfied to let the deadlock remain as long as possible. That is, at leasst, the general impression in most Indian circles.

The problem, therefore, is, can anything be done to break this deadlock through our help? It seems to me that all we can do is to try to induce the Indian political leaders to meet together and discuss the form of government which they regard as applicable to India, and thus to show the world that they have sufficient intelligence to tackle the problem. We must not assume that they will adopt the American or British systems. In view of the importance of guaranteeing protection to the minorities, a majority form of government may not be applicable

and a coalition may prove to be the only practical way of guaranteeing internal harmony. We cannot suppose that the British Government can or will transfer power to India by the scratch of a pen at the conclusion of the peace conference unless there is an Indian Government fit to receive it. The question remains, therefore, how to induce the leaders to bring now to prepare for their future responsibilities.

There is, perhaps, a way out of the deadlock which I suggest to you, not because I am sure of its success, but because I think it is worthy of your consideration.

With the approval and blessing of the British Government, an invitation could be addressed to the leaders of all Indian political groups on behalf of the President of the United States, to meet together to discuss plans for the future. The assembly could be presided over by an American who could exercise influenc in harmonizing the endless divisions of caste, religion, race and political views. The conference might well be under the patronage of the King Emperor, the President of the United States, the President of the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-shek, in order to bring pressure to bear on Indian politicians. Upon the issuance of the invitations, the King Emperor could give a fresh assurance of the intention of the British Government to transfer power to Indian upon a certain date as well as his desire to grant a provisional set-up for the duration. The conference could be held in any city in India except Delhi.

American chairmanship would have the advantage, not only of expressing the interest of America in the future independence of India, but would also be a guarantee to the Indians of the British offer of independence. This is an important point because, as I have already said in previous letters, British promises in this regard are no longer believed.

If either of the principal parties refused to attend the conference, it would be noticeable to all the world that India was not ready for self-government, and I doubt whether a political leader would put himself in such a position. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery may be obstacles, for, notwithstanding statements to the contrary, India is governed from London, down to the smallest details.

Should you approve the general idea and care to consult Churchill, he might reply that, since the Congress leaders are in jail, a meeting such as is contemplated is impossible. The answer could be that certain of the leaders, notably Gandhi, might be freed unconditionally in order to attend the conference. The British may even be searching for a good excuse to release Gandhi, for the struggle between him and the Viceroy is over with honors for both--the Viceroy has maintained his prestige; Gandhi has carried out his protest against the Government by his successful fast, and has come back into the limelight.

There is nothing new in my suggestion, except the method of approach to the problem. The British have already announced their willingness to grant freedom to India after the war, if the Indians have agreed among themselves as to its form. The indians say they cannot agree because they have no confidence in the British promises. The proposed plan perhaps provides the guarantee required by the Indians, and is in line with British declared intentions.

Possibly this is a way out of the impasse, which if allowed to continue, may affect our conduct of the war in this part of the world and our future relations with colored races. It may not be successful, but, at least, America will have taken a step in furthering the ideals of the Atlantic Charter.

I offer the suggestion now in order that it may have your consideration before my return to Washington at the end of April or early May, when I shall be able to give you at first hand further information on the subject.

William Phillips.

APPENDIX B

WILLIAM PHILLIPS' LETTER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT[2]

May 14, 1943

May I add a few words to what I said to you on Tuesday afternoon when I had the pleasure of giving you an oral report of my impressions on the Indian situation.

Assuming that India is bound to be an important base for our future operations against Burma and Japan, it would seem to me of highest importance that we should have around us a sympathetic India rather than an indifferent and possibly a hostile India. It would appear that we will have the primal responsibility in the conduct of the war against Japan. There is no evidence that the British intend to do much more than give token assistance. If that is so, then the conditions surrounding our base in India become of vital importance.

At present the Indian people are at war only in a legal sense as, for various reasons, the British Government declared India in the conflict without the formality of consulting Indian leaders or even the Indian legislature. Indians feel that they have no voice in the Government and therefore no responsibility in the conduct of the war. They feel they have nothing to fight for as they are convinced that the professed war aims of the United Nations do not apply to them. The British Prime Minister, in fact, has stated that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter are not applicable to India, and it is not unnatural therefore that the Indian leaders are beginning to wonder whether the Charter is only for the benefit of the white races. The present Indian Army is purely mercenary and only that part of it which is drawn from the martial races has been tried in actual warfare and these martial

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2. *Foreign Relation of the United States*, 1943, Vol. 4, Letter Phillips to Roosevel, 14 May 1943, P.P. 220-222.

soldiers represent only thirty-three percent of that Army. General Stilwell has expressed to me his concern over the situation and in particular in regard to the poor morale of the Indian officers.

The attitude of the general public toward the war is even worse. Lassitude and indifference and bitterness have increased as a result of the famine conditions, the growing high cost of living and the continued political deadlock.

While India is broken politically into various parties and groups, all have one object in common, eventual freedom and independence from British domination.

There would seem to be only one remedy to this highly unsatisfactory situation in which we are unfortunately but nevertheless seriously involved, and that is to change the attitude of the people of India towards the war, make them feel that we want them to assume responsibilities to the United Nations and are prepared to give them facilities for doing so, and that the voice of India will play an important part in the reconstruction of the world. The present political conditions do not permit of any improvement in this respect. Even though the British should fail again it is high time that they should make a new effort to improve conditions and to reestablish confidence among the Indian people that their future independence is to be granted. Words are of no avail. They only aggravate the present situation. It is time for the British to act. This they can do by a solemn declaration from the King Emperor that India will achieve her independence at a specified date after the war as a guarantee of good faith in this respect a provisional representative coalition government will be established at the center and limited powers transferred to it.

I feel strongly, Mr. President, that in view of our military position in India we should have a voice in these matters. It is not right for the British to say "this is none of your business" when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the future struggle with Japan. If we do nothing and merely accept the British point of view that conditions in India are none of our business then we must be prepared for various serious consquences in the internal situation in India which may

develop as a result of despair and misery and anti-white sentiments of hundreds of millions of subject people.

The people of Asia-and I am supported in this opinion by other diplomatic and military observers-cynically regard this war as one between fascist and imperialist powers. A generous British gesture to India would change this undesirable political atmosphere. India itself might then be expected more positively to support our war effort against Japan. China, which regards the Anglo-American bloc with misgiving and mistrust, might then be assured that we are in truth fighting for a better world. And the colonial peoples conquered by the Japanese might hopefully feel that they have something better to look forward to than simply a return to their old masters. Such a British gesture, Mr. President, will produce not only a tremendous psychological stimulus to flagging morale through Asia and facilitate our military operations in that theater, but it will also be proof positive to all people -- our own and the British included -- that this is not a war of power politics but a war for all we say it is.

William Phillips

APPENDIX C

WINSTON CHURCHILL'S LETTER TO

C. R. ATTLEE[1]

28 Hyde Park Gate
London, S. W. 7.
July 1, 1947.

My dear Prime Minister,

I am much concerned to hear from my colleagues whom you consulted yesterday that you propose to call the Indian Bill, "The Indian Independence Bill." This, I am assured, is entirely contrary to the text, which corresponds to what we have previously been told were your intentions. The essence of the Mountbatten proposals and the only reason why I gave support to them is because they establish the phase of Dominion Status. Dominion Status is not the same as Independence, although it may be freely used to established independence. It is not true that a community is independent when its Ministers have in fact taken the oath of allegiance to the King. This is a measure of grave constitutional importance and a correct and normal procedure and nomenclature should be observed. The correct title would be, it seems to me "The Indian Dominion Bill." I should however be quite willing to support it if it were called "The Indian Bill, 1947" or "The India self-Government Bill."

I am glad to hear you are considering such alterations.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely
Winston Churchill

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee
C. H., M. P.

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1. PRO: Prem 8541/Pt.II, Western 1617

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INDEX

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